JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The instant appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 20.05.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(L) No.5602 of 2009, whereby and whereunder, the award dated 26.08.2009 passed by the Labour Court, Ranchi in Reference Case No. 03 of 2003 holding the workmen entitled to be regularized in service has been quashed and set aside by dismissing the writ petition. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition which requires to be enumerated, read as under: The respondent-workmen, appellant herein, claiming himself to be the workmen of the writ-petitioner, respondent, Mecon Ltd. has raised a demand of giving him status of unskilled worker but the same having not been acceded, the matter went before the Deputy Labour Commissioner for conciliation but the conciliation having failed. Thereafter, the failure report was sent before the appropriate government basis upon which reference has been made- “Whether not to regularize the service of Sri Dinabandhu Mahto workman of Mecon Ltd., Doranda, Ranchi by the management is justified? If not what relief he is entitled to and from which date?” The Labour Court after receipt of the reference has called upon the writ petitioner Mecon Ltd. wherein the issue was raised regarding the question of propriety of reference by taking the plea that there is no such demand having been raised by the workmen to regularize him in service of the writ petitioner-Mecon Ltd. rather the dispute as per the demand of the workmen was only to accede him the status of unskilled worker, therefore, the same cannot be said to be a dispute in the nature of industrial dispute since there is no demand having been raised regarding the regularization of the workmen before the management. The Labour Court, however, has proceeded and after considering the relevant documents which have been led by way of evidence and the oral submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, had passed the award in favour of the workmen holding the respondent-appellant entitled for regularization vide award dated 26.08.2009. The Labour Court, however, has proceeded and after considering the relevant documents which have been led by way of evidence and the oral submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, had passed the award in favour of the workmen holding the respondent-appellant entitled for regularization vide award dated 26.08.2009. The writ petitioner-Management, being aggrieved with the said award, filed a writ petition being W.P.(L) No. 5602 of 2009, whereby and whereunder, the award has been reversed by quashing and setting it aside by disposing of the writ petition which is the subject matter of the instant appeal. 3. Mr. Rahul Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant-workmen has submitted that serious irregularity has been committed by the learned Single Judge while reversing the award solely on the ground that there was no demand of regularization having been raised by the workmen and hence, the same cannot be said to be a dispute under the definition of the ‘dispute’ as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act. It has been contended that the only dispute raised by the workmen was to give him the status of the unskilled worker and to that effect a demand was raised but when the management has not acceded to such demand, the same fell for its conciliation before the Deputy Labour Commissioner but conciliation failed. The report was sent before the appropriate government basis upon which the appropriate government ought to have made a reference with respect to the grant of status of unskilled worker to the workmen by making reference to that effect, Whether not to regularize the service of Sri Dinabandhu Mahto workman of Mecon Ltd., Doranda, Ranchi by the management is justified? Therefore, the regularization since has never been an issue of demand by the workmen, hence, the same cannot be considered to be a dispute. Taking into consideration the fact, the learned Labour Court has decided the award even then the specific ground has been agitated in this regard but the same has not been considered by answering either-way, hence, perversity of award has been shown. Taking into consideration the fact, the learned Labour Court has decided the award even then the specific ground has been agitated in this regard but the same has not been considered by answering either-way, hence, perversity of award has been shown. Contention has been raised that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the fact that the issue of regularization was very much known to the management since the evidences has been led in this regard and as such, it cannot be said that the management in any way has been prejudiced even though the reference to the effect of regularization has not been made by the appropriate government. The learned counsel for the appellant-workmen has, therefore, submitted that the ground, basis upon which, the award has been quashed and set aside, cannot be set aside since the terms of reference cannot be construed to be a demand having not been a demand raised by the workmen. It has been contended that the management even has not been questioned the terms of reference and hence, once accepting the terms of reference and thereafter raising the legality and propriety of the reference, cannot be said to be proper on the part of the management but even this aspect of the matter has not been considered, therefore, the impugned order requires interference. 