JUDGMENT : SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. This criminal appeal preferred at the instance of the appellant herein under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment dated 17/07/2015 passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Balodabazar in Special Sessions Case No. 45/2014 whereby the appellant has been convicted for offence punishable under Section 363, 376(2)(i)/511 of IPC and he has been sentenced to undergo R.I. for 5 years with fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for 3 months and also convicted for offence punishable under Section 4/18 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred as the Act of 2012) with the aid of Section 42 of the Act of 2012 and has been sentenced to undergo R.I. for 7 years with fine of Rs. 3000/- and in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 6 months. However, no direction has been issued as to whether both the sentences will run concurrently or consecutively. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 27/07/2014 at about 1:30 PM at village Junwani Jora Road, the appellant herein abducted the minor victim, aged about 9 years, from her lawful guardianship and thereafter, committed sexual intercourse with her and thereby, committed the aforesaid offence. 3. Further case of the prosecution is that on 27/07/2014 at about 08:20 PM, victim's mother (PW-2) lodged a report at Police Chowki Bhatgaon that since it was a school holiday, she had not sent her daughter to school and had rather sent her to graze cattle and at about 03:30 PM, her daughter (victim) returned home and started crying and upon asking, informed her grandmother Manobai (PW-4) about the act done by the appellant. On the basis of the said report, zero first information report was registered against the appellant vide Ex.P/2 and at the instance of victim's mother (PW-2), victim's underwear and a ten rupees note given by the appellant to the victim were seized vide Ex.P/5. Thereafter, victim was subjected to medical examination which was conducted by Dr. Anita Verma (PW-10) and MLC report has been brought on record as Ex.P/10. Thereafter, zero first information report registered against the appellant was converted to actual numbered first information report vide Ex.P/9. Thereafter, victim was subjected to medical examination which was conducted by Dr. Anita Verma (PW-10) and MLC report has been brought on record as Ex.P/10. Thereafter, zero first information report registered against the appellant was converted to actual numbered first information report vide Ex.P/9. After due investigation, the appellant was charge-sheeted for offence punishable under Sections 363, 376(2)(i) of IPC and Section 4 of the Act of 2012 which was committed to the Court of Special Judge for trial in accordance with law. The appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence. 4. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses and brought on record 19 documents. The statement of the appellant was taken under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. wherein he denied guilt, however, he examined only one witness in his defence and did not bring any document on record. 5. Learned Special Judge, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, proceeded to convict the appellant for offence punishable under Sections 363, 376(2)(i)/511 of IPC and Section 4/18 of the Act of 2012 and sentenced him as aforesaid. 6. Mr. C.R. Sahu, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that prosecution has failed to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt and learned Special Judge has erred in convicting the appellant relying upon the testimony of the victim (PW-3) as she is not a trustworthy witness and even her medical report (Ex.P/10) does not support the prosecution case. As such, the appellant be acquitted from the charges levelled against him. 7. Per contra, Mr. Ashish Tiwari, learned State counsel, would submit that learned Special Judge has rightly convicted the appellant relying upon the testimony of the victim (PW-3) as she has clearly stated about the act committed by the appellant and moreover, as per Dr. Anita Verma (PW-10) who medically examined the victim has clearly stated before the Court that injuries were found on the thigh of the victim, as such, the instant appeal is liable to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the record with utmost circumspection. 9. The question for consideration herein is whether learned Special Judge is justified in convicting the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 363, 376(2)(i)/511 of IPC and Section 4/18 of the Act of 2012? 10. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the record with utmost circumspection. 9. The question for consideration herein is whether learned Special Judge is justified in convicting the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 363, 376(2)(i)/511 of IPC and Section 4/18 of the Act of 2012? 10. Victim (PW-3), who was a minor aged about 9 years on the date of the offence, was examined before the trial Court and she has clearly supported the case of the prosecution. Victim was also subjected to medical examination which was conducted by Dr. Anita Verma (PW-10) and she has stated before the Court that there was injury on her thigh. As such, considering the entire evidence available on record, particularly considering the statement of the victim (PW-3) and her mother (PW-2) and grandmother (PW-4) and the version of the victim is duly supported by medical evidence, we are of the considered opinion that the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the offences in question. We hereby affirm the conviction as recorded by the trial Court. 11. At this stage, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that though the offence under Section 366, 376(2)(i) of IPC and Section 4/18 of the Act of 2012 are said to have been committed by the appellant in the single transaction yet learned Special Judge has not directed the two sentences imposed upon him either to run concurrently or consecutively and as such, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside to that extent and direction be made for running the sentences concurrently to which learned State counsel draws attention of this Court upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of O.M. Cherian alias Thankachan vs. State of Kerala and Others, (2015) 2 SCC 501 wherein their Lordships have dealt with Section 31 of Cr.P.C. which relates to quantum of punishment to an accused who has been convicted for several offences at one trial. 