ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. Anurag Dayal Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Chandresh Shrivastava, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondent No. 1 Mr. B.N. Mishra, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No. 2. 2. The present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the petitioners for quashing the order dated 04.05.2018 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur, whereby the application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. has been allowed and ordered for registration of FIR and submission of charge sheet as well as criminal proceeding of the Criminal Case No. 3377 of 2018 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur between State of Chhattisgarh vs. Kamal Kishore and Others. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the Civil Suit bearing No. 130-A/2016 has been brought by the respondent No. 2 under Power of Attorney of Murari Lal Gupta, Devesh Gupta and Smt. Shalini Bansal, who are the plaintiff, for declaration of title over the suit land bearing Kh No. 676/8 area 0.18 acre situate at Juna Bilaspur, District Bilaspur coupled with prayer to declare the sale deed dated 29.03.2016 as null and void which has been executed by petitioner No. 1 to respondent No. 4. The said suit is pending for consideration before the learned Civil Judge Class-II, Bilaspur. The son namely Shrey Chouksay of the said power of attorney holder i.e. respondent No. 2 Mukesh Chouksay is tenant of petitioner No. 1 over the property known as “Hotel Panchwati” (now Rasoi-In) situate at Link Road, Bilaspur. The dispute of tenancy is also pending before the Rent Controller Authority, Bilaspur as well as before this Hon’ble Court in ARBA No. 119 of 2018. The other Civil Suit bearing No. 248-A/2017 was filed by Smt. Rani Gupta, who is daughter of petitioner No. 1 for declaration of her share over the property in which the complainant Mukesh Chouksay is doing his business and is in possession as tenant. In this suit also he represent the plaintiff being power-of-attorney holder of her. 4. The other Civil Suit bearing No. 248-A/2017 was filed by Smt. Rani Gupta, who is daughter of petitioner No. 1 for declaration of her share over the property in which the complainant Mukesh Chouksay is doing his business and is in possession as tenant. In this suit also he represent the plaintiff being power-of-attorney holder of her. 4. On this back ground, where civil disputes are alive and pending, one complaint under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. was filed by respondent No. 2 being power-of-attorney holder alleging that the petitioner No. 1 has fraudulently transferred the property which is the subject matter of Civil Suit No. 130-A/2016 to respondent No. 4 and the petitioners together with respondent Nos. 3 & 4 had committed mischief by fire and caused damage to the property by committing house trespass. The complainant, therefore, prayed for punishment to the petitioners for offence punishable under Section 379, 420, 436, 448 of the Indian Penal Code. Simultaneously the complainant has also moved the application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. for direction to the Police to register the FIR under the said sections against the petitioners. 5. The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur had called the report from the concerned Police Station vide its order dated 06.11.2017 and after hearing the Complainant on registration of complaint on 04.05.2018 had allowed the application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. after taking cognizance on complaint and after expressing its opinion regarding prima-facie case and had issued direction for registration of FIR and submission of final report and, therefore, closed the case considering that the FIR has been registered in compliance of the order of the Court. 6. The respondent No. 1 had prepared the charge sheet and submitted before the learned JMFC, Bilaspur on 27.08.20218. The petitioner Nos. 2 & 3 had moved the criminal revision against the said order dated 04.05.2018 before learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, which has been dismissed vide order dated 02.11.2018 considering that the order passed by the learned JMFC is an interlocutory order. Hence, the present petition. 7. Mr. The petitioner Nos. 2 & 3 had moved the criminal revision against the said order dated 04.05.2018 before learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, which has been dismissed vide order dated 02.11.2018 considering that the order passed by the learned JMFC is an interlocutory order. Hence, the present petition. 7. Mr. Anurag Dayal Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a criminal colour was given to civil dispute as the learned JMFC has failed to appreciate that the present complaint has been filed by the respondent No. 2, who is stated to be power-of- attorney holder of Murari Lal Gupta, Devesh Gupta and Smt. Shalini Bansal. Neither the respondent No. 2 is effected by the alleged act of the present petitioners nor so far as criminal prosecution is concerned, he could enter into shoes of the sated victims. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.C. Narayanan vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, AIR 2014 SC 630 , wherein it has been held that the attorney holder cannot file a complaint in his own name as if he was the complainant, but he can initiate criminal proceedings on behalf of his principal. 8. Mr. Shrivastava further stated that the order dated 04.05.2018 is apparently without jurisdiction as the respondent No. 2 has made complaint under Section 200 together-with application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. the learned trial Court had called the report from the concerned Police Station and after receiving of the report, arguments of the complainant was heard on the said report and after taking cognizance, instead of further stepping under Section 200/202 of Cr.P.C. the learned trial Court has switched back to the provision of 156(3) of Cr.P.C. and directed the Police to register the FIR and to investigate and further directed to submit the charge sheet against the petitioners. He also submitted that the order of learned JMFC is also erroneous since under proviso to Section 202(1) of Cr.P.C. there is rider for making over the investigation to the Police by the Magistrate. He also submitted that the order of learned JMFC is also erroneous since under proviso to Section 202(1) of Cr.P.C. there is rider for making over the investigation to the Police by the Magistrate. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anju Chaudhary vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2013) 6 SCC 384 , wherein Power of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been mentioned as follows: “Power of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. 37. Investigation into commission of a crime can be commenced by two different modes. First, where the police officer registers an FIR in relation to commission of a cognizable offence and commences investigation in terms of Chapter XII of the Code, the other is when a Magistrate competent to take cognizance in terms of Section 190 may order an investigation into commission of a crime as per the provisions of that Chapter XIV. Section 156 primarily deals with the powers of a police office to investigate a cognizable case. While dealing with the application or passing an order under Section 156(3), the Magistrate does not take cognizance of an offence. When the Magistrate had applied his mind only for order an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code or issued a warrant for the said purpose, he is not said to have taken cognizance. It is an order in the nature of a preemptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise its primary duty and power of investigation in terms of Section 151 of the Code. Such an investigation embraces the continuity of the process which begins with collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with the final report either under Section 159 or submission of charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code. [Refer Mona Pawar vs. High Court of Allahabad, (2011) 3 SCC 496 ] 38. In the case of Dilawar Singh vs. State of Delhi, (2007) 9 SCR 695 , this Court as well stated the principle that investigation begin in furtherance to an order under Section 156(3) is not anyway different from the kind of investigation commenced in terms of Section 156(1). They both terminate with filing of a report under Section 173 of the Code. They both terminate with filing of a report under Section 173 of the Code. The Court signified the point that when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before taking cognizance of an offence. The court in paragraph 18 of the judgment held as under: “The clear position therefore is that any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complainant because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter.” 39. Caution in this process had been introduced by this Court vide its judgment in the case of Tula Ram and Others vs. Kishore Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 459 where it was held that the Magistrate can order the police to investigate the complaint, but it has no power to compel the police to submit a charge sheet on a final report being submitted by the police. 40. Still another situation that can possibly arise is that the Magistrate is competent to treat even a complaint termed as an application and pass orders under Section 156(3), but where it takes cognizance, there it would have to be treated as a regular complaint to be tried in accordance with the provisions of Section 200 onwards falling under Chapter XV of the Code. There also the Magistrate is vested with the power to direct investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit for the purposes of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This power is restricted and is not as wide as the power vested under Section 156(3) of the Code. The power of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code to order investigation by the police have not been touched or affected by Section 202 because these powers are exercised even before the cognizance is taken. In other words, Section 202 would apply only to cases where Magistrate has taken cognizance and chooses to enquire into the complaint either himself or through any other agency. But there may be circumstances where the Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the case himself, chooses to order a pure and simple investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. These cases would fall in different class. This view was also taken by a Bench of this Court in the case of Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau vs. State of Gujarat, (2010) 4 SCC 185 . The distinction between these two powers had also been finally stated in the judgment of this Court in the case of Srinivas Gundluri and Others vs. SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corporation and Others, (2010) 8 SCC 206 where the Court stated that to proceed under Section 156(3) of the Code, what is required is a bare reading of the complaint and if it discloses a cognizable offence, then the Magistrate instead of applying his mind to the complaint for deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding, may direct the police for investigation. But where it takes cognizance and decides as to whether or not there exists a ground for proceeding any further, then it is a case squarely falling under Chapter XV of the Code.” 9. On the other hand, Mr. B.N. Mishra, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No. 2 opposed the aforesaid submission and supports the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court and submitted that there is no abuse of the process of law. Respondent No. 2 was duly authorized vide authorization dated 21.04.2016 and Power of Attorney dated 26.05.2016 by Shri Muralilal Gupta and Devesh Gupta to take care of the property situated at Kh. Respondent No. 2 was duly authorized vide authorization dated 21.04.2016 and Power of Attorney dated 26.05.2016 by Shri Muralilal Gupta and Devesh Gupta to take care of the property situated at Kh. No. 676/8 area 0.18 decimal which was originally the property in the share of Smt. Kamla Gupta W/o Shri Murarilal Gupta through a registered will executed by the father of Smt. Kamla Gupta namely late Shiv Dayal Singhal during his life time as back as dated 19.10.1992. He further submitted that petitioner No. 1 fraudulently converted the said property of Smt. Kamla Gupta in his name and sold a part of it to respondent No. 4 vide sale deed dated 29.03.2016 and set fire and demolished the Kalyan Bhawan, a building situated on the said Kh. No. 676/8 area 0.18, subject complaint under Section 200 r/w Section 156(3) was lodged by respondent No. 2 lawfully being the power of attorney holder. It is therefore, not correct that a criminal colour was given civil dispute. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the matter of Viswa Mitter vs. O.P. Poddar and Others, AIR 1984 SC 5 , wherein it has been held as under: “It is thus crystal clear that anyone can set the criminal law in motion by filing a complaint of facts constituting an offence before a Magistrate entitled to take cognizance under Sec. 190 and unless any statutory provision prescribes any special qualification or eligibility criteria for putting the criminal law in motion, no Court can decline to take cognizance on the sole ground that the complainant was not competent to file the complaint. Sec. 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly indicates that the qualification of the complainant to file a complaint is not relevant. But where any special statute prescribes offences and makes any special provision for taking cognizance of such offences under the statute, the complainant requesting the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence must satisfy the eligibility criterion prescribed by the statute. But where any special statute prescribes offences and makes any special provision for taking cognizance of such offences under the statute, the complainant requesting the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence must satisfy the eligibility criterion prescribed by the statute. Even with regard to offences under the Indian Penal Code, ordinarily, anyone can set the criminal law in motion but the various provisions in Chapter XIV prescribe the qualification of the complainant which would enable him or her to file a complaint in respect of specified offences and no Court can take cognizance of such offence unless the complainant satisfies the eligibility criterion, but in the absence of any such specification, no Court can throw-out the complaint or decline to take the cognizance on the sole ground that the complainant was not competent to file the complaint.” 10. Mr. Mishra further submitted that in view of the disclosure of the nature of criminal offence in the text of the complaint, the learned trial Court did not fail to appreciate the process of law in considering the application under Section 156(3) as alleged in the petition. The learned JMFC is vested with the powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to refer the case to the concerned Police Station for an enquiry and submit report if the Magistrate finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the matter of Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and Others v. V. Narayana Reddy and Others, (1976) 3 SCC 252 , wherein it has been held as under: “It is well settled that when a Magistrate receives a complaint, he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint, disclose the commission of an offence. This is clear from the use of the words “may take cognizance” which in the context in which they occur cannot be equated with must take cognizance.” The word “may” gives a discretion to the Magistrate in the matter. This is clear from the use of the words “may take cognizance” which in the context in which they occur cannot be equated with must take cognizance.” The word “may” gives a discretion to the Magistrate in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under s. 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence, himself.” 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned orders and materials available on record. 12. It is not in dispute that there are several Civil Litigations pending between the petitioners and the principal owner of the property in question and the respondent No. 2 was duly authorized vide authorization dated 21.04.2016 and Power of Attorney dated 26.05.2016 by Shri Muralilal Gupta and Devesh Gupta to take care of the property situated at Kh. No. 676/8 area 0.18 decimal which was originally the property in the share of Smt. Kamla Gupta W/o Shri Murarilal Gupta through a registered will executed by the father of Smt. Kamla Gupta namely late Shiv Dayal Singhal during his life time as back as dated 19.10.1992. No. 676/8 area 0.18 decimal which was originally the property in the share of Smt. Kamla Gupta W/o Shri Murarilal Gupta through a registered will executed by the father of Smt. Kamla Gupta namely late Shiv Dayal Singhal during his life time as back as dated 19.10.1992. Since the complaint was lodged by respondent No. 2, who was power of attorney holder, he is neither effected by the alleged act of the present petitioners nor so far as criminal prosecution is concerned, he could enter into shoes of the sated victims as per judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.C. Narayanan (supra), wherein it has been held that the attorney holder cannot file a complaint in his own name as if he was the complainant, but he can initiate criminal proceedings on behalf of his principal and more so that the order dated 04.05.2018 is apparently without jurisdiction as the respondent No. 2 has made complaint under Section 200 together-with application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. the learned trial Court had called the report from the concerned Police Station and after receiving of the report, arguments of the complainant was heard on the said report and after taking cognizance, instead of further stepping under Section 200/202 of Cr.P.C. the learned trial Court has switched back to the provision of 156(3) of Cr.P.C. and directed the Police to register the FIR and to investigate and further directed to submit the charge sheet against the petitioners, which is not permissible in law as per the law laid down by the Apex Court in Anju Chaudhary (supra). 13. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.C. Narayanan (supra) and Anju Chaudhary (supra), I find that the learned trial Court has committed grave illegality in passing the impugned order dated 04.05.2018 and the revisional court has also committed illegality in affirming the said order. 14. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The order dated 04.05.2018 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur as well as criminal proceeding of the Criminal Case No. 3377 of 2018 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur are hereby quashed.