ORDER : I.A. No. 1844 of 2022 1. The present Interlocutory Application has been filed for condonation of delay of 64 days in filing the instant appeal. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. No counter affidavit has been filed opposing the prayer for condoning the delay. 4. Having regard to the averments made in this application, we are of the view that the appellants were prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. 5. Accordingly, I.A. No. 1844 of 2022 is allowed and delay of 64 days in preferring the appeal is condoned. L.P.A. No. 210 of 2018 6. The instant intra-court appeal, under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against order dated 11.12.2017 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 4109 of 2014, wherein prayer has been made for setting aside the land acquisition proceeding being L.A. Case No. 11 of 1958-59 which was initiated by issuance of a notification under section 4(1) read with Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 1894”) for acquisition of 24.78 acres land situated in Mauza-Saraidhela, P.S. Saraidhela, District-Dhanbad, Jharkhand (hereinafter called the said land) on two ground i.e. that the land has not been used for the public purpose for which it was acquired and secondly prayer has been made to restore the land on the basis of the new Act i.e. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 2013”), which contains a provision as under 24(2), has been dismissed. 7. The briefs facts of the case, as per the pleadings made in the writ petition, read as under: A land acquisition proceeding, being L.A. Case No. 11 of 1958-59, was initiated by issuance of a notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 of the Act, 1894 for acquisition of 24.78 acres of land situated in Mouza-Saraidhela within the District of Dhanbad and subsequently, an area of 24.75 acres of land was declared to be acquired under Section 6 of the Act, 1894. The land of the petitioners was also acquired under the said acquisition proceeding and now they are claiming for restoration of their land. 8. The land of the petitioners was also acquired under the said acquisition proceeding and now they are claiming for restoration of their land. 8. It is evident from the materials available on record, as per the pleadings made in the writ petition that the land in question has been decided to be acquired by issuance of notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 of the Act, 1894. The State Government initiated a proceeding for acquisition of land being L.A. Case No. 11 of 1958-59. The proceeding of the aforesaid acquisition case was concluded and thereafter compensation has also been paid as per Award prepared in Land Acquisition Case No. 11 of 1958-59. The petitioner has raised the grievance that the land has not been taken by the State and as such in view of saving clause of the Act, 2013 i.e. 24(2) of the Act, 2013, the proceeding which was initiated under the old Act i.e. the Act, 1984 will be set at knot and a fresh land acquisition proceeding is required to be initiated under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. Second ground has been raised that the land which was acquired for a particular purpose but the same was not utilized for the purpose for which it was acquired and hence the land be restored in favour of raiyats. The grievance of the writ petitioner having been not redressed at the end of the State Government, therefore, the writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 4109 of 2014 has been filed. The learned Single Judge, after calling upon the State and taking into consideration the fact that the acquisition proceeding was initiated way back in the year 1958 basis upon which the amount of compensation, as determined in the acquisition proceeding, has been paid, hold that there is no question of applicability of the Act, 2013 by taking aid of Section 24(2) thereof and refused to entertain the grounds for restoration of land on the ground that once the land has been acquired by the State and in lieu thereof compensation has been paid the land having been vested in the State and it is upon the State to utilize the said land if it is not utilized for the purpose for which it was acquired rather it can also be utilized for other public purpose. Learned Single Judge, while discarding the said issue, has taken aid of judgment by Hon’ble Apex Court in Govt. of A.P. and Another vs. Syed Akbar, (2005) 1 SCC 558 as also in Leelawanti and Others vs. State of Haryana and Others, (2012) 1 SCC 66 and passed the impugned order denying the claim of the petitioner, which is the subject matter of instant intra-court appeal. 