4. While on the other hand, Mr. Amitabh, learned counsel for the respondent-management has submitted by defending the order passed by the learned Single Judge by agitating the ground that the settled position of law is that the foremost thing is required to be seen by the appropriate government regarding the demand of the workmen which is the subject matter of the reference to be made in exercise of power conferred under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Here, in the given facts of the case as would appear from the material available on record that the regularization was never a demand of the workmen rather the demand was to give the workmen the status of the unskilled worker. Here, in the given facts of the case as would appear from the material available on record that the regularization was never a demand of the workmen rather the demand was to give the workmen the status of the unskilled worker. The said demand failed to be conciliated, as such, the failure report was send before the appropriate government and in that view of the matter it was only left upon the appropriate government to make reference regarding the consideration of the case of the workmen as to whether he is entitled to be given the status of unskilled worker or not. But, instead of doing so, the appropriate government in excess of its jurisdiction has made the reference of regularization and the same has been decided, hence, the very terms of reference itself cannot be construed to be a demand within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that even on this ground, the award had been interfered with by the learned Single Judge and the same cannot be said to suffer from infirmity. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent-Management has further submitted by giving rebuttal reply with respect to causing prejudice, since the fact about regularization has well been dealt with by the Labour Court, that there is no question of causing prejudice since the law is well settled that the appropriate government has got no jurisdiction to deviate from the failure report and if there is failure on the part of the appropriate government in making reference contrary to the failure report submitted by the Labour Department under Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the same will be said to be in excess of its jurisdiction. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 7. The fact which is not in dispute as would appear from the material available on record that the workmen who claims to have worked under the Mecon Ltd. had raised a demand to give him the status of unskilled worker. The said demand having not been acceded, thereafter, the matter went before the Labour Department wherein the management has not conceded to the said demand of the workmen, therefore, the conciliation failed. The said demand having not been acceded, thereafter, the matter went before the Labour Department wherein the management has not conceded to the said demand of the workmen, therefore, the conciliation failed. The failure report under Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act was sent before the appropriate government basis upon which the reference has been made to the effect that Whether not to regularize the service of Sri Dinabandhu Mahto workman of Mecon Ltd., Doranda, Ranchi by the management is justified? If not what relief he is entitled to and from which date? 8. The adjudicator, the learned Labour Court has proceeded to answer the reference by calling upon the management-Mecon Ltd., the respondent herein. Written statement had been filed by the Management, wherein specific plea had been taken regarding the issue of propriety of the demand of regularization since in the written statement, specific ground has been taken that there is no demand on behalf of the workmen for regularization rather the demand is only to give him the status of unskilled worker as would appear from the statement made at paragraph-5 of the written statement of the Management which reads as under: “5] That it is submitted that the Notification dated 12.6.03 is bad in law on the following grounds : (a) For that as would appear from the statement of demand dated 06.12.2001 that the dispute was raised by Shri Dinbandhu Mahto, the concerned workman, himself, and on a plain reading it is clear that the Union had not raised the dispute. Secondly, the dispute was raised for getting him enrolled as unskilled workman (Trainee) in MECON Ltd., Ranchi and NOT for regularization.” …” 9. The Management had adduced the evidences so as also the workman, thereafter, the award was passed in favour of the workman holding him entitled to be regularized in service. The award passed in Reference Case No. 03 of 2003 had been challenged by the writ petitioner-Mecon Ltd. by filing writ petition being W.P.(L) No. 5602 of 2009 wherein the award has been reversed by setting it aside which is the subject matter of the instant appeal. 10. The award passed in Reference Case No. 03 of 2003 had been challenged by the writ petitioner-Mecon Ltd. by filing writ petition being W.P.(L) No. 5602 of 2009 wherein the award has been reversed by setting it aside which is the subject matter of the instant appeal. 10. The question has been raised while questioning the award that the appropriate government has got no jurisdiction to travel beyond the issue of demand as also if the issue of demand is different to that of terms of reference and the terms of reference so made can only be said to be not a dispute within the meaning of ‘dispute’ under the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Single Judge has agreed to such submission and therefore, interfered with the award. 11. This Court, therefore, is required to answer (i) whether the appropriate government has got jurisdiction to travel beyond the subject matter of the failure report?; (ii) whether the appropriate government has got jurisdiction to make reference even though there is no such demand having been raised by the workmen? and; (iii) whether the Labour Court by not answering the issue of propriety of reference even though specific plea has been taken in the written statement, the same can be said to be perverse? 