JUDGMENT : DEEPAK KUMAR TIWARI, J. 1. This Appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 30.9.2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Fast Track Special Court, Bilaspur in Special Criminal Case (POCSO Act) No. 114/2018 whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge has convicted and sentenced the appellant as under: Conviction Sentence Under Section 363 IPC RI for 7 years, fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default, 4 months additional imprisonment Under Section 366 IPC RI for 10 years, fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default, 6 months additional imprisonment Under Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 Imprisonment for life, fine of Rs. 2,000/- in default, 6 months additional imprisonment. 2. Prosecution case, in brief, is that father of the prosecutrix has lodged a report with the PS Masturi on 20.7.2018 alleging that his minor daughter aged about 16 years 8 months is studying in Class-10 at Government Girls High School, Masturi. On 19.7.2018, at 9 a.m. the prosecutrix left for the school and did not return. Thereafter a search was made, however, her whereabouts could not be traced. Some unknown person has allured and induced his daughter and abducted her. During investigation, the prosecutrix was recovered. Statements of the witnesses were recorded and seizure was also effected, on the basis of which the appellant was arrested. 3. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant for offence under Sections 363, 366, 376 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The charges were read over and explained to the appellant, however, the appellant denied the same and claimed to be tried. The learned trial Court after hearing learned counsel for the parties and on the basis of material available on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in para-1 of this judgment. It is pertinent to mention here that the appellant was also convicted under Section 376 of the IPC, however, as on the date of the incident i.e. 19/7/2018, the prosecutrix was minor, the appellant was sentenced under Section 4 of the POCSO Act since under the said section maximum sentence of life imprisonment is prescribed. 4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined as many as 15 witnesses and exhibited 24 documents. 4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined as many as 15 witnesses and exhibited 24 documents. Statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. wherein the accused pleaded innocence and false implication. However, he did not examine any defence witness. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the age of the victim/prosecutrix to be a minor. No authentic evidence was collected by the prosecution to show that the prosecutrix was minor on the date of the alleged incident. He further submits that only on the basis of School Admission Register Article ‘A-1’ though material on the basis of which the said entry was recorded, was not proved. Therefore, mere production of the School Admission Register, though a public document in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act, was not sufficient to prove the age of the prosecutrix. Authenticity of the entry would depend as to on whose instruction the said entry stood recorded and what was the source of his information. Reliance is placed on the judgments in the matters of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi vs. State of U.P. (2006) 5 SCC 584 , Babloo Pasi vs. State of Jharkhand and Another, (2008) 13 SCC 133 , Madan Mohan Singh and Others vs. Rajni Kant and Another, (2010) 9 SCC 209 , C. Doddanarayana Reddy (Dead) by Legal Representatives and Others vs. C. Jayarama Reddy (Dead) by Legal Representatives and Others, (2020) 4 SCC 659 . 6. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the prosecutrix and the appellant were in love with each other and she voluntarily left the house and had gone to Pune. As both the prosecutrix and the appellant belong to different caste, therefore, parents of the prosecutrix has lodged the false report. He further submits that in the matter of Jarnail Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263 it has been held that for determining the age, even of a child who is a victim of crime, there is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime and the relevant rule provided under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 was applicable to both. He submits that recently in the matter of P. Yuvaprakash vs. State Rep. by Inspector of Police, 2023 SCC Online SC 846 it was observed that for determination of age of the victim in the offence under the POCSO Act, 2012, provision of Section 94 applies and when the documents prescribed in the aforesaid provision has not been proved by the prosecution, the same was found fatal and the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden for proving the age. Considering all these aspects, conviction imposed on the appellant by the trial Court is bad in law and the same cannot be sustained. 7. Per contra, learned State Counsel submits that the prosecution was able to prove the age of the prosecutrix on the basis of Dakhil Kharij Register Article ‘A’ which has been duly proved by the In-Charge Headmaster (PW-9) Smt. Usha Kashyap and also in the FSL report (Ex.P/24), human sperm was found on the slide which was obtained during the medical examination of the prosecutrix, as also on her underwear Article ‘C’ and the appellant’s underwear Article ‘A’. He further submits that the evidence of the prosecutrix (PW-8) along with the FSL report is sufficient to prove that she was subjected to sexual assault and rape by the appellant against her will. Therefore, conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant are well merited, which do not call for any interference. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and minutely perused the entire record. 9. First of all, the question which arises for consideration is that whether the prosecutrix (PW-8) was minor on the date of the incident i.e. on 19.7.2018 and 20.7.2018. In this connection, the prosecution has filed the Dakhil Kharij Register vide Article ‘A’ which is proved by (PW-9) Smt. Usha Kashyap, In-charge Headmaster. She has stated that in the School Admission Register, date of birth of the prosecutrix was recorded as 6.11.2001 and the prosecutrix was admitted in Class-1 on 12.7.2008 and she left the school on 17.6.2013 after passing the 5th standard. She admits in her cross-examination that entry in the School Admission Register was not made by her. She has further stated that the said entry was made on the basis of form submitted by the parents at the time of admission. She admits in her cross-examination that entry in the School Admission Register was not made by her. She has further stated that the said entry was made on the basis of form submitted by the parents at the time of admission. She has categorically deposed that on the date of recording of evidence, she had not brought the said document or form on the basis of which entry of date of birth of the prosecutrix was made in the Dakhil Kharij Register Article ‘A’. She further admits that in the year 2008, at the time of admission, they usually obtained the birth certificate and on the date of her deposition, she had also not brought the said birth certificate. 