JUDGMENT : Vivek Bharti Sharma, J. Present second appeal is preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31.03.2023, passed by 2nd Additional District Judge, Nainital in Civil Appeal No. 7 of 2018, whereby appellate court dismissed the first appeal and upheld the judgment and decree dated 25.11.2017, passed by the trial court thereby decreeing the suit in Civil Suit No. 86 of 2007 in favour of respondent/plaintiff. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction and easement right in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Nainital against the appellant/defendant, as Civil Suit No. 86 of 2007. Along with the plaint, an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of C.P.C. for grant of interim injunction was also filed by the respondent/plaintiff. The appellant/defendant filed the written statement and denied all the allegations contained in the plaint. The oral and documentary evidence were adduced by the parties and after completion of the evidence, the trial court by the impugned judgment and order dated 25.11.2017 was partly allowed the said suit. 3. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the appellant/defendant filed the Civil Appeal No.7 of the 2018 wherein the 1st Appellate Court upheld the judgment dated 25.11.2017 by dismissing the appeal vide judgment and decree dated 31.03.2023. Hence, the present second appeal. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgments, memo of appeal and documents filed therewith. 5. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the appellant/defendant filed the Civil Appeal No.7 of the 2018 wherein the 1st Appellate Court upheld the judgment dated 25.11.2017 by dismissing the appeal vide judgment and decree dated 31.03.2023. Hence, the present second appeal. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgments, memo of appeal and documents filed therewith. 5. Counsel for the appellant/defendant would submit that the judgments of the trial court as well as the First Appellate Court are bad in the eyes of law for the reasons that the trial court and the First Appellate Court grossly erred in not appreciating the fact that the respondent/plaintiff has miserably failed to state in his plaint that he has unobstructed access and right to way through the land i.e. Khasra No. 1239 of the appellant for reaching his Khet No. 1240 l , 1248, 1250, 1251 situated at Village Aanu, Tehsil & District Nainital for the last 20 years from the date of filing of the plaint; that, the trial court has erred in law in framing the Issue No. 1 i.e. as to whether the respondent/plaintiff has Bhoomidhari transferable rights in agriculture land in possession of Khet No. 1240 l , 1248, 1250, 1251 situated at Village Aanu, Tehsil & District Nainital, if yes it’s effect?; that, this issue could not have been decided by the trial court for the reason that the same is barred under Section 331A of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (in short “U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act”); that, as per the provisions of U.P.Z.A.L.R. Act, this issue could have been decided by the Revenue Court only. He would further submit that the trial court and the First Appellate Court further erred in not appreciating the fact that the appellant/defendant had also erected a Gate on the property in question which was purchased by it in the year 1987, however, he admitted that this plea was not taken by appellant in its written statement before the trial court. 6. 6. Perusal of the plaint annexed with the memo of appeal shows that it is nowhere stated in the plaint that for the last 20 years from the date of filing of the plaint, the respondent/plaintiff had been using the access as right of way through Khet No. 1239 of appellant for reaching his Khet No. 1240 l , 1248, 1250, 1251 Village Aanu, Tehsil & District Nainital. However, in Paragraph no. 6 of the plaint, it is specifically stated that respondent/plaintiff had been cultivating his fields from the time of his forefathers by crossing through Khet (fields) of the appellant/defendant because there is no access to any Khet in the villages without crossing through the field of others, and therefore, this easement right is available in practice. 7. Counsel for the appellant/defendant would rely upon a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Justiniano Antao and others vs. Smt. Barnadette B. Pereira” (2005) 1 SCC 471 . This Court respectfully perused this judgment. Relevant portion of paragraph 10 of the judgment (Supra) is extracted hereunder:- “We have gone through the three judgments i.e. trial court, first appellate court and that of the High Court. We have gone through the evidence adduced. From this, it is more than clear that there is no specific averment in the plaint or in the statement of the witnesses showing that this access from the land of the defendants was used as of right for the last 20 years. The evidence very categorically shows that the plaintiff has an access on the south east side and this was being used by her for a long time. It was pointed out that only in the year 1984 the plaintiff has started using the access through the property of the defendants. It is also admitted that the defendants were during that time on board of ship and as soon as they came and saw the use of their land by the plaintiff, they put obstructions to it. Therefore, it is clear that it is not the case that the plaintiff has been using the access as of right through the property of the defendants for more than 20 years.” 