9. Mr. Manoj Tandon, learned counsel being assisted by Ms. Rishi Bharti, learned counsel for the petitioners-appellants has submitted by referring to Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 wherein it has been provided two conditions either of which is to be complied with i.e. the possession is to be taken or compensation is to be paid, if not paid and if either of the conditions is available the proceeding has been said to be initiated under the old Act, 1894will be said to be closed and it will be commenced again under the provisions of Act, 2013 by virtue of Section 24(2) thereof. It has been contended that here the possession of the land has not been taken and as such one of the conditions as per the provision of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 is available, therefore, the land acquisition proceeding initiated in the year 1958-59 will be said to have non-conclusive and as such the same is required to be initiated afresh under the provisions of the Act, 2013 but the said action has not been taken and as such there is absolute and flagrant violation of mandate of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. Further contention has been raised that the land although has been acquired by issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894for a particular public purpose but still the same has not been utilized for that particular purpose and as such the same is fit to be restored in favour of raiyats. It has further been contended that the learned Single Judge while negating the aforesaid claim of the writ petitioner has not appreciated the factual aspect in right prospective by ignoring the statutory mandate, as would appear from Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, therefore, the instant appeal. 10. Per contra, Mr. It has further been contended that the learned Single Judge while negating the aforesaid claim of the writ petitioner has not appreciated the factual aspect in right prospective by ignoring the statutory mandate, as would appear from Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, therefore, the instant appeal. 10. Per contra, Mr. Ratnesh Kumar, learned SC (L&C)-I appearing for the respondents-State refuting the argument advanced on behalf of appellants, has submitted that in given facts of the case, there is no question of applicability of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 reason being that the proceeding which was commenced by way of filing L.A. Case No. 11 of 1958-59 under the provisions of Act, 1984 will be said to be conclusive since even accepting that the possession of the land has not been taken but it is not disputed and it cannot be disputed that the compensation has been paid on conclusion of L.A. Case No. 11 of 1958-59. It has, therefore, been contended by referring to the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court in Indore Development Corporation Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and Others, (2020) 8 SCC 129 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the law by interpreting the provision of law as contained under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 wherein difference in between the word “possession” and “compensation” has been declared to be conjunctive and not disjunctive; meaning thereby either of the conditions i.e. the possession has been taken or if the possession has not been taken but the compensation has been paid then the saving clause as contained under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 will not be applicable. So far as contention raised on behalf of appellants that the land for the purpose of which was acquired since has not been utilized for that particular purpose, therefore, the same is to be restored in favour of the raiyats, submission has been made that once the land has been acquired and the displaced persons, raiyats, has been compensated by initiating a land acquisition proceeding which culminated into an award and once the amount of compensation has been received it is not available to the raiyats to raise the issue for restoration of the land. It has further been contended that once the land has been acquired it vests upon the State Government for a particular purpose or for different purpose but in no case the raiyats from whom the land has been acquired has got any business to question once compensation has been accepted and the land has been vested upon the State. Learned counsel for the State on the aforesaid background has submitted that order passed by learned Single Judge suffers from no error. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by learned Single Judge. 12. The issues, which are required to be answered by this Court, are as to: (I) Whether in the given facts of the case the provision of saving clause as under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 is said to be applicable or not? (II) Whether the land can be restored in favour of the raiyats, if according to the raiyats, the land is not being utilized for the purpose for which it was acquired? 13. Since both the issues are inter-linked, therefore, both are taken up together to be answered. But before dealing with the same, it requires to refer herein the mandate of the Constitution Bench Judgment rendered in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra) wherein the issue of applicability of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 has been dealt with while giving declaration that the difference in between the word “possession” and “compensation” has been held to be conjunctive and not disjunctive. