JUDGMENT : The challenge in this petition is made to the communication dated 24.08.2023, made by the respondent-State Bank of India (“SBI”), by which a representation given by the petitioner for defreezing his bank account, has been rejected. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent-Bank had once freezed the account of the petitioner. That order was challenged in WPMS No.2356 of 2023, Resizone Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State Bank of India (“the first petition”). The first petition was decided on 21.08.2023, with the following directions:- “Exclusively on that ground since the order is having a civil consequences and the same has been apparently passed without any opportunity of hearing being provided to the petitioner, the writ petition would stand allowed. The impugned order would stand quashed with a direction to the respondent/bank, that the respondent would hear the petitioner on his representation to be filed by him and pass afresh order within three days. But, however, for a period of three days only, the petitioner would not operate the Account No. 32948210005 standing in the branch of the State Bank of India, I.T. Park, Dehradun. It goes without saying that if the decision is not taken within three days, it would be open for the petitioner to operate the account in accordance with law. Subject to above exception, writ petition is allowed.” 4. Subsequent to it, according to the petitioner, he made a representation to the respondent-Bank on 21.08.2023, but, it has been rejected on 24.08.2023, without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, as was required to be given pursuant to the order dated 21.08.2023, passed by this Court in the first petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the respondent-Bank has no business to freeze the account of the petitioner; earlier, when the account was not allowed to be operated by the respondent-Bank, the petitioner had filed the first petition; the first petition was allowed with the directions to the respondent-Bank to afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner on the representation that may be filed by the petitioner; the petitioner did file a representation, but he was not afforded any opportunity of hearing. It is also argued that along with the impugned order, a notice under Section 91 Cr.P.C./102 Cr.P.C. has been enclosed revealing that in FIR No.702 of 2023, under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B IPC (“the FIR”), Police Station Kavinagar, District Ghaziabad, directions were issued to the respondent-Bank. It is argued that directions were with regard to providing account details, not for freezing the account. Even otherwise, it is argued that under Section 91 Cr.P.C., such action cannot be done. It is also argued that, in fact, in the FIR, which is referred to, the petitioner is not named. He is not connected with the offences. 6. This Court offered learned counsel for the petitioner to explain as to what he has to say in support of his representation that was filed by the petitioner before the respondent-Bank. This is so because, it has been argued that pursuant to the directions passed by this Court in the first petition, on 21.08.2023, the petitioner has never been afforded an opportunity of hearing. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner would raise the following points in his submission:- (i) under Banking Laws, the account cannot be freezed. (ii) In the FIR, in which allegedly such action was taken, petitioner or his family members are not named. They have no connection with the activities, as narrated in the FIR. (iii) The impugned communication is in violation to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in State of Maharashtra Vs. Tapas D. Neogy (1999) 7 SCC 685 , according to which the bank account of only accused or his relatives may be freezed. (iv) Procedure under Section 102 Cr.P.C. has not been followed. 8. The impugned order makes reference to the judgment in the case of Tapas (supra). In the case of Tapas (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, held that, “A plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 102 indicates that the police officer has the power to seize any property which may be found under circumstances creating suspicion of the commission of any offence. In the case of Tapas (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, held that, “A plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 102 indicates that the police officer has the power to seize any property which may be found under circumstances creating suspicion of the commission of any offence. The legislature having used the expression “any property” and “any offence” have made the applicability of the provisions wide enough to cover offences created under any Act………………….the bank account of the accused or any of his relations is “property” within the meaning of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and a police officer in course of investigation can seize or prohibit the operation of the said account if such assets have direct links with the commission of the offence for which the police officer is investigating into. ” 9. The principle of law, as laid down in the case of Tapas (supra) has further been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Teesta Atul Setalvad Vs. State of Gujarat and connected matters, (2018) 2 SCC 372 . 10. It may be noted that the petitioner had not challenged the communication made by the Investigating Officer of FIR No.702 of 2023, under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B IPC, Police Station Kavinagar, District Ghaziabad. The communication that was made by the Investigating Officer of the FIR has been enclosed along with the impugned order as part of Annexure No.1. Though it requires the Bank Manager to provide the Bank details, but it also records the required actions. They are as follows:- The required action: 1. Mark a debit freeze on the aforesaid account on immediate basis. 2. Inform the undersigned about the balance amount available while freezing the account. 3. AOF & KYC documents of the aforesaid account. 4. Name and address registered with the account. 11. At the top of the notice, that was given to the respondent-Bank Manager, it is recorded that the notice is under Section 91 Cr.P.C./102 Cr.P.C. 12. The above mentioned required actions, as noted in the notice given by the Investigating Officer of the FIR under Section 91 Cr.P.C. or 102 Cr.P.C. categorically reveals that the Investigating Officer had required the respondent-Bank Manager to mark a debit freeze on the account. The directions were for freezing the account. It was so done by the respondent-Bank. The above mentioned required actions, as noted in the notice given by the Investigating Officer of the FIR under Section 91 Cr.P.C. or 102 Cr.P.C. categorically reveals that the Investigating Officer had required the respondent-Bank Manager to mark a debit freeze on the account. The directions were for freezing the account. It was so done by the respondent-Bank. If the petitioner is aggrieved by the action of the Investigating Officer to claim that the directions for freezing the account under Section 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“the Code”) is not lawful, the petitioner ought to have challenged those directions, which is not done. 13. It is true that in the first petition, directions were given to hear the petition in person as well in support of his representation. This Court has offered this opportunity to the petitioner. The principle of natural justice may not be a mere formality. It should have some substance. What is being argued is that the procedure under Section 102 of the Code is not lawful, the Banking Law does not permit of freezing of the account, the petitioner or his family members are not named in the FIR. 14. It may be noted that the respondent-Bank, on their own has not freezed the account of the petitioner. They have simply followed the directions of the Investigating Officer investigating the FIR. Had the respondent-Bank not complied with those directions, perhaps, they would have been blamed for non-compliance or non-cooperating a public servant in discharge of his duties and perhaps would have been booked under some penal offences. As stated, if the petitioner is aggrieved by the communication of the Investigating Officer of the FIR, that could have been challenged, which is not done. 15. In view of what is stated hereinabove, this Court does not see any reason to make any intervention at this stage. Accordingly, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed at the stage of admission itself. 16. The petition is dismissed in limine.