ORDER : 1. Since these three criminal revisions and two CRMP petitions are arise out of same Crime Number i.e. Crime No. 377/2009, registered at Police Station, Balco, District-Korba (C.G.) and same Sessions Trial No. 16/2010, they are clubbed and heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. Heard Ms. Sharmila Singhai, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, learned counsel for the revisionists in CRR No. 450/2013, CRR No. 451/2013 and CRR No. 448/2013. Also heard Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Sanya Shukla, Ms. Devangna Singh and Mr. Shireesh Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner in CRMP No. 664/2013 and Mr. Abhishek Sinha, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Samrath Singh Marhas, learned counsel for the petitioner in CRMP No. 665/2013 and Ms. Madhunisha Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondents. 3. CRR No. 450/2013, CRR No. 451/2013 and CRR No. 448/2013 are filed under Section 397/401 of Cr.P.C. by the revisionists for setting aside the impugned order dated 19.06.2013 and framing of charges against the revisionists by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Korba, District Korba (C.G.) whereas CRMP No. 664/2013 and CRMP No. 665/2013 are filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing the Criminal Case S.T. No. 16/2010 against the petitioners and for quashing/setting aside of the orders dated 15.04.2013 and 19.06.2013 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Korba (C.G.) 4. The revisionists in CRR No. 450/2013, CRR No. 451/2013 and CRR No. 448/2013 are nationals of Peoples Republic of China and employees of SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corporation (hereinafter referred to as SEPCO), which is a Company incorporated in Peoples Republic of China and has acquired international repute for its expertise in the field of setting up power plants for last more than 50 years. 5. The petitioner in CRMP No. 664 of 2013, namely, Deepak Nagarng is a qualified Mechanical Engineer and has been appointed as Assistant General Manager (Planning) with Bharat Aluminium Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as BALCO) on 04.08.2008 and the petitioner in CRMP No. 665 of 2013, namely, Anup Mahapatre, were posted as Site Engineer In-charge and Site Engineer respectively to look after work of Site Contractor and Sub Contractor and to supervise them mainly for smooth co-ordination of work. 6. 6. M/s BALCO entered into a Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU) dated 07.10.2006 with the Government of Chhattisgarh for establishing 1200 MW Thermal Power Plant. Pursuant to MOU, BALCO being desirous of procuring, setting up and bringing into commercial operation of a 4 x 300 MW coal power plant at BALCO, Korba, Chhattisgarh entered an engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract with the SEPCO on 20.08.2007. The scope of the work under the contract was to provide certain technical services including design, engineering and supervision of erection, testing and commissioning, demonstration of performance, guarantee and comprehensive project management services in a fully coordinated manner. Amongst other the said project included construction of two chimney of the height of 275 meters each. 7. Consequent to the EPC contract, on 08.08.2008, SEPCO entered into a turnkey contract for construction of the 2 chimney with Gannon Dunkerley and Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as GDCL). In pursuance to the contract given by the SEPCO, the chimney was being constructed by GDCL as per the specifications mentioned therein. The chimney was to be constructed up to the height of 275 meters to meet with the environmental norms and it was well constructed up to the height of 248 meters. On 23rd September 2009 at around 3.30 pm, there were strong winds accompanied by heavy rain and lightening which affected the chimney during which it collapsed resulting into loss of 40 human lives and injuries to several employees working at that time. 8. After panchnama of the deceased and observations of the S.D.O. PWD, the First Information Report bearing No. 377/2009 under sections 304, 34 of Indian Penal Code was lodged against the unnamed officers of BALCO Management and GDCL by Police Station Balco Nagar on 25.09.2009, and after completion of the investigation the charge-sheet was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class against 17 accused persons out of which 3 have been declared absconded and 01 has been declared dead. The Criminal Case No. 78/2010 has been committed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Korba, District-Korba and now it is pending before the learned Additional Session Judge, Korba, District-Korba (C.G.) as S.T. No. 16/2010 captioned as State of Chhattisgarh vs. Manoj Sharma and Others. 9. The Criminal Case No. 78/2010 has been committed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Korba, District-Korba and now it is pending before the learned Additional Session Judge, Korba, District-Korba (C.G.) as S.T. No. 16/2010 captioned as State of Chhattisgarh vs. Manoj Sharma and Others. 9. The Learned trial Court while framing the charge against the accused/revisionists and the petitioners vide impugned order dated 15.04.2013 observed as follows: ^^mijksDr rdZ i'pkr vfHk;kstu dh vksj ls ÁLrqr nLrkostksa ds voyksdu ls eSa ;g ikrk gwa fd fpeuh ckydks dsIVho ikoj IykaV ds 1200 esxkokV fo|qr mRiknu gsrq fd;s tk jgs fpeuh fuekZ.k dk dk;Z ckydks daiuh ds }kjk Bsds ij fn;k tkuk mRd dk;ksZ ds lIrkfgd@ikf{kd vFkok ekfld leh{kk fuekZ.k esa vkus okyh ck/kkvksa ds laca/k esa le;≤ ij lsidks] thŒMhŒlhŒ,yŒ ,oa ckydks daiuh ds vf/kdkfj;ksa dh la;qDr cSBd gksrh jgh gS] ftlesa fdlh ,d ij vfu;feRrk dh ftEesnkjh ugha Mkyh tk ldrh cfYd la;qDr ftEesnkjh ekuh tkosxhA D;ksafd xq.koRrk dh tkap dk laiw.kZ vf/kdkj ckydksa daiuh ds bathfu;j dks gh Fkk] tSlk fd bZdjkjukek esa mYysf[kr gS vksj fuekZ.k dk fujh{k.k vkSj fu;a=.k djus dh mn~ns’; ls ckydks daiuh }kjk ÁkstsDV dk gsM fojky esgrk dks cuk;k x;k Fkk] mDr fpeuh fuekZ.k ds lkbZM bathfu;j bapktZ ,ŒthŒ,eŒ nhid ukjax ,oa lkbZM bathfu;j vuqi egkik= tks lkbZM dkUVsªDVj ,oa lc&dkUVsªDVj ds dk;Z dks ns[krs Fks vkSj lqijokbZt djrs FksA lsidks fuekZrk daiuh Fkh ftuds }kjk thŒMhŒlhŒ,yŒ dks lc&dkUVsªDVj fuekZ.k ds fy, fn;k x;k FkkA ,slh fLFkfr esa fpeuh fuekZ.k esa fdlh Hkh Ádkj dh xMcM+h ds fy, ckydks] lsidks vkSj thŒMhŒlhŒ,yŒ rhuksa ,stsUlh;ka cjkcj dk ftEesnkj gksaxsA ,uŒvkbZŒVhŒ jk;iqj }kjk fn;s x;s Áfrosnu ds vk/kkj ij ,uŒlhŒlhŒchŒ,eŒ }kjk fn;k x;k fjiksZV lgh ugha gksuk ,oa muds }kjk ckydks leFkZu esa fjiksZV nsrs gq, vfHk;qDr dks dMs n.M ls cpkus ds fy, fn;k x;k fjiksZV gksuk vfHk;ksx i= ls nf’kZr gksrk gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa mudh vksj ls ÁLrqr cpko rdZ bl Lrj ij ekU; fd;s tkus ;ksX; ugha ikrkA vkjksi ds Lrj ij vfHk;kstu dh vksj ls pkyku ds lkFk ÁLrqr nLrkostksa ds voyksdu ls ÁFke n`"V;k gh vfHk;qDrx.k ds fo:) ;fn Ácy 'kadk fo|eku gS rks vkjksi fojfpr fd;k tk ldrk gSA ÁR;{k ,oa ifjfLFkfrtU; nksuksa gh ekeyksa esa vkjksi yxk;k tk ldrk gSA vkjksi dh fojpuk djrs gq, lk{; dk mRd`"V &#2338ax ls fujh{k.k ugha fd;k tk ldrkA vfHk;qDrx.k dh vksj ls cpko nLrkostksa dks lk{; ds nkSjku gh Á;qDr dh tk ldrh gS vkjksi ds nkSjku ughaA cfYd vkjksi yxus ds i'pkr crkSj cpko mls is’k fd;k tk ldrk gSA vkjksi dh fojpuk djus dh Áde ij ek= ekeys dh leh{k.kh; igyqvksa dks ns[kk tkuk gksrk gSA bl Lrj ij dksbZ lw{e lUoh{kk fd;s tkus dh vko’drk ugha gksrh gSA ;fn vkjksi dh fojpuk djus ds fy, ÁFke n`"V;k nLrkostksa ij rkfRodk fo|eku gksrh gS rc mu /kkjkvksa dk vkjksi vo’; yxk;k tkuk pkfg,A bl Ádj.k esa Hkh vfHk;kstu dh nLrkostksa ds vk/kkj ij ÁFke n`"V;k bl dk;Z ;k Kku ds lkFk fd mlls e`R;q dkfjr djuk laHkkO; gS fdUrq e`R;q ;k ,slh 'kkjhfjd {kfr ftlls e`R;q dkfjr djuk laHkkO; gS] dkfjr djus ds vk’k; ls fcuk fd;k tuk Árhr gksrk gSA bl Ádkj vfHk;qDrx.k fojky esgrk] nhid ukjax] vuqi egkik=k] ;wpquku] fy;ks xsDlu] oksx osfxax] vkyksd 'kekZ] eukst] lquhy] vfu:)] O;adVs’k] okle lsV~Vh ds fo:) /kkjk 304 HkkŒnaŒfoŒ ds laca/k esa vkjksi cuuk ik;k tkrk gS rFkk ,eŒ,eŒ vyh ,oa jkts’k dqekj ds }kjk vkjksfi;ksa dks dMs n.M ls ÁfrNkfnr djus ds fy, tkucw>dj =qfViw.kZ fjiksVZ Ásf"kr fd;k tkuk Árhr gksus ij /kkjk 201 HkkŒnaŒfoŒ ds vkjksi cuus ds i;kZIr vk/kkj gSA vr% vfHk;qDr.k dks mUekspu fd;s tkus ckcr~ fuosnu vekU; fd;k tkrk gSA Ádj.k vkjksi gsrq vUrjky i'pkr~ is’k gksA** 10. Thereafter, charge under Section 304/34 of IPC was framed by the learned trial Court against the aforementioned accused persons vide its order dated 19.06.2013. 