JUDGMENT : (Sanjeev Kumar, J.) 1. This Letters Patent Appeal by the State of J&K (now UT of J&K) and the Department of Health & Medical Education is directed against a judgment dated 14.03.2017 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court [‘the Writ Court’] in a writ petition SWP No. 1901/2013 titled ‘Parvinder Singh vs. State and others’, whereby the Writ Court has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent [“the writ petitioner”], and the appellants herein stood directed to offer employment to the writ petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of impugned judgment in terms of SRO 181 of 1988. 2. Before we advert ourselves to the grounds of challenge urged by Mr. Amit Gupta, learned AAG appearing for the appellants, we deem it necessary to give brief resume of the factual antecedents leading to filing of the writ petition and the present appeal. 3. The case set up by the writ petitioner in the writ petition was that his father, namely Sh. Balwant Singh, was the owner in possession of land measuring 01 kanal 19 marlas falling in khasra No. 987 of village Chhajala, Tehsil Mendhar, District Poonch. Out of the said land, the father of the writ petitioner donated one kanal of land [“subject land”] to the Health Department for construction of a building for setting up of a Primary Health Center in the year 1981. It was pleaded that the father of the writ petitioner had given one kanal of land being more than 50% of his agricultural land without receiving any compensation in lieu thereof. It is not the case that the land was so donated with a precondition in writing by the petitioner’s father to the Health Department. 4. In the year 1988, the Government issued SRO 181/1988 dated 03.06.1988 thereby providing for appointment of one member of the family which is left with less than 50% of its agricultural land, on account of same having been acquired by the Government for public purpose, against a post available at the lowest rank of the cadre in a service for which such person is eligible. This SRO 181 of 1988 further provided that if a vacancy was not available in the Department for which the land had been acquired, then General Administration Department shall make such appointment in any other Department where such a vacancy may be found available. It was the further case of the writ petitioner that his father, who was an illiterate person was never made aware by the appellants or any other Authority about the issuance of SRO 181 of 1988 and, therefore, he could not make any request for employment. 5. It is pleaded that only when the petitioner did his 10+2 in the year 2011 that he came to know that the Health Department has made certain appointments in lieu of the land donated by some people. The writ petitioner, on enquiry, found that two persons said to be similarly situated with the writ petitioner and who are Waseem Ahmad Khan and Razia Bi having been appointed against class-IV posts in the Health Department in lieu of land donated by them for construction of a hospital building/residential quarters at PHC Chatryal (Poonch) vide Government Order No. 622-HME of 2010 dated 28.12.2010. 6. The writ petitioner too moved an application before the then Health Minister for his intervention and direction to the Health Department to provide him also the employment as against land so donated The case of the writ petitioner, as was claimed, was processed at different levels. 7. The matter came up for consideration before the Secretary to the Government, Health and Medical Education Department, the appellant No.2 herein, who, vide his order bearing No.HD/NG/06/2013 dated May, 2013, rejected the claim of the writ petitioner. 8. Feeling aggrieved, the writ petitioner by way of writ petition SWP No. 1901/2013 challenged the aforesaid communication of appellant No.2 and sought a direction for his appointment to any available class-IV post in the Health Department on the analogy of aforesaid persons, namely Waseem Ahmed Khan and Razia Bi. 9. The writ petition was contested by the appellants herein by filing their reply affidavit. It was a clear stand taken by the appellants before the Writ Court that the subject land measuring 01 kanal was donated by father of the writ petitioner voluntarily for public cause without any precondition and was not compulsorily acquired from him. 9. The writ petition was contested by the appellants herein by filing their reply affidavit. It was a clear stand taken by the appellants before the Writ Court that the subject land measuring 01 kanal was donated by father of the writ petitioner voluntarily for public cause without any precondition and was not compulsorily acquired from him. It was, thus, submitted that SRO 181 of 1988 was applicable only in cases where the Government compulsorily acquired 50% or more the agricultural land of a family. It was also contended by the appellants that, with respect to the land allegedly donated by father of the writ petitioner, a report was called from BMO Mendhar, who in his report dated 07.02.2014 submitted that one Mohd Yousaf was in litigation with Sh. Balwant Singh, father of the writ petitioner, over title of the land including the land donated for construction of PHC. Said Mohd Yousaf also produced an Agreement