JUDGMENT : T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, J. 1. Challenging the award and decree dated 24.07.2013 in M.V.O.P. No. 333 of 2008 passed by the Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-IV Additional District Judge, Tirupati, (for short “the tribunal”) the second respondent, M/s. United India Insurance Company Limited, Divisional Manager, Tirupati, Chittoor District, has preferred the appeal, vide M.A.C.M.A. No. 125 of 2014, questioning the liability fastened on it. On the other hand, the claimants have preferred the appeal, vide M.A.C.M.A. No. 565 of 2022, seeking enhancement of compensation. 2. For convenience, the parties will hereinafter be referred to as arrayed in the M.V.O.P. 3. The claimants had filed an application under Section 166 (1) (c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1989, claiming compensation of Rs.20,00,000/- on account of the death of R. Hema Kumar (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 13.04.2008. 4. The claimant’s case is that on 13.04.2008 at 10.45 a.m., the deceased was a rider of the two-wheeler bearing R. No. TN 20 AF 9383 and his friend, Jyothi, as a pillion rider, were proceeding from Uthukottai to Kalki Bhagavan Ashramam near Varadaiahpalem. When they reached near Tirupati-Mudaliar mango garden, Palagunta, on Sathyavedu- Varadaiahpalem main road, a lorry bearing R.No. ABW 4819, hereinafter referred to as “the offending vehicle”, driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner, came in the opposite direction dashed against the motorcycle, due to which the deceased and Jyothi fell on the road, sustained multiple injuries and died on the spot. Based on the complaint, a case in crime No. 14 of 2008 for the offence under Section 304-A of I.P.C. against the driver of the offending vehicle. The deceased was 27 years old, hale and healthy. It is further averred that the deceased did his B.B.A. degree course at Madras University and diploma course in C.S.C. computer education in computer application and also underwent a training course in Honours Diploma in Computer Hardware in Government of India Small Scale Industries Development Organisation, Chennai and he was working as System Administrator at Prathyusha Institute of Technology and Management, Aranvoyalkuppal and drawing a salary of Rs.16,275/- and was contributing the same to the welfare of the claimants. The claimants are the parents of the deceased. 5. The claimants are the parents of the deceased. 5. The first respondent, the owner of the offending vehicle, appeared through his counsel and filed a written statement denying the material averments, including the age, occupation and earnings of the deceased; the offending vehicle was insured with the second respondent, and the policy was in force as of the date of the accident. At the time of the accident, the rider of the motorcycle drove it in a rash and negligent manner at high speed and dashed against the vehicle. The accident occurred due to the rash and negligent manner on the part of the deceased’s motorcycle. It is further contended that the motorcycle was not insured by any insurance company, and there was no policy by the accident date. Therefore, the claimants are not entitled to compensation. 6. The second respondent, the insurer of the offending vehicle, filed its counter on similar lines to the counter filed by the first respondent and further submitted that the offending vehicle was plied without any permit and registration in violation of the terms and conditions of the policy and prayed to dismiss the claim petition. 7. Based on the pleadings, the Tribunal framed relevant issues. To substantiate their claim, on behalf of the claimants, P.Ws.1 to 3 got examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.13; on behalf of the respondents, RWs. 1 to 3 got examined and marked Exs.B.1 to B.4; and also marked Exs.X.1, X.1(a) and X.2 through the witnesses. 8. After appreciation of the evidence on record, the Tribunal, while answering issue No. 1, held that the accident in question occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle’s driver; while answering issue No. 2, the Tribunal awarded compensation Rs.16,95,050/- payable by respondents 1 and 2 jointly and severally together with proportionate costs and the second respondent is permitted to recover the compensation from the first respondent by initiating execution proceeding, after payment to the claimants. 9. Learned counsel for the claimants/appellants in M.A.C.M.A. No. 565 of 2022 contend that the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate the evidence on record properly and failed to consider the monthly earnings of Rs.16,275/- future prospects and the multiplier and also failed to notice that there is no bar to award more compensation than the amount claimed by the claimants and sought for enhancement of compensation. 10. 