11. Being aggrieved by both the impugned orders dated 15.04.2013 and 19.06.2013 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge, Korba, District-Korba (C.G.), the aforementioned petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and revision petitions under Sections 397/401 Cr.P.C. have been filed by the respective petitioners/revisionists. 12. Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioner, namely Deepak Narang, in CRMP No. 664/2013, vehemently argued that the present petitioner is a Mechanical Engineer and as per the terms and conditions of the contract between BALCO and SEPCO or otherwise, he was not supervising the civil construction of the Chimney No. 1 during the period when it has been alleged that there was deficiencies pointed out by BVIL. The petitioner joined the services of BALCO as Assistant Manager (Planning) on 04.08.2008. The construction of Chimney started in March 2008 by the Construction Company i.e. GDCL and even as per the prosecution case, the petitioner came into picture only after Mr. Sanjay Deb was relieved from BALCO on 10th July 2009 and all the alleged inferior construction which as per the prosecution led to the collapse of the chimney relates to a period when Mr. Sanjay Deb was in-charge of the civil construction of the company as per the prosecution itself. The prosecution has failed to place on record any document indicating that the petitioner was in charge of the civil construction of the chimney and was in any manner involved in the construction of the chimney for or on behalf of BALCO. As per the charge-sheet itself, the issue of collapse of the chimney is a technical issue. Various technical experts were involved but none of the technical reports point out that the cause of the collapse of the chimney was substandard material. The prosecution has completely overlooked the material which points out that the cause of collapse of chimney was lightening. Since the experts themselves have not been able to pin point the collapse of chimney, the continuance of the trial would be futile. 13. Mr. The prosecution has completely overlooked the material which points out that the cause of collapse of chimney was lightening. Since the experts themselves have not been able to pin point the collapse of chimney, the continuance of the trial would be futile. 13. Mr. Shrivastava further submitted that there is no material on record to indicate that during two months i.e. from 11.07.2009 till the collapse, i.e. 23.09.2009, when petitioner was coordinating in absence of Sanjay Deb there was any deficiency brought to petitioner’s knowledge by which he can said to have derived knowledge that his act was likely to cause any death or such incident. Hence, rejection of his prayer for discharge and framing of charge u/s 304 IPC is bad and perverse liable to be set aside. 14. Mr. Shrivastava also submitted that in order to sustain prima facie a charge, for the purposes of framing charge and proceeding with trial, going by the definition of offence under Section 304, in the very first place, there must be a charge of culpable homicide which has been defined in Section 299 of IPC as follows: “299. Culpable homicide - Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.” The emphasis is in the section is on the use of the words “by doing an act.....” 15. Mr. Shrivastava further submitted that the learned trial Court in the impugned order for framing charge has categorically held that there was no intention of causing death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. The question therefore arises is whether the accused Deepak Narang did “any such act” which could attribute knowledge to him of the consequences that is likely by “such act” to cause death. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Keshub Mahindra vs. State of M.P. (1996) 6 SCC 129 , wherein it has been held that if culpable homicide as defined in Section 299 is not prima facie established, that would straightaway take Section 304 away from application. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Keshub Mahindra vs. State of M.P. (1996) 6 SCC 129 , wherein it has been held that if culpable homicide as defined in Section 299 is not prima facie established, that would straightaway take Section 304 away from application. In the entire charge-sheet, no such overt act has been alleged against the petitioner of which he could have had knowledge that such act is likely to cause death. In the entire charge-sheet, and even in the impugned orders, no omission, much less illegal, unlawful or negligent has been attributed to the petitioner, Deepak Narang, who for a brief while before the unfortunate incident took place, acted as Assistant General Manager in the services of BALCO. He was not even the Site Engineer or Supervisor. The entire charge-sheet does not allege that by doing or no doing any particular act attributable to the petitioner, Deepak Narang, he had or he is deemed to have knowledge that by doing such act, he is likely to cause death. 16. Mr. Shrivastava also placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarabjeet Singh vs. State of U.P. (1984) 1 SCC 673 , wherein it has been held in Para 15 that there must be a close connection between the alleged act and the consequence of death. The entire charge-sheet does not show any material much less make an allegation of the existence of any such proximity between the alleged act and the consequence of death. Merely because the incident is tragic and many people have died, is no basis to level charge of culpable homicide against the petitioner, Deepak Narang as per Para 20 of the law laid down in Keshub Mahindra (supra). Interestingly, the impugned order framing charge holds that all the three companies are “equally responsible” for the incident which allegedly occurred on account of use of sub-standard quality of material. It is the prosecution’s own case that BALCO was not doing the construction. The question of any of its employees and in particular, the petitioner, Deepak Narang being involved in the activity of construction and the use of sub-standard construction material does not arise. It is the prosecution’s own case that BALCO was not doing the construction. The question of any of its employees and in particular, the petitioner, Deepak Narang being involved in the activity of construction and the use of sub-standard construction material does not arise. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the quality of construction was poor for any reason, there is no connection based on any material or allegation in the charge-sheet between the petitioner and the use of sub-standard quality of construction material. 17. Mr. Shrivastava also contended that the impugned order holds that the companies such as BALCO, SEPCO and GDCL are equally liable for the offence. It is not the Company but their employees who are prosecuted. No criminal liability of any offence in criminal jurisprudence can fall upon the officer. There is no concept of vicarious liability in criminal law on the officers for the acts/omissions amounting to offence of the company. In support of this contention he placed reliance on the various judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravindranath Bajpe vs. Mangalore Special Economic Zone Ltd. 2021 SCC Online SC 806, Narendra Kumar A. Baldota vs. State of Karnataka, 2022 SCC Online SC 1880, Sunil Bharti Mittal vs. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609 , Maksud Saiyed vs. State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 SCC 668 , R. Kalyani vs. Janak C. Mehta and Others, (2009) 1 SCC 516 , Sham Sunder vs. State of Haryana, (1989) 4 SCC 630 . 