Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Gallepogu Bhushanam
2023-03-01
T.MALLIKARJUNA RAO
body2023
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. Aggrieved by the award and decree dated 08.05.2015 in M.V.O.P. No.85 of 2012 passed by the Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-VII Additional District Judge, Ongole (for short, "the tribunal"), whereby the tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.1,42,500/-with interest 9% per annum against the respondents 1, 2 and 4 and dismissed the claim against the 3rd respondent, the 4th respondent, A.P.S.R.T.C., has preferred the present appeal questioning the award passed by the tribunal. 2. For convenience, the parties herein will be referred to as per their rankings in the M.V.O.P. 3. The claim is filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for compensation of Rs. 6,00,000/-on account of the death of Gallepogu Yerra Kotaiah (hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’), in a road accident that occurred on 16.01.2012. 4. The claimant's case is that on 16.01.2012 at about 9.30 AM their father, deceased, was crossing the road from north to south, the driver of a hired R.T.C. bus bearing No. AP 27 X 2412 (hereinafter be referred to as “the offending vehicle”) came at high speed and in a rash and negligent manner, hit the deceased. As a result, the deceased fell on the road, sustained injuries, and died on the spot. On a complaint, the Darsi Police Station has registered a case under Crime No.7 of 2012 under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the offending vehicle's driver. 5. The first respondent, the offending vehicle’s driver, stated that he was working as a driver for the second respondent, the offending vehicle’s owner. The fourth respondent hired the offending vehicle to the second respondent. After the passengers boarded the bus at the Veerayapalem village bus stop, he began to proceed slowly, and the victim abruptly crossed the road, slipped, and fell on the road, causing the accident. 6. The second respondent, the owner of the offending vehicle, filed a counter in similar lines to the one filed by the first respondent. 7. The third respondent, the insurer of the offending vehicle, filed its counter, claiming that the first respondent did not have a valid licence and that the deceased crossed the road negligently, causing the accident. Any liability had to be paid by the fourth respondent, the custodian of the offending vehicle, so this respondent was not obligated to pay compensation. 8.
The third respondent, the insurer of the offending vehicle, filed its counter, claiming that the first respondent did not have a valid licence and that the deceased crossed the road negligently, causing the accident. Any liability had to be paid by the fourth respondent, the custodian of the offending vehicle, so this respondent was not obligated to pay compensation. 8. The fourth respondent, the hirer of the offending vehicle, filed in its counter stating that the offending vehicle, the hired bus, belongs to the second respondent, who entered into an agreement with this respondent for a period of four years. As per column 5 (iv) of the said agreement, the owner of the vehicle, the second respondent, shall be responsible for all claims arising from statutory violations arising out of the operation, such as claims for accidents payable under the MV Act, furthermore, the third respondent, the offending vehicle’s insurer; and the policy was in force and it is liable to pay the compensation amount. 9. Based on the pleadings, the tribunal framed relevant issues. To substantiate the claim on behalf of the claimant during the trial, P.W.1 got examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.5. On behalf of the respondents, no oral evidence was adduced; however, a copy of the policy got marked as Ex.B.1. 10. After appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the tribunal held that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle’s driver, the first respondent. The deceased died due to the injuries sustained in the accident and was granted compensation amount as referred to above. 11. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for both parties. 12. In the grounds of appeal, learned counsel for the fourth respondent/appellant contends that the tribunal erred in awarding compensation without there being any acceptable evidence; the tribunal erred in holding that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle; the tribunal ought to have seen that the fourth respondent is not the owner of the vehicle and that the said vehicle is a hired bus. Though the hire agreement is not filed, it is an undisputed fact that the offending vehicle was insured by the 4th respondent-Insurance company. Therefore, the claim against the 4th respondent/appellant is unwarranted, and the claim is not maintainable. 13.