10. Learned counsel for the insurer/ appellants in M.A.C.M.A. No. 125 of 2014 contends that the Tribunal erred in directing the second respondent to pay the compensation at the first instance and then recover the same from the first respondent. The Tribunal should have seen that the first respondent could not pay the compensation amount at the first instance and the recovery from the first respondent. The learned Tribunal should have seen that since there is contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, the claim petitioners are not entitled to the compensation amount. The Tribunal should have noticed that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is highly excessive. 11. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for both parties. I have carefully perused the record. 12. Now the points for consideration are: (I) Is the Tribunal justified in holding that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle’s driver? (II) Is the Tribunal justified in directing the insurance company to pay and recover the compensation from the 1st respondent despite holding that the offending vehicle’s driver had a fake driving licence? (III) Is the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal just and reasonable and requires modification? POINTS I & II: (a) The evidence adduced on behalf of the claimants that the deceased died due to the injuries sustained in the accident is not disputed. To prove the deceased’s death due to the injuries, the claimants relied on Ex.A.1-certified copy of F.I.R. Ex.A.2-certified copy of charge sheet, Ex.A.3-certified copy of inquest report and Ex.A.4-certified copy of postmortem report. These documents clearly show that the deceased died due to the injuries sustained in the accident. The claimants mainly relied on the evidence of PW-2, C.R. Venkatesam, to prove the aspect of negligence and rashness on the part of the offending vehicle’s driver. (b) During the evidence, PW-2 deposed that on 13.04.2008 at 10.45 a.m. he and K. Madhusudan Naidu were proceeding to Sathyavedu from their village Palagunta on his two-wheeler and at the same time, the deceased along with pillion rider-Jyothi were proceeding on a two-wheeler on the extreme left side of the road. When they reached Tirupati-Mudaliar mango garden, Palagunta village on Sathyavedu-Varadaiahpalem, the offending vehicle, driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner at high speed, came in the opposite direction and dashed against the motorcycle. When they reached Tirupati-Mudaliar mango garden, Palagunta village on Sathyavedu-Varadaiahpalem, the offending vehicle, driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner at high speed, came in the opposite direction and dashed against the motorcycle. (c) On behalf of the respondents, RW-1/L. Jyotheeswari and RW-3/G. Venkataramana got examined to disprove the case as pleaded in the claim petition regarding the manner of the accident. Admittedly, they are not eyewitnesses to the accident. Though PW-2 was cross-examined at length, nothing was elicited to discredit the evidence of PW-2. Ex.A.2- charge sheet would reveal after proper investigation into the case, the sub-inspector of police filed the charge sheet in Crime No. 14/2008 against the offending vehicle’s driver, Armugam, the accident in question occurred. (d) It is not the case of the second respondent that its staff or officials have witnessed the accident in question; however, it is disputing the claimants’ case regarding the involvement of the offending vehicle in the accident in question. The claimants have examined the eye witness as PW-2 to prove the accident in question and relied on Ex.A.1-certified copy of the F.I.R. and Ex.A.2-certified copy of the charge sheet. The respondents placed no evidence to show that the contents of the charge sheet needed to be corrected. In K. Rajani and Others vs. M. Satyanarayana Goud and Others, 2015 ACJ 797 this Court observed that: “when the insurance company came to know that the police investigation is false, they must also challenge the charge sheet in appropriate proceedings. If at all the findings of the police are found to be incorrect, it is for the insurance company to produce some evidence to show that the contents of the charge sheet are false.” (e) In the case of Bheemla Devi vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation, 2009 ACJ 1725 (SC) the Apex Court observed as follows: “It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants are merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been applied.” (f) Nothing on record suggests that the Investigating Officer filed a charge sheet against the offending vehicle’s driver without conducting a proper investigation. The claimants are merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been applied.” (f) Nothing on record suggests that the Investigating Officer filed a charge sheet against the offending vehicle’s driver without conducting a proper investigation. It is also difficult to hold that the Police Officer fabricated a case. In a proceeding under the M.V. Act, where the procedure is a summary procedure, there is no need to go by strict rules of pleading or evidence. The document having some probative value, the genuineness of which is not in doubt, can be looked into by the Tribunal for getting preponderance of probable versions. The preponderance of probabilities is the touchstone for concluding rashness and negligence and the accident’s mode and manner of happening. As