18. It has been further argued by Mr. Shrivastava that a perusal of the charge framed against the petitioner only mentions about “supervision” by the petitioner and Anup Mahapatre of the work of contractor and sub-contractor. However, in the charge framed as such the incident has been related with and/or attributable to “acts” of the persons who are employers of SEPCO and GDCL. Mere use of the word “supervision” without any material or allegation in the charge-sheet does not make out a case of culpable homicide against the petitioner with the meaning of Section 299 read with Section 304 of IPC. As a matter of proposition of law, mere allegation of lack of supervision or negligent/deficient supervision per se would not bring the omission in performance of supervision within the meaning of culpable homicide. The petitioner or any of the officers of BALCO were not at all involved in the construction activity. As a matter of proposition of law, mere allegation of lack of supervision or negligent/deficient supervision per se would not bring the omission in performance of supervision within the meaning of culpable homicide. The petitioner or any of the officers of BALCO were not at all involved in the construction activity. Even BALCO as a Company or any of its employees/officers could not be held vicariously liable for any alleged act of the actual persons involved in construction. He further submitted that in much serious industrial disaster, Bhopal Gas tragedy, where also the employees of the UCIL and UCC were sought to be prosecuted under Section 304 IPC, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Keshub Mahindra (supra) quashed the charge under Section 304 IPC holding as follows: “18. It was next submitted that despite the recommendations in the report of the operational Safety Survey conducted at Bhopal Plant by experts from United States during May 1982 and despite various deficiencies of serious and minor nature being pointed out no remedial steps were taken. Even during the Safety Survey leakages from MIC plant area had been noticed. Deficiency in safety valve and absence of fixed water sprayers in the MIC Plant area had been particularly pointed out. Thus the gas had leaked from the storage tank due to a chain chemical reaction. That the material led before the Trial Court at the stage of framing of charge clearly indicated that there was possibility of ingress of water and other con-taminants from the RVVH or during cleaning of the valve due to rupturing the disc valve which had resulted into this grim tragedy. It was next contended that the material led by the prosecution at this stage at least prima facie showed that all the accused were fully responsible for the conduct of the plant and they shared the criminal knowledge about the acts of commission and omission on the part of those of the accused who were actually handling the plant and supervising its working on that fateful night at Bhopal. That accused R. Choudhary, J. Mukund, S.P. Choudhary, K.V. Shelly and S.I. Qureshi who were actively associated with the working of the plant at Bhopal were directly concerned with the incident as they were in full knowledge of the deficiencies in the plant. That accused R. Choudhary, J. Mukund, S.P. Choudhary, K.V. Shelly and S.I. Qureshi who were actively associated with the working of the plant at Bhopal were directly concerned with the incident as they were in full knowledge of the deficiencies in the plant. Similarly accused Keshub, Mahindra, V.P. Gokhale and Kishore Kamdar too had full knowledge of the defects in the plant at Bhopal and therefore, they also shared the criminal liability based on criminal knowledge about the acts of commission and omission in connection with the operation of the said plant at Bhopal. That alt the accused had full knowledge of the hazardous nature of the MIC manufactured as an intermediate product in Bhopal plant, defects in the design of the plant lack of safety Measures, but -still they had taken to precautionary steps to avoid this unfortunate accident. 19. The Learned senior counsel for the appellant-accused on the other hand submitted that even if taking the material available on record at this stage on its face value the short question is whether any charge could have been framed against the accused under Section 304 Part II, IPC with or without the aid of Section 35, IPC and even for that matter any charges could have been framed under Sections 326, 324 or 429 with or without the aid of Section 35 of IPC. We may at once state that both the learned Sessions Judge as well as the High Court have taken the view on the aforesaid material that a prima facie case has been made out by the prosecution requiring accused to face the aforesaid charges and (he trial of the accused on these charges cannot be cut short or nipped in the bud in the light of the aforesaid material which has to be accepted as prima facie true and reliable at this preliminary stage of framing of charges. 20. It, therefore, become necessary for us now to address ourselves on this moot question. As noted earlier the main charge framed against all these accused is under Section 304 Part II, IPC. So far as accused Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 12 are concerned they are also charged with offences under Sections 326,324, IPC and 429 IPC read with Section 35 IPC while accused 5 to 9 are charged substantially with these offences also. As noted earlier the main charge framed against all these accused is under Section 304 Part II, IPC. So far as accused Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 12 are concerned they are also charged with offences under Sections 326,324, IPC and 429 IPC read with Section 35 IPC while accused 5 to 9 are charged substantially with these offences also. We shall first deal with the charges framed against the concerned accused under the main provisions of Section 304 Part II, IPC. A look at Section 304 Part II shows that the concerned accused can be charged under that provision for an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and when being so charged if it is alleged that the act to the concerned accused is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death the charge offences would fall under Section 304 Part II. However before any charge under Section 304 Part II can be framed, the material on record must at least prima facie show that the accused is guilty of culpable homicide and the act allegedly committed by him must amount to culpable homicide. However, if the material relied upon for framing such a charge against the concerned accused falls short of even prima facie indicating that the accused appeared to be guilty of an offence of culpable homicide Section 304 Part I or Part II would get put of the picture. In this connection we have to keep in view Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code which defines culpable homicide. It lays down that: “Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.” Consequently the material relied upon by the prosecution for framing a charge under Section 304 Part II must at least prima fade indicate that the accused had done an act which had caused death with at least such a knowledge that he was by such act likely to cause death. The entire material which the prosecution relied upon before the Trial Court for framing the charge and to which we have made a detailed reference earlier, in our view, cannot support such a charge unless it indicates prim a facie that on that fateful night when the plant was run at Bhopal it was run by the concerned accused with the knowledge that such running of the plant was likely to cause deaths of human beings. It cannot be disputed that mere act of running a plant as per the permission granted by the authorities would not be a criminal act. Even assuming that it was a defective plant and it was dealing with a very toxic and hazardous substance like MIC the mere act of storing such a material by the accused in tank No. 610 could not even prima facie suggest that the concerned accused thereby had knowledge that they were likely to cause death of human beings. In fairness to prosecution it was not suggested and could not be suggested that the accused had an intention to kill any human being while operating the plant. Similarly on the aforesaid material placed on record it could not be even prima facie suggested by the prosecution that any of the accused had a knowledge that by operating the plant on that fateful night whereat such dangerous and highly volatile substance like MIC was stored they had the knowledge that by this very act itself they were likely to cause death of any human being. Consequently in our view taking the entire material as aforesaid on its face value and assuming it to represent correct factual position in connection with the operation of the plant at Bhopal on that fateful night it could not be said that the said material even prima facie called for framing of a charge against the concerned accused under Section 304 Part II, IPC on the spacious plea the said act of the accused amounted to culpable homicide only because the operation of the plant on that night ultimately resulted in deaths of number of human beings and cattle. It is also pertinent to note that when the complaint was originally filed suo motu by the police authorities at Bhopal and the criminal case was registered at the police station Hanumanganj, Bhopal as case No, 1104/84 it was registered under Section 304-A of the IPC. It is also pertinent to note that when the complaint was originally filed suo motu by the police authorities at Bhopal and the criminal case was registered at the police station Hanumanganj, Bhopal as case No, 1104/84 it was registered under Section 304-A of the