Though the hire agreement is not filed, it is an undisputed fact that the offending vehicle was insured by the 4th respondent-Insurance company. Therefore, the claim against the 4th respondent/appellant is unwarranted, and the claim is not maintainable. 13. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the claimants has supported the findings and observations of the tribunal. 14. Now, the points for determination are: I. Whether the tribunal erred in holding that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle? II. Whether the tribunal erred in not fastening liability on the insurance company? III. Whether the quantum of compensation fixed by the tribunal is just and reasonable? POINT No. I: a. To prove the manner of the accident, the first claimant was examined as P.W. 1, wherein he testified that the accident occurred on 16.01.2012 at about 9.30 AM near the Veerayyapalem Bus stop while the deceased was crossing the road. At that time, the offending bus hit the deceased at high speed in a rash and negligent manner. In the cross-examination, P.W. 1 denied the suggestion that his father was not aged about 75 years and was aged about 80 years. From the reading of P.W.1’s cross-examination, it is clear that regarding the manner of the accident, no cross-examination was effectively made; however, it only disputed the age of the deceased. The first respondent, the offending vehicle’s driver, did not come forward to give evidence in support of the version of the fourth respondent. It is also made clear from the charge sheet, Ex.A.5, that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle's driver. b. In K.Rajani and others, V. M.Satyanarayana Goud and others, 2015 ACJ 797 , this High Court observed that: "when the insurance company came to know that the police investigation is false, they must also challenge the charge sheet in appropriate proceedings. If at all the findings of the police are found to be incorrect, it is for the insurance company to produce some evidence to show that the contents of the charge sheet are false". c. In Bheemla Devi V. Himachal Road Transport Corporation, 2009 ACJ 1725 (S.C.) the Apex Court observed as follows: "It was necessary to bear in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be done by the claimants.
c. In Bheemla Devi V. Himachal Road Transport Corporation, 2009 ACJ 1725 (S.C.) the Apex Court observed as follows: "It was necessary to bear in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be done by the claimants. The claimants are merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been applied". d. There needs to be something on record to suggest that the investigating officer filed a charge sheet against the offending vehicle’s driver without conducting a proper investigation. Consequently, it is also difficult to hold that the police officer fabricated a case against the driver of the offending vehicle. e. In a proceeding under the M.V. Act, where the procedure is a summary procedure, there is no need to go by strict rules of pleading or evidence. The document having some probative value, the genuineness of which is not in doubt, can be looked into by the tribunal for getting a preponderance of probable versions. As such, it is by now well settled that even F.I.R. or Police Papers, when made part of a claim petition, can be looked into for giving a finding in respect of the happening of the accident. The preponderance of probabilities is the touchstone for concluding rashness and negligence, as well as the accident's mode and manner of occurrence. f. Hence, this court is of view believes that the tribunal rightly held that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle's driver. Accordingly, the point is answered. POINT No.II: a. It is the contention of the learned standing counsel for the fourth respondent that the corporation had hired the bus from the original owner. Therefore, the offending vehicle’s insurer is liable to pay the compensation. b. On the other hand, the learned standing counsel for the insurer vehemently contends that the insurer has no obligation to indemnify since the offending vehicle was taken on hire by the Corporation and the same was being driven under the control of the Corporation only. Therefore, any accident resulting in bodily injuries or death shall only have to be indemnified by the Corporation.
Therefore, any accident resulting in bodily injuries or death shall only have to be indemnified by the Corporation. c. In this regard, it would be used to refer to Rikhi Ram AndAnr vs Smt. Sukhrania And Ors, 2003 ACJ 534 SC, wherein the Apex Court held that, "whenever a vehicle which is covered by the insurance policy is transferred to a transferee, the liability of the insurer does not cease so far as the third party/victim is concerned, even if the owner or purchaser does not give any intimation as required under the provisions of the Act." d. Keeping in view the principle laid down by the Apex Court, this court views simply because the vehicle was transferred from the original owner to another person, as long as the insurance policy covers the vehicle, the insured and, in turn, the insurer are responsible for paying compensation; however, this is subject to the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. e. In Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Kulsum & Ors., (2011) 8 SCC 142 the Apex Court held that "If the Corporation had become the owner even for the specific period and the vehicle having been insured at the instance of the original owner, it will be deemed that the vehicle was transferred along with the Insurance Policy in existence to the Corporation and thus Insurance Company would not be able to escape its liability to pay the amount of compensation." f. After careful appreciation of the facts, this court finds that it is not the case of the insurance company that there has been any violation of the terms and conditions of the policy. It has also failed to point out the violations of any Act, Rules or conditions of the insurance company. In light of the principle laid down by the Apex Court, the third respondent/ insurer has no legal justification for denying compensation to the claimants. The second respondent had insured the offending vehicle to meet such liability, which may arise on account of the use of the vehicle. g. It is not in dispute that the offending vehicle was under the absolute control of the Corporation, and the original owner did not part with the ownership of the vehicle. In other words, there is no cessation of the relationship between the vehicle and its original owner.