12. Since all the issues are interlinked, therefore, the same are being answered hereinbelow simultaneously but before answering the said issues, relevant provision of the Industrial Disputes Act is required to be referred herein, i.e., the definition of ‘industrial dispute’ : “2(k) "industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person; It is evident from the definition that the dispute within the meaning of industrial disputes can only be said to be dispute if the specific demand has been raised in this regard by the concerned workmen. If such demand has been made by the workmen, the option available to the management is at all to accept the demand or to refuse it. If such demand has been made by the workmen, the option available to the management is at all to accept the demand or to refuse it. In case of acceptance of the demand, the matter will not travel before the Labour Department but in case of non-acceptance, the matter will be raised before the Deputy Labour Commissioner by the workmen and in that eventuality, the authority concerned will call upon the management for conciliation. The ‘conciliation’ as would appear from Section 12 of the Industrial Act reads as under: 12. Duties of conciliation officers.- (1) Where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer may, or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under section 22 has been given, shall hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. (2) The conciliation officer shall, for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the dispute, without delay, investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and the right settlement thereof and may do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute. (3) If a settlement of the dispute or of any of the matters in dispute is arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings the conciliation officer shall send a report thereof to the appropriate Government [or an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government] together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to the dispute. (4) If no such settlement is arrived at, the conciliation officer shall, as soon as practicable after the close of the investigation, send to the appropriate Government a full report setting forth the steps taken by him for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to the dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof, together with a full statement of such facts and circumstances, and the reasons on account of which, in his opinion, a settlement could not be arrived at. (5) If, on a consideration of the report referred to in sub- section (4), the appropriate Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board, [Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal,] it may make such reference. Where the appropriate Government does not make such a reference it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefor. Where the appropriate Government does not make such a reference it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefor. (6) A report under this section shall be submitted within fourteen days of the commencement of the conciliation proceedings or within such shorter period as may be fixed by the appropriate Government: [Provided that, [subject to the approval of the conciliation officer,] the time for the submission of the report may be extended by such period as may be agreed upon in writing by all the parties to the dispute.] 13. The process as provided under Section 12 is that the meeting of conciliation will be conducted under the Chairmanship of the competent authority of the Labour Department and in case of non-acceptance of the demand of the workman by the management, the concerned competent authority of the Labour Department will prepare a failure report which will be sent before the appropriate government for making reference as would appear from Section 12(5) of the Act, 1947 as quoted and referred above. 14. The appropriate government has been conferred with the power under Section 10 of making reference on the basis of the subject matter of the failure report. For ready reference, the said provision is being referred as under: “10. 14. The appropriate government has been conferred with the power under Section 10 of making reference on the basis of the subject matter of the failure report. For ready reference, the said provision is being referred as under: “10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals.- (1) [Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time], by order in writing,-- (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or (b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or (c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified, in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication: Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Third Schedule and is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, the appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court under clause (c):] [Provided further that] where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under section 22 has been given, the appropriate Government shall, unless it considers that the notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given or that it would be inexpedient so to do, make a reference under this sub- section notwithstanding that any other proceedigns under this Act in respect of the dispute may have commenced: [Provided also that where the dispute in relation to which the Central Government is the appropriate Government, it shall be competent for that Government to refer the dispute to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, constituted by the State Government;] [(1A) Where the Central Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and the dispute involves any question of national importance or is of such a nature that industrial establishments situated in more than one State are likely to be interested in, or affected by, such dispute and that the dispute should be adjudicated by a National Tribunal, then, the Central Government may, whether or not it is the appropriate Government in relation to that dispute, at any time, by order in writing, refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Natoinal Tribunal for adjudication.] (2) Where