IPC. We will come to that provision a little later. Suffice it to say at this stage that on the entire material produced by the prosecution in support of the charge it could not be said even prima facie that it made the accused liable to face the charge under Section 304 Part II. In this connection we may refer to a decision of the Calcutta High Court to which our attention was drawn by learned senior counsel Shri Rajendra Singh for the appellants. In the case of Adam Ali Taluqdar and Others vs. King Emperor, AIR 1927 Calcutta 324 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court made the following pertinent observations while interpreting Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC: “Although to constitute an offence under S. 304, Part 2, there must be no intention of causing death or such injury as the offender knew was likely to cause death, there must still be a common intention to do an act with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death though without the intention of causing death. Each pf the assailants may know that the act, they are jointly doing, is one that is likely to cause death but have no intention of causing death, yet they may certainly have the common intention to do that act and therefore S. 34 can apply to a case Under S. 304, Part 2.” Once we reach the conclusion that the material produced by the prosecution before the Trial Court at the stage of framing of charges did not even prima fade connect the accused with any act done with the knowledge that by that act itself deaths of human beings would be caused the accused could not be even charged for culpable homicide and consequently there would be no question of attracting Section 304 Part II against the concerned accused on such material. When on the material produced by the prosecution no charge could be framed against any of the accused under Section 304 Part II there would remain no occasion to press in service the applicability of Section 35, (PC in support of such a charge for those accused who were not actually concerned with the running of the plant at Bhopal, namely, accused Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 12. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 22. However this is not the end of the matter. There still remains the question as to whether any other charge can be framed against the concerned accused for any of the offences under the Indian Penal Code on the basis of the very same material relied upon by the prosecution for framing appropriate charges against the accused. It is true that though Originally the criminal case was registered for an offence under Section 304-A of the IPC the Central Bureau of Investigation which took up the investigation thought it proper to press in service Section 304 Part II and Sections 324, 326 and 429 of the IPC. Charges under these Sections have been found by us to be unsustainable on the material produced by the prosecution on record in support of these charges. However that does not mean that on the material as it stands on record the accused cannot even prima facie be alleged to have committed any criminal offence for which they can be called upon to face the trial and that they should get a clean chit and clear walk-over. In our view the prosecution on the material as aforesaid had made out a prima facie case against the accused for being tried under Section 304-A of the IPC which reads as under: “304-A. Causing death by negligence - Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for the term which may extend to two years, or fine, or with both.” On our finding that the material pressed in service by the prosecution does not indicate even prima facie that the accused were guilty of an offence of culpable homicide and, therefore, Section 304 Part II was out of picture, Section 304-A on this very finding can straightaway get attracted at least prima-facie......” 19. Mr. Mr. Shrivastava also contended that setting criminal law into motion is a very serious matter and direct infringement of the fundamental right of freedom and liberty of the accused. He relied on the judgment passed by the Apex Court in Narendra Kumar A. Baldota vs. State of Karnataka, (2022) SCC Online SC 1880. He further submitted that in the case of Rajiv Thapar vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has gone a step ahead and said even the defence materials can be seen (See Para 29, 30). However, the petitioner’s submission is, to repeat, that taking all of the prosecution’s story narrated in the charge-sheet and culled out in the impugned order, on its face value, even remotely, no prima-facie charge of Section 304/34 IPC is made out against the petitioner. It is, therefore, humbly prayed that the entire charge-sheet filed against the petitioner resulting in impugned order dated 15.04.2013 and framing of charge dated 19.06.2013 be quashed in the interest of justice. 20. With regard to charge under Section 34 of the IPC, Mr. Shrivastava submitted that as per the charge-sheet and the charge framed against the petitioner, he is not the principal offender of the alleged crime under Section 304 IPC. There is no material much less as allegation in the charge-sheet accusing the petitioner of having common intention, which is sine qua non for invoking Section 34 of IPC. It is not the prosecution’s story in the charge-sheet that the particular act (culpable homicide) was done by several persons meaning thereby all the accused persons, “in furtherance of common intention of all.” 21. Mr. Abhishek Sinha, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the accused/petitioner- Anup Mahapatre in CRMP No. 665 of 2013 adopts the argument of Mr. It is not the prosecution’s story in the charge-sheet that the particular act (culpable homicide) was done by several persons meaning thereby all the accused persons, “in furtherance of common intention of all.” 21. Mr. Abhishek Sinha, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the accused/petitioner- Anup Mahapatre in CRMP No. 665 of 2013 adopts the argument of Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate and in addition he submitted that specific conditions of the contract, which is part of the prosecution document though the specific agreement in a piece of paper, obligates that all the safety, supervision is the responsibility of the SEPCO and as per SEPCO contract, it is the responsibility of GDCL and there is nothing on record except the statements recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. of Devashish Goswami (Employee of BVIL), Jyotikrit Dhal (Safety Engineer of BVIL) and Raul Pandey (Surveyor in BVIL) which does not show that the petitioner has the knowledge that it will cause death, and therefore, no offence under Section 304/34 IPC is made out. 22. Ms. Sharmila Singhai, learned Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of revisionists Liu Gaoxuan (CRR No. 450/2013), Wu Chuannan (CRR No. 448/2013) and Wang Weiging (CRR No. 451/2013), submitted that M/s Bharat Aluminium Company Limited entered into a Memorandum of Undertaking dated 07.10.2006 with the Government of Chhattisgarh for establishing 1200 MW Thermal Power Plant. Pursuant to MOU, BALCO being desirous of procuring, setting up and bringing into commercial operation a coal power plant at Balco, Korba, entered an engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract with the SEPCO Power Construction on 20.08.2007. Amongst other the said project included construction of two chimney of the height of 275 meters each and in pursuance to the contract given by the SEPCO, the chimney was being constructed by GDCL as per the specifications mentioned therein. The chimney was to be constructed up to the height of 275 meters to meet with the environmental norms and it was well constructed up to the height of 248 meters under the supervision of DCPL (Indian Company - Development Consultant Private Limited) and BVIL (French Company - Bureau Vertile of India Limited) appointed/engaged by BALCO. 23. Ms. The chimney was to be constructed up to the height of 275 meters to meet with the environmental norms and it was well constructed up to the height of 248 meters under the supervision of DCPL (Indian Company - Development Consultant Private Limited) and BVIL (French Company - Bureau Vertile of India Limited) appointed/engaged by BALCO. 