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 since contains a provision that the proceeding if commenced under the Act, 1894 will be said to be inconclusive if either of the conditions i.e. “possession” has not been taken or “compensation” has not been paid; meaning thereby that the issue has been raised that if the compensation has not been paid or possession has not been taken from the raiyat the saving clause as contained under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 will automatically be applicable by setting at knot the proceeding initiated under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 but the Hon’ble Apex Court has answered the said issue by interpreting the provision of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 by holding therein that either of the conditions i.e. possession has been taken or compensation has been given is fulfilled the saving clause as per section 24(2) will not be applicable. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph of the judgment rendered in Indore Development Authority (supra) is quoted as under: “97. Section 24(2) carves out an exception to Section 24(1)(b), where the award has been passed, and the proceedings are pending, but in such proceedings, physical possession of the land has not been taken, or compensation has not been paid, proceedings shall lapse. There are twin requirements for the lapse; firstly, physical possession has not been taken and, secondly, compensation has not been paid. In case, possession has been taken but compensation has been paid, there is no lapse of the proceedings. The question which is to be decided is whether the conditions are cumulative i.e. both are to be fulfilled, for lapsing of acquisition proceedings, or the conditions are in the alternative (“either/or”). According to the State and acquiring agencies, in a situation where possession has been taken, and compensation is not paid, there is no lapse : also in case where compensation has been paid, but possession not taken in a proceeding pending as on 1-1-2014, there is no lapse. Sine qua non is that proceeding must be pending. They argue that the word “or” used in phrase “the physical possession of the land has been not taken, or the compensation has not been paid”, has to be interpreted as “and” as two negative requirements qualify it. Sine qua non is that proceeding must be pending. They argue that the word “or” used in phrase “the physical possession of the land has been not taken, or the compensation has not been paid”, has to be interpreted as “and” as two negative requirements qualify it. Furthermore, argues the State when two negative conditions are connected by “or”, they are construed as cumulative, the word “or” is to be read as “nor” or “and.” Naturally, the landowners argue to the contrary i.e. that lapse of acquisition occurred if compensation were not paid, or possession were not taken, 5 years before the coming into force of the 2013 Act. 98. It would be useful to notice rules of statutory interpretation in this regard. Principles of Statutory Interpretation (14th Edn.) by Justice G.P. Singh, speaks of the following general rule of statutory interpretation of positive and negative conditions whenever prescribed by a statute: “… Speaking generally, a distinction may be made between positive and negative conditions prescribed by a statute for acquiring a right or benefit. Positive conditions separated by “or” are read in the alternative [Star Co. Ltd. vs. CIT, (1970) 3 SCC 864 : AIR 1970 SC 1559 ] but negative conditions connected by “or” are construed as cumulative and “or” is read as “nor” or “and” [Patel Chunibhai Dajibha vs. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar, (1965) 2 SCR 328 : AIR 1965 SC 1457 ; Punjab Produce and Trading Co. Ltd. vs. CIT, (1971) 2 SCC 540 and Brown and Co. Ltd. vs. Harrison, 1927 All ER Rep 195, 203, 204 (CA)].” The above rule of statutory interpretation is based upon the decision of this Court in Patel Chunibhai Dajibha vs. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar, AIR 1965 SC 1457 , in which this Court held: (AIR pp. 1464-1465, Para 19) “19. It may be recalled that amendments to Section 32 were made from time to time, and Bombay Act 38 of 1957 added to sub-section (1)(b), clause (iii) and the preceding “or.” It is to be noticed that the conditions mentioned in sub-sections (1)(a) and (1)(b) are mutually exclusive. In spite of the absence of the word “or” between sub-sections (1)(a) and (1)(b), the two sub-sections lay down alternative conditions. The tenant must be deemed to have purchased the land if he satisfies either of the two conditions. In spite of the absence of the word “or” between sub-sections (1)(a) and (1)(b), the two sub-sections lay down alternative conditions. The tenant must be deemed to have purchased the land if he satisfies either of the two conditions. The appellant is not a permanent tenant, and does not satisfy the condition mentioned in sub-section (1)(a). Though not a permanent tenant, he cultivated the lands leased personally, and, therefore, satisfies the first part of the condition specified in sub-section (1)(b). The appellant's contention is that sub-sections (1)(b)(i), (1)(b)(ii) and (1)(b)(iii) lay down alternative conditions, and as he satisfies the condition mentioned in sub-section (1)(b)(iii), he must be deemed to have purchased the land on 1-4-1957. Colour is lent to this argument by the word “or” appearing between sub-section (1)(b)(ii) and sub-section (1)(b)(iii). But, we think that the word “or” between sub-sections (1)(b)(ii) and (1)(b)(iii) in conjunction with the succeeding negatives is equivalent to and should be read as “nor.” In other words, a tenant (other than a permanent tenant) cultivating the lands personally would become the purchaser of