the parties to an industrial dispute apply in the prescribed manner, whether jointly or separately, for a reference of the dispute to a Board, Court 4*[Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], the appropriate Government, if satisfied that the persons applying represent the majority of each party, shall make the reference accordingly. [(2A) An order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under this section shall specify the period within which such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall submit its award on such dispute to the appropriate Government: Provided that where such industrial dispute is connected with an individual workman, no such period shall exceed three months: Provided further that where the parties to an industrial dispute apply in the prescribed manner, whether jointly or separately, to the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for extension of such period or for any other reason, and the presiding officer of such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal considers it necessary or expedient to extend such period, he may for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit: Provided also that in computing any period specified in this sub- section, the period, if any, for which the proceedings before the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal had been stayed by any injunction or order of a Civil Court shall be excluded: Provided also that no proceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall lapse merely on the ground that any period specified under this sub-section had expired without such proceedings being completed.] (3) Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Board, 2*[Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] under this section, the appropriate Government may by order prohibit the continuance of any strike or lock-out in connection with such dispute which may be in existence on the date of the reference. (4) Where in an order referring an industrial dispute to [a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] under this section or in a subsequent order, the appropriate Government has specified the points of dispute for adjudication, [the Labour Court or the Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as the case may be] shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto. (5) Where a dispute concerning any establishment or establishments has been, or is to be, referred to a 6*[Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] under this section and the appropriate Government is of opinion, whether on an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, that the dispute is of such a nature that any other establishment, group or class of establishments of a similar nature is likely to be interested in, or affected by, such dispute, the appropriate Government may, at the time of making the reference or at any time thereafter but before the submission of the award, include in that reference such establishment, group or class of establishments, whether or not at the time of such inclusion any dispute exists or is apprehended in that establishment, group or class of establishments.] [(6) Where any reference has been made under sub-section (1A) to a National Tribunal, then notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no Labour Court or Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any matter which is under adjudication before the National Tribunal, and accordingly,-- (a) if the matter under adjudication before the National Tribunal is pending in a proceeding before a Labour Court or Tribunal, the proceeding before the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, in so far as such matter, shall be deemed to have been quashed on such reference to the National Tribunal; and (b) it shall not be lawful for the appropriate Government to refer the matter under adjudication before the National Tribunal to any Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication during the pendency of the proceeding in relation to such matter before the National Tribunal. (7) Where any industrial dispute, in relation to which the Central Government is not the appropriate Government, is referred to a National Tribunal, then notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any reference in section 15, section 17, section 19, section 33A, section 33B and section 36A to the appropriate Government in relation to such dispute shall be construed as a reference to the Central Government but, save as aforesaid and as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, any reference in any other provision of this Act to the appropriate Government in relation to that dispute shall mean a reference to the State Government.] (8) No proceedings pending before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal in relation to an industrial dispute shall lapse merely by reason of the death of any of the parties to the dispute being a workman, and such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall complete such proceedings and submit its award to the appropriate Government.” 15. It also requires to refer herein certain judicial pronouncement as to which dispute can be said to be dispute within the meaning of industrial dispute as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Limited vs. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat and Ors., AIR 1968 SC 529 , paragraph-4 of the said judgment reads as under: “4. The second ground urged on behalf of the appellant is that in this case, no dispute relating to reinstatement was actually raised either by respondent No. 2 or respondent No 3 before the reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal by the Government of Gujarat and, consequently, that reference itself was without jurisdiction. When Mr. A. K. Sen, counsel for the appellant, raised this ground, it was urged by Mr. Gopalakrishnan on behalf of the respondent that this ground was being taken for the first time in this Court and had not been raised at any earlier stage, so that it should not be allowed to be taken in this Court. It however, appears that the question of jurisdiction of the State Government to refer the demand for reinstatement for adjudication to the Tribunal was specifically urged in the High Court and the High Court actually dealt with it in its judgment, dismissing the petition filed on behalf of the appellant. It however, appears that the question of jurisdiction of the State Government to refer the demand for reinstatement for adjudication to the Tribunal was specifically urged in the High Court and the High Court actually dealt with it in its judgment, dismissing the petition filed on behalf of the appellant. The High Court clearly mentions that the counsel for the appellant contended that the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction as the question referred to fit and which it was called upon to adjudicate relating to reinstatement of respondent No. 3 in the service of the Corporation would not fall within the scope of item in the Second Schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was further urged that since the third respondent was neither discharged nor dismissed by the appellant, the question of relief of reinstatement would not arise under that item and, there being no item under which the demand would fall the State Government had no jurisdiction to refer such a demand for adjudication to the Tribunal. These points urged before the High Court would cover the ground now urged by Mr. Sen before us. It is true that the form in which it was urged before the High Court was slightly different. There, the point raised was that a demand for reinstatement, when there had been retrenchment only and no discharge or dismissal, could not be held to constitute an industrial dispute. On the facts of the case as they appeared from the material before the Tribunal, it is now urged that, in fact, the demand, which was being pressed with the management by both the respondents, was in respect of retrenchment compensation and not reinstatement. The demand for reinstatement seems to have been given up, because the respondents realised that the services of respondent No. 3 had not been terminated by discharge or dismissal, but by retrenchment only and that retrenchment not being the result of any unfair labour practice or victimisation, respondent No. 3 could only claim retrenchment compensation. In the evidence given before the Tribunal, there were included two letters written by the two respondents containing the demand for retrenchment compensation. We have already referred to one of these letters which was sent on 7th March, 1958 by respondent No. 3 to the Administrative Officer of the appellant. In the evidence given before the Tribunal, there were included two letters written by the two respondents containing the demand for retrenchment compensation. We have already referred to one of these letters which was sent on 7th March, 1958 by respondent No. 3 to the Administrative Officer of the appellant. The other letter was sent on 10th July, 1958 by the General Secretary of respondent No 2 in which again it was stated that Sindhu Hotchief had paid retrenchment; dues to respondent No. 3 in respect of the services he had rendered in that Company, but the appellant Corporation was responsible for his retrenchment dues for the service which had been rendered by respondent No. 3 in the appellant Corporation. The prayer was that, as the appellant had refused him reemployment, arrangement should be made to pay his retrenchment dues according to Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Thus, both the respondents, in their claims put forward before the management of the appellant, requested for payment of retrenchment compensation and did not raise any dispute for reinstatement. Since no such dispute about reinstatement was raised by either of the respondents before the management of the appellant, it is clear that the State Government was not competent to refer a question of reinstatement as an industrial dispute for adjudication by the Tribunal. The dispute that the State Government could have referred competently was the dispute relating to payment of retrenchment compensation by the appellant to respondent No. 3 which had been refused. No doubt, the order of the State Government making the reference mentions that the Government had considered the report submitted by the Conciliation Officer under subsection (4) of Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, in respect of the dispute between the appellant and workmen employed under it, over the demand mentioned in the Schedule appended to that order; and, in the Schedule, the Government mentioned that the dispute was that of reinstatement of respondent No. 3 in the service of the appellant and payment of his wages from 21st February, 1958. It was urged by Mr. Gopalakrishnan on behalf of the respondents that this Court cannot examine whether the Government, in forming its opinion that an industrial dispute exists, came to its view correctly or incorrectly on the material before it. It was urged by Mr. Gopalakrishnan on behalf of the respondents that this Court cannot examine whether the Government, in forming its opinion that an industrial dispute exists, came to its view correctly or incorrectly on the material before it. This proposition is, no doubt, correct; but the aspect that is being examined is entirely different. It may be that the Conciliation Officer reported to the Government that an industrial dispute did exist relating to the reinstatement of respondent No. 3 and payment of wages to him from 21st February, 1958 but when the dispute came up for adjudication before the Tribunal, the evidence produced clearly showed that no such dispute had ever been raised by either respondent with the management of the appellant. If no dispute at all was raised by the respondents with the management, any request sent by them to the Government would only be a demand by them and not an industrial