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2023 DIGILAW 486 (BOM)

Milind B. Jadhav v. Usha S. Patel

2023-02-14

MILIND N.JADHAV

body2023
JUDGMENT Milind N. Jadhav, J. - By the present Writ Petition, Petitioners have prayed for the following relief: 'b. After considering the legality, validity and proprietary of the same, Writ of Certiorari or any other writ, order, or direction in the like nature may kindly be passed thereby quashing and setting aside the order dated 03.01.2022 passed in Civil Miscellaneous application No. 56 of 2018 passed by the Ld. District Judge-2, Kalyan and Civil Miscellaneous Application No.56 of 2018 may kindly be allowed;' 2. Petitioners are challenging the Order dated 03.01.2022 passed in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 56 of 2018, passed by Learned District Judge-2, Kalyan rejecting their application for condonation of delay of 5 months and 23 days in filing the Civil Appeal for challenging the judgment and decree dated 15.11.2017 passed in R.C.S No. 193 of 2022 by the Learned 5th Jt. Civil Judge Senior Division, Kalyan. Though it appears that delay of 5 months and 23 days is not condoned, and one would look at the reasons given for the delay, the facts in the present case are shocking and serious. 3. Such of the relevant facts which are necessary for adjudication of the lis between the parties are as under: 3.1. Original Plaintiffs (Respondent No. 1 to 3) filed suit No.193 of 2012 for seeking possession, arrears of license of fee and compensation/damages against Original Defendant No.1 - Rafique Malbari, Original Defendant No.2 - Bhimdas Jadha and Original Defendant No.3 - Milind Jadhav (Petitioner No.1 & son of Defendant No.2 herein) in respect the suit property i.e. room bearing chalta No. 589 (part) situated on the ground floor in Municipal House No.25 - Shambhu Building in Survey No. 1/3/3/C of village Mohone, Taluka Kalyan (herein refer to as a 'suit premises'). Suit was instituted against Defendant No.2 and Defendant No.3 (Petitioner No.1 herein) because they were found to be in possession of the suit property as they were servants of Defendant No.1 Petitioners are legal heirs of deceased Defendant No.2 who expired on 18.09.2016. Plaintiffs admittedly are owners of Municipal House No. 25 - Shambhu Building bearing Survey no.1 and Hissa No.3/3/C situated at village Mohone, Tal. Kalyan, Dist. Thane. There is no dispute about ownership. 3.2. Plaintiffs admittedly are owners of Municipal House No. 25 - Shambhu Building bearing Survey no.1 and Hissa No.3/3/C situated at village Mohone, Tal. Kalyan, Dist. Thane. There is no dispute about ownership. 3.2. Plaintiffs executed a leave and licence agreement dated 23.09.2003 with Original Defendant No. 1 (Rafique Malbari) for a period of 33 months with monthly compensation for an amount of Rs. 450/- excluding municipal taxes and other charges as per the terms and conditions mentioned in the Agreement which was registered with the office of the Sub-Registrar, Kalyan. The license would expire on 31.03.2006. Defendant No.1 was thus required to handover vacant and peaceful possession on 31.05.2006 to the Plaintiffs. Admittedly, Original Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 have no nexus with the Plaintiffs. They claimed to be servants of Defendant No.1. It has come on record that they have tresspassed into the suit property and are occupying the same since prior to 2006. How they have come into possession is still not explained by them? 3.3. Since the suit property was not vacated, Plaintiffs visited the site and found that it was in possession of Defendant No.2 and 3 i.e. Petitioner No.1 herein who were servants of Defendant No.1 at the them time and they were conducting business of lottery and building material suppliers. Suit filed against Original Defendant Nos.1 to 3 came to be decreed after a full length trial on 15.11.2017 by the Learned 5th Jt. Civil Judge Senior Division, Kalyan. 3.4. Petitioners aggrieved and dissatisfied with the decree filed Civil Appeal alongwith Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 56 of 2018 seeking condonation of delay of 5 months and 23 days in filing the Appeal. Petitioners also filed application below Exh.20 under Order 41 Rule 5 Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'CPC') for stay to the execution of the decree. No stay was granted in the Appeal, therefore Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 i.e. Original Plaintiffs filed Special Darkhast No.14 of 2019 for execution of the judgment and decree dated 15.11.2017 passed in R.C.S Suit No.193 of 2012. The stay application in execution filed below Exh.20 was allowed with certain conditions of deposit on 03.01.2020 by the Trial Court. 3.5. However Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 56 of 2018 was rejected by the impugned order dated 03.01.2022. 3.6. Petitioners filed Civil Writ Petition (St.) No.1214 of2022 which was not pressed by them and was withdrawn. 3.7. The stay application in execution filed below Exh.20 was allowed with certain conditions of deposit on 03.01.2020 by the Trial Court. 3.5. However Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 56 of 2018 was rejected by the impugned order dated 03.01.2022. 3.6. Petitioners filed Civil Writ Petition (St.) No.1214 of2022 which was not pressed by them and was withdrawn. 3.7. Thereafter, Petitioners filed Second Appeal No.25 of 2022 and vide order dated 22.02.2022, stay was granted pending the Second Appeal and was continued for some time, but at the admission stage the Second Appeal was dismissed on 10.11.2022 on the ground of maintainability in view of the embargo under sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, with liberty to take out any such appropriate proceeding as permissible and admissible in law. Therefore Petitioners have filed the present Writ Petition to challenge the impugned order. 