12. 12. True it is that appellant has been convicted for offences punishable under Section 363, 376(2)(i)/511 of IPC and Section 4/18 of the Act of 2012 and separate sentences have been awarded to him for both the offences separately but no order or direction has been given by the learned Special Judge as to whether the sentences have to run concurrently or consecutively which the Special Judge was obliged to do by virtue of Section 31(1) of Cr.P.C. read with Rule 262 of the Rules and Orders (Criminal). 13. Section 31 of Cr.P.C. which provides for sentence in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial, states as under: “31. Sentence in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial: (1) When a person is convicted at one trial of two or more offences, the Court may, subject to the provisions of Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code, sentence him for such offences, to the several punishments prescribed therefor which such Court is competent to inflict; such punishments when consisting of imprisonment to commence the one after the expiration of the other in such order as the Court may direct, unless the Court directs that such punishments shall run concurrently. (2) In the case of consecutive sentences, it shall not be necessary for the Court by reason only of the aggregate punishment for the several offences being in excess of the punishment which it is competent to inflict on conviction of a single offence, to send the offender for trial before a higher Court: Provided that: (a) in no case shall such person be sentenced to imprisonment for a longer period than fourteen years. (b) the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the Court is competent to inflict for a single offence. (3) For the purpose of appeal by a convicted person, the aggregated of the consecutive sentences passed against him under this section shall be deemed to be a single sentence.” 14. (b) the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the Court is competent to inflict for a single offence. (3) For the purpose of appeal by a convicted person, the aggregated of the consecutive sentences passed against him under this section shall be deemed to be a single sentence.” 14. The Supreme Court in the matter of O.M. Cherian (supra) considered the issue and answered in paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 of the judgment holding that under Section 31 of Cr.P.C. the trial Court has full discretion to order the sentences to run concurrently in case of conviction for two or more offences considering the facts and circumstances of the case and nature of offence and observed as under: “19. As pointed out earlier, Section 31 Cr.P.C. deals with quantum of punishment which may be legally passed when there is (a) one trial and (b) the accused is convicted of two or more offences. The ambit of Section 31 is wide, covering not only a single transaction constituting two or more offences but also offences arising out of two or more transactions. In the two judgments in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain vs. Collector of Customs, (1988) 4 SCC 183 and Manoj vs. State of Haryana, (2014) 2 SCC 153 the issue that fell for consideration was the imposition of sentence for two or more offences arising out of the single transaction. It is in that context, in those cases, this Court held that the sentences shall run concurrently. 20. Under Section 31 Cr.P.C. it is left to the full discretion of the court to order the sentences to run concurrently in case of conviction for two or more offences. It is difficult to lay down any straitjacket approach in the matter of exercise of such discretion by the courts. By and large, trial courts and appellate courts have invoked and exercised their discretion to issue directions for concurrent running of sentences, favouring the benefit to be given to the accused. Whether a direction for concurrent running of sentences ought to be issued in a given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or offences committed and the facts and circumstances of the case. The discretion has to be exercised along the judicial lines and not mechanically. 21. Whether a direction for concurrent running of sentences ought to be issued in a given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or offences committed and the facts and circumstances of the case. The discretion has to be exercised along the judicial lines and not mechanically. 21. Accordingly, we answer the reference by holding that Section 31 Cr.P.C. leaves full discretion with the court to order sentences for two or more offences at one trial to run concurrently, having regard to the nature of offences and attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances. We do not find any reason to hold that normal rule is to order the sentence to be consecutive and exception is to make the sentences concurrent. Of course, if the court does not order the sentence to be concurrent, one sentence may run after the other, in such order as the court may direct. We also do not find any conflict in the earlier judgment in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain (supra) and Section 31 Cr.P.C.” 15. Similarly, relying upon their earlier decisions rendered in the matters of V.K. Bansal vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 211 and Mohd. Akhtar Hussain (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that when the prosecution is based on single transaction where it constitutes two or more offences, sentences are to run concurrently and observed in paragraphs 16 and 17 as under: “16. When the prosecution is based on single transaction where it constitutes two or more offences, sentences are to run concurrently. Imposing separate sentences, when the acts constituting different offences form part of the single transaction is not justified. So far as the benefit available to the accused to have the sentences to run concurrently of several offences based on single transaction, in V.K. Bansal (supra) in which one of us (T.S. Thakur, J.) was member, this Court held as under : (SCC p. 217, Para 16) “16........we may say that the legal position favours exercise of discretion to the benefit of the prisoner in cases where the prosecution is based on a single transaction no matter different complaints in relation thereto may have been filed as is the position in cases involving dishonour of cheques issued by the borrower towards repayment of a loan to the creditor.” 