dispute between them and their employer. An industrial dispute, as defined, must be a dispute between employers and employers, employers and workmen, and workmen and workmen. A mere demand to a Government, without a dispute being raised by the workmen with their employer, cannot become an industrial dispute. Consequently, the material before the Tribunal clearly showed that no such industrial dispute, as was purported to be referred by the State Government to the tribunal, had ever existed between the appellant Corporation and the respondents and the State Government, in making a reference, obviously committed an error in basing its opinion an material which was not relevant to the formation of opinion. The Government had to come to an opinion that an industrial dispute did exist and that opinion could only be formed on the basis that there was a dispute between the appellant and the respondents relating to reinstatement. Such material could not possibly exist when, as early as March and July. 1958. respondent No. 3 and respondent No 2 respectively had confined their demands to the management to retrenchment compensation only and; did not make any demand for reinstatement. On those facts it is clear that the reference made by the Government was not competent. The only reference that the Government could have made had to be related to payment of retrenchment compensation which was the only subject-matter of dispute between the appellant and the respondents.” 16. On those facts it is clear that the reference made by the Government was not competent. The only reference that the Government could have made had to be related to payment of retrenchment compensation which was the only subject-matter of dispute between the appellant and the respondents.” 16. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the dispute to be not a dispute if no dispute at all was raised by the respondents with the management, any request sent by them to the Government would only be a demand by them and not an industrial dispute between them and their employer. An industrial dispute, as defined, must be a dispute between employers and employers, employers and workmen, and workmen and workmen. It is, thus, evident that a dispute can only be considered to be a dispute by the appropriate government if a demand has been made by the workmen before the management and if no demand has been made then the same cannot be said to be dispute within the meaning of the dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act. 17. The reference of a judgment rendered in State of Madras vs. C.P. Sarathy and Anr,. AIR 1953 SC 53 is also required to be made wherein the relevant is paragraph-145 which reads as under: “16. This is, however, not to say that the Government will be justified in making a reference under Section 10(1) without satisfying itself on the facts and circumstances brought to its notice that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended in relation to an establishment or a definite group of establishments engaged in a particular industry, and it is also desirable that the Government should, wherever possible, indicate the nature of the dispute in the order of reference. But, it must be remembered that in making a reference under Section 10(1) the Government is doing an administrative act and the fact that it has to form an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dispute as a preliminary step to the discharge of its function does not make it any less administrative in character. The Court cannot, therefore, canvass the order of reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. The Court cannot, therefore, canvass the order of reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. No doubt, it will be open to a party seeking to impugn the resulting award to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, and that, therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. But if the dispute was an industrial dispute as defined in the Act, its factual existence and the expediency of making a reference in the circumstances of a particular case are matters entirely for the Government to decide upon, and it will not be competent for the Court to hold the reference bad and quash the proceedings for want of jurisdiction merely because there was, in its opinion, no material before the Government on which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion on those matters. The observations in some of the decisions in Madras do not appear to have kept this distinction in view.” 18. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid judgment that it will be open to a party seeking to impugn the resulting award to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, and that, therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. But if the dispute was an industrial dispute as defined in the Act, its factual existence and the expediency of making a reference in the circumstances of a particular case are matters entirely for the Government to decide upon, meaning thereby, that in case of absence of making any dispute before the management even if the award has been passed, that can be challenged on the ground that the same cannot be said to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act. 19. This Court is now proceeding to examine the question as have been formulated above. It has not been disputed by the workman that the demand which he has raised pertains to giving him the status of unskilled worker. The Labour Court has also considered the said issue by calling upon the management regarding conferment of the status of unskilled worker. This fact has also not been disputed on behalf of the workman. It has not been disputed by the workman that the demand which he has raised pertains to giving him the status of unskilled worker. The Labour Court has also considered the said issue by calling upon the management regarding conferment of the status of unskilled worker. This fact has also not been disputed on behalf of the workman. The