3.8. Hence the present Writ Petition. 4. Mr. Navale, Learned Advocate appearing for Petitioners has made the following submissions:- 4.1. that the leanred Judge failed to appreciate that the reason for the delay was genuine and bonafide and the circumstances were beyond the control of the Petitioners and sufficient cause was made out by Petitioners; 4.2. that the subject matter of suit property in R.C.S No. 193 of 2012 is Room No.25 Shambhu Building, situated at C.T.S No. 589 (Part) Hissa No. 3/3/C mauje Mohane, Tal. Kalyan, Dist: Thane and the decree is passed in respect of the said Room premises. But however Plaintiffs are misrepresenting before the learned Executing Court that the said Room premises is the one which from where the Petitioners are running their Dairy business under the title 'Shreenath Dairy' and have sought possession of the said premises which is situated at C.T.S. No.1780 at Gavthan of mauje Mohane, Tal. Kalyan, Dist.: Thane; that the Dairy premises is cleary distinct and separate from the suit property and said property from which Petitioners are running their Dairy business i.e. 'Shreenath Dairy' is an ancestral property of the Petitioners; 4.3. Kalyan, Dist.: Thane; that the Dairy premises is cleary distinct and separate from the suit property and said property from which Petitioners are running their Dairy business i.e. 'Shreenath Dairy' is an ancestral property of the Petitioners; 4.3. that deceased Defendant No.2 was looking after the suit property case and when Defendant No.2 expired, Petitioners were unaware about the name of the Advocate and therefore, they could not contact him, but later on, with the help of one Advocate Bhilare they could locate the details and came to know that the suit was decreed; that Petitioners filed application for condonation of delay for the period of 5 months and 23 days alongwith the Civil Appeal and there was no deliberate delay in filing the appeal and the delay was caused due to genuine medical grounds and hence needed to be condoned in the interest of justice. He has therefore urged the Court to set aside the impugned order and condone the delay on any terms thought reasonable by this Court. 5. PER CONTRA, Ms. Patel - Respondent No.2 has appeared in person and has made the following submissions in support of the impugned order: 5.1. that Petitioner No.1 (Original Defendant No.3) in the suit before the Trial Court alongwith his father i.e. Defendant No.2 filed common written statement alongwith Defendant No.1 dated 23.02.2010 below Exh.33. Therein all three Defendants categorically contended that Defendant No.2 and 3 were servants of Defendant No.1 and were unnecessarily impleaded as party defendants. The written statement was signed by Defendant No.2 and Petitioner No.1. She submitted that they also contended before the Trial Court for striking out their names from the array of parties as defendants and therefore Petitioners now have no locus to file the present appeal nor any application whatsoever in resepct of the suit premises; 5.2. that on 04.09.2018, Petitioner No.1 illegally broke open the lock of the adjacent room of the suit premises and tresspassed into the propety and for that action he is facing criminal prosecution; that Petitioner No.1 has also filed a false and fraudulent Suit No.94 of 2019 in respect of the suit premises owned by the Original Plaintiffs and the Application for temporary injunction filed therein has been dismissed; that appeal filed against the said order being Misc. Appeal No. 29 of 2019 also came to be dismissed on 10.05.2019; 5.3. Appeal No. 29 of 2019 also came to be dismissed on 10.05.2019; 5.3. that Petitioners have not shown any sufficient cause to condone the delay and such scrupulous applications are required to be dismissed in limine with exemplary costs as Petitioners have no nexus or privity with Plaintiffs (Respondent Nos. 1 to 3) and any right and interest in the suit premises in the first instance and the application is filed with an ulterior motive which should be dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs. 5,00,000/-; 5.4. that this Court should uphold the impugned order as Petitioners have succeed in taking advantage of the due process of law to their own benefit in the gross facts of the present case, when they or their predecessor i.e. Defendant No.2 do not have any right to occupy the suit premises; 5.5. She has therefore urged that the impugned order be upheld. 6. I have heard Mr. Navale appearing for the Petitioners and Ms. Anjana Patel - Respondent No.2, appearing in person on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and with their able assistance perused the entire record and pleadings of the case. 7. At the outset it needs to be mentioned that the facts in the present case are extremely gross. Hence the question that would first arise for consideration is whether can the Court allow a party to take advantage of the due process of law with its eyes shut and be a mute spectator. I would say no and certainly so in the facts of the present case. The suit premises admittedly belong to the ownership of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 who are the Original Plaintiffs. Admitted position is that the Plaintiffs executed a leave and licence agreement in good faith for 33 months and let out the suit premises to the original Defendant No.1 only in the year 2003. The leave and license agreement expired on 31.05.2006 and as per the said agreement original Defendant No.1 was required to handover vacant possession of the suit premises to Plaintiffs on 