ORDER : 1. Heard Mr.Manoj Paranjape and Mr.Shreyansh Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Avinash Singh, learned Panel Lawyer for the respondent/State. 2. By way of this petition under Section 482 CrPC, the petitioners have prayed for following reliefs:- “It is therefore, most humbly prayed that the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the instant petition and the FIR bearing Crime No.173/2015, registered at Police Station Fingeshwar, District Gariyaband and the entire criminal prosecution/proceedings bearing Criminal Case No.762/2015, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajim, Gariyaband, may kindly be quashed, in the interest of justice.” 3. Petitioner No.1-Tularam Bhatpahri is holding the substantive post of In-charge Headmaster and is posted at Middle School, Rachkatti, Tahsil Gariyaband, District Gariyaband. Petitioner No.2-Ajay Kumar Yadav is holding the substantive post of Teacher Panchayat and is posted at Middle School Rachkatti, Tahsil Gariyaband, District Gariyaband and petitioner No.3-Faneshwar Kumar Sahu is holding the substantive post of Teacher Panchayat and is posted at Middle School Rachkatti, Tahsil Gariyaband, District Gariyaband. The instant petition has been filed only on behalf of the teachers. 4. Undisputed facts of the case are that on 17.10.2015 (Saturday) 72 students of Middle School, Rachkatii, Fingeshwar, Gariyaband were sent by the School Management for Devi Darshan to Rupayee Temple, which is 4 kilometers away from the school. The teachers and the students were seating in the trolley. The tractor and trolley was hired by the School Management. Even the children of the owner of the tractor and trolley were also seating in the trolley. The owner of the tractor and trolley bearing No. CG-04 MK 5789 was driving the tractor. As per the case of the prosecution, the driver was plying the tractor and trolley negligently and due to his negligent driving, tractor and trolley turned turtle and the students who were travelling in the tractor and trolley have received certain injuries and Kumari Khushi Sahu, Punni Dhruv, Bharti Netam, Girja Shankar Sahu and Khageshwar Yadav received grievous injuries and died on the spot, whereas Omprakash, Rekhraj, Chetan, Pooja, Minakshi, Urvashi, Laxmi, Ishwar, Komal, Khumeshwar have received injuries. The FIR of the incident was lodged by Manish Kumar Banjare. The FIR of the incident was lodged by Manish Kumar Banjare. The police investigated the matter and filed the charge-sheet for offences under Sections 279, 337, 338 & 304-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 66 & 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was alleged that the petitioners being teachers of the school have failed to discharge their duties and have committed negligence and they are responsible for death and as such, they have committed offences under Sections 279, 337, 338 & 304-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 66 & 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 5. The police has recorded the statements of the students. It is apparent from the statements of the students that they were going to temple and the driver of the offending vehicle namely Bedram was driving the vehicle negligently and due to the negligent driving, tractor and trolley turned turtle and they have received injuries. 6. Mr.Manoj Paranjape, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that if the entire case charge-sheet is accepted, offence under Sections 279, 337, 338 & 304-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 66 & 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act would not be made out against the petitioners. The reading of Sections 279, 337, 338 & 304-A of the IPC and Sections 66 & 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act would be manifest that the essential ingredients of offence under Sections 279, 337, 338 & 304-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 66 & 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act are completely missing. The essential ingredients of offence under Section 304-A of the IPC are that there should be a death, caused by rash and negligent act and it shall not amount to culpable homicide. He further submits that to make an act culpable and punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 & 304-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 66 & 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act, there has to be evidence that accused has committed rash and negligent act and that act should be immediate and proximate cause of death. The present charge-sheet does not contain any allegation of this nature. The petitioners who are the teachers and not hardened criminals are not required to be sent for trial. The present charge-sheet does not contain any allegation of this nature. The petitioners who are the teachers and not hardened criminals are not required to be sent for trial. He also submits that there is no evidence on record which shows that the teachers were negligent in driving the vehicle or in other words, due to negligence on the part of the teachers the tractor and trolley turned turtle and the students have received injuries. Thus, no offence under Sections 279, 337, 338 & 304-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 66 & 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act is made out against the petitioners. He contended that the students who died in the alleged incident their parents have also received compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act and copies of the same have been filed along with an application for taking documents on record and the driver who was driving the offending vehicle on the date of incident has been tried separately. As such, the petition deserves to be allowed and the FIR bearing Crime No.173/2015, registered at Police Station Fingeshwar, District Gariyaband and the entire criminal prosecution/proceedings bearing Criminal Case No.762/2015, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajim, Gariyaband deserve to be quashed. