JUDGMENT : N.K. Chandravanshi, J. 1. This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed by the appellant against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29-4-2022, passed by learned Upper Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court (POCSO Act), Manendragarh, Distt. Koriya (henceforth referred to as “trial Court”) in Special Criminal Case No. 54/2020, whereby the appellant-accused has been convicted for offence under Section 363, 366, 376(2)(n), 376(3) of the Indian Penal Code, (in short, hereinafter referred to as ‘the IPC’) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short, hereinafter referred to as ‘POCSO Act’) and sentenced as under :- Sr. Sentence u/S. Sentence Default stipulation Default stipulation 1. 363 IPC 2 years RI Rs. 500/- 1 month RI 2. 366 IPC 5 years RI Rs. 500/- 1 month RI 3. 6 POCSO Act 20 years RI Rs. 500/- 1 year RI 4. 376(3) IPC 20 years RI Rs. 500/- 1 year RI All the substantive jail sentences have been directed to run concurrently. It is pertinent to mention here that appellant has also been convicted for the offence under Section 376 (2)(n) of the IPC, but since punishment under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, is greater in degree, therefore, in view of provisions of Section 42 of the POCSO Act, the appellant has only been sentenced for offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 2. Facts of the case in brief are that on 23-9-2020 at about 2.30 pm, when minor victim, aged 14 – 15 years, went outside of her house, then appellant/accused took her on the water tank, kept her till 00.00 hour in the night and made physical relation with her on pretext of marriage. Thereafter, in the night itself, accused took her in the house of his brother Sanju, where he kept the victim till evening of 24-9-2020. There also, he made physical relation with victim. Thereafter the accused went from the house, leaving the victim there. At about 8.00 pm, the victim came out of the house and was going towards her house. Since parents of victim did not find her, they along with other persons were searching her and after getting the victim, she was taken to Police Station Jhagrakhand, where, FIR Ex. P-15 was lodged on 24-9-2020 by mother (P.W. 2) of the victim (P.W. 1). Recovery memo (Ex. Since parents of victim did not find her, they along with other persons were searching her and after getting the victim, she was taken to Police Station Jhagrakhand, where, FIR Ex. P-15 was lodged on 24-9-2020 by mother (P.W. 2) of the victim (P.W. 1). Recovery memo (Ex. P-1) was prepared, statement of victim was recorded, her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. was also recorded. She was medically examined by Dr. Ankita Agrawal (P.W. 3), who opined vide MLC report (Ex. P-5) that there was sign of recent sexual intercourse with the victim, but no external or internal injury was found on her body. She prepared two vaginal slides and also recovered Panty of victim, handed over the same for chemical examination, which was seized vide Ex. P-9. Statement of witnesses were recorded. Copy of Dhakhil-Kharij register (Ex. P-8-C) of primary school of prosecutrix was seized vide Ex. P-7. Semen slide and underwear of accused were seized vide Ex. P-10. Spot map was prepared. Progress report of Class 1 of victim (Article A-1) was seized and Mark sheet of Class 8 (Article A-2) of the victim was also recovered from her mother vide seizure memo Ex. P-13. Appellant was arrested. FSL report Ex. P-23 was received with regard to seized undergarment and slides of victim as well as accused. After usual investigation, charge sheet was filed before learned trial Court. 3. Learned trial Court framed charges under Section 363, 366, 376(2)(n), 376(3) of IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, read over and explained to the accused, who abjured his guilt. 4. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined following witnesses :- 1. P.W. 1 prosecutrix 2. P.W. 2 prosecutrix’s mother 3. P.W. 3 Dr. Ankita Agrawal, examined the victim 4. P.W. 4 Rajendra Yadav, Head Master 5. P.W. 5 Sonkunwar Singh, Female constable 6. P.W. 6 Kamlesh Sahu, Constable 7. P.W. 7 O.L. Barman, examined accused and gave report Ex.P-11 8. P.W. 8 Kirti Tiwari, Head Constable 9. P.W. 9 Prosecutrix’s Father 10. P.W. 10 Vijay Singh, Investigating Officer Besides aforesaid ocular evidence, prosecution also exhibited following documents :- Sr. P.W. 4 Rajendra Yadav, Head Master 5. P.W. 5 Sonkunwar Singh, Female constable 6. P.W. 6 Kamlesh Sahu, Constable 7. P.W. 7 O.L. Barman, examined accused and gave report Ex.P-11 8. P.W. 8 Kirti Tiwari, Head Constable 9. P.W. 9 Prosecutrix’s Father 10. P.W. 10 Vijay Singh, Investigating Officer Besides aforesaid ocular evidence, prosecution also exhibited following documents :- Sr. Particulars 1 ExP-01 Baramdagi/Recovery Panchnama of victim 2 ExP-02 Consent Letter given by the victim 3 ExP-03 Statement of Prosecutrix U/s 164 of Cr.P.C. 4 ExP-04 Police statement of Prosecutrix under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. 