8. Perusal of the judgment (Supra) clearly reveal that the time period of 20 years has to be stated by the plaintiff in the case. Therefore, it is clear that it is not the case that the plaintiff has been using the access as of right through the property of the defendants for more than 20 years.” 8. Perusal of the judgment (Supra) clearly reveal that the time period of 20 years has to be stated by the plaintiff in the case. However, this Court is of the considered view that, though, respondent/plaintiff has not used words “20 years” in plaint but in Paragraph no.6 of the plaint, the respondent/plaintiff clearly stated that the respondent/plaintiff had been using the right to way through Khet No. 1239 the land of the appellant/defendant since time of his forefathers as this was the practice in the villages. Naturally the age and time of his father and grandfather is always more than 20 years. As it is specifically stated in the plaint that the access and easement right to cross through the Khet (fields) of the appellant/defendant is from the time of his forefathers then that period is always more than 20 years. Therefore, for merely not writing the averment that this period is more than “20 years” would not defeat the case of respondent/plaintiff when holistic implication of words used is more than twenty years. 9. The second point raised by the counsel for the appellant/defendant is that the issue no. 1 whether the respondent/plaintiff is owner of the Khet No. 1240, 1248, 1250, 1251 Village Aanu, Tehsil & District Nainital, the said issue has wrongly been decided by the trial court as Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the same, rather, it should have been decided by the Revenue Court as per provisions of Section 331 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act 1950. The argument of the counsel for the appellant/defendant is that the aforesaid issue is barred by provisions of Section 331A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950. However, this Court is of the opinion that deciding factor for jurisdiction of the Revenue Court is not the issue framed, but, the suit in totality. The perusal of the relief clause in plaint reveals that the relief is mainly for the permanent injunction that as the respondent/plaintiff has easement right to have access to his Khet Nos. However, this Court is of the opinion that deciding factor for jurisdiction of the Revenue Court is not the issue framed, but, the suit in totality. The perusal of the relief clause in plaint reveals that the relief is mainly for the permanent injunction that as the respondent/plaintiff has easement right to have access to his Khet Nos. 1240 l , 1248, 1250, 1251 situated at Village Aanu, Tehsil & District Nainital through the Khet No. 1239 of appellant, therefore, the appellant/defendant be restrained from creating obstruction in right to way and access of respondent/plaintiff. This suit is not to decide the ownership or possession or for any purpose enumerated in Column 3 of Schedule II of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950. 10. It is pertinent to note that the two conditions must be satisfied before the question of jurisdiction can be raised before an appellate or revisional court. Firstly, the objection must have been taken before the trial court at the earliest stage and secondly, the party must show that there has been failure of justice on account of the suit being tried by the Civil Court. If either of the two conditions are not fulfilled it is not open to party to raise the question of jurisdiction before appellate Court or the revisional Court and a decree or order passed by the Civil Court shall be valid notwithstanding the provisions contained in Section 331 of the Act. 11. It is not the case of appellant/defendant that the suit not being referred to Revenue Court has caused any failure of justice. It is pertinent to note, that appellant/defendant itself has stated in its written statement that on the land purchased by it buildings and hostel etc. have already been constructed. This means that the property in question is no more being used for any agriculture purpose. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the trial court had jurisdiction to decide the said issue, therefore, the arguments of the counsel for the appellant/defendant is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Hence, no ground is made out to admit the appeal. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant has not been able to show any illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment passed by the first appellate court which may give rise to any 'substantial question of law' warranting adjudication by this Court in the second appeal. Hence, no ground is made out to admit the appeal. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant has not been able to show any illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment passed by the first appellate court which may give rise to any 'substantial question of law' warranting adjudication by this Court in the second appeal. Since no 'substantial question of law' is shown to have arisen, the appeal is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage. 13. In view of the above discussion, the appeal deserves to be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed in limine.