such, it is by now well settled that even F.I.R. or Police Papers, when made part of a claim petition, can be looked into for giving a finding regarding the accident. (g) The Tribunal has not accepted the observations made by the Investigating Officer in the charge sheet making the offending vehicle’s driver responsible for the accident. The charge sheet contents also support the claimants’ case regarding the manner of the accident. The reading of the documents placed before the Tribunal, there is a clear evidence that the accident happened because of the negligence of the offending vehicle’s driver. (h) This Court views that the offending vehicle’s driver is the best person to speak about the manner of the accident or noninvolvement of the offending vehicle in the accident. The insurance company has not taken steps to prove its contention by summoning the offending vehicle’s driver. A standard rule is for the claimant to prove negligence. But in accident cases, hardship is caused to the claimants as the actual cause of the accident is not known to them but is solely within the knowledge of the respondents who caused it. It will then be for the respondents to establish the accident was due to some other cause than their negligence. (i) This Court believes that negligence or contributory negligence must be proved like any other fact. There are no different standards for proving negligence or contributory negligence. But they cannot be decided on suspicion or surprise. It will then be for the respondents to establish the accident was due to some other cause than their negligence. (i) This Court believes that negligence or contributory negligence must be proved like any other fact. There are no different standards for proving negligence or contributory negligence. But they cannot be decided on suspicion or surprise. The pleas taken in the counter will remain not substantiated by acceptable, relevant, and legal evidence. There must be cogent evidence to prove contributory negligence. In this case, there is no proof that the accident was caused by the motorcycle driver being careless and driving too fast. In the absence of convincing evidence to prove the plea of contributory negligence, the said doctrine of common law cannot be applied in the present case. There are no details of contributory negligence in the counter, and no evidence is also put forth except for the allegation of a stray sentence. How the accident happened leaves no doubt that the offending vehicle’s driver was solely negligent in causing the accident. While granting relief under the Act, the courts should not be bound by mere technicalities. Still, they should adopt a liberal approach by giving the law a more comprehensive construction and meaning that would favour the victims. (j) As already observed, the respondents contend that there is no negligence on the part of the offending vehicle’s driver. There is no hurdle for the second respondent to examine either the owner or driver of the vehicle to establish the said fact. When the involvement of the vehicle is not disputed by the owner, I don’t find any reason to suspect the involvement of the vehicle in the accident, as the respondent/insurance company has not placed any material to create doubt about the involvement of the offending vehicle. The case of the claimants that the offending vehicle had an insurance policy at the time of the accident is not seriously disputed by the second respondent. As seen from the record, the second respondent got marked Exs.B.1 and B.2, policy copies. As seen from Ex.B.1, one P. Purushotham was the owner of the offending vehicle, and in Ex.B.2, transfer endorsement was in the name of the first respondent, and the offending vehicle was insured with the second respondent. The policy was in force from 16.05.2007 to 15.05.2008. As seen from Ex.B.1, one P. Purushotham was the owner of the offending vehicle, and in Ex.B.2, transfer endorsement was in the name of the first respondent, and the offending vehicle was insured with the second respondent. The policy was in force from 16.05.2007 to 15.05.2008. As seen from Ex.B.2, policy, the first respondent is the owner of the offending vehicle from 29.01.2008 as Ex.B.1, the policy was transferred in his name, and the same was in force till 15.05.2008. (k) The main contention of the insurer is that the offending vehicle’s driver did not have a valid driving licence at the time of the accident. Hence, the insurer is not responsible for indemnifying the claimant. (l) The first respondent, the offending vehicle’s owner, was examined as RW-3. During the evidence, RW-3 deposed that the offending vehicle’s driver had a valid driving licence at the time of the accident. In support of the contention, Ex.B.3, a driving licence is produced. As seen from Ex.B.3, it is a driving licence No. TN 23 2000000007865 issued in the name of Armugam, driver of the offending vehicle, authorizing him to drive a non-transport vehicle valid from 05.04.2012 to 02.06.2011. (m) To establish its contention, the second respondent/ insurer has examined RWs. 1 and RW-2. RW-1, working as Assistant Manager in the insurance company, deposed that the offending vehicle was