5 ExP-05 Medical examination report of victim 6 ExP-06 Memo to Head Master regarding providing of Dakhil Khariz Register of victim 7 ExP-07 Seizure Memo of Dakhil-Kharij register 8 Ex. P-8-C copy of Dakhil-kharij register 9 Ex. P-9 seizure memo of vaginal slide and underwear of victim, & Ex. P-10 Seizure Memo of semen slide and underwear of accused 10 Ex. P-11 Medical examination report of accused 11 Ex. P-12 Spot Map 12 Ex. P-13 Seizure Memo of mark sheet of Class- 8 of victim 13 Ex. P-14 Police statement of Agnu Prajapati (P.W. 9) 14 Ex. P-15 First Information Report 15 Ex. P-16 Crime Details form 16 Ex. P-17 Memo to Tahsildar for providing of spot map 17 Ex. P-18 memo to learned JMFC for recording statement of prosecutrix u/S. 164 of Cr.P.C. 18 Ex. P-19 memo for medical examination of accused Indra Kumar 19 Ex. P-20 Memo of Child Welfare Samiti for providing copy of statement after counseling the prosecutrix 20 Ex. P-21 memo for FSL report 21 Ex. P-22 Receipt of exhibits of FSL, Ambikapur 22 Ex. P-23 FSL report 23 Ex. P-24 Arrest memo of accused dated 25-9-2020 24 Article A-1 Progress report of Class – 1 of victim. 25 Article A-2 Copy of Mark sheet of Class - 8 5. Statement of accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which he denied all the circumstances appearing against him and stated that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated. He has not examined any witness in his defence. 6. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by the impugned judgment convicted and sentenced the accused as mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment against which, this criminal appeal has been filed. 7. He has not examined any witness in his defence. 6. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by the impugned judgment convicted and sentenced the accused as mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment against which, this criminal appeal has been filed. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that as per case of the prosecution, victim was minor on the date of incident, but this fact has not been proved by adducing lawful evidence. In this regard, only Dakhil-Kharij register (Ex. P-8-C), progress report (Article A-1) of Class -1 and mark sheet (Article A-2) of Class - 8th of the victim have been seized, which shows that date of birth of victim is 25-2-2006, but it has not been proved by any of the witnesses that, on what basis aforesaid date of birth was recorded in the school. It is further submitted that since prosecution has failed to prove by adducing cogent evidence that, on the date of incident, victim was minor, hence the finding recorded by learned trial Court in this regard is not sustainable. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police [2023 SCC Online SC 846]. 7.1 Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that as per case of prosecution, appellant had taken victim on the water tank of village, where he kept her till 00.00 hours in the night and thereafter he took her to his brother’s house, but in Court statement, she has denied all these facts and she has projected different story that appellant by tying her eyes took her to a house, raped her and left the house in the night leaving her alone. Thus, there is complete contradiction with regard to the case of prosecution and the case projected by the victim in her Court statement/deposition. But, learned trial Court has not considered these aspects which itself shows that the case of the prosecution is totally concocted, hence learned trial Court ought to have acquitted the accused. Therefore, it is prayed that the appeal may be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment passed by learned trial Court. 8. But, learned trial Court has not considered these aspects which itself shows that the case of the prosecution is totally concocted, hence learned trial Court ought to have acquitted the accused. Therefore, it is prayed that the appeal may be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment passed by learned trial Court. 8. Per contra, learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the learned trial court has passed the impugned judgment based on the evidence available on record and no interference in the same is called for, therefore, this criminal appeal may be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, perused the impugned judgment and original record of the trial Court. 10. As per case of the prosecution, victim was minor on the date of incident i.e. on 23-9-2020, because as per school record, her date of birth is 25-2-2006, accordingly, her age was 14 years, 6 months and 29 days on the date of incident. 11. Victim (P.W. 1) has deposed in her statement recorded in the Court on 5-3-2021 that her date of birth is 25-2-2006 and her age is 15 years. P.W. 2 is mother of the victim. As per her cross-examination, age of victim is 14 years. P.W. 9 is father of victim. He has also stated that at the time of incident, age of victim was 14 years, but in cross-examination, he has stated that he could not remember year of birth of the victim. 12. To prove the date of birth of victim, prosecution has seized copy of Dhakhil-Kharin register (Ex. P-8-C) of Government Primary School, Kol Dafai, Ramnagar, Distt. Anuppur (M.P.) vide seizure memo Ex. P-7. This fact has been proved by Rajendra Yadav (P.W. 4), who is Head Master of aforesaid Government school and as per his statement, date of birth of victim as per Ex. P-8-C is 25-2-2006. Entries with regard to admission of victim in aforesaid Dakhil-Kharij register were made in the year 2011, when she got admitted in Class – 1. Vide seizure memo Ex. P-13, mark sheet (Article A-2) of class – 8 of victim was seized from her mother (P.W. 2), which she has proved in her deposition and well supported by the Investigating Officer Vijay Singh (P.W. 10). Vide seizure memo Ex. P-13, mark sheet (Article A-2) of class – 8 of victim was seized from her mother (P.W. 2), which she has proved in her deposition and well supported by the Investigating Officer Vijay Singh (P.W. 10). In this mark sheet also of Class – 8 (Article A-2), date of birth of victim has been mentioned as 25-2-2006. Thus, it is apparent that in school record of victim right from Class – 1 to Class – 8 her date of birth has been mentioned as 25-2-2006. 