to Sell attested by a Notary Public on 17.04.2003 indicating that the father of the petitioner had transferred his entire land in favour of Mohd Yousaf for a consideration of Rs.14.00 lac. Mohd Yousaf was also on record to state before BMO Mendhar that in the year 1999 he had purchased 11 kanals and 10 marlas of land in khasra No. 986, 987 and 988/1 from the father of the writ petitioner and, therefore, the contention of the writ petitioner that his father was left with less than 50% of his total land holding after donating 1 kanal for construction of PHE, is factually incorrect. The appellants also placed on record Government Order dated 10.03.2014 whereby the claim of the writ petitioner was rejected by appellant No.2 10. The Writ Court, after hearing both the sides and having gone through the entire record, came to a conclusion that despite his entitlement to employment under SRO 181/1988, the petitioner had been made to run from pillar to post to get his right enforced. 11. Be that as it may, on the basis of findings aforesaid returned by the Writ Court, the writ petition was allowed vide judgment impugned and a direction came to be issued to the appellants herein to offer employment to the writ petitioner within a period of eight weeks in terms of SRO 181 of 1988. 11. Be that as it may, on the basis of findings aforesaid returned by the Writ Court, the writ petition was allowed vide judgment impugned and a direction came to be issued to the appellants herein to offer employment to the writ petitioner within a period of eight weeks in terms of SRO 181 of 1988. It is this judgment of the Writ Court which is called in question by the appellants before us. 12. Mr. Amit Gupta, learned AAG, appearing for the appellants argues that the judgment passed by the Writ Court is not in conformity with law and, therefore, deserves to be set aside on the ground that the father of the writ petitioner was not even the owner of the land which he had donated to the Health Department for construction of PHC, nor was he left with less than 50% of his total land holding after donation of one kanal in favour of Health Department for construction of PHC. Reference is also invited by Mr. Amit Gupta, learned AAG to khasra girdwari of the year 2001 appended with the appeal as Annexure-D to submit that the land measuring 10 kanals, 06 malras under survey No. 987 was allotted to father of the writ petitioner which was sold by him to one Abdul S/O Baggha. The appellants have also placed on record a copy of sale deed dated 28.03.1993 executed by Balwant Singh in favour of Abdul in respect of land under survey No. 987. It is, thus, submitted that the father of the writ petitioner late Balwant Singh had sold his land in survey No. 987 as far back as in 1993 in favour of Abdul, who, later on, became evacuee and the land was reoccupied by late Balwant Singh. In short, it is argued that father of the writ petitioner did not have any title to the land which was so donated by him for construction of PHC. The appellants have also placed on record statement of Sh. Balwant Singh, recorded on 01.10.1980 before the Tehsildar Mendhar saying that he was donating the subject land free of cost, though, he had no title over the land and that he would not claim any consideration by way of appointment or otherwise. It is, thus, submitted that the Writ Court was kept in dark by the writ petitioner and the relevant documents were not brought on record. It is, thus, submitted that the Writ Court was kept in dark by the writ petitioner and the relevant documents were not brought on record. In a nutshell, the arguments of Mr. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the appellants are in the following manner: (i) That the father of the writ petitioner did not have clear title to the subject land donated by him for construction of PHC; (ii) That the subject land was donated by father of the writ petitioner in the year 1880-81 when there was no statutory or non-statutory provision like SRO 181 of 1988 providing for employment to a member of the family having been left with 50% or less than 50% of the land after its acquisition by the Government for public purpose; (iii) That the writ petitioner was not even born in 1980 or even in the year 1988 when SRO 181 came to be issued and, therefore, the claim set up by the writ petitioner for appointment was not tenable; (iv) That the writ petitioner acquired eligibility to seek employment after he did his 10+2 in the year 2011 and staked his claim for employment after more than thirty years of donation of subject land; and, (v) SRO 181 of 1988 stood rescinded by SRO 214 w.e.f 11.07.1991. 