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matters of Kurban Hussein Mohamedali Rangawalla v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 1616 , Sushil Ansal v. State through Central Bureau of Investigation, (2014) 6 SCC 173 and the judgment passed by this Court in Arvind Kesharwani v. State of Chhattisgarh (Cr.M.P.No.897 of 2016), decided on 28.07.2023. 7. On the other hand, Mr.Avinash Singh, learned Panel Lawyer for the respondent-State, opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and submits that no case for interference of this Court under Section 482 of the CrPC is made out by the petitioners and the instant petition deserves to be dismissed. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with this petition. 9. At the outset, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of interference in charge-sheet filed by the police against accused in extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. 10. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with this petition. 9. At the outset, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of interference in charge-sheet filed by the police against accused in extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. 10. In the matter of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 , the Supreme Court has held that the accused can approach the High Court either under Section 482 of the CrPC or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him. 11. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 laid down the principles of law relating to the exercise of inherent powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the first information report and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In paragraph 102 of the report, The Supreme Court laid down the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 of the CrPC should be exercised, which are as under: - “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 12. Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the IPC read thus:- “279. Rash driving or riding on a public way.- Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 337. 337. Causing hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others.-Whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. 338. Causing grievous hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others.-Whoever causes grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 304-A. Causing death by negligence.—Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sushil Ansal (supra) has held that one of the basic ingredients for committing an offence under Section 304A of Indian Penal Code is that the rash or negligent act of the accused ought to be direct immediate and proximate cause of the death and that the principle of law that the death must be shown to the direct immediate and proximate result of the rash or negligent act is well accepted. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the doctrine of causa causans that for offence under Section 304 A to be proved, it is not only necessary to establish that the accused was either rash or grossly negligent but also that such rashness or gross negligence was the cause that resulted in the death of the victim. Paras 80 to 84 of the said judgment dealing with the issue are quoted as follows: “80. We may now advert to the second and an equally, if not, more important dimension of the offence punishable under Section 304-A IPC viz. that the act of the accused must be the proximate, immediate or efficient cause of the death of the victim without the intervention of any other person’s negligence. We may now advert to the second and an equally, if not, more important dimension of the offence punishable under Section 304-A IPC viz. that the act of the accused must be the proximate, immediate or efficient cause of the death of the victim without the intervention of any other person’s negligence. This aspect of the legal requirement is also settled by a long line of decisions of the courts in this country. We may at the outset refer to a Division Bench decision of the High Court of Bombay in Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap, (1902) 4 Bom LR 679 where Sir Lawrence Jenkins speaking for the Court summed up the legal position in the following words: “... to impose criminal liability under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, it is necessary that the act should have been the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the accused and that act must be proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another negligence. It must have been the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the causa sine qua non.” The above statement of law was accepted by this Court in Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli Rangawalla (supra). We shall refer to the facts of this case a little later especially because Mr Jethmalani, learned counsel for the appellant Sushil Ansal, placed heavy reliance upon the view this Court has taken in the fact situation of that case. 81. Suffice it to say that this Court has in Kurban Hussein case (supra) accepted in unequivocal terms the correctness of the proposition that criminal liability under Section 304-A IPC shall arise only if the prosecution proves that the death of the victim was the result of a rash or negligent act of the accused and that such act was the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another person’s negligence. A subsequent decision of this Court in Suleman Rahiman Mulani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 829 has once again approved the view taken in Omkar Rampratap case that the act of the accused must be proved to be the causa causans and not simply a causa sine qua non for the death of the victim in a case under Section 304-A IPC. 82. 