plying without a valid permit and that the driver has no driving licence. RW-2, K.Varadan, Junior Assistant working in the office of R.T.A. Vellore. When he received the summons from the Court, he produced the driving license of N.Armugam s/o. Natesan, and during the evidence, he deposed that no driving license was issued to the said person by their office and that they had not issued Ex.B.3, driving license No. TN 23 2000000007865, to the, said Armugam, offending vehicle’s driver. To that effect, he produced Ex. X.1(a), a driving licence vide D.L. No. TN 23 20000007865, dated 06.04.2000, issued by the R.T.A. office. Hence, Ex.X.1(a) would reveal that Ex.B.3, the driving licence No. TN 23 2000000007865 has not been issued by the authorities. (n) In support of the case, the transport authority also relied on Ex.X.2, particulars of driving licence extract issued on 06.04.2000 starting from S. No. 1480 and ends with S. No. 1493. After carefully appreciating the evidence of RWs. Hence, Ex.X.1(a) would reveal that Ex.B.3, the driving licence No. TN 23 2000000007865 has not been issued by the authorities. (n) In support of the case, the transport authority also relied on Ex.X.2, particulars of driving licence extract issued on 06.04.2000 starting from S. No. 1480 and ends with S. No. 1493. After carefully appreciating the evidence of RWs. 1 and two and the perusal of the driving licence, the Tribunal has found that Ex.B.3 has not been issued by the R.T.A., Vellore. The Tribunal also took into consideration the fact that the first respondent did not examine the said driver to establish that he had a driving licence and Ex.B.3 licence was issued by the R.T.A. office. (o) By considering the material on record, the Tribunal has given a correct finding that the first respondent entrusted the vehicle to the person with no driving licence and thereby violated the terms and conditions of the policy. (p) In National Insurance Company Limited vs. Geeta Bhat and Others, 2008 ACJ 1498 . In paragraphs 13 and 15, the Apex Court held as under: “13. We would, therefore, assume that the licence possessed by the 6th respondent, Gopal Singh was fake. Only because the same was fake, the same, having regard to the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore, would not absolve the insurer to reimburse the owner of a vehicle in respect of the amount awarded in favour of a third party by the Tribunal in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 14............ 15. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice shall be sub-served if the Appellant is directed to pay the awarded amount in favour of respondent Nos. 1 to 5 with liberty to recover the same from the owner and the driver of the vehicle.” (q) It is not the case of the second respondent that the offending vehicle’s owner willfully allowed his driver to drive the vehicle, knowing that he had a fake licence. The Tribunal has given its reasons to conclude that the licence produced by the offending vehicle’s driver was a fake one, and the said case of the insurance company is further corroborated with the evidence of RW-2, who was examined on behalf of the second respondent. The material on record shows that RW-2 has also produced Ex.X.2, driving licence extract. The Tribunal has given its reasons to conclude that the licence produced by the offending vehicle’s driver was a fake one, and the said case of the insurance company is further corroborated with the evidence of RW-2, who was examined on behalf of the second respondent. The material on record shows that RW-2 has also produced Ex.X.2, driving licence extract. Upon careful perusal of the evidence of RW-2 coupled with Exs.B.3 and Ex.X.1(a), the Tribunal has rightly concluded that the driving licence produced by the offending vehicle’s driver is a fake one. In light of the said facts of the case, this Court views that the Tribunal was justified in directing the insurance company to pay and recover the amount from the offending vehicle’s owner. (r) After reading the evidence of RW-2, this Court views that the offending vehicle’s driver produced a fake driving licence before the owner. Based on the said licence, the first respondent allowed him to drive the vehicle. Thus, it is not the case of the insurance company that the first respondent willfully allowed his driver to drive the vehicle knowing that the licence produced by his driver is a fake one. (s) In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Ruby Devi and Others, 2023 SCC Online Del. 682 a single Judge Bench of the Delhi High Court, following the principles laid down by the three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in National Insurance Company Limited vs. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297 held at paragraphs 19 to 21 as under: “19. This practice holds good even in cases where there has been a breach of terms and conditions of the insurance policy by the insured, wherein the insurance company first satisfies the claimants and then gains recovery right against the insured. This becomes evident from the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Limited vs. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297 . The relevant paragraph is being reproduced hereunder: “110. (iii) The breach of policy condition, e.g. disqualification of the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, have to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. The relevant paragraph is being reproduced hereunder: “110. (iii) The breach of policy condition, e.g. disqualification of the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, have to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time are not defences available to the insurer against the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding the use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified from driving at the relevant time. xxx xxx xxx (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove a breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/ are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the case of the accident. The Tribunals, in interpreting the policy conditions, would apply “the Rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insured under Section 149(2) of the Act. xxx xxx xxx (ix) The claims tribunal constituted under Section 165 read with Section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or bodily injury or damage to property of a third party arising in the use of the motor vehicle. The said power of the Tribunal is not restricted to deciding the claims inter se between claimant or claimants on one side and the insured, insurer and driver on the other. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and deciding the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between the insurer and the insured. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and deciding the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between the insurer and the insured. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of the claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants. (x) Where on the adjudication of the claim under the Act, the Tribunal concludes that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of section 149(2) read with sub-section (7), as interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the Tribunal. Such determination of claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the Tribunal to the Collector in the same manner under Section 174 of the Act as arrears of land revenue. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by sub-section (3) of Section 168 of the Act, the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the Tribunal. (xi) The provisions contained in sub-section (4) with proviso thereunder and sub-section (5), which are intended to cover specified contingencies mentioned therein to enable the insurer to recover the amount paid under the contract of insurance on behalf of the insured, can be taken recourse of by the Tribunal and be extended to claims and defences of insurer against insured by relegating them to the remedy before regular Court in cases where on given facts and circumstances adjudication of their claims inter se might delay the adjudication of the claims of the victims.” 20. It is also to be noted that the Appellant is not disputing that the offending vehicle was insured with the Appellant at the time of the accident. It is also to be noted that the Appellant is not disputing that the offending vehicle was insured with the Appellant at the time of the accident. Upon considering the position of law as emanating from the perusal of the above judgments, this Court is of the view that the learned Claims Tribunal was right in directing the Appellant to deposit the compensation amount at the first instance with recovery rights against the Respondent No. 6/ Respondent No. 7 in accordance with the law, a Respondent No. 6 was not having a valid driving licence at the appropriate time. 21. Given the above appreciation of facts and legal position, this Court holds that there is no perversity in the impugned award about the involvement of the offending vehicle in the accident.” (t) In Swaran Singh’s case, the Apex Court also held in paragraph 92 that: “WHERE THE DRIVER’S LICENCE IS FOUND TO BE FAKE: 92. It may be true, as has been contended on behalf of the petitioner, that a fake or forged licence is as good as no licence, but the question herein, as noticed hereinbefore, is whether the insurer must prove that the owner was guilty of the wilful breach of the conditions of the insurance policy or the contract of insurance. In Lehru’s case (supra), the matter has been considered in some detail. We are in general agreement with the approach of the Bench, but we intend to point out that the observations made therein must be understood to have been made in the light of the requirements of the law in terms of which the insurer is to establish wilful breach on the part of the insured and not for its disentitlement from raising any defence or the owners be absolved from any liability whatsoever. We will deal in some details with this aspect of the matter later.” (u) It is a settled proposition of law that when there is a breach of policy condition, the fundamental duty is on the owner and driver to discharge the duty and prove that the driver had a proper