13. Per contra, Mr. R.K.S.Thakur leaned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner submits that the title of the subject land donated by petitioner’s father was never disputed by the appellants on the clear understanding that it was proprietary land of father of the writ petitioner. It is because of this understanding, the case of the writ petitioner for employment in lieu of compensation for the donated land was processed at different levels. Mr. R.K.S. Thakur submits that the plea as to the father of the petitioner not holding title to the subject land is an afterthought and deserves to be thrown out-rightly. He argues that SRO 181 of 1988, as is held by this Court in its several judgments was retrospective in operation and applicable to all the acquisitions made without payment of compensation prior to the issuance of SRO 181 of 1988. He argues that SRO 181 of 1988, as is held by this Court in its several judgments was retrospective in operation and applicable to all the acquisitions made without payment of compensation prior to the issuance of SRO 181 of 1988. It is submitted that the subsequent SRO 214 issued on 11.07.1991 whereby SRO 181 of 1988 was rescinded would not affect the acquired right of the writ petitioner to seek employment which had accrued to him during interregnum between issuance of SRO 181 of 1988 and its rescission by SRO 214 of 1991. Learned counsel, in support of his submissions, places reliance upon the following judgment of this Court: (i) Bashir Ahmad Lone vs. State and others, 2009(1) JKJ 121 (Division Bench); (ii) State and others vs. Sitan Devi and others, 2013 (1) JKJ [HC] 547 (Division Bench); (iii) Mohd Akram Rather vs. State and others, 2014(1) JKJ [HC] 301 (Single Bench); (iv) Krishan Lal vs State and others, 2004 (3) JKJ [HC] 664; (Single Bench) (v) Gh. Nabir Mir vs. State and others, 2011 (2) JKJ [HC] 665 (Single Benchg). 14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record, it is necessary to set out SRO 181 of 1988 and SRO 214 of 1991 for better understanding of the issues raised before us. “SRO 181:-In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Section 124 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir and not with standing anything contained in the rules and orders for the time being in force, the Governor hereby directed that the appointment of one member of the family who are left with 50% or less of their agricultural land on account of the same having been acquired by the Government for public purposes, shall be made without any reference to the Recruitment Board concerned, against a post available at the lowest rank of the cadre for which such a person is eligible. In case the vacancy is not available in the Department which has acquired the land, the General Department shall make such appointment in any Department where the vacancy may be available, By order of the Government." “SRO 214: In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 124 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government is pleased to rescind the notification SRO 181 dated 3.6.1988: Provided that any appointment made under the provisions of the said notification shall continue to remain valid and no fresh appointments shall be made in cases which are under process at the time of issuance of this notification”. 15. Now before considering the contentions in the light of twin SROs, we deem it appropriate to recapture the admitted facts: 16. Father of the petitioner late Balwant Singh, who was allegedly in possession of land measuring 1 kanal and 19 marlas falling in khasra No. 987 in village Chhajala, donated 01 kanal of his land to the Department of Health for construction of PHC Mankote in the year 1981. 17. Indisputably, in the year 1981 there was no conception of, much less the, statutory or non-statutory rule, order, or instructions providing for employment in lieu of compensation for the land donated or acquired by the Government for public purpose. The father of the writ petitioner, as is clear from the pleadings as also the material on record, had voluntarily donated his land for a pubic cause expecting and asking neither compensation nor employment in return. It is because of this reason the father of the writ petitioner never lodged his claim, either for compensation or, for that matter, for any employment during his life time. True it is that in the year 1988, the Government came up with SRO 181 issued by the Governor, in exercise of powers conferred by Proviso to Section 124 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir thereby making a provision for the first time for offering an appointment to one of the members of the family who is left with 50% or less of their agricultural land on account of the same having been acquired by the Government for public purpose. 18. SRO 181 of 1988, on the face of it, was prospective in nature to govern the compulsory acquisitions made by the Government for public purpose on or after 03.06.1988. 18. SRO 181 of 1988, on the face of it, was prospective in nature to govern the compulsory acquisitions made by the Government for public purpose on or after 03.06.1988. This position, however, is disputed by learned counsel for the writ petitioner to which we advert to a little later. 19. It is also a fact that the SRO 181 of 1988 which was issued on 03.06.1988 remained in force till 11.07.1991 when the same was rescinded by the Government vide SRO 214 of 1991. SRO 214 of 1991 was clear and unequivocal and saved only the appointments that had been made under SRO 181 of 1988. SRO 214 of 1991 clearly provided that no such appointment shall be made in the cases which were under process at the time of issuance of the said SRO 214. It is also not in dispute that no claim for compensation or employment was ever lodged by the father of the writ petitioner or by the petitioner till the year 2011 when the writ petitioner did his 10+2. 