23. Ms. Singhai further submitted that completion of each phase of work required a SIR (surveillance Intelligence Report) from above two supervisory company and without getting such SIR work cannot be started for new phase thus the entire work is going by GDCL under the inspection of BVIL and DCPL. On 23rd September 2009 at around 3.30 pm, there were strong winds accompanied by heavy rain and lightening which affected the chimney during which it collapsed resulting into loss of 40 human lives and injuries to several employees working at that time. The First Information Report bearing no. 377/2009 was lodged at Police Station, Balco and at the time Chimney was collapsed, Mr. Wu Chuannan, Project Manager of SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corporation was in China and getting the news of Chimney collapsed, he returned back to Bharat and participated in the investigation. After completion of the investigation the charge-sheet was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class against 4 accused persons namely Manoj Sharma, Deepak Narang, Viral Mehta and Anup Mahapatra. 24. Ms. Singhai also submitted that the samples of collapsed chimney were sent to National Council for Cement and Building Material (NCCBM), Ballabhgarh for report regarding reasons and causes of collapse and the report was favourable to the accused persons then the investigating Agency arrayed the scientists of Ballabhgarh Institute and the samples were sent to National Institute of Technology (NIT) who gave the report in favour the Investigating Agency then the supplementary Charge-sheet was filed against the present revisionists, Scientist of Ballabhgarh Institute and employees of GDCL. The Criminal Case No. 78/2010 was triable by Sessions Judge, so it was committed to the learned Session Judge Korba and it was made over to the learned Additional Session Judge for adjudication of the case. The case is pending before the learned Additional Session Judge as Session Trial No. 16/2010. 25. Ms. Singhai further contended that the revisionists have various reports on causes of collapse of Chimney, prepared and given by the various institutes of technology. The case is pending before the learned Additional Session Judge as Session Trial No. 16/2010. 25. Ms. Singhai further contended that the revisionists have various reports on causes of collapse of Chimney, prepared and given by the various institutes of technology. The reports show that on 23rd September 2009 at around 3.30 pm, there were strong winds accompanied by heavy rain and lightening which affected the chimney during which it collapsed. It is clear from the reports that the present revisionists have not committed any offence as alleged by the Investigating Agency. The revisionists preferred the reports on causes of collapse of chimney given by the various institutes of technology before the learned trial court which are as follows: (i) Report dated 23.10.2009 by Dr. S.N. Sinha, Professor, Civil Engineering Department, New Delhi. (ii) Report dated 20.11.2009 by Shri Ravindra Arora, Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur. (iii) Report dated 23.02.2011 by Dr. Pradipta Banerji, Professor, Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay. (iv) Expert analysis of BALCO Chimney Collapse by Vladimir A. Rakov, Ph.D. Professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of Florida (UF) and Co-Director of the International Center for Lightning Research and Testing (ICLRT) dated February 12, 2011. Thus it is clear that the present revisionists were neither present at the spot nor they have direct role attributed in the crime in question and vicarious liability cannot be shifted upon the revisionists for committing an offence under section 304, 34 Indian Penal Code. 26. Ms. Singhai also contended that looking the entire incident, there were no culpable homicide but due to act of God such a fateful incident occurred and for an offence under section 304 of Indian Penal Code - an accused must have done an act which caused death of a person with the knowledge that by such act he was likely to cause death, thus in the present case ingredients of section 304 would not be attracted and therefore due to lack of knowledge, intention or negligence on the part of the revisionists, they are entitled to be discharged. She placed reliance on judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Keshub Mahindra (supra), Nitinchandra Somnath Raval vs. State of Gujarat and Others, (2019) 14 SCC 676 and Central Bureau of Investigation and Others vs. Keshub Mahindra and Others, (2011) 6 SCC 216 and a judgment passed by this Court in the matter of M.K. Khan vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2009 SCC Online Chh. 421. 27. On the other hand, Ms. Madhunisha Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondent, opposed the aforesaid submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners/revisionists and submitted that an under construction chimney was being collapsed because of strong wind and the negligence and bad quality of contraction without proper safety measures by the officers of BALCO, SEPCO and GDCL because of that 40 poor labourers were crushed under the debris and number of persons were have been injured. During investigation, it was found that the officers of GDCL, the sub Contractor and the Chinese Company engaged in the construction of the said Chimney SEPCO along with the officers of BALCO management, who were responsible for the supervision and safety measure in the site and to check constriction quality have knowledge that Chimney will collapse at any time and will cause huge loss of life and property, despite of that they continued the work and not taken any care in the construction quality or in the work site. 28. Ms. Singh further submitted that during the investigation Section 161 Statements of Devashish Goswami (Employee of BVIL), Jyotikrit Dhal (Safety Engineer of BVIL) and Rahul Pandey (Surveyor in BVIL) were recorded and they have categorically stated the names of Deepak Narang, Anup Mahapatre and officers of Chinese Company engaged in the construction of said Chimney. BVIL (Buro Beritas India Limited) is the Company engaged by the BALCO to check the quality of construction work. Devashish Goswami (Employee of BVIL) in his statement record under Section 161 stated that all responsibility of compliance was vested with his Client i.e. BALCO Management and the construction site officer of BALCO is AGM Engineer in Charge Deepak Narang, Site Engineer Anup Mahapatre along with them officer of GDCL Stroni Singh and Engineer of Chinese Company SEPCO used to present at the Chimney point. Jyotikrit Dhal (Safety Engineer of BVIL) stated in her statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that as per her knowledge, BALCO had not taken any safety plan regarding the security or emergency or rescue measures at the Chimney site. Rahul Pandey (Surveyor in BVIL) in his statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. stated that the construction site officer of BALCO AGM Engineer in Charge Deepak Narang, Site Engineer Anup Mahapatre along with them officers of GDCL Stroni Singh and Engineer of Chinese Company SEPCO used to present at the Chimney point. 29. Ms. Singh also submitted that the learned Trial Court while framing the charge against the present accused categorically and prima facie found that the Officer of the BALCO were responsible for the quality check and supervision of the work as per agreement and the contract of the work was allotted to the Company named SEPCO and they sub delegated the work to one GDCL. The construction site officer of BALCO is AGM Engineer in Charge Deepak Narang, Site Engineer Anup Mahapatre along with them officers of GDCL Stroni Singh and Engineer of Chinese Company SEPCO used to present at the Chimney point, if any mismanagement or misshaping in the construction of the Chimney found, then the officer of BALCO, GDCL and SPECO were equally liable. The report submitted by the NIT Raipur in favour of BALCO was not correct, it is submitted only to save the officer responsible for such misshaping. Thus, she submitted that the present accused officers of the BALCO, GDCL and SPECO were accused of chimney collapsed and liable to face trial Under Section 304/34 I.P.C. and the prima facie case of 304/34 of IPC is made out against them. She placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Sushil Ansal vs. State through Central Bureau of Investigation, (2014) 6 SCC 173 (Uphaar Cinema Case), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court dealt with the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 304-A IPC and held as follows: “80. We may now advert to the second and an equally, if not, more important dimension of the offence punishable under Section 304-A IPC, viz. that the act of the accused must be the proximate, immediate or efficient cause of the death of the victim without the intervention of any other person’s negligence. We