ORDER : (Ananda Sen, J.) 1. This intra-court appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment passed in WP(S) No. 3284 of 2012 dated 16.3.2021 whereby, the writ petition filed by the petitioner-appellant herein has been dismissed and the proceeding was remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority with a direction to proceed in the matter in accordance with law. 2. The writ petitioner was appointed in the post of Matric Trained Teacher at Government Girls' Middle School vide letter dated 25th May 1985. Chargesheet dated 18.2.2010 was issued to the writ petitioner with allegation that the petitioner was appointed in the said post on political recommendation, without following the procedure. The petitioner replied to the said chargesheet stating that she was appointed against the sanctioned and vacant post after following all the procedure duly established by law. After 25 years of appointment, the departmental proceeding was initiated. Against such initiation of departmental proceeding, the writ petitioner approached this Court by filing writ petition being WPS No. 3284 of 2012. In the said writ petition, vide order dated 28.8.2012, writ Court passed an interim order directing the respondents not to take any final decision against the petitioner. The writ petition was kept pending before this Court. In the meantime, the petitioner superannuated on 31.1.2018. The aforesaid writ petition was taken up for final hearing and vide order dated 16.3.2021, the same was dismissed with direction to respondents to continue with the departmental proceeding. Learned Single Judge relying upon the judgment in the case of Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Limited Vs. Rabindranath Choubey, reported in (2020) 18 SCC 71 has held that even after superannuation, a departmental proceeding can continue 3. One of the objections which was taken by the appellant-writ petitioner is that the petitioner has already superannuated and there does not exist any relationship of employee and employer between the petitioner and respondents, thus after superannuation, the departmental proceeding cannot continue. Challenging the judgment, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant-writ petitioner submits that since the relationship of employer and employee ceased, the learned Single Judge could not have remanded the matter with a direction to continue and conclude the departmental proceeding. He further submits that there is no misconduct on the part of the petitioner-appellant, which can attract initiation of a departmental proceeding. He further submits that there is no misconduct on the part of the petitioner-appellant, which can attract initiation of a departmental proceeding. He also submits that since there is no allegation that the petitioner has committed any fraud, the writ petitioner could not have been proceeded against, as from the chargesheet, it would be apparent that the allegation is that the respondents have appointed the petitioner without publishing any advertisement/without calling for any application from Employment -Exchange/ without roster clearance/without recommendation from the Selection Committee, rather her appointment is pursuant to a political recommendation. As per petitioner, when the charge of misconduct is not against the writ-petitioner, she could not have been proceeded against. 4. Learned counsel for the State submits that the appointment of the petitioner was irregular/illegal, thus the learned Single Judge has correctly dismissed the writ petition. He however admits that now the petitioner has already superannuated. 5. During the course of argument, the learned counsel for the respondent-State could not bring any Rule/regulation or any order, issued by the State, before us, which could suggest that even after superannuation, the departmental proceeding can continue against an employee of the State. The learned Single Judge relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Mahanadi Coalfields Limited (Supra), but on the facts of this case the said judgment is not favouring the respondents-State rather the same is favouring the appellant-writ petitioner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment has considered two question of law, which are as under:- (i) As to whether it is permissible in law for the appellant (employer) to withhold the payment of gratuity of the respondent (employee), even after his superannuation from service, because of the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings against him?, and (ii) where the departmental enquiry had been instituted against an employee while he was in service and continued after he attained the age of superannuation, whether the punishment of dismissal can be imposed on being found guilty of misconduct in view of the provisions made in Rule 34.2 of the CDA Rules of 1978? In paragraph 17 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “17. In paragraph 17 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “17. It depends upon the rules in a case where a departmental enquiry was instituted while the employee was in service, proceedings had been continued, under the rule what kind of punishment can be imposed after the employee had attained the age of superannuation.” 6. Further in case of Ramesh Chandra Sharma Vs. Punjab National Bank, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 15 in paragraphs 13 and 16, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “13. The question as to whether a departmental proceeding can continue despite the delinquent officer's reaching the age of superannuation would depend upon the applicability of the extant rules. It may be true that the question of imposition of dismissal of the delinquent officer from service when he has already reached the age of superannuation would not ordinarily arise. However, as the consequences of such an order are provided for in the service rules, in our opinion, it would not be correct to contend that imposition of such a punishment would be wholly impermissible in law. 16. The question, thus, as to whether continuation of a disciplinary proceeding would be permissible or the employer will have to take recourse only to the pension rules, in our opinion, would depend upon the terms and conditions of the services of the employee and the power of the disciplinary authority conferred by reason of a statue or statutory rules.” 