20. As is the contention of the writ petitioner which is not rebutted on facts, the writ petitioner was actually prompted to stake his claim for employment when he found that two persons namely Waseem Ahmed and Razia Bi had been appointed as class-IV by the appellants in the Health Department in lieu of land donated by them for construction of a Hospital building/residential quarters at Chhatryial, District Poonch in the year 2010. It is also not in dispute that the aforesaid averment made in the writ petition was not specifically dealt with by the appellants. 21. It is in the context of aforesaid admitted position, when we examine the case of the writ petitioner, we find that the writ petitioner never acquired any claim much less a right to employment in lieu of the land measuring 01 kanal donated by his father in the year 1981. 22. Indisputably, the writ petitioner was not born in the year 1981, nor was the land belonging to the father of the petitioner compulsorily acquired by the Department of Health for public purpose. The providing of land for construction of PHC, Mankote, by father of the writ petitioner was an act of benevolence for a public cause and a matter of charity. The providing of land for construction of PHC, Mankote, by father of the writ petitioner was an act of benevolence for a public cause and a matter of charity. The writ petitioner is very fair in submitting all through his writ petition that his father donated land for construction of PHC and does not say anywhere that the same was compulsorily acquired by the State for public purpose. Be that as it may, the fact remains that in the year 1981, when father of the writ petitioner made available one kanal of land to the Department of Health for construction of PHC by way of donation, there was no statutory/ non-statutory order or rule in position providing for either compensation or employment in lieu of land donated by a citizen for public purpose. 23. As per Cambridge Dictionary, word ‘donation’ is defined as money or goods that are given to help a person or organization, or the act of giving them. In Merriam-Webster Dictionary, word ‘donation’ is defined as; (a) the making of a gift especially to a charity or public institution; and (b) a free contribution: gift. In Oxford Learner’s Dictionary, word ‘donation’ is defined as something that is given to a person or an organization such as a charity, in order to help them; the act of giving something in this way. It is, thus, crystal clear that the term ‘donation’ is entirely different and distinct from the term ‘acquisition’. 24. What the father of the writ petitioner did with respect to the land in question was an act of donation i.e providing of land to the Department of Health for public cause i.e. for establishment of PHC. That being the nature of delivery of the land made by father of the petitioner in favour of Department of Health, it cannot be contended by the writ petitioner that his father had donated the land to the appellants as quid pro quo, that is, for employment to a member of his family. Otherwise also, even if we were to concede that such right was available to the father of the petitioner, yet, the said right was never asserted or availed of by the father of the writ petitioner during his life time. 25. Otherwise also, even if we were to concede that such right was available to the father of the petitioner, yet, the said right was never asserted or availed of by the father of the writ petitioner during his life time. 25. That being the clear position emerging from the admitted facts, the right in respect of employment, if any, available to father of the writ petitioner extinguished when same was not staked by father of the petitioner during his life time. It is not the case of the writ petitioner that there was any promise, oral or in writing made by any competent Authority of the Government for providing employment to his future son in lieu of the land donated by him for construction of PHC. 26. Coming to SRO 181 of 1988, we are of the considered opinion that SRO 181 of 1988 issued on 03.06.1988 was prospective in operation and was not applicable to the acquisitions made prior to 03.06.1988 without there being any specific promise made for employment in lieu of compensation. Otherwise also, from a bare perusal of SRO 181/1988, it becomes abundantly clear that the same was intended to be applied to the cases where 50% or more of the total agricultural land possessed by a person was compulsorily acquired by the Government for public purpose. The expression ‘acquired by the Government for public purpose’ is an expression of known legal import and which refers to the acquisition which the Government can make under an appropriate land acquisition legislation. SRO 181 of 1988 appears to have been issued to achieve an avowed objective of rehabilitating the small scale land holding family who is left with 50% or less of its total agricultural land only source of livelihood for the family, by providing employment to one of its members. It was not meant to be applicable to the cases where the people would come out voluntarily to donate their land for public cause. 