82. To sum up: for an offence under Section 304-A to be proved it is not only necessary to establish that the accused was either rash or grossly negligent but also that such rashness or gross negligence was the causa causans that resulted in the death of the victim. 83. As to what is meant by causa causans we may gainfully refer to Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Edn.) which defines that expression as under: “Causa causans.—The immediate cause; the last link in the chain of causation.” ”The Advance Law Lexicon edited by Justice Chandrachud, former Chief Justice of India defines causa causans as follows: “Causa causans.—The immediate cause as opposed to a remote cause; the ‘last link in the chain of causation’; the real effective cause of damage.” 84. The expression “proximate cause” is defined in the 5th Edn. of Black’s Law Dictionary as under: “Proximate cause.—That which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Wisniewski v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 226 Pa Super 574, A2d at p. 748. That which is nearest in the order of responsible causation. That which stands next in causation to the effect, not necessarily in time or space but in causal relation. The proximate cause of an injury is the primary or moving cause, or that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the accident could not have happened, if the injury be one which might be reasonably anticipated or foreseen as a natural consequence of the wrongful act. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act, or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.” 14. The principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sushil Ansal (supra) was followed by this Court in Arvind Kesharwani (supra). 15. The principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sushil Ansal (supra) was followed by this Court in Arvind Kesharwani (supra). 15. From perusal of the records, It transpires that there is no evidence on record which shows that the petitioners were negligent in driving the vehicle or in other words, due to negligence of the petitioners, the tractor and trolley turned turtle and some of the students have died and some have received injuries. The students who died in the alleged incident their parents have also received compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. During the investigation, the police has recorded the statements of the students. It appears from the statements of the students that they were going to temple and the driver of the offending vehicle namely Bedram was driving the vehicle negligently and due to the negligent driving, the tractor and trolley turned turtle and they have received injuries. 16. In the present case, petitioner No.1-Tularam Bhatpahri is the Incharge Headmaster and posted at Middle School, Rachkatti, Tahsil Gariyaband, District Gariyaband. Petitioner No.2-Ajay Kumar Yadav is Teacher and posted at Middle School Rachkatti, Tahsil Gariyaband, District Gariyaband and petitioner No.3-Faneshwar Kumar Sahu is also Teacher and posted at Middle School Rachkatti, Tahsil Gariyaband, District Gariyaband. There is no evidence on record which goes to show that the teachers were negligent in driving the vehicle or in other words, due to negligence on the part of the teachers, the tractor and trolley turned turtle and the students have received injuries. They are not also seating in the tractor and trolley and as per statements of the students, driver Bedram was driving the offending vehicle rashly and negligently, due to which, the tractor and trolley turned turtle and the students have received injuries. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the driver who was driving the offending vehicle on the date of incident has been tried separately. As such, the ingredients of Sections 279, 337, 338, 304-A and Sections 66 & 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are completely missing. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the driver who was driving the offending vehicle on the date of incident has been tried separately. As such, the ingredients of Sections 279, 337, 338, 304-A and Sections 66 & 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are completely missing. 17.Considering the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, particularly considering the statements made by the students in which they have stated that they were going to temple and the driver of the offending vehicle namely Bedram was driving the vehicle negligently and due to his negligent driving, the tractor and trolley turned turtle and the students have received injuries, further considering that the driver who was driving the offending vehicle on the date of incident has been tried separately and also considering the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Sushil Ansal (supra), I am of the view that the petitioners have made out a case for interference in exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC. 18. Accordingly, the petition under Section 482 of the CrPC is allowed and the FIR bearing Crime No.173/2015, registered at Police Station Fingeshwar, District Gariyaband for offences under Sections 279, 337, 338 & 304-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 66 & 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the entire criminal prosecution/proceedings bearing Criminal Case No.762/2015, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajim, Gariyaband qua the petitioners are hereby quashed.