driving license to drive the vehicle in question involved in the accident. The first respondent himself was subjected to examination as RW-3, to prove that the driver who was allowed to drive the offending vehicle has a valid driving licence. But according to the evidence of RWs. The first respondent himself was subjected to examination as RW-3, to prove that the driver who was allowed to drive the offending vehicle has a valid driving licence. But according to the evidence of RWs. 1 and 2, it is clear that the offending vehicle’s driver had shown a fake driving licence to the first respondent. The offending vehicle’s driver did not step into the witness box to contradict the evidence of RWs. 1 and 2. Hence it is presumed that the driver did not possess a valid driving licence. The onus could not be shifted on the insurance company; just because the vehicle was insured with the appellant/ insurance company, it cannot be made liable unless it is proved that there was no violation of the policy condition. In a case between Shamanna and Another vs. Divisional Manager, The Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Others, Civil Appeal No. 8144 of 2018 and S.L.P. (C) No. 26955 of 2017 the facts of the case are that the jeep driver had no valid driving license at the time of the accident and there was a violation of the terms of the insurance policy, the Tribunal directed the insurance company to pay the compensation to the claimants and granted liberty to the insurance company to recover the same from the owner of the offending vehicle. In such a case, the Apex Court observed in paragraphs Nos. 7 and 8, 12 as follows. “7.......As per the decision in the Swaran Singh case, the onus is always upon the insurance company to prove that the driver had no valid driving licence and that there was a breach of policy conditions. Where the driver did not possess a valid driving licence and there is a breach of policy conditions “pay and recover” can be ordered in case of third-party risks. The Tribunal is required to consider whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out whether the driving licence produced by the driver does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case. 8.........The Supreme Court considered the decision of the Swaran Singh case in a subsequent decision in National Insurance Co. The Tribunal is required to consider whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out whether the driving licence produced by the driver does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case. 8.........The Supreme Court considered the decision of the Swaran Singh case in a subsequent decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Laxmi Narain Dhut, (2007) 3 SCC 700 , wherein this Court held that “the decision in Swaran Singh case has no application to cases other than third party risks and in case of third party risks the insurer has to indemnify the amount and if so advised, to recover the same from the insured.” The same principle was reiterated in Prem Kumari vs. Prahlad Dev and Others, (2008) 3 SCC 193 . xxx xxx xxx 12..........since the reference to the larger Bench in the Parvathneni case has been disposed of by keeping the questions of law open to be decided in an appropriate case, presently, the decision in the Swaran Singh case followed in Laxmi Narain Dhut and other cases hold the field. The award passed by the Tribunal directing the insurance company to pay the compensation amount awarded to the claimants and, after that, recover the same from the vehicle owner in question is in accordance with the Judgment passed by this Court in Swaran Singh and Laxmi Narain Dhut cases. While so, in our view, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the award passed by the Tribunal directing the first respondent to pay and recover from the owner of the vehicle. The impugned Judgment of the High Court exonerates the insurance company from its liability. It directs the claimants to recover the compensation from the owner of the vehicle is set aside, and the award passed by the Tribunal is restored.” (v) Given the above settled legal position, this Court is of the view that the insurance company can be directed to pay the compensation amount first and then recover the same from the owner of the offending vehicle as pay and recovery can be ordered in case of third-party risk. Hence, this Court finds no perversity about the giving direction to the second respondent/ insurance company to pay compensation first and then recover from the offending vehicle’s owner. Accordingly, point No. 1 is answered. Hence, this Court finds no perversity about the giving direction to the second respondent/ insurance company to pay compensation first and then recover from the offending vehicle’s owner. Accordingly, point No. 1 is answered. POINT No. III (a) The compensation under the head loss of dependency is concerned; there is no dispute regarding the death of R. Hema Kumar (deceased herein) due to the injuries sustained in the accident. The claimants are the parents of the deceased. The relationship of the claimants with the deceased is not in dispute. The first claimant, the father of the deceased, was