7. Further in paragraph 32 of the judgment in Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Limited (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “32. Section 4(1) used the expression “termination of employment after five years by way of superannuation, retirement or resignation or on his death or disablement due to accident or disease” that is in a normal course. It does not deal with a situation where departmental enquiry is instituted and continued and completed after the age of superannuation and termination of employment had not taken place on completion of the age of superannuation as there is a deemed continuation of the employment for the purpose of holding an inquiry and passing the appropriate punishment order after the conclusion of the departmental enquiry on the basis of misconduct if any found established. Provisions of Section 4(1) do not impinge upon the continuation of inquiry. Section 4(6) prevails on it. Provisions of Section 4(1) do not impinge upon the continuation of inquiry. Section 4(6) prevails on it. The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, can govern the conditions concerning payment of gratuity. It cannot control and provide with respect to an employer's right to hold a departmental enquiry after retirement, and there is no provision prescribing what kind of punishment can be imposed in the departmental enquiry if it is continued after attaining the age of superannuation. The relevant rules would govern such matters. In case the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is interpreted to interdict the departmental enquiry after the age of superannuation and to deal with the nature of punishment to be imposed, it would be taken as a case of overinclusion in the Act which deals exclusively with the payment of gratuity.” 8. After considering various judgments, ultimately in the case of Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Limited (Supra), in paragraph 45 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that under Rule 34.2 of the CDA Rules, inquiry can be held in the same manner as if the employee had continued in service and appropriate major and minor punishments can be passed. Be it noted that Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with a case, whose CDA Rules provided for deemed extension of service even after employment for the purpose of departmental enquiry. 9. Thus from the judgment, it is clear that only if there is deeming provision of continuation of service after superannuation for the purpose of departmental enquiry, then only the departmental proceeding can continue against a superannuated employee. Thus the judgment delivered in the case of Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Limited (Supra), which was heavily relied upon by the learned Single Judge, does not match the case in hand. 10. The situation is not the same in the instant case, as mentioned. Admittedly there is no rule of the respondents-State that the employee would be deemed to be in service for the purpose of departmental enquiry even after his/her superannuation. 11. Thus, after superannuation of the petitioner-employee of the State, the State cannot proceed departmentally against the writ petitioner in absence of any specific Rules. The learned Single Judge, thus, has wrongly relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Limited (Supra), which cannot be applied in the facts and circumstances of this case. 12. 11. Thus, after superannuation of the petitioner-employee of the State, the State cannot proceed departmentally against the writ petitioner in absence of any specific Rules. The learned Single Judge, thus, has wrongly relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Limited (Supra), which cannot be applied in the facts and circumstances of this case. 12. Further we find that the allegation against the writ petitioner is that she was appointed without following roster clearance and the appointment was made by the Deputy Director, Education-cum-District School Inspector. Similar issue fell for consideration before this Court in the case of L.P.A. No. 141 of 2021 (the State of Jharkhand Vs. Sushma Kumari @ Sushma Kumari Devi), wherein this Court recorded the objection of the State in paragraph 6 of judgment dated 2.3.2023 and the said objection has been dealt with and decided in paragraph 7 of the judgment. Paragraph 6 and 7 of the said Judgment run as under:- “6. In assailing the judgment impugned, the learned counsel for the State would in essence raised two objections. They are as follows:- (i) The District School Inspectress was not competent to appoint in view of Rule 97(ii) of the Bihar Education Code which is later on adopted by the State of Jharkhand on its creation; and (ii) At the time of selection and appointment of the petitioner respondent, the roster regarding reservation was not followed and therefore, her appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher was illegal. 7. In course of hearing, the learned counsel for the respondent would bring to our notice to clause-(xi) of Rule 97 of the Bihar Education Code, but it appears that in Rule 97 the said provision has been deleted. However, it is being borne from the record especially page no. 65 of the L.P.A. that the appointment of Smt. Sushma Kumari was confirmed by the District School Inspectress i.e. Zila Vidyalaya Nirikchhika with effect from 27.12.1988. But if there is any jurisdictional issue regarding the appointment of the respondent in the post of Assistant Teacher was at all there, the same stands rectified by the order passed by the Deputy Director of Education vide Memo no. 4161 dated 22.04.1989. But if there is any jurisdictional issue regarding the appointment of the respondent in the post of Assistant Teacher was at all there, the same stands rectified by the order passed by the Deputy Director of Education vide Memo no. 4161 dated 22.04.1989. Thus, on the basis of lack of jurisdiction or powers to appoint Assistant Teacher on the part of the District School Inspectress, there is no illegality in the order of appointment as far as sole respondent is concerned.” 13. Thus, the case of the petitioner is covered by the findings given in paragraph 7 of the aforesaid judgment passed in LPA No. 141 of 2021. In this case also, writ petitioner was also appointed by the District School Inspector. 14. Considering what has been held above, we find merit in this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. Consequently, impugned judgment dated 16.3.2021 passed in WP(S) No. 3284 of 2012 along with the proceeding initiated against the writ petitioner is set aside.