ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. Rajat Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Ms. Madhunisha Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No. 1/State and Ms. Pragya Pandey, learned counsel for respondent No. 2. 2. The petitioners have filed this petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. with the following prayers: “(i) It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon’ble Court may kind enough in quashing the final report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. against the petitioners, this Hon’ble Court may further be also pleased to quash the complete charge-sheet filed against the petitioners and they be set free from the criminal trial which is now proposed by the concerned Police Station. This Hon’ble Court may also be pleased to stay the trial against present petitioners as they are not related directly shows in the allegation.” Any other relief as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. The present petitioners namely Neetu Sharma is sister-in-law (Nanad), Smt.Janki Sharma is mother-in-law (Mousi Sas), Ramavtar is father-in-law (Dada Sasur) and Bhanchand Sharma is father-in-law (Mousa Sasur) of the complainant/respondent No. 2-Sonali Joshi (Sharma). 4. Brief facts necessary for disposal of this case are that written complaint was lodged by respondent No. 2/complainant on 30.06.2016 in Mahila Police Station, Sector-6, Bhilai, District Durg in which she has named and lodged a report against the petitioners and husband and mother-in-law of the complainant. It is alleged in the complaint that from the very beginning of the marriage, the petitioners along with main accused person were making demand of dowry and hence, she has left the house of the husband. In the written complaint, no specific overt act and allegations are made against the petitioners except the bald statement. Reconciliation proceedings were initiated by the concerned Police Station which failed and thereafter charge-sheet was filed by the concerned Police against the petitioners, husband and mother-in-law of the complainant/respondent No. 2. Hence, this Cr.M.P. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners have neither demanded any kind of dowry from the complainant or her family members nor mentally harassed her. The petitioners have been falsely implicated and roped in by the complainant in sheer misuse of process of law. Hence, this Cr.M.P. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners have neither demanded any kind of dowry from the complainant or her family members nor mentally harassed her. The petitioners have been falsely implicated and roped in by the complainant in sheer misuse of process of law. He further submits that in written complaint filed by respondent No. 2, there is no direct allegation or connection of the present petitioners in the aforesaid offences except general and omnibus allegations having no legs to stand. He also submits that taking contents of charge-sheet and document appended along with charge-sheet as it is, aforesaid offences are not made out against the petitioners. As such, in absence of specific allegation and in absence of ingredient of demand of dowry and cruelty, prosecution against the petitioners deserves to be quashed. To bolster his submission, he would rely upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the matters of Geeta Mehrotra and Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 741 , Preeti Gupta and Another vs. State of Jharkhand and Another, (2010) 7 SCC 667 , Swapnil vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 567 and Rashmi Chopra vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, 2019 SCC Online SC 620 (Para-24). 6. On the other hand, Ms. Madhunisha Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No. 1/State and Ms. Pragya Pandey, learned counsel for respondent No. 2/complainant, would submit that after due investigation the petitioners have been chargesheeted for the aforesaid offences and prima-facie material collected are sufficient to put the petitioners at trial and they are standing trial also, but taking into consideration the material available on record, it cannot be held that no prima-facie case against the petitioners for standing trial is made out. They would further submit that jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is extremely limited as FIR and charge-sheet cannot be quashed particularly when there is sufficient evidence available on record to put the accused persons to trial. As such, the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. deserves to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 8. As such, the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. deserves to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 8. At the outset, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of interference in charge-sheet filed by the police against accused in extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 9. In the matter of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 the Supreme Court has held that the accused can approach the High Court either under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him. 10. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 laid down the principles of law relating to the exercise of inherent powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the first information report and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In paragraph 102 of the report, The Supreme Court laid down the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should be exercised, which are as under: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala-fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 11. The principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) has been followed by the Supreme Court in the matters of Google India Private Limited vs. Visaka Industries, (2020) 4 SCC 162 , Ahmad Ali Quraishi and Another vs. State of U.P. and Another, (2020) 13 SCC 435 and Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2019) 18 SCC 191 . Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2019) 18 SCC 191 . The Supreme Court in Google India Private Limited (supra), explained the scope of dictum of Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and “that too in the rarest of rare cases” as indicated in paragraph 103 therein of the report. 