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2023 DIGILAW 5 (CHH)

Samar Singh Bisen S/o Late Shri R. S. Bisen v. Chhattisgarh Kiraya Bhandar Through its Sole Proprietor Shashank Yadu

2023-01-03

DEEPAK KUMAR TIWARI

body2023
JUDGMENT : 1. Learned counsel for the parties would submit that respondent No.2/defendant No.2 was ex-parte before the Court below, which is also reflected from the order sheet dated 27.11.2019 in Civil Suit No.294 A/2018. The notice issued by this Court to respondent No.2 is also returned unserved with a note that respondent No.2 is not living in the said address. 2. Learned counsel for the parties would submit that at present, the main contesting party is defendant No.1, who has moved an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC. 3. In view of the above, notice to respondent No.2 is dispensed with. 4. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the matter is heard finally. 5. Being aggrieved with the order dated 5.12.2019 passed by the Seventh Additional Judge to First Civil Judge Class-II, Raipur in Civil Suit No.294A/18, whereby, the application preferred by defendant No.1/respondent No.1 under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 of CPC on the grounds that the suit was not properly valued and also there is deficiency in the Court Fees, was allowed and the petitioner/plaintiff was directed to pay the Court Fees on the basis of the market value of the suit property as per Section 7(v) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 (in short “the Act, 1870”). 6. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner/plaintiff has preferred a civil suit seeking relief(s) of possession, permanent injunction and declaration asserting that he has acquired the title over the suit property by way of lease deed executed by the owner of the property on 10.1.2007 for a period of 29 years and he holds a title as a tenant over the suit property and enjoying his limited rights. He further asserted that the defendants/respondents 1 to 4 entered into forceful possession over the suit property, therefore, the suit was filed for eviction of the defendants. In the said suit, defendant No.1 preferred an application under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 of CPC on the ground that the proper court fees has not been paid by the plaintiff, which has been allowed. Hence, this petition. 7. Mr. In the said suit, defendant No.1 preferred an application under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 of CPC on the ground that the proper court fees has not been paid by the plaintiff, which has been allowed. Hence, this petition. 7. Mr. K. Rohan, learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff would submit that the plaintiff/petitioner has a limited right as a tenant and there is a specific provision under Section 7(xi) of the Act, 1870, which stipulates a special status for the tenant to enforce his right without any undue financial burden. He submits that in reply of the application, the plaintiff has categorically stated that he is ready to pay the court fees according to the valuation under Section 7(xi) of the Act, 1870 However, the trial Court has committed a serious error and directed for payment of court fees under Section 7(v) of the Act, 1870. He would further submit that in such a situation, if there is a dispute between the landlord and the tenant, it would be very easy for the landlord to evict the tenant by resorting to illegal means of inducing third party over the suit property and thereby, the tenant would succumb to the heavy court fees. He submits that considering the limited rights of the tenant, the relief can be claimed by paying the court fees under Section 7(xi) of the Act, 1870. He would place reliance on the judgment rendered in the matter of Janab E.M. Ghulam Dastagir Saheb Vs. Marudai Pillai and another, C.R.P. No.1462 of 1947 and submit that the said judgment was also relied by the Nagpur High Court in the matter of Pralhad Narayan Vs. Smt. Mankuarbai, 1952 SCC OnLine MP 22. Hence, he would pray to set-aside the impugned order and allow the petitioner/plaintiff to deposit the Court Fees under Section 7(xi) of the Act, 1870. 8. Per contra, Mr. Kshitij Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.1 would submit that while deciding the application under Section 7 Rule 11 of CPC, only the plaint averments have to be seen and the plaintiff has categorically stated in the plaint that the defendants are the trespassers and sought the relief of possession. 8. Per contra, Mr. Kshitij Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.1 would submit that while deciding the application under Section 7 Rule 11 of CPC, only the plaint averments have to be seen and the plaintiff has categorically stated in the plaint that the defendants are the trespassers and sought the relief of possession. He submits that in view of the above, the trial Court has rightly come to the conclusion that to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed and the subject-matter is a house or garden, the valuation has to be done according to the market value of the house or garden as per Section 7(iv)(c) read with Section 7(v)(e) of the Act, 1870. He submits that as per the averments made in the plaint, the case does not attract the provisions contained under Section 7(xi) of Act, 1870. He places reliance on the judgment rendered in the matter of Suhrid Singh alias Sardool Singh Vs. Randhir Singh and others, (2010) 12 SCC 112 and prays to dismiss the petition. 9. Mr. Ankur Agarwal, learned counsel for respondent No.3 and Mr. Shobhit Mishra, learned counsel for respondent 4 would adopt the submissions of Mr. Kshitij Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.1, and would also support the impugned order and pray for dismissal of the petition. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the documents annexed along with the petition. 11. In Suhrid Singh (supra), the following was observed vide para 6 & 8 : 6. The second proviso to Section 7(iv) of the Act will apply in this case and the valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of the said section. Clause (v) provides that where the relief is in regard to agricultural lands, court fee should be reckoned with reference to the revenue payable under sub-clauses (a) to (d) thereof; and where the relief is in regard to the houses, court fee shall be on the market value of the houses, under sub-clause (e) thereof. 8. Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the court fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. 8. Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the court fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of Section 7. 12. Revering back to the facts of the present case, in light of the aforesaid legal proposition propounded by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that the trial Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the valuation has to be done according to the market value of the house. 13. The first case law (Janab E.M. Ghulam Dastagir Saheb) relied by learned counsel for the petitioner, is distinguishable facts as learned counsel for respondent No.1 has rightly pointed out that in the said matter, when the first defendant objected about the market value, the plaintiff has amended the suit accordingly and in such circumstances, the suit was covered under Section 7(xi) of the Act, 1870, but in the present case, no such pleading has been made and further, such suit was filed against the formal lessee. The second case law (Pralhad Narayan (supra)) relied by learned counsel for the petitioner relates to the illegally evicted tenant by the landlord, and in such circumstances, Section 7 (xi) (e) of the Act, 1870 was found attracted, which is not the issue in the present case. 14. In view of the foregoing, this Court is of the view that such precedents are of no help to the petitioner/plaintiff and the impugned order passed by the trial Court directing the plaintiff to pay the deficit Court Fees on the basis of the market value of the suit property, is just and proper. Accordingly, the impugned order is affirmed. 15. Consequently, the petition is dismissed.