failure report was prepared and was sent before the appropriate government but the appropriate government instead of making reference on consideration of the failure report regarding conferment of the status of the unskilled worker has made reference as to why the respondent-appellant be not regularized. The preliminary objection has been raised in the written statement as would appear from paragraph-5 thereof as quoted and referred above wherein specific plea has been taken that the workman has never made the demand for his regularization rather his demand was for conferment of the status of unskilled worker to him. 20. This Court has gone across the entire award as has been appended to the paperbook but the said issue has not been agitated either-way by discarding or accepting since there is no finding to that effect available in the award rather the Labour Court has proceeded to answer the reference regarding the entitlement of the respondent-appellant as to whether he is fit to be regularized in the services of the management or not. 21. The law is well settled as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Limited vs. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat and Ors. (supra) and State of Madras vs. C.P. Sarathy and Anr. (supra) that a dispute can only be said to be a dispute within the meaning of ‘dispute’ under the Industrial Disputes Act if specific demand has been made by the workman, then only, it will be said to be a dispute in between the employer and the employee and in absence thereof, dispute cannot be said to be a dispute under the Industrial Dispute Act. 22. 22. Herein also, since the fact is not in dispute that the demand of the workman was for conferment of the status of unskilled worker that was made before the management basis upon the failure of the acceptance of such demand, a failure report was prepared at that stage by the appropriate government, therefore, by taking into consideration the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Limited vs. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat and Ors. (supra) and State of Madras vs. C.P. Sarathy and Anr. (supra), a dispute will only be said to be a dispute within the meaning of ‘dispute’ under the Industrial Disputes Act if reference to the effect as to whether any conferment of the status of the unskilled worker to the workman can be said to be justified, as such, reference can only be said to be justified reference on the basis of the demand made by the workman before the management but herein, no such reference has been made rather reference has been for his regularization as to why the workman be not regularized. Therefore, this Court is of the view applying the principle/ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court that since the workman has never raised the dispute for his regularization, as such, the same cannot be said to be a dispute having been raised by the workman with the management, hence, it is not a dispute within the meaning of ‘dispute’ and once there is no dispute, there is no question of its adjudication by the adjudicator. 23. This Court, taking into consideration this aspect of the matter, if the reference has been answered, the same will be considered to be erroneous and contrary to the law. 24. Learned counsel for the respondent-appellant has raised the issue that the issue of regularization was known to the workman before the Labour Court since they have led evidence in this regard, as such, there is no question of causing prejudice to the management. 25. 24. Learned counsel for the respondent-appellant has raised the issue that the issue of regularization was known to the workman before the Labour Court since they have led evidence in this regard, as such, there is no question of causing prejudice to the management. 25. This Court, so far as the said submission is concerned, is of the view that there is no question of causing prejudice rather the question herein is that the acceptance of the view of the Labour Court on the basis of the settled position of law and once the dispute is being rendered to be not a dispute, there is no question of its adjudication even though the reference is being made by the appropriate government by exceeding its jurisdiction. Appropriate government has been conferred with the power under Section 10 to make reference on the basis of the failure report to be answered by the adjudicator but the appropriate government has not been conferred with the power to travel beyond the demand having been raised by the workman which is the subject matter of the failure report prepared by the conciliator. This Court, therefore, is of the view that merely because the evidence has been led for regularization, the award cannot be said to be proper when the reference itself suffers from infirmity and it is settled position of law that if the foundation will go, the subsequent decision/action will also be demolished. 26. Here, in the given facts of the case, very reference is bad in the eyes of law as has been discussed hereinabove, therefore, merely because the evidence has been led, illegality committed by the appropriate government in its inception cannot be allowed to be rectified due to the subsequent development since the position of law is well settled that illegality committed at its inception cannot be allowed to be legalized. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Orissa and Anr. vs. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 , paragraph-37 of the said judgment reads as under: “37. It is a settled legal proposition that if an order is bad in its inception, it does not get sanctified at a later stage. A subsequent action/development cannot validate an action which was not lawful at its inception, for the reason that the illegality strikes at the root of the order. It is a settled legal proposition that if an order is bad in its inception, it does not get sanctified at a later stage. A subsequent action/development cannot validate an action which was not lawful at its inception, for the reason that the illegality strikes at the root of the order. It would be beyond the competence of any authority to validate such an order. It would be ironic to permit a person to rely upon a law, in violation of which he has obtained the benefits. If an order at the initial stage is bad in law, then all further proceedings consequent thereto will be non est and have to be necessarily set aside. A right in law exists only and only when it has a lawful origin.” 