may now advert to the second and an equally, if not, more important dimension of the offence punishable under Section 304-A IPC, viz. that the act of the accused must be the proximate, immediate or efficient cause of the death of the victim without the intervention of any other person’s negligence. This aspect of the legal requirement is also settled by a long line of decisions of Courts in this country. We may at the outset refer to a Division Bench decision of the High Court of Bombay in Emperor vs. Omkar Rampratap, (1902) 4 Bom. L.R. 679 where Sir Lawrence Jenkins speaking for the Court summed up the legal position in the following words: “.....to impose criminal liability under Section 304-A, Indian Penal Code, it is necessary that the act should have been the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the accused and that act must be proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another negligence. It must have been the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the causa sine qua non.” The above statement of law was accepted by this Court in Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli Rangawalla vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 1616 . We shall refer to the facts of this case a little later especially because Mr. Jethmalani, learned Counsel for the appellant-Sushil Ansal, placed heavy reliance upon the view this Court has taken in the fact situation of that case. 81. Suffice it to say that this Court has in Kurban Hussein’s case (supra) accepted in unequivocal terms the correctness of the proposition that criminal liability under Section 304-A of the IPC shall arise only if the prosecution proves that the death of the victim was the result of a rash or negligent act of the accused and that such act was the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another person’s negligence. A subsequent decision of this Court in Suleman Rahiman Mulani v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1968 SC 829 has once again approved the view taken in Omkar Rampratap’s case (supra) that the act of the accused must be proved to be the causa causans and not simply a causa sine qua non for the death of the victim in a case under Section 304-A of the IPC. To the same effect are the decisions of this Court in Rustom Sherior Irani vs. State of Maharashtra, 1969 ACJ 70 , Balchandra @ Bapu and Another vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 1319 , Kishan Chand vs. State of Haryana, (1970) 3 SCC 904 , S.N. Hussain vs. State of A.P. (1972) 3 SCC 18 , Ambalal D. Bhatt vs. State of Gujarat, (1972) 3 SCC 525 and Jacob Mathew’s case (supra). 82. To sum up: for an offence under Section 304-A to be proved it is not only necessary to establish that the accused was either rash or grossly negligent but also that such rashness or gross negligence was the causa causans that resulted in the death of the victim. 83. As to what is meant by causa causans we may gainfully refer to Black’s Law Dictionary (Fifth Edition) which defines that expression as under: “Causa causans - The immediate cause; the last link in the chain of causation.” The Advance Law Lexicon edited by Justice Chandrachud, former Chief Justice of India defines Causa Causans as follows: Causa causans - The immediate cause as opposed to a remote cause; the ‘last link in the chain of causation’ the real effective cause of damage.” 84. The expression “proximate cause” is defined in the 5th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary as under: “That which in a natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Wisniewski vs. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company 226 Pa. Super 574, 323 A2d, 7744 (1974), A2d at p. 748. That which is nearest in the order of responsible causation. That which stands next in causation to the effect, not necessarily in time or space but in causal relation. The proximate cause of an injury is the primary or moving cause, or that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the accident could not have happened, if the injury be one which might be reasonably anticipated or foreseen as a natural consequence of the wrongful act. The proximate cause of an injury is the primary or moving cause, or that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the accident could not have happened, if the injury be one which might be reasonably anticipated or foreseen as a natural consequence of the wrongful act. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act, or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.” xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 125. We have at some length dealt with the ingredients of an offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC in the earlier part of this judgment. One of those ingredients indeed is that the rash or negligent act of the accused ought to be the direct, immediate and proximate cause of the death. We have in that regard referred to the decisions of this Court to which we need not refer again. The principle of law that death must be shown to be the direct, immediate and proximate result of the rash or negligent act is well accepted and not in issue before us as an abstract proposition. What is argued and what falls for our determination is whether the causa causans in the case at hand was the fire in the DVB transformer as argued by the defence or the failure of the victims to rapidly exit from the balcony area. Two aspects in this connection need be borne in mind. 125.1. The first is that the victims in the instant case did not die of burn injuries. All of them died because of asphyxiation on account of prolonged exposure to poisonous gases that filled the cinema hall including the balcony area. Fire, whatever may have been its source, whether from the DVB transformer or otherwise, was the causa sine qua non for without fire there would be no smoke possible and but for smoke in the balcony area there would have been no casualities. Fire, whatever may have been its source, whether from the DVB transformer or otherwise, was the causa sine qua non for without fire there would be no smoke possible and but for smoke in the balcony area there would have been no casualities. That is not, however, the same thing as saying that it was the fire or the resultant smoke that was the causa causans. It was the inability of the victims to move out of the smoke filled area that was the direct cause of their death. Placed in a smoke filled atmosphere any one would distinctively try to escape from it to save himself. If such escape were to be delayed or prevented the causa causans for death is not the smoke but the factors that prevent or delay such escape. Let us assume for instance that even when there are adequate number of exits, gangways and all other safety measures in place but the exits are locked preventing people from escaping. The cause of death would in such case be the act of preventing people from exiting from the smoke filled hall, which may depending upon whether the act was deliberately intended to cause death or unintended due to negligence, amount to culpable homicide amounting to murder or an act of gross negligence punishable under Section 304A. Similarly take a case where instead of four exits required under the relevant Rules, the owner of a cinema provides only one exit, which prevents the patrons from exiting rapidly from the smoke filled atmosphere, the causa causans would be the negligent act of providing only one exit instead of four required for the purpose. It would in such circumstances make no difference whether the fire had started from a source within the cinema complex or outside, or whether the occupiers of the cinema were responsible for the fire or someone else. The important question to ask is what the immediate cause of the death was. If failure to exit was the immediate cause of death nothing further need be considered for that would constitute the causa causans. That is what happened in the case at hand. Smoke entered the cinema hall and the balcony but escape was prevented or at least delayed because of breach of the common law and statutory duty to care. 125.2. If failure to exit was the immediate cause of death nothing further need be considered for that would constitute the causa causans. That is what happened in the case at hand. Smoke entered the cinema hall and the balcony but escape was prevented or at least delayed because of breach of the common law and statutory duty to care. 125.2. The second aspect is that while the rash or negligent act of the accused must be the causa causans for the death, the question whether and if so what was the causa causans in a given