the lands on 1-4-1957, if on that date neither an application under Section 29 read with Section 31 nor an application under Section 29 read with Section 14 was pending. If an application either under Section 29 read with Section 31 or under Section 29 read with Section 14 was pending 1-4-1957, the tenant would become the purchaser on “the postponed date”, that is to say, when the application would be finally rejected. But if the application be finally allowed, the tenant would not become the purchaser. The expression “an application” in the proviso means not only an application under Section 31 but also an application under Section 29 read with Section 14. If an application of either type was pending on 1-4-1957, the tenant could not become the purchaser on that date. Now, on 1-4-1957, the application filed by Respondent 1 under Section 29 read with Section 31 was pending. Consequently, the appellant could not be deemed to have purchased the lands on 1-4-1957.” (Emphasis supplied) The decision of this Court in Punjab Produce and Trading Co. Ltd. vs. CIT, (1971) 2 SCC 540 , was relied upon in the discussion mentioned above, where provisions of Section 23-A of the Income Tax Act, 1922 and Explanations (b)(ii) and (iii) came up for consideration. Ltd. vs. CIT, (1971) 2 SCC 540 , was relied upon in the discussion mentioned above, where provisions of Section 23-A of the Income Tax Act, 1922 and Explanations (b)(ii) and (iii) came up for consideration. This Court ruled with respect to “or” and held that it had to be read as “and” construing negative conditions thus: (SCC pp. 543-544, Paras 7-8) “7. On behalf of the assessee a good deal of reliance has been placed on decision of this Court in Star Co. Ltd. vs. CIT, (1970) 3 SCC 864 : AIR 1970 SC 1559 . In that case, sub-clause (b)(ii) came up for consideration, and it was held that the two parts of the Explanation contained in that sub-clause were alternative. In other words, if one part was satisfied it was unnecessary to consider whether the second part was also satisfied. Thus, the word “or” was treated as having been used disjunctively and not conjunctively. The same reasoning is sought to be invoked with reference to sub-clause (b)(iii). 8. It is significant that the language of sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (b) is different. The former relates to a positive state of affairs whereas the latter lays down negative conditions. The word “or” is often used to express an alternative of terms defined or explanation of the same thing in different words. Therefore, if either of the two negative conditions which are to be found in sub-clause (b)(iii) remains unfulfilled, the conditions laid down in the entire clause cannot be said to have been satisfied. The clear import of the opening part of clause (b) with the word “and” appearing there read with the negative or disqualifying conditions in sub-clause (b)(iii) is that the assessee was bound to satisfy apart from the conditions contained in the other sub-clauses that its affairs were at no time during the previous year controlled by less than six persons and shares carrying more than 50% of the total voting power were during the same period not held by less than six persons. We are unable to find any infirmity in the reasoning or the conclusion of the Tribunal and the High Court so far as Question 1 is concerned.” It was observed that if either of the two negative conditions, which are to be found in sub-clause (b)(iii), remains unfulfilled, the conditions laid down in the entire clause cannot be said to have been satisfied. 99. It would also be useful to note that in Brown and Co. Ltd. vs. Harrison 1927 All ER Rep 195, 203, 204 (CA), the provisions contained in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924 came up for consideration before the Court of Appeal. The Court held that the word “or” in Article IV, Rule 2(q), must be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. It has been observed that quite commonly collation of the word “or” can be meant in conjunctive sense and certainly where the disjunctive use of the word, leads to repugnance or absurdity. 100. In this Court's considered view, as regards the collation of the words used in Section 24(2), two negative conditions have been prescribed. Thus, even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse, and this logically flows from the 1894 Act read with the provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 Act. Any other interpretation would entail illogical results. That apart, if the rule of interpretation with respect to two negative conditions qualified by “or” is used, then “or” should be read as “nor” or “and.” Brown and Co. Ltd. vs. Harrison, 1927 All ER Rep 195, 203, 204 (CA), ruled thus, about the interpretation of two negative conditions connected by the word: (All ER pp. 203 I-204 B) “… I think it quite commonly and grammatically can have a conjunctive sense. It is generally disjunctive, but it may be plain from the collation of the words that it is meant in a conjunctive sense, and certainly where the use of the word as a disjunctive leads to repugnance or absurdity, it is quite within the ordinary principles of construction adopted by the court to give the word a conjunctive use. It is generally disjunctive, but it may be plain from the collation of the words that it is meant