examined as PW-1. According to the evidence of PW-1, as of the date of the accident, the deceased was 27 years, and he was hale and healthy. His evidence shows that the deceased graduated from a B.B.A. course at Madras University, a diploma course in C.S.C. computer education in Computer Application and also underwent a Training course in Honours Diploma in Computer hardware in Government of India Small Scale Industries Development Organisation, Chennai. He further stated that the deceased was working as a System Administrator at Pratyusha Institute of Technology and Management, drawing a salary of Rs.16,275/- per month and contributing the same to the welfare of the claimants. Ex.A.6 is the salary certificate issued by the Pratyusha Institute of Technology and Management, Aranvoyalkuppam, stating that he worked as System Administrator in their college from 14.02.200 to 12.04.2008. He was paid Rs.16,275/- per month as salary by their college up to March 2008: Ex.A.7, C.S.C. computer education transcript of the deceased. Ex.A.8 is the C.S.C. computer education, Honours diploma in computer application of Hema Kumar. Ex.A.9, certificate of training issued by the Government of India Ministry Small Scale Industries Development Organisation, states that the deceased underwent computer hardware and networking training. Ex.A.10, transfer certificate of Institute of Correspondence Education, University of Madras, of Hema Kumar. Ex.A.11, statement of marks of B.B.A. degree examination of the deceased, Hema Kumar, by the University of Madras. Ex.A.12, photo identity card of the deceased issued by Pratyusha Institute of Technology and Management, Aranvoyalkuppam, stating that he is working in their college as a System Administrator. (b) As seen from the cross-examination of PW-1, the respondents have not seriously disputed the deceased’s education qualification. Ex.A.12, photo identity card of the deceased issued by Pratyusha Institute of Technology and Management, Aranvoyalkuppam, stating that he is working in their college as a System Administrator. (b) As seen from the cross-examination of PW-1, the respondents have not seriously disputed the deceased’s education qualification. To prove the deceased’s employment, the claimants examined PW-3, P.B. Suresh, who deposed that he works at Pratyusha Institute of Technology and Management, Chennai. His evidence shows that the Management, on receipt of notice from the Tribunal, authorized him to give evidence under Ex.X.1. His evidence shows that he knows the deceased, Hema Kumar; he worked as Assistant System Administrator from 14.02.2006 till his death at 12.04.2008 and the deceased worked under him, and his salary was Rs.16,275/- per month, in support of the said oral evidence, Ex.A.6, a certificate issued by the principal of their college, Ex.A.13, identity card of the deceased issued by Pratyusha Institute of Technology and Management. (c) The material placed on record establishes the employment of the deceased as claimed in the petition, and also his salary was Rs.16,275/-. A reading of the order passed by the Tribunal shows that the Tribunal accepted the said case of the claimants. The Tribunal considered the age of the deceased as 27 years by relying on Ex.A.3, inquest report and Ex.A.4, Postmortem examination report. As seen from the grounds of appeal and the submissions made at the hearing, the insurance company has not seriously disputed the age of the deceased as observed by the Tribunal. (d) The Tribunal considered the monthly income at Rs.16,275/- deducted 50% of the personal and living expenses, and considered the age of the deceased as 27 years and rightly applied the multiplier ‘17’ as provided by the Apex Court in the case Sarala Verma vs. Delhi Transport Corporation, 2009 ACJ 1298 . However, the Tribunal erred in not awarding the future prospects. In National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi, (2017) ACJ 2700 the Apex Court, at paragraph 61, held that: (iii) When determining the income, an addition of 50% of the actual salary to the deceased’s income towards prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40, should be made. The addition should be 30% if the deceased is between 40 to 50 years. If the deceased was between 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. The addition should be 30% if the deceased is between 40 to 50 years. If the deceased was between 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as basic salary less tax. (iv) If the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an additional 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary computation method. The established income means the income minus the tax component. (e) In this case, the deceased was 27 years old and self-employed. As such, this Court views that an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant towards future prospectus. The monthly income, including a future prospectus, arrives at Rs.22,785/- (16,275+6,510), out of which, since the deceased is a bachelor, 50% of the earnings has to be deducted towards personal and living expenses, thereby the contribution of the deceased at Rs.11,392.50 ps. rounded off to Rs.11,392/- towards