case, would depend upon the fact situation in which the occurrence has taken place and the question arises. This Court has viewed the causa causans in each decided case, in the facts and circumstances of that case. If Hatim’s failure to stir the hot wet paint while Rosin was being poured into it was held to be causa causans, in Kurban Hussein’s case (supra), the failure of the motorist to look ahead and see a pedestrian crossing the road even when the motorist was driving within the speed limit prescribed was held to be the causa causans for the death in Bhalchandra Waman Pathe vs. State of Maharashtra (supra). In Bhalchandra @ Bapu and Another vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) where an explosion in a factory manufacturing crackers claimed lives, this Court found that use of explosives with sensitive compositions was the immediate cause of the explosion that killed those working in the factory. In Rustom Sherior Irani’s case (supra), this Court found the new chimney of the Bakery was being erected without the advice of a properly qualified person and that the factory owner was responsible for neglect that caused the explosion and not the mason employed by him for erecting the chimney. The decision in Kurban Hussein’s case (supra) was cited but distinguished on facts holding that the choice of the low diameter pipe and engaging a mere mason not properly qualified for doing the job were the cause of the accident resulting in causalities. 126. It is in that view, not correct to say that the causa causans in the present case ought to be determined by matching the colours of this case with those of Kurban Hussein’s case (supra). 126. It is in that view, not correct to say that the causa causans in the present case ought to be determined by matching the colours of this case with those of Kurban Hussein’s case (supra). The ratio of that case lies not in the peculiar facts in which the question arose but on the statement of law which was borrowed from the judgment of Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor vs. Omkar Rampratap (supra). The principle of law enunciated in that case is not under challenge and indeed was fairly conceded by Mr. Salve and Mr. Tulsi. What they argued was that when applied to the facts proved in the present case, the causa causans was not the fire in the transformer but the breaches committed by the occupiers of the cinema which prevented or at least delayed rapid dispersal of the patrons thereby fatally affecting them because of carbon monoxide laden gas in the smoke filling the atmosphere. The causa causans indeed was the closure of the exit on the right side, the closure of the right side gangway, the failure to provide the required number of exits, failure to provide emergency alarm system and even emergency lights or to keep the exit signs illuminated and to provide help to the victims when they needed the same most, all attributable to Ansal brothers, the occupiers of the cinema. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the argument of Mr. Jethmalani, which he presented with commendable clarity, persuasive skill and tenacity at his command.” 30. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and perused the records with utmost circumspection. 31. In the instant case, accused petitioners/revisionists have been charged for offence under Section 304/34 of the IPC. Section 304 reads as under: “304. Jethmalani, which he presented with commendable clarity, persuasive skill and tenacity at his command.” 30. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and perused the records with utmost circumspection. 31. In the instant case, accused petitioners/revisionists have been charged for offence under Section 304/34 of the IPC. Section 304 reads as under: “304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder - Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Section 34 reads as under: “34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention - When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.” 32. In the instant case, M/s BALCO entered into a Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU) dated 07.10.2006 with the Government of Chhattisgarh for establishing 1200 MW Thermal Power Plant. Pursuant to MOU, BALCO being desirous of procuring, setting up and bringing into commercial operation of a 4 x 300 MW coal power plant at BALCO, Korba, Chhattisgarh entered an engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract with the SEPCO on 20.08.2007. The scope of the work under the contract was to provide certain technical services including design, engineering and supervision of erection, testing and commissioning, demonstration of performance, guarantee and comprehensive project management services in a fully coordinated manner. Amongst other the said project included construction of two chimney of the height of 275 meters each. Consequent to the EPC contract, on 08.08.2008, SEPCO entered into a turnkey contract for construction of the 2 chimney with Gannon Dunkerley and Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as GDCL). Amongst other the said project included construction of two chimney of the height of 275 meters each. Consequent to the EPC contract, on 08.08.2008, SEPCO entered into a turnkey contract for construction of the 2 chimney with Gannon Dunkerley and Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as GDCL). In pursuance to the contract given by the SEPCO, the chimney was being constructed by GDCL as per the specifications mentioned therein. The chimney was to be constructed up to the height of 275 meters to meet with the environmental norms and it was well constructed up to the height of 248 meters. On 23rd September 2009 at around 3.30 pm, there were strong winds accompanied by heavy rain and lightening which affected the chimney during which it collapsed resulting into loss of lives of 40 labourers and injuries to several employees working at that time. During investigation, it was found that the officers of GDCL, the sub Contractor and the Chinese Company engaged in the construction of the said Chimney SEPCO along with the officers of BALCO management, who were responsible for the supervision and safety measure in the site and to check construction quality have knowledge that Chimney will collapse at any time and will cause huge loss of life and property, despite of that they continued the work and not taken any care in the construction quality or in the work site and as such, all the three companies are found to be equally liable for the said incident. 33. It is settled law that while framing of charge, appreciation of evidence is not required and at that stage, it is also not desirable for weighing the pros and cons of all the implications of the material, nor for shifting the materials placed by the prosecution and the only thing which needs to be considered is whether there is existence of ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. 34. The Supreme Court in the matter of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2018) 16 SCC 299 has held that interference in the order framing charges or refusing to discharge is called for in the rarest of rare case only to correct the patent error of jurisdiction. 35. 34. The Supreme Court in the matter of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2018) 16 SCC 299 has held that interference in the order framing charges or refusing to discharge is called for in the rarest of rare case only to correct the patent error of jurisdiction. 35. The Supreme Court in the matter of Munna Devi vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 9 SCC 631 has held as under: “3......The revision power under the Code of Criminal procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts are required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first information report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged.” 36. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Vijayan vs. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 , while dealing with the similar issue, observed as follows: “15. In a recent decision, in the case of Soma Chakravarty v. State through CBI, (2007) 5 SCC 403 this Court has held that the settled legal position is that if on the basis of material on record the Court could form an opinion it can frame the charges, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. At the time of framing of the charges the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true. Before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. Whether, in fact, the accused committed the offence, can only be decided in the trial. Before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. Whether, in fact, the accused committed the offence, can only be decided in the trial. Charge may although be directed to be framed when there exists a strong suspicion but it is also trite that the Court must come to a prima facie finding that there exist some materials there for suspicion along, without anything more, cannot form the basis therefore or held to be sufficient for framing charge.” 