in a conjunctive sense, and certainly where the use of the word as a disjunctive leads to repugnance or absurdity, it is quite within the ordinary principles of construction adopted by the court to give the word a conjunctive use. Here, it is quite plain that the word leads to an absurdity, because the contention put forward by the shipowners in this matter amounts to this, as my Lord said, that, if a shipowner himself breaks open a case and steals the contents of it, he is exempted from liability under Rule 2(q) if none of his servants stole the part of the case or broke it open. That seems to me to be a plain absurdity. In addition to that, there is a repugnancy because it is plainly repugnant to the second part of Rule 2(q). Therefore I say no more about that.” 366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and.” The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse. 14. This Court is now proceeding to examine the factual aspect on the premise of aforesaid settled position, as has been settled in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra) by the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court. Herein, the fact which is not in dispute is that compensation in lieu of acquisition of land has been paid to the ancestors of the writ petitioners. However, an issued was raised that the amount of compensation is meager one. The moment the issue the quantum of amount has been raised which itself suggests that the amount of compensation has been paid and received by the ancestors of the writ petitioners-appellants. However, an issued was raised that the amount of compensation is meager one. The moment the issue the quantum of amount has been raised which itself suggests that the amount of compensation has been paid and received by the ancestors of the writ petitioners-appellants. Therefore, as per settled position of law the amount of compensation since has been received, the saving clause as per provision of Section 24(2) will not be applicable and the proceeding initiated way back in the year 1958-59 will be said to be conclusive. 15. Therefore, the issue of applicability of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 as has been held by the learned Single Judge by assigning the aforesaid reason cannot be said to suffer from error. 16. So far as second issue that the land is required to be restored in favour of ancestors of the writ petitioners is concerned since the land is not being utilized for the purpose for which it was acquired, the law is well settled, having been taken care of by learned Single Judge also by giving reference of the judgment rendered in the case of Govt. of A.P. and Another vs. Syed Akbar (supra), relevant of which is paragraph 12, 13 and 14. For ready reference, the paragraph 12, 13 and 14 of the judgment rendered in is being Govt. of A.P. and Another vs. Syed Akbar (supra) is being reproduced hereunder as: “12. In the case Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil vs. State of Maharashtra claim of the petitioner for restitution of the possession of the land acquired pursuant to the resolution of the State Government was rejected. In Para 2, this Court observed thus: (SCC p. 406) “2. … We do not think that this Court would be justified in making direction for restitution of the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised for any other public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose. It is not intended that any land which remained unutilised, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification. It is not intended that any land which remained unutilised, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions.” 13. Yet in another recent decision, this Court in Northern Indian Glass Industries vs. Jaswant Singh referring to the case of Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil and other cases held that: (SCC p. 340, Para 12) “12. If the land was not used for the purpose for which it was acquired, it was open to the State Government to take action but that did not confer any right on the respondents to ask for restitution of the land.” Paras 10 and 11 of the said judgment read thus: (SCC p. 340) “10. In Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil vs. State of Maharashtra it is stated that the acquired land remaining unutilised was not intended to be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of notification. 11. Yet again in C. Padma vs. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of Tamil Nadu, it is held that acquired land having vested in the State and the compensation having been paid to the claimant, he was not entitled to restitution of possession on the ground that either original public purpose had ceased to be in operation or the land could not be used for other purpose.” 