the family welfare. By applying the multiplier ‘17’ for the persons aged from 26 to 30 years as provided by the Apex Court in Sarala Verma’s case, the loss of dependency would arrive at Rs.23,23,968/- (11,392 x 12 x 17). (f) Coming to the consideration of funeral expenses, loss of estate and loss of consortium, in Pranay Sethi’s case referred to supra, the Apex Court held, in paragraph 61, that: “(viii) Reasonable figures under conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses, should be Rs.15,000/- Rs.40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at 10% every three years.” (g) In Magma General Ins. Co. Ltd. vs. Nanu Ram, in paragraph 8, the Apex Court held that: “(8.6).......the Motor Vehicles Act is beneficial and welfare legislation. The Court is duty-bound and entitled to award ‘just compensation, irrespective of whether any plea on that behalf was raised by the claimant. .......... (8.7) A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi, 2017 ACJ 2700 (SC) dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is the loss of consortium. .......... (8.7) A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi, 2017 ACJ 2700 (SC) dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is the loss of consortium. In legal parlance ‘consortium’ is a compendious term which encompasses ‘spousal consortium’ parental consortium’ and filial consortium. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. Concerning a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse [Rajesh vs. Rajbir Singh, 2013 ACJ 1403 (SC)] The parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of ‘parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training. The filial consortium is the right of parents to compensate in the case of the accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the end of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The most incredible suffering for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and role in the family unit.” (h) By following the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Sarala Verma’s case, Pranay Sethi’s case and Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. cases referred to supra, this Court inclined to award the compensation as detailed hereunder: Towards loss of dependency Rs. 23,23,968/- Towards funeral expenses Rs. 16,500/- Towards Loss of estate Rs. 16,500/- Filial consortium Rs. 60,000/- (each claimant Rs. 30,000/-) Total Rs. 24,16,968/- (m) In Laxman @ Laxman Mourya vs. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Another, (2011) 10 SCC 756 the Apex Court while referring to Nagappa vs. Gurudayal Singh, 2003 ACJ 12 (SC) held as under: “It is true that in the petition filed by him under Section 166 of the Act, the appellant had claimed compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- only, but as held in Nagappa vs. Gurudayal Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 274 , in the absence of any bar in the Act, the Tribunal and for that any competent Court is entitled to award higher compensation to the victim of an accident.” (n) In Ramla vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Civil Appeal No. 11495 of 2018, the Apex Court held no restriction to award compensation exceeding the amount claimed. Ltd. Civil Appeal No. 11495 of 2018, the Apex Court held no restriction to award compensation exceeding the amount claimed. As such, given the principle laid down by the Apex Court, the claimants are entitled to Rs.24,16,968/- exceeding the claimed amount. However, the claimants shall pay the requisite court fee over and above the compensation awarded. (o) Following the principles laid down by the Apex Court in a catena of judgments, this Court can safely be concluded that the claimants are entitled to get more than what has been claimed. Further, the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation where the interest of the claimants is a paramount consideration. The courts should always endeavour to extend the benefit to the claimants to a just and reasonable extent. Accordingly, point No. II is answered. 14. Given the aforesaid discussion, the appeal preferred by the second respondent in M.A.C.M. No. 125 of 2014 is dismissed. In contrast, the appeal preferred by the claimants in M.A.C.M.A. No. 565 of 2022 is allowed by enhancing the compensation from Rs.16,95,050/- to an amount of Rs.24,16,968/- (Rupees twenty-four lakhs, sixteen thousand, nine hundred and sixty-eight only) with interest at 7.5% per annum as awarded by the Tribunal. The claimants shall pay the requisite court fee on the enhanced compensation amount. The respondents are directed to deposit the balance compensation amount, if any, after excluding the amount deposited, within two months of receipt of a copy of this order. The claimants are entitled to the apportionment as per the ratio made by the Tribunal. The claimants are permitted to withdraw their respective shares of compensation as per the terms of the Tribunal’s order by filing an appropriate application before the Tribunal. There shall be no order as to costs in both appeals. 15. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in these appeals shall stand closed.