31.05.2006. Admittedly the suit premises was not vacant/vacated and the plaintiffs found that it was in possession of some third parties i.e. Defendant Nos.2 and 3 who were unknown to the Plaintiffs. Admittedly the suit premises was not vacant/vacated and the plaintiffs found that it was in possession of some third parties i.e. Defendant Nos.2 and 3 who were unknown to the Plaintiffs. These third parties were Defendant No. 2 and 3, who were carrying on their business in the name and style as 'Sunny Building Materials' from the suit premises and have been successful in stalling all attempts by the Plaintiffs to secure possession of the suit premises for the past 17 years. It is also seen that one criminal proceeding is filed against the Petitioner No.1 for illegal breaking open the lock of the adjacent room of the suit premises and having committed tresspass. One Suit No.94 of 2019 in respect of the suit premises is filed by Petitioner No.1 wherein application for temporary injunction is dismissed and Appeal filed against the said order being Miscellaneous Application No.29 of 2019 is also dismissed on 10.05.2019. 8. There is not a single piece of documentary evidence shown by the Petitioners either before the Trial Court or to me to show as to how Defendant No.2 and Petitioner No.1 were inducted into the suit premises. Hence I say that the facts are shocking the conscience of this Court. 9. Record clearly indicates that in the above background the learned Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of Plaintiffs on 15.11.2017 after a complete trial. Defendant No.3 i.e. Petitioner No.1 and other legal heirs of Defendant No.2 filed Civil Appeal after a delay of 5 months and 23 days along with Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 56 of 2018. Learned District Court rejected the Application by the impugned order and hence the present writ petition is filed. Though it is contended by Petitioners that there were medical reasons and other reasons for the delay and the delay needs to be condoned, it is pertinent to note that there was no stay granted by the Appellate Court despite the stay application also having being filed. Plaintiffs filed Special Darkhast No.14 of 2019 for execution of the decree. It is pleaded by Petitioners that in execution proceedings the Executing Court permitted Petitioners to deposit the arrears and continue depositing the monthly compensation and granted stay. Plaintiffs filed Special Darkhast No.14 of 2019 for execution of the decree. It is pleaded by Petitioners that in execution proceedings the Executing Court permitted Petitioners to deposit the arrears and continue depositing the monthly compensation and granted stay. However no substantive right can accrue in favour of the Petitioners by virtue of the said stay order granted by the Executing Court, so as to make out a case for filing the Appeal. 10. In the above background, Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 56 of 2018 was heard and by the impugned order 03.01.2022 it came to be dismissed. The present Writ Petition is filed on 25.09.2022. 11. It is pertinent to note that between January 2022 and November 2022, Petitioners filed Civil Writ Petition No. 1214 of 2022 against the impugned order. The same was withdrawn and thereafter Petitioners filed Second Appeal No. 25 of 2022. Initially on 22.02.2022 this Court granted stay in the Second Appeal. The said stay was continued from time to time. However on 10.11.2022 at the admission stage the Second Appeal was dismissed as non maintainable in view of the embargo under sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 with liberty to take out appropriate proceedings. It is this liberty which has prompted the Petitioners to file the present Writ Petition to challenge the impugned order. 12. The above facts clearly reveal one and one thing only i.e. Petitioners have no right title, entitlement whatsoever to occupy the suit premises. Infact Petitioners / their predecessor do not have any nexus or privity of contract with the Plaintiffs. Though it is argued by Petitioners that this Court needs to merely look at the reasons for rejecting condonation of delay, this Court cannot loose sight of the above mentioned gross facts which have prevented the Plaintiffs from procuring and securing possession of their ownership suit premises since 2006. Even today Petitioners are unable to show to me a single document entitling Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 (Petitioner No.1) to occupy the suit premises at any point of time. 13. Perusal of the impugned order reveals that the Learned Appellate Court has returned an important finding in paragraph No.11 of the said order. For convenience, the said paragraph is reproduced below. ' From the aforesaid written statement, application Exh.28 and on perusal of the judgment and decree passed by the Ld. 13. Perusal of the impugned order reveals that the Learned Appellate Court has returned an important finding in paragraph No.11 of the said order. For convenience, the said paragraph is reproduced below. ' From the aforesaid written statement, application Exh.28 and on perusal of the judgment and decree passed by the Ld. Trial Court, it clearly reveals that neither deceased defendant No.2 nor applicant No.1 herein has any concern with the suit premises. They themselves claimed that they are the servants of original defendant No.1. The Ld. Trial Court has recorded the finding that suit premises was given to original defendant No.1 on leave and license agreement dated 23/09/2003, the license comes to an end on 31/05/2006. Since then applicant No.1 and deceased defendant No.2 are using the suit premises illegally from 01/06/2006 for commercial purpose. Therefore, plaintiff / non-applicant Nos.1 to 3 are entitle for possession of suit premises alongwith compensation at the rate of Rs. 100/- per day. Undisputedly, original defendant No.1 has not challenged the judgment and decree. Applicant No.1 or deceased defendant No.2 during the pendency of suit had not amended the pleadings by claiming any independent right, title and interest in the suit premises. Non applicant Nos. 1 to 3 had filed the aforesaid suit in the year 2008. In spite of that, they have filed the present appeal alongwith delay condonation application, which is pending from 2018. Applicants have no cause of action to file present application and appeal. It seems that these applicants have unnecessarily filed this application against the judgment and decree passed in the aforesaid suit only with a view to stall the execution proceeding. Non applicant Nos. 1 to 3 are all the senior citizens. By filing this proceeding, applicants have compelled them to come from N.B.Road, Mumbai which is far away from Kalyan. Non-applicants are attending Court dates from 2018 i.e. not less than 50 dates. Applicants are aware from the date of filing written statement that they have no concern with the suit premises nor they have any right to retain the possession. Therefore, I find substance in the submission of non-applicant that applicants have filed this proceeding with an ulterior motive to cause obstruction in the execution of decree and to harass them. Applicant No.1 was aware of the proceeding pending against them. The cause shown by him is absolutely not believable and lacks bonafide. Therefore, I find substance in the submission of non-applicant that applicants have filed this proceeding with an ulterior motive to cause obstruction in the execution of decree and to harass them. Applicant No.1 was aware of the proceeding pending against them. The cause shown by him is absolutely not believable and lacks bonafide. I find that it is a pure case of abuse of process of law, therefore, application will have to be dismissed with heavy cost. Hence, following order is passed.' 14. From a conjoint reading of the written statement which was specifically signed by Original Defendant No.2 and Defendant No.3 i.e. the Petitioner No.1 herein, at Exh.28 filed in Special Civil Suit No. 439 of 2008 and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court it is seen that on the Petitioners own showing it is their case that both Defendant No.2 nor Defendant No.3 i.e. Petitioner No.1 have any nexus in the suit premises. In fact it is admitted in all pleadings that Defendant No.2 and Petitioner No.1 were servants of the Original Defendant No.1, who was inducted as licensee in the suit premises for 33 months. In these facts and circumstances and more specifically the fact that the decree of the Trial Court having not being challenged by the Original Defendant No.1, the Petitioners have no right whatsoever to continue in possession of the suit premises. 15. Respondent No.2 in the course of her submissions has referred to and relied upon the following decisions of the Supreme Court :- 1. S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath and Others - 1994 (1994) 1 SCC 1 . 2. Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs. Executive Engineer Jalgaon Medium Project and Another - 2008 (2008) 17 SCC 448 3. Dalip Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another - 2010 (2010) 2 SCC 114 4. Sabarmati Gas Limited Vs. Shah Alloys Limited - 2023 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 9 15.1. While referring the case of S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (first supra) she has contended that a litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. That if he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party. That if he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party. That the Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean-hands. That more often than not, process of the Court is being abused. That property-grabbers, tax- evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court - process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. That a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court and he should be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. She has therefore urged to dismiss the Writ Petition in the facts of the present case. 15.2. While referring to the decision in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (second supra), she has drawn my attention to paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 and contended that settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with while condoning the delay by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the parties are guilty of denying benefit which otherwise they are not entitled to in law in any fraudulent manner. Sections 30 and 31 are reproduced below:- '30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner sub-serves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the land loosers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit which otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the land loosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the land loosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the land loosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest. 31. It is true when the State and its instrumentalities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for Governmental authorities. Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the government in filing appeals or applications as such. It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In a given case if any such facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and those factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the present case, no such facts are pleaded and proved though a feeble attempt by the learned Counsel for the respondent was made to suggest collusion and fraud but without any basis. We cannot entertain the submission made across the Bar without there being any proper foundation in the pleadings.' 15.3. While referring to the decision in the case of Dalip Singh (third supra), she has drawn my attention to paragraph Nos. 1 and 2 of the said decision and contended that this Court needs to take cognizance of the gross facts in the present case and pass appropriate orders. Paragraph Nos. 1 and 2 read thus: '1. For many centuries, Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e., 'Satya' (truth) and 'Ahimsa' (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has over-shadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do no hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings. 2. In last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.' 15.4. While referring to the decision of Sabarmati Gas Limited (forth supra), she has referred to paragraph Nos. 24 and 25 therein and contended that Petitioners in the present case are legally not entitled to lay any claim to the suit premises and therefore in that view of the matter there can be no question of considering condoning any delay in filing the appeal and the impugned order is therefore sustainable. Paragraph Nos. 24 and 25 are reproduced below:- '24. When the limitation period for initiating CIRP Under Section 9, IBC is to be reckoned from the date of default, as opposed to the date of commencement of IBC and the period prescribed therefor, is three years as provided by Section (sic Article) 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the same would commence from the date of default and is extendable only by application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 it is incumbent on the Adjudicating Authority to consider the claim for condonation of the delay when once the proceeding concerned is found filed beyond the period of limitation. 25. 25. As relates Section 5 of the Limitation Act showing 'sufficient cause' is the only criterion for condoning delay. 'Sufficient Cause' is the cause for which a party could not be blamed. We have already taken note of the legal bar for initiation of proceedings against an industrial company by virtue of Section 22(1), SICA and obviously, when a party was thus legally disabled from resorting to legal proceeding for recovering the outstanding dues without the permission of BIFR and even on application permission therefor was not given the period of suspension of legal proceedings is excludable in computing the period of limitation for the enforcement of such right in terms of Section 22(5), SICA. In the absence of provisions for exclusion of such period in respect of an application Under Section 9, IBC, despite the combined reading of Section 238A, IBC and the provisions under the Limitation Act what is legally available to such a party is to assign the same as a sufficient cause for condoning the delay Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In such eventuality, in accordance with the factual position obtained in any particular case viz., the period of delay and the period covered by suspension of right Under Section 22(1), SICA etc., the question of condonation of delay has to be considered lest it will result in injustice as the party was statutorily prevented from initiating action against the industrial company concerned. The first question formulated hereinbefore is accordingly answered.' 16. From the above observations, findings and discussion, it is clear that Petitioners have no title, entitlement or interest whatsoever in the suit premises. They are rank trespassers who have taken advantage of the legal system and have abused the due process of law at all stages without having being put in possession of the suit premises by the owner i.e. Original Plaintiffs. Record further indicates that Petitioners are infact owners of 'Shreenath Dairy', run by the Petitioner No.1 and it stands immediately adjacent to the suit premises. As seen and alluded to herein above, Petitioner No.1 is carrying on business 'Sunny Building Materials' from the suit premises. The learned Trial Court has returned a finding that possession and occupation of the suit premises by Petitioner No.1 and Defendant No.2 to be completely illegal. There is no proof of any license and / or security deposit whatsoever produced by them. The learned Trial Court has returned a finding that possession and occupation of the suit premises by Petitioner No.1 and Defendant No.2 to be completely illegal. There is no proof of any license and / or security deposit whatsoever produced by them. The decree passed by the Trial Court has returned cogent and reasoned findings and in view of the gross facts which are alluded to herein above, Petitioners are not entitled for any relief. The impugned order dated 03.01.2022 is sustained. It is reiterated that if the delay in such cases is condoned in favour of Petitioners and if they are allowed to prosecute their appeal, it will amount to a travesty of justice in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Petitioners do not deserve any relief from this Court in the present Writ Petition. 17. Writ petition is dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs. 25,000/-. The costs shall be deposited by the Petitioners with the Kirtikar Law library, High Court, Mumbai within a period of one week from today and receipt of the same shall be produced on record of the present Writ Petition. 18. Writ Petition dismissed. 19. Put up for compliance after one week on 21st February, 2023, First on Board.