14. From the position of law made clear in the aforementioned decisions, it follows that (1) under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land acquired vests in the Government absolutely free from all encumbrances; (2) the land acquired for a public purpose could be utilised for any other public purpose; and (3) the acquired land which is vested in the Government free from all encumbrances cannot be reassigned or reconveyed to the original owner merely on the basis of an executive order. Further, in the case of Leelawanti and Others vs. State of Haryana and Others, (2012) 1 SCC 66 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph nos. 13 and 22 held as under:- “13. We have considered the respective submissions and examined the records. Further, in the case of Leelawanti and Others vs. State of Haryana and Others, (2012) 1 SCC 66 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph nos. 13 and 22 held as under:- “13. We have considered the respective submissions and examined the records. In our view, the High Court did not commit any error by not entertaining the appellants’ challenge to the acquisition of land because they did not offer any explanation for the long time gap of more than three decades between the issue of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 i.e. 1976 and filing of the writ petition i.e. 2007. 22. The approach adopted by the High Court is consistent with the law laid down by this Court in State of Kerala vs. M. Bhaskaran Pillai, 1997 (5) SCC 432 and Govt. of A.P. vs. Syed Akbar (supra). In the first of these cases, the Court considered the validity of an executive order passed by the Government for assignment of land to the erstwhile owners and observed: (M. Bhaskaran Pillai case, (supra), SCC p. 433, Para 4) “4. In view of the admitted position that the land in question was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by operation of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The question emerges whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilized for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting a higher value.” 17. It is evident from the aforesaid judgments wherein the issue has been settled that once the land has been acquired and vested by the State it is upon the State to utilize the said land since after its vesting in the government, it becomes absolutely free from all encumbrances and the land can also be acquired for public purpose can be utilized for other public purpose also, as would appear from paragraph 14 of the judgment rendered in being Govt. of A.P. and Another vs. Syed Akbar (supra). 18. The learned Single Judge has also taken the ground for discarding the claim of the petitioners that the acquisition proceeding was initiated way back in the year 1958-59 but after delay of about 53 years such grievance has been raised. Law is well settled that the writ petition cannot be entertained on the ground of delay and laches. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of New Delhi Municipal Council vs. Pan Singh and Others, (2007) 9 SCC 278 in particular paragraph 17, which reads as under: “17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. vs. Union of India).” In State of M.P. and Others vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and Others, AIR 1987 SC 251 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the writ petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to interfere and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid down on the principle of delay and laches stating that the High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and inconvenience in bringing the justice. In this context, further reference is made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Baljeet Singh (Dead) through LRs. and Others vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2019 SCC Online SC 1004 [S.L.P. (C) Nos. 30404-30442/2017] wherein the land losers had approached the Court of law after inordinate delay seeking enhanced compensation which the Hon’ble Apex Court has refused to condone. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held at paragraph 7 as under: “7. The matter requires examination from another aspect, viz. laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, where the period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to the prayer for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a case where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not brought within the period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonation of delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause and justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. It is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. It is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order. These principles are based on the principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such right is non-existent.” Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The Court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional Court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the Court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 19. This Court, after having discussed the facts in entirety as also the legal position and going through the order passed by learned Single Judge, is of the considered view that that the learned Single Judge has considered all these aspects of the matter, therefore, the same requires no interference. 20. 19. This Court, after having discussed the facts in entirety as also the legal position and going through the order passed by learned Single Judge, is of the considered view that that the learned Single Judge has considered all these aspects of the matter, therefore, the same requires no interference. 20. Accordingly, the instant intra-court appeal fails and is dismissed. 21. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed of.