13. Ex. P-5 is medical report dated 25-9-2020 of victim, which was prepared and proved by Dr. Ankita Agrawal (P.W. 3), in which she has assumed and noted her age as 15 years. On 5-3-2021, when deposition of victim was recorded, at that time, the Court has also assumed and noted her apparent age, as 15 years. As per deposition of victim and her parents, at the time of incident, age of victim was 14 years. Thus, ocular evidence as well as documentary evidence/school record from Class – 1 to Class – 8 of victim, show that on the date of incident victim was minor, as her date of birth is 25-2-2006. 14. How dakhil-kharij register is treated to be relevant came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand and another [ (2008) 13 SCC 133 ] wherein it has been held as under:- “22. It is well settled that it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. The date of birth is to be determined on the basis of material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties. The medical evidence as to the age of a person, though a very useful guiding factor, is not conclusive and has to be considered along with other cogent evidence. 28. It is trite that to render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions have to be satisfied, namely: (i) entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; (ii) it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or a relevant fact, and (iii) it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duties, or in performance of his duty especially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded. (See: Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit[ (1997) 4 SCC 24 ]”. 15. In the case of C. Doddanarayan Reddy (Dead) by Legal Representatives and ors. Vs. C. Jayarama Reddy (Dead) by Legal Representatives and ors. [ (2020) 4 SCC 659 ], Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the fact that how date of birth mentioned in school record can be considered and relied upon reiterating law laid down in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, [1988 Supp SCC 604], has observed in para 17, 18 and 19 as under :- “17. In Birad Mal Singhvi [Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp SCC 604], the date of birth was sought to be proved by the Principal of the school. Though, the Principal could not produce the admission form in original or its copy. It was held therein that the entries contained in the school's register are relevant and admissible but have no evidentiary value for the purpose of proof of date of birth of the candidates. A vital piece of evidence was missing as no evidence was placed before the court to show on whose information the date of birth was recorded in the aforesaid document. It was held as under : (Birad Mal Singhvi case [Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp SCC 604], SCC p. 618, para 14) “14. … No doubt, Exts. 8. 9, 10, 11 and 12 are relevant and admissible but these documents have no evidentiary value for purpose of proof of date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi as the vital piece of evidence is missing, because no evidence was placed before the court to show on whose information the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and the date of birth of Suraj Prakash Joshi were recorded in the aforesaid document. As already stated, neither of the parents of the two candidates nor any other person having special knowledge about their date of birth was examined by the respondent to prove the date of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents. Parents or near relations having special knowledge are the best persons to depose about the date of birth of a person. If entry regarding date of birth in the scholar's register is made on the information given by parents or someone having special knowledge of the fact, the same would have probative value. The testimony of Anantram Sharma and Kailash Chandra Taparia merely prove the documents but the contents of those documents were not proved. The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. The entry contained in the admission form or in the scholar's register must be shown to be made on the basis of information given by the parents or a person having special knowledge about the date of birth of the person concerned.” 18. In Madan Mohan Singh [Madan Mohan Singh v. Rajni Kant, (2010) 9 SCC 209 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 655] this Court held that the entries made in the official record may be admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872 but the Court has a right to examine their probative value. The authenticity of the entries would depend on whose information such entries stood recorded. The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 216-17, paras 20-22) “20. So far as the entries made in the official record by an official or person authorised in performance of official duties are concerned, they may be admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act but the court has a right to examine their probative value. The authenticity of the entries would depend on whose information such entries stood recorded and what was his source of information. The entries in school register/school leaving certificate require to be proved in accordance with law and the standard of proof required in such cases remained the same as in any other civil or criminal cases. 