17. This Court in Mohd. This Court in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain (supra), recognised the basic rule of conviction arising out of a single transaction justifying the concurrent finding running of the sentences. The following passage in this regard is relevant to be noted: (SCC p. 187, Para 10) “10. The basic rule of thumb over the years has been the so-called single transaction rule for concurrent sentences. If a given transaction constitutes two offences under two enactments generally, it is wrong to have consecutive sentences. But this rule has no application if the transaction relating to offences is not the same.” 16. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in O.M. Cherian (supra) has been followed with approval subsequently by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sunil Kumar alias Sudhir Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 560 and recently in Malkeet Singh Gill vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204 . 17. Returning to the facts of the case in hand, it is quite vivid that both the offences have been committed by the appellant on the same line i.e. firstly he abducted the victim, aged about 9 years, from her lawful guardianship and then committed sexual intercourse with her and the learned Special Judge though convicted him for both the offences separately and awarded separate sentences but did not specify as to whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively which he was obliged to do under Section 31(1) of Cr.P.C. and Rule 262 of Rules and Orders (Criminal). Thus, in view of the provisions contained under Section 31(1) of Cr.P.C. read with Rule 262 of the Rules and Orders (Criminal) as well as the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the matters of V.K. Bansal (supra), and Mohd. Akhtar Hussain (supra) which have been followed with approval in O.M. Cherian (supra), we are of the considered opinion that since prosecution is based on single transaction constituting two offences under Section 363 of IPC and Section 376(2)(i)/511 of IPC read with Section 4/18 of the Act of 2012 and further considering that separate sentences have been awarded by the Special Court for both the offences, while affirming the conviction of the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 363, 376(2)(i)/511 of IPC and Section 4/18 of the Act of 2012, we hereby direct that both the sentences shall run concurrently. 18. 18. It is pertinent to notice here that there is no such specific order passed by the Special Court with regard to concurrent or consecutive running of both the sentences, which he was obliged to pass, in this regard Rule 262 of the Rules and Orders (Criminal) may be noticed herein profitably, which provides as under: “262. Where a person is convicted of an offence which is made up of parts each of which constitutes an offence or when a person is convicted of more offences than one, the limitations imposed by section 71 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 35 of the Code must be adhered to. When a person is convicted of more than one offence, the court should be careful to pass a separate sentence for each offence, so that if the conviction is set aside on appeal with respect to one of the offences, there will be no room for doubt as to the sentences passed with respect to the rest. The court has a discretion to make such sentences run concurrently, and this discretion should be exercised so as to make the effective sentence proportionate to the gravity of the offence. Under Section 397 of the Code the court has power to order, in a case where an accused person is already undergoing imprisonment for another offence, that a subsequent sentence of imprisonment passed on him shall take effect at once and run concurrently with the sentence he is undergoing.” 19. In the matter of Nagaraja Rao vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2015) 4 SCC 302 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that it is obligatory upon the court of first instance while awarding sentence to specify in clear terms in the order of conviction as to whether sentences awarded to the accused would run “concurrently” or they would run “consecutively” and observed as under: “11. The expressions “concurrently” and “consecutively” mentioned in the Code are of immense significance while awarding punishment to the accused once he is found guilty of any offence punishable under IPC or/and of an offence punishable under any other Special Act arising out of one trial or more. It is for the reason that award of former enure to the benefit of the accused whereas award of latter is detrimental to the accused interest. It is for the reason that award of former enure to the benefit of the accused whereas award of latter is detrimental to the accused interest. It is, therefore, legally obligatory upon the court of first instance while awarding sentence to specify in clear terms in the order of conviction as to whether sentences awarded to the accused would run “concurrently” or they would run “consecutively.” 20. In view of the aforesaid Rule 262 of the Rules and Orders (Criminal) read with the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matters of V.K. Bansal (supra) and Mohd. Akhtar Hussain (supra) since the offence punishable under Section 363 and 376(2)(i)/511 of IPC and Section 4/18 of the Act of 2012 have been found to have been committed by the appellant herein in the same transaction, we direct that sentences for both the offences will run concurrently from the date of order dated 17/07/2015. 21. Accordingly, this criminal appeal stands disposed of with the aforesaid direction. However, this would not prejudice our order dated 04/09/2023. 22. While parting with the record, we hope and trust that the trial Courts will henceforth specify in the order of conviction, while awarding sentences for separate offences, in clear terms as to whether the sentences awarded would run concurrently or consecutively as directed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Nagaraja Rao (supra) and as per Rule 262 of the Rules and Orders (Criminal). 23. Let a certified copy of this judgment be sent to the concerned trial Court along with the original records as well as to the jail authorities for information and compliance.