12. Having noticed the scope of interference by this Court in the petition relating to quashment of FIR/charge-sheet, reverting to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that in the impugned charge-sheet, six petitioners including the present petitioners have been charged for offences under Sections 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short “the Act of 1961”). 13. Chapter XXA of the IPC deals with offence of cruelty by husband or relatives of husband. Section 498A of the IPC defines the offence of cruelty as under: “498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty - Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation - For the purpose of this section “cruelty” means: (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman. (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 14. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that in order to establish offence under Section 498A of the IPC, the prosecution must establish: (i) That, woman must be married. (ii) She has been subjected to cruelty or harassment. (iii) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of the woman or by relative of her husband. (ii) She has been subjected to cruelty or harassment. (iii) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of the woman or by relative of her husband. The word ‘relative’ has not been defined in the IPC or in this Chapter, but in order to be covered under Section 498A of the IPC, one has to be relative of the husband by blood, marriage or adoption. The word ‘relative’ in Section 498A of the IPC would be limited only to blood relation and relations by marriage. 15. The word ‘cruelty’ within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC has been explained in Explanation appended to Section 498A of the IPC. It consists of two clauses namely clause (a) and clause (b). To attract Section 498A of the IPC, it must be established that cruelty or harassment to the wife to coerce her or cause bodily injury to herself or to commit suicide or the harassment was to compel her to fulfill illegal demand for dowry. It is not every type of harassment or cruelty that would attract Section 498A of the IPC. Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC contemplates harassment of woman to coerce or any relation of her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. The complainant if wants to come within the ambit of Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC, she can succeed if it is proved that there was an unlawful demand by the husband or any of his relatives with respect to money or of some valuable security. 16. In the matter of Geeta Mehrotra (supra), the Supreme Court has held that casual reference to the family member of the husband in FIR as co-accused particularly when there is no specific allegation and complaint did not disclose their active involvement. It was held that cognizance of matter against them for offence under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 and 304-B of the IPC would not be justified as cognizance would result in abuse of judicial process. 17. It was held that cognizance of matter against them for offence under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 and 304-B of the IPC would not be justified as cognizance would result in abuse of judicial process. 17. In the matter of K. Subba Rao and Others vs. State of Telangana Represented by its Secretary, Department of Home and Others, (2018) 14 SCC 452 the Supreme Court delineated the duty of the criminal Courts while proceeding against relatives of victim’s husband and held that the Court should be careful in proceeding against distant relatives in crime pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths and further held that relatives of husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations, unless specific instances of their involvement in offences are made out. 18. In the matter of Rashmi Chopra (supra), it has been held by the Supreme Court relying upon the principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) that criminal proceedings can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed and further held that judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment and the High Court should not hesitate in exercising the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings if the proceedings deserve to be quashed in line of parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) and further held that in absence of specific allegation regarding anyone of the accused except common and general allegations against everyone, no offence under Section 498A IPC is made out and quashed the charges for offence under Section 498A of the IPC being covered by category seven as enumerated in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) by holding as under: “24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations against the appellants for offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding for divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted. No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding for divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of C.J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra. 25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one of the applicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. “they started harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry of one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother’s sister and husband of mother’s sister have been roped in clearly indicate that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the applicants.....” 19. Having noticed the legal position qua quashing the FIR and charge-sheet, the question would be whether taking the contents of the FIR and charge-sheet as it is, offence under Section 498A/34 of the IPC is made out against the petitioners who are relatives of husband of respondent No. 2/complainant. 20. From perusal of the record, it appears that written complaint was made by respondent No. 2-Sonali Joshi on 30.06.2016 in Mahila Police Station Sector-6, Bhilai, District Durg in which it has been alleged that from the very beginning of the marriage, the petitioners along with main accused person were making demand of dowry and hence, she has left the house of the husband. 