27. As we have stated above, a distinction needs to be drawn and kept in view between ‘land acquired by an act of the State’ and ‘the land donated by the owner thereof for public cause’ to State. 28. Viewed thus, said SRO 181 of 1988, on which strong reliance is placed by Mr. 27. As we have stated above, a distinction needs to be drawn and kept in view between ‘land acquired by an act of the State’ and ‘the land donated by the owner thereof for public cause’ to State. 28. Viewed thus, said SRO 181 of 1988, on which strong reliance is placed by Mr. Thakur, was not applicable to an voluntary donation of land by an owner for public cause, like construction of schools/hospitals and primary health centers etc. May be, there are cases where the appellants were themselves confused about the true interpretation of SRO 181 of 1988 or possibly on many occasions SRO 181 of 1988 was deliberately misinterpreted to confer wrongful benefit on some favoured persons of the authorities in power at the relevant point of time. However, we are not in favour of perpetuating the illegality by invoking of Article 14 of the Constitution of India to achieve that undeserving benefit. What is provided under Article 14 of the Constitution of India is ‘equality before the law’ and ‘equal protection of the law’ to ensure that similarly situated persons are not treated unequally and that there is no discrimination made or caused between the members of the same class. In the instant case, the past bad precedents cannot be perpetuated, more particularly, when the provisions of SRO 181 of 1988 are clear and unequivocal. 29. We, at this stage, are reminded of a celebrated judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Basawaraj & anr vs Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 . Para (8) of the judgment is relevant for our purpose and is, thus, set out below: 8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/ benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a Judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would make functioning of administration impossible.” 30. It is, thus, trite that Article 14 of the Constitution of India which guarantees equality before the law does not envisage negative equality and, thus, if some other person or persons similarly situate, have been bestowed and granted some illegal benefit or relief, either inadvertently or deliberately or by mistake, by the State, the same does not become a precedent for perpetuation of illegality in future. Equality envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be claimed in illegality and, therefore, a citizen is not to seek its enforcement in a negative manner. 31. We are also not impressed with the argument of Mr. Thakur that SRO 181 of 1988 was applicable to the past acquisitions/donations also. 32. True it is that the SRO 181 of 1988 provided for appointment of one member of the family left with 50% or less of their agricultural land on account of the same having been acquired by the Government for public purpose. ‘Having been acquired’ expression does not mean the land which was acquired right from the creation of the State till the issuance of SRO 181 of 1988. Reference to the term ‘having been acquired’ has to be read in the context of expression ‘family’, who is left with 50% or less of its agricultural land. ‘Having been acquired’ expression does not mean the land which was acquired right from the creation of the State till the issuance of SRO 181 of 1988. Reference to the term ‘having been acquired’ has to be read in the context of expression ‘family’, who is left with 50% or less of its agricultural land. Reading SRO 181 of 1988 in its entirety and in the context it has been issued, it becomes abundantly clear that if a family is left with only 50% or less of its agricultural land after it is acquired by the Government for public purpose, a member of such family is entitled to employment. The expression ‘having been acquired’ cannot be construed to mean that all the agricultural lands which stood acquired prior to 03.06.1988 too was covered under SRO 181 of 1988. By that reference, it would take us even to very first acquisition made upon coming into force the Jammu and Kashmir Land Acquisition Act, Svt.1990. 33. For twin reasons; one that SRO 181 of 1988 was not applicable to the donation of land made voluntarily by the citizens and two that SRO 181 of 1988 was prospective in operation, we cannot accede to the contention of the writ petitioner that right to employment had accrued to him with the promulgation of SRO 181 of 1988. That apart, it is not the case of the writ petitioner that he had acquired eligibility to seek employment or that he had staked his claim for such employment at any time between issuance of SRO 181 of 1988 and issuance of SRO 214 of 1991. We cannot also miss to notice that vide SRO 214 of 1991 the notification issued vide SRO 181 of 1988 was rescinded with a clear stipulation that no such appointments shall be made in cases which were under process at the time of issuance of the notification. 34. Though, in the instant case, the case of the writ petitioner was not even pending consideration as the petitioner had not even acquired the eligibility to seek employment and might have been minor at the relevant point of time, yet, we find that even if his case was pending and was still under process, the same was not to be considered in view of the provisions of SRO 214 of 1991. It needs to be noted that SRO 214 of 1991, or for that matter, SRO 181 of 1988 were not the subject matter of challenge in the writ petition. 35. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we refrain from going into the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that father of the petitioner was not even holding title to the property donated by him to the Department of Health for construction of PHC. We also need not go into the other aspects highlighted by leaned counsel for the appellants that father of the petitioner had sufficient agricultural land which he had sold to one Yousaf and, therefore, it was not even a case where the father of the writ petitioner was left with 50% or less of agricultural land after donating 1 kanal for construction of PHC. 36. For all these reasons, we regret our inability to concur with the view taken by the Writ Court. The Writ Court is more or less swayed by the unwarranted sympathy and passed the judgment which we find is not in conformity with the legal and factual position obtaining in the instant case. 37. Before we part with and conclude the judgment, we deem it necessary to deal with the judgments cited by learned counsel for the writ petitioner. 38. In the judgment passed in the case of Bashir Ahmed Lone (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has held that as per the Scheme under SRO 181 of 1988, the moment the promise is made by the State for employment by accepting the donation of land, a right accrues in favour of the donor which cannot be extinguished or forfeited by issuance of subsequent SRO 214 of 1991. The Division Bench further held that mere failure of the State to appoint the donor or a member of his family till the issuance of SRO 214 of 1991 cannot deprive such person of his right accrued under SRO 181 of 1988. In the said judgment, the Division Bench has not considered the distinction between ‘donation’ and ‘acquisition’, nor has it adverted to the provisions of SRO 214 of 1991 providing clearly that, with the issuance of SRO 214 of 1991, the cases for employment under process shall not be considered. In the said judgment, the Division Bench has not considered the distinction between ‘donation’ and ‘acquisition’, nor has it adverted to the provisions of SRO 214 of 1991 providing clearly that, with the issuance of SRO 214 of 1991, the cases for employment under process shall not be considered. The aforesaid judgment is otherwise not applicable to the instant case as we have already held that no right ever accrued, either to father of the petitioner, or to the petitioner any time after the issuance of SRO 181 of 1988 till the issuance of SRO 214 of 1991. 39. In the case of Sitan Devi (supra), the Division Bench of this Court was confronted with a situation where the land of the claimant had been taken over by the State by making a promise that one of his family members would be provided Government employment. In that context, the Division Bench held the case covered by SRO 181 of 1988. We are at a loss to understand as to how the aforesaid judgment helps the writ petitioner when his father had voluntarily donated the land without seeking any consideration or commitment from the Government. 40. The judgment passed by the Single Bench in Mohd Akram Rather’s case (supra) being a Single Bench judgment does not bind us. The judgment mainly relies upon the case of Bashir Ahmad Lone (supra) which we have already discussed above. To the similar effect is the judgment of the Single Judge in Krishan Lal’s case (supra) holding that the right once vested under SRO 181 of 1988 could not be taken away by subsequent SRO 214 of 1991 whereby the earlier SRO i.e. SRO 181 was repealed. 41. The other judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the writ petitioner is in the case of Gh. Nabi Mir which is also a Single Bench Judgement. The Single Bench has no doubt held that SRO 181 of 1988 was retrospective in operation and would apply even to the acquisitions of land made for public purpose prior to the issuance of SRO 181 of 1988. We respectfully beg to differ with the view taken by the learned Single Judge for the reasons given above. Otherwise also, in the instant case, the father of the writ petitioner had voluntarily donated his land for public cause i.e. construction of PHC. We respectfully beg to differ with the view taken by the learned Single Judge for the reasons given above. Otherwise also, in the instant case, the father of the writ petitioner had voluntarily donated his land for public cause i.e. construction of PHC. It was not the case where the land belonging to the father of the writ petitioner was compulsorily acquired for public purpose. Viewed thus, we do not find that any of the judgments cited by learned counsel for the writ petitioner are applicable to the facts of the instant case and would come to the rescue of the writ petitioner. 42. For the foregoing reasons, we find enough merit in the appeal preferred by the appellants/State. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the impugned order of the Writ Court is set aside. As a result, the writ petition of the writ petitioner shall stand dismissed.