10. (PW-12) ‘AK’ mother of the prosecutrix, has stated that at the time of incident, age of the prosecutrix was around 17 years. In cross-examination, at Para-6, she has stated that after the birth of her elder son ‘R’ i.e. about 4 years, the prosecutrix was born. 11. (PW-13) ‘AR’ father of the prosecutrix, would depose that at the time of incident in the year 2018, age of his daughter was around 16 years. In cross-examination, he has stated that in the year 1996, his elder son ‘R’ was born and after 5 years of the birth of his son ‘R’ the prosecutrix was born. 12. Parents of the prosecutrix have given the approximate age on the basis of oral statements and they have not produced any documentary evidence about their marriage and date of birth of their elder son ‘R’. Except the oral statement of the parents, in the absence of any authentic document on the basis of which they have stated the age of the prosecutrix, no material has been produced and proved or is available on record to prove the age of the prosecutrix. Even in the School Admission Register Article ‘A’ on what basis the entry concerning the date of birth of the prosecutrix has been made in the said register is not known, as no primary document was filed and proved. 13. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi (Supra), the following was observed at Para-26: “26. In Birad Mal Singhvi vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp. 13. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi (Supra), the following was observed at Para-26: “26. In Birad Mal Singhvi vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp. SCC 604, this Court held: (SCC p. 619, Para 15) “To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. Same proposition was reiterated in the matter of Babloo Pasi (Supra) wherein the following material observations were made at Paras-28 to 29: “28. It is trite that to render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions have to be satisfied, namely: (i) entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; (ii) it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or a relevant fact, and (iii) it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duties, or in performance of his duty especially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded. (See: Birad Mal Singhvi vs. Anand Purohit). 29..............in the absence of evidence to show on what material the entry in the voters' list in the name of the accused was made, a mere production of a copy of the voters' list, though a public document, in terms of Section 35, was not sufficient to prove the age of the accused........” 15. 29..............in the absence of evidence to show on what material the entry in the voters' list in the name of the accused was made, a mere production of a copy of the voters' list, though a public document, in terms of Section 35, was not sufficient to prove the age of the accused........” 15. Further in the matter of Madan Mohan Singh and Others (Supra), it was observed that the entries made in the official record by an official or person aurthorised in performance of official duties may be admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act but the Court has a right to examine their probative value. The authenticity of the entries would depend on whose information such entries stood recorded and what was his source of information. The entries in school register/ school leaving certificate require to be proved in accordance with law and the standard of proof required in such cases remained the same as in any other civil or criminal cases. 16. In the matter of C. Doddanarayana Reddy (Dead) by Legal Representatives and Others (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the same principle that no official from the school nor any person has proved the signatures of father on such certificate. Apart from the self-serving statement, there is no evidence to show that the entry of the date of birth was made by the official-in-charge, which alone would make it admissible as evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872. 17. In the light of aforesaid settled legal principles, if we examine the facts of the present case, we find that the relevant document on the basis of which entries were made in the school admission register Article ‘A’ was not filed and proved. Mere oral statements of the parents cannot discharge the burden of the prosecution to prove the said fact that on the date of the incident the prosecutrix was minor. 18. The prosecutrix (PW-8) has categorically stated in her deposition that at the time of incident, she used to like the appellant and, therefore, she had gone with him to Pune without informing anyone at home. She has further deposed that she kept her clothes in her school bag and joined the company of the appellant, who was waiting for her at Bus Stand Masturi to elope with him. She has further deposed that she kept her clothes in her school bag and joined the company of the appellant, who was waiting for her at Bus Stand Masturi to elope with him. She had gone to Pune in a train with the appellant and the appellant took her to one of his relatives i.e. maternal uncle ‘PT & ST’ (PW-14). PW-14 has stated that when he got information over telephone from the father and mother of the prosecutrix, he brought back the prosecutrix and the appellant to her home at Masturi and thereafter they have produced the appellant and the prosecutrix in the Police Station Masturi. PW-14 has turned hostile and stated that the prosecutrix has not informed anything that the appellant has made any physical relations with her. 19. The prosecutrix has also deposed that as the appellant belonged to different caste, therefore, their parents were not agreed for their marriage. She has further stated that if the appellant gets married with her, she would not make any statement against him. 20. (PW-1) Dr. Parul Jogi has proved the medical examination of the prosecutrix vide Ex.P/1 and found that hymen was old torn. She has further opined that she had not given any opinion about the recent sexual intercourse. 21. The prosecutrix (PW-8) has stated that though she was not ready for the physical relations, however, before meeting his maternal uncle (PW-14), the appellant had made physical relations with her, as they have stayed for one day at Pune. 22. From the conduct of the prosecutrix, it is explicit that she was in love with the appellant and has voluntarily left her house without informing anyone at her home. Therefore, the prosecution has not been able to establish the fact that the sexual assault was as a result of coercion or compulsion on the part of the appellant. Further, the material fact i.e. the age of the prosecutrix was not proved by admissible evidence beyond reasonable doubt and the same remained ambiguous. 23. On the basis of aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the view that the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden to prove the charges levelled against the appellant and we are inclined to extend benefit of doubt to the appellant, who was aged about 19 years on the date of the incident. 24. In the result, the Appeal is allowed. 24. In the result, the Appeal is allowed. Conviction and sentences imposed on the appellant under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 are set aside and he is acquitted of the said charges. The appellant be set at liberty forthwith unless required to be detained in any other case.