21. Thus, upon the basis of above-stated analysis, following broad facts are apparent on the face of record: (i) That, the present petitioners are the sister-in-law (Nanad), mother-in-law (Mousi Sas), father-in-law (Dada Sasur) and father in-law (Mousa Sasur) of the complainant/respondent No. 2 and they are not residing in different States. (ii) The petitioners have neither demanded any kind of dowry from the complainant or her family members nor mentally harassed her and the petitioners have been falsely implicated and roped in by the complainant. (ii) The petitioners have neither demanded any kind of dowry from the complainant or her family members nor mentally harassed her and the petitioners have been falsely implicated and roped in by the complainant. (iii) Only general and omnibus allegations have been made that from the very beginning of the marriage the petitioners along with main accused person were making demand of dowry and hence, she has left the house of the husband. 22. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice that the petitioners have also been charged for offence under Section 4 of the Act of 1961. Section 4 of the Act of 1961 states as under: “4. Penalty for demanding dowry - If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees: Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.” 23. The term ‘dowry’ has been defined under Section 2 of the Act of 1961 which states as under: “2. Definition of ‘dowry’ - In this Act, “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly: (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage. (b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include] dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. Explanation II - The expression “valuable security” has the same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” 24. Explanation II - The expression “valuable security” has the same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” 24. The aforesaid provision of Section 2 of the Act of 1961 clearly defines the word ‘dowry’ by holding that any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage or in connection with the marriage of the said parties. 25. The Supreme Court in the matter of Appasaheb and Another vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721 while considering the definition of ‘dowry’ under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act clearly held that correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential and further held that demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as demand for dowry. It was observed as under: “11. In view of the aforesaid definition of the word “dowry” any property or valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well-known social custom or practice in India. It is well settled principle of interpretation of Statute that if the Act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business or transaction knows or understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning. [See Union of India vs. Garware Nylons Ltd. (1996) 10 SCC 413 and Chemical and Fibres of India vs. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 664 ]. A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses of for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses of for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for “dowry” as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure. Since an essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC viz. demand for dowry is not established, the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained.” 26. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of aforesaid definition of ‘dowry’ as considered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Appasaheb (supra), it is quite vivid that it is the case of the prosecution that from the very beginning of the marriage the petitioners along with main accused person were making demand of dowry and hence, she has left the house of the husband. Taking the contents of the FIR as it is, prima-facie demand of dowry by the petitioners as defined in Section 2 of the Act of 1961 is not established, as such, no offence under Section 4 of the Act of 1961 is made out particularly against the petitioners herein. 27. Following the Bhajan Lal’s case (supra), the Supreme Court has recently quashed the case of Section 498A IPC against the in-laws in the matter of Abhishek vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 SCC Online SC 1083. 28. The Supreme Court in the matter of Kahkashan Kausar vs. State of Bihar, (2022) 6 SCC 599 has held as under: “20. Here it must be borne in mind that although the two FIRs may constitute two independent instances, based on separate transactions, the present complaint fails to establish specific allegations against the in-laws of the respondent wife. Allowing prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the appellant in-laws would simply result in an abuse of the process of law.” 29. The perusal of the First Information Report and the charge-sheet would make it clear that the allegations made by respondent No. 2-complainant against the present petitioners are vague and omnibus in nature and no specific allegations are made against them. 30. The perusal of the First Information Report and the charge-sheet would make it clear that the allegations made by respondent No. 2-complainant against the present petitioners are vague and omnibus in nature and no specific allegations are made against them. 30. On the basis of aforesaid discussion, I am of the considered opinion that prima-facie no offences under Section 498A/34 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Act of 1961 are made out for prosecuting the petitioners for the above-stated offences and the prosecution against them for the aforesaid offences is covered by Category 1, 3 and 7 of Para-102 of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) and as such, liable to be quashed. 31. As a fallout and consequence of the above-stated legal analysis, FIR registered in Crime No. 146/2016 at Police Station Saraswati Nagar, District Raipur for offences under Sections 498-A/34 IPC and Section 4 of the Act of 1961, charge-sheet and consequential criminal proceedings/prosecution against the present petitioners are hereby quashed. 32. It is made clear that all the observations made in this order are for the purpose of deciding the petition filed by the petitioners hereinabove and this Court has not expressed any opinion on merits of the matter and concerned Court will decide criminal case pending against other co-accused persons strictly in accordance with law without being influenced by any of these observations made hereinabove. 33. The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. No costs.