27. It is further relevant to refer herein that the specific ground has been given to that effect as would appear from the statement made in the written statement but the Labour Court has not answered the same. On this ground also, according to the considered view of this Court, the award will be said to be perverse since the perversity means that if any fact has been raised but not answered. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under: “24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [ (2001) 1 SCC 501 ] this Court observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [ (2001) 1 SCC 501 ] this Court observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [ AIR 1966 Cal 31 ] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341 ] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc. 27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn. “Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.” 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn. Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn. Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.) Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn. “Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.”” 28. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn. “Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.”” 28. This Court, after having discussed the factual aspect, deems it fit and proper to refer the power of judicial review conferred to the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Ors., A.I.R. 1964 SC 477. Paragraph no.7 of the said judgment is being reproduced as under: “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held at paragraph no.21 as under: “With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” In Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra) 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In Heinz India (P) Ltd. and Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.66 and 67 as under: “66. vs. State of U.P. and Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.66 and 67 as under: “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” In Thansingh Nathmal vs. Supdt. of Taxes, A.I.R. 1964 SC 1419 Supreme Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which requires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. In Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships, while discussing the scope of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference into the finding of the Tribunal, has been pleased to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para-14 as under: “14. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the …...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” In General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and Others vs. Giridhari Sahu and Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 695 the Hon'ble Apex Court has delved upon the issue about scope of issuance of writ of certiorari by the High Court and has laid down that, if the finding recorded by the court is erroneous and based upon perversity, the order is fit to be quashed/set aside. 29. The purpose for referring these judgments is that since the learned Single Judge in exercise of power of judicial review conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has interfere with the award, as such, it is necessary to deal with the power of High Court in exercise of power to show interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 30. The law is well settled as per the reference of the judgment referred hereinabove that the award can be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of power in a case if the same suffers from perversity or based upon the erroneous finding or the reference itself is contrary to the demand made by the workman. 31. Herein also, in the facts of the case, the very reference is contrary to the demand raised and as such, the same cannot be considered to be a dispute within the meaning of ‘dispute’ under the Industrial Disputes Act. Further, the issue of propriety of the reference has also been raised before the Labour Court in the written statement by the Management but the same has not been considered since there is no reference of the aforesaid fact either discarding or accepting it by the Labour Court. 32. Further, the issue of propriety of the reference has also been raised before the Labour Court in the written statement by the Management but the same has not been considered since there is no reference of the aforesaid fact either discarding or accepting it by the Labour Court. 32. This Court, therefore, is of the view on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove based upon the legal position and the settled position of law as has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases referred hereinabove and after going through the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge this Court has found that the learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the fact that the terms of reference is contrary to the demand made by the workman, hence, the reference has been treated to be bad in the eyes of law. As such, the award passed based upon the wrong reference has been interfered with by quashing and setting it aside by considering the fact that the workman has never made the demand of regularization. This Court, accordingly, is of the view that the impugned order requires no interference. 33. In the result, the instant appeal fails and stands dismissed. 34. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.