37. In the matter of Manendra Prasad Tiwari vs. Amit Kumar Tiwari and Others, 2022 SCC Online SC 1057, it has been held that the scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. to quash the charges framed by the trial court, the principle is reiterated that at this stage, the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for “presuming” that the accused has committed an offence and only form an opinion whether there is strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence and the relevant paras read as under: “21. The law is well settled that although it is open to a High Court entertaining a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. or a revision application under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the charges framed by the trial court, yet the same cannot be done by weighing the correctness or sufficiency of the evidence. In a case praying for quashing of the charge, the principle to be adopted by the High Court should be that if the entire evidence produced by the prosecution is to be believed, would it constitute an offence or not. The truthfulness, the sufficiency and acceptability of the material produced at the time of framing of a charge can be done only at the stage of trial. To put it more succinctly, at the stage of charge the Court is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied that prima facie case of commission of offence alleged has been made out against the accused person. To put it more succinctly, at the stage of charge the Court is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied that prima facie case of commission of offence alleged has been made out against the accused person. It is also well settled that when the petition is filed by the accused under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or a revision Petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C. seeking for the quashing of charge framed against him, the Court should not interfere with the order unless there are strong reasons to hold that in the interest of justice and to avoid abuse of the process of the Court a charge framed against the accused needs to be quashed. Such an order can be passed only in exceptional cases and on rare occasions. It is to be kept in mind that once the trial court has framed a charge against an accused the trial must proceed without unnecessary interference by a superior court and the entire evidence from the prosecution side should be placed on record. Any attempt by an accused for quashing of a charge before the entire prosecution evidence has come on record should not be entertained sans exceptional cases. 22. The scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. has been time and again explained by this Court. Further, the scope of interference under Section 397 Cr.P.C. at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also well settled. At the stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with the proof of the allegation rather it has to focus on the material and form an opinion whether there is strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which if put to trial, could prove his guilt. The framing of charge is not a stage, at which stage the final test of guilt is to be applied. Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge, the court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold something which is neither permissible nor is in consonance with the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure. 24. Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge, the court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold something which is neither permissible nor is in consonance with the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure. 24. It is useful to refer to judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 , where the scope of Section 397 Cr.P.C. has been succinctly considered and explained. Para 12 and 13 resply are as follows: “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinize the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. “13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the Cr.P.C.” 25. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the Cr.P.C.” 25. The Court in Para 27 has recorded its conclusion and laid down the principles to be considered for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of quashing of charge framed under Section 228 Cr.P.C. Paras 27, 27(1), (2), (3), (9), (13) resply are extracted as follows: 27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be: 27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 27.9. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima-facie....” 26. This Court in the case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605 , observed in Para 25 as under: “25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for “presuming” that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction. 27. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for “presuming” that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction. 27. In State of Maharashtra vs. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court explained the meaning of the word “presume.” Referring to the dictionary meanings of the said word, the Court observed thus: 32.....if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the Court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has commuted the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage.” 38. Looking to the sufficient material and evidence produced by the prosecution the learned trial Court has framed charges against the present petitioners/revisionists, which is just and proper, therefore, the impugned order does not call for any interference by this Court, hence quashing of the same is hereby rejected. 39. In the instant case, as specific allegation has been made by the prosecution against the present petitioners/revisionists and even supporting evidence are also available on record, I am of the opinion that prima facie, it cannot be said that no offence is made out against the petitioners/revisionists. The prosecution has to be permitted to lead evidence against the petitioners/revisionists as 40 persons have lost their lives and several others were injured in the said incident. The case laws cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners/revisionists are distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case, hence is no help to them. 40. The prosecution has to be permitted to lead evidence against the petitioners/revisionists as 40 persons have lost their lives and several others were injured in the said incident. The case laws cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners/revisionists are distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case, hence is no help to them. 40. In view of the foregoing reasons and considering the principle of law laid down by the Apex Court in Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Munna Devi (supra), P. Vijayan (supra) and Manendra Prasad Tiwari (supra), with respect to framing of charge and the scope of this Court for interference at the stage of framing of charge by trial Court, I do not find any good ground for interference by this Court for quashing of the impugned order as well as proceeding arising thereof against the petitioners/revisionists. 41. The instant petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and revisions under Section 397/401 of Cr.P.C. are, accordingly, dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 42. Considering the fact that the incident is of 23.09.2009 and the trial is pending from the year 2010 and more than 13 years have lapsed, the present case has not been brought to its logical end because of the interim order passed by this Court, hence the trial Court is directed to expedite the trial expeditiously and conclude the same in accordance with law preferably within a period of one year from the date of production of a certified copy of this order without granting unnecessary adjournments to the parties, if there is no legal impediment. 43. Registrar (Judicial) is directed to send a copy of this order to the concerned trial Court for necessary information and compliance forthwith.