g. It is not in dispute that the offending vehicle was under the absolute control of the Corporation, and the original owner did not part with the ownership of the vehicle. In other words, there is no cessation of the relationship between the vehicle and its original owner. As rightly observed by the tribunal, both parties have not chosen to file the agreement. No attempt has been made by the parties to the proceedings to produce policy before the tribunal. h. In similar facts of the case, in a case between A.P.S.R.T.C., Mushirabad, Hyderabad V. Kanche Nagabhushanam @ Bhushanam and others, (2007) 6 ALT 627 this court observed that "28. In the case on hand also, there appears to be an agreement, but the same was not pressed into service by either of the parties, and no attempt has been made even by the Insurer to file such a document before the tribunal. Even before this Court also, no such document has been filed. Even if any such document is filed, it should be demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that there was a specific condition to the effect that it is only the corporation which is liable to indemnify any damages. In the absence of any such document on record, it is not possible for this Court to conclude that there was a privity of contract shifting the burden of indemnification by the owner to the corporation. 29. Even in such cases, it is to be remembered that there is no cessation of the privity of contract between the original owner and the Insurer through a policy. In other words, even in case of transfer of ownership, in any manner, so long as the policy is in force covering certain risks, notwithstanding the possession of the vehicle or the nature of possession, the liability of the Insurer cannot be held to be ceased to the extent of its liability against third parties only as postulated under Section 157 of the new Act. This position has been made clear by the apex Court in United India Insurance Company Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh, 2006 (3) A.L.D. 75 (S.C.): 2006 (1) D.T. (SC) 479. 30….. 31…. 32…. 33.
This position has been made clear by the apex Court in United India Insurance Company Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh, 2006 (3) A.L.D. 75 (S.C.): 2006 (1) D.T. (SC) 479. 30….. 31…. 32…. 33. Unless and until the obligation of indemnification on the part of the Insurance Company is divested by way of an express agreement between the owner and the hirer, the said obligation on the part of the Insurer will not get ceased. Furthermore, the conditions of the insurance policy would always remain unless they are specifically excluded by way of a separate agreement between the owner, hirer and the Insurance Company. In other words, the Insurance Company must be a party to a tripartite agreement, but not a bipartite settlement between the owner and the hirer, and any such agreement does not absolve the Insurer from its liability of indemnification. The same thing may happen by an independent agreement between the owner and the hirer excluding the liability of the Insurer as happened in Kailash Nath Kothari's case (supra)." i. Taking into consideration the legal position as referred to above, this court views that the tribunal erred in not fastening the liability of the insurance company. It is not the case of the third respondent that the obligation of the indemnification on the part of the third respondent is divested by way of an express agreement between the owner and the hirer. Accordingly, the point is answered. POINT No.III a. In determining the amount of compensation, the tribunal took into account the deceased's age of more than 65 years, applied multiplier five, assessed the annual earnings as Rs.36,000/-, deducted one-third for personal and living expenses, and awarded compensation under conventional heads. The claimants have not disputed the quantum of compensation. As a result, after reviewing the tribunal's order, this court concludes that the tribunal has determined just and reasonable compensation. Accordingly, the point is answered. 15. As a result, the appeal is partly allowed without costs, setting aside the award and decree dated 08.05.2015 in M.V.O.P. No.85 of 2012 passed by the Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-VII Additional District Judge, Ongole, in dismissing the claim against the 3rd respondent and the third respondent is jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation along with respondents 1, 2, and 4. In all other respects, the tribunal's decision remains unaltered. 16.
In all other respects, the tribunal's decision remains unaltered. 16. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.