21. For determining the age of a person, the best evidence is of his/her parents, if it is supported by unimpeachable documents. The entries in school register/school leaving certificate require to be proved in accordance with law and the standard of proof required in such cases remained the same as in any other civil or criminal cases. 21. For determining the age of a person, the best evidence is of his/her parents, if it is supported by unimpeachable documents. In case the date of birth depicted in the school register/certificate stands believed by the unimpeachable evidence of reliable persons and contemporaneous documents like the date of birth register of the Municipal Corporation, government hospital/nursing home, etc. the entry in the school register is to be discarded. (Vide Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Sinha, AIR 1965 SC 282 , Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp SCC 604, Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 217 and Satpal Singh v. State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 714 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1081].) 22. If a person wants to rely on a particular date of birth and wants to press a document in service, he has to prove its authenticity in terms of Section 32(5) or Sections 50, 51, 59, 60 and 61, etc. of the Evidence Act by examining the person having special means of knowledge, authenticity of date, time, etc. mentioned therein. (Vide Updesh Kumar v. Prithvi Singh, (2001) 2 SCC 524 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1300 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1063] and [State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, (2005) 3 SCC 702 ].)” 19. In a judgment in Ram Suresh Singh v. Prabhat Singh, (2009) 6 SCC 681 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1194 it has been held that entry in the school register may not be a public document and, thus, must be proved in accordance with law. The Court held as under : (SCC p. 687, para 12) “12. The condition laid down in Section 35 of the Evidence Act for proving an entry pertaining to the age of a student in a school admission register is to be considered for the purpose of determining the relevance thereof. But in this case, the said condition must be held to have been satisfied. The condition laid down in Section 35 of the Evidence Act for proving an entry pertaining to the age of a student in a school admission register is to be considered for the purpose of determining the relevance thereof. But in this case, the said condition must be held to have been satisfied. An entry in a school register may not be a public document and, thus, must be proved in accordance with law, as has been held by this Court in Birad Mal Singhvi [Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp SCC 604] but in this case the said entry has been proved.” 16. In the case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors. [ (2022) 8 SCC 602 ], while considering the various judgments, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under :- “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.1. xxx xxx xxx. 33.2. xxx xxx xxx. 33.2.1.. xxx xxx xxx. 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of Section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. 33.2.3. xxx xxx xxx. 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rules 12(3)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the JJ Rules, 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the criminal court concerned. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the criminal court concerned. In case of an inquiry, the court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of Section 94 of the 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7. This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Evidence Act viz. Section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 17. Recently, in the case of P. Yuvaprakash (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under :- “14. Section 94(2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2021(12) SCR 502], this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school(other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii)and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [(2019) 9 SCR 735] that: “Clause (i) of Section 94(2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal [(2012) 9 SCR 224], this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 18. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 18. Reverting into facts of instant case, although it has not been proved in case in hand, by mother and father of the victim that on the basis of which document, aforesaid date of birth of victim was recorded, but with regard to age of any child, evidence of his/her father and mother is the best evidence and when they say that at the time of incident, age of their child was 14/15 years and this fact also gets support from school record, where she first attended, that too is a government school, in which date of birth was noted prior to 9-10 years of the incident and further doctor and court also assumed and noted that while medical examination/recording of deposition, age of victim is 15 years, hence, on the basis of aforesaid evidence, strong presumption of fact arise in favour of victim that on the basis of date of birth as 25-2-2006, on the date of incident, she was minor i.e. below the age of 18 years. Such strong presumption of fact cannot be discarded only on the basis of the fact that the document on the basis of which, such date of birth has been mentioned in school record, has not been proved, because aforesaid date of birth has been mentioned in school record of government school, where victim first attended, that too, prior to 9 – 10 years of date of incident and victim’s age based on that date of birth is also supported by the deposition of her parents. Illiteracy or less literacy also cannot be a ground to disbelieve such strong presumption because, after all, why parents of victim of such heinous offence would record wrong date of birth of their child, that too, many years prior to the incident. If, from the evidence available on record, age of victim is found to be marginal to the age of majority, then such date of birth of school record may be treated as doubtful, but if age of victim is found to be below 16 years, then it cannot be discarded and in such situation, burden shifts on accused, that, as to why date of birth recorded in the school, should not be believed. 19. 19. In the case of P. Yuvaprakash (supra), Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that Clause (i) of Section 94(2) of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the Case of Birad Mal Singhavi (supra), parents or near relatives of Hukumi Chand and Suraj Prakash were not examined, hence, date of birth mentioned in the documents of school records of aforesaid two candidates, were not found to be true. In aforesaid case, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that parents or near relatives having special knowledge are the best persons to depose about the date of birth of a person. 20. In instant case, as has been stated above that victim and her parents have deposed in their court statement that at the time of incident, age of victim was 14/15 years, this fact also gets support from date of birth (25-2-2006) of victim mentioned in school records of government school, which has also been proved by Head Master, who is a government servant, this fact clearly shows that, on the date of incident, age of victim was 14 years, 6 months and 29 days and aforesaid date of birth has been recorded right from Class – 1 to Class - 8th in the school record of victim, which was firstly recorded about 9 years prior to the incident. Hence, as has been stated above, it creates strong presumption of facts that on the date of incident, the victim was minor. 21. Appellant/accused has not brought any strong fact on record or in the cross-examination of material witnesses of the prosecution to disbelieve aforesaid date of birth of the victim. Therefore, we uphold the finding recorded by the trial Court that on the date of incident, victim was child (minor) i.e. below the age of 18 years. 22. So far as allegation of commission of kidnapping and rape of victim by the accused is concerned, victim (P.W. 1) has clearly stated that the accused had abducted her and took her in a house and sexually exploited her many times. On next day, appellant went away leaving her alone. 22. So far as allegation of commission of kidnapping and rape of victim by the accused is concerned, victim (P.W. 1) has clearly stated that the accused had abducted her and took her in a house and sexually exploited her many times. On next day, appellant went away leaving her alone. Thereafter, when she was going to her house, while on the way, police met her and took her to the police station, where recovery memo Ex. P-1 was prepared. Her mother (P.W. 2) and father (P.W. 9) have also supported her statement, whom she told about the incident happened with her. 23. Although, the victim has not stated the fact verbatim as per her police statement and statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., but in her cross-examination also, she has stated that she was sexually exploited by the accused. Nothing has been elicited in her or her parents’ cross-examination to disbelieve the statement made by the victim in her examination-in-chief, some contradiction/omission of facts cannot be a ground to discard her deposition, that too, in cases registered under the POCSO Act. 24. Dr. Ankita Agrawal (P.W. 3) has examined the victim on very next day of her recovery. Although, she did not find any external or internal injury on the body of victim, but she has clearly stated that she found symptoms of recent intercourse with the victim. This fact also gets support from F.S.L. report (Ex. P-23), in which human spermatozoa is reported to be found in the vaginal slides and underwear of the victim and accused also. Thus, medical evidence and F.S.L. report also support the statement of victim that accused had abducted her and sexually abused her by making physical relation with her. Although, injury was not found on the body of victim, which may show her consent, but since victim was minor below the age of 18 years on the date of incident, therefore, her consent is not found to be legal, which can protect the accused from above crime. 25. Thus, in view of aforesaid discussion, and the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases mentioned above, we find that the trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the accused and there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment warranting interference by this Court. 26. 25. Thus, in view of aforesaid discussion, and the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases mentioned above, we find that the trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the accused and there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment warranting interference by this Court. 26. In the result, the appeal being sans substance, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.