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2023 DIGILAW 505 (HP)

Chetan v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2023-12-11

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2023
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 137/2023, dated 26.7.2023 for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 504, 307, 323, and 325 read with Section 34 of IPC. The matter was compromised between the parties. The victim Vivek Singh Thakur made a statement that he has settled the matter with the petitioners voluntarily and he has no objection in case the FIR is ordered to be quashed because of the compromise entered between the parties. 2. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent no. 1-State submitted that the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC was involved and the FIR should not be quashed based on compromise. 3. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 4. It was laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 that the Court can quash the FIR/criminal proceedings based on the settlement to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. Such power is not to be exercised in heinous offences like murder, dacoity, rape etc. which have a serious impact on the society. Offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC would also fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and is to be treated as crimes against society. However, it will be open for the High Court to go by the nature of the injury, part of the body where the injury was inflicted and the nature of the injury to determine whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chance of the conviction are remote and bleak. It was observed:- “29.1. The power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, the offences alleged to have been committed under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationships or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crimes against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or if the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. It would be open to the High Court to examine whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or if the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of the injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, the nature of weapons used, etc. Medical reports in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case, it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case, it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on a complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, the timings of settlement play a crucial role. In those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of the offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of this reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, in those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at the infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after a prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. Likewise, in those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at the infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after a prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in the acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” 5. In the present case, the status report mentions that as per the FIR, Chetan inflicted a blow on the head of the victim Abhishek Mishra with an iron rod due to which he started bleeding. As per the opinion of the Medical Officer, the nature of the injury was grievous caused by blunt force trauma and was endangering the life. Therefore, the police added Section 307 of IPC. 6. The medical report clearly shows that the nature of the injury was grievous and endangering to life. It was laid down by Punjab and Haryana High Court in Atma Singh Vs. State of Punjab 1980 Crim. L.J. 1220 that IPC recognizes only four kinds of injuries — simple, grievous, injuries inflicted with intent to commit murder and injuries sufficient to cause death. There is no provision in the IPC which recognizes injury dangerous to life or which endangers life. The injury endangering the life will fall within Section 20(8) of IPC and such an injury will be grievous. It was observed:- “10. There is no provision in the IPC which recognizes injury dangerous to life or which endangers life. The injury endangering the life will fall within Section 20(8) of IPC and such an injury will be grievous. It was observed:- “10. When the doctor is required to carry out a medico-legal examination of the injury suffered in a criminal assault, he is required to examine the injury from two standpoints : (1) for the purpose of opining the kind of weapon used to inflict the injury in question and, (2ndly) to form an opinion regarding the degree of seriousness of the injury in order to enable to see as to what offence has the accused committed by inflicting the injury in question. The Indian Penal Code recognises from the standpoint of seriousness only four types of injuries, (1) simple injuries; (2) grievous (3) injuries of the kind inflicted with intent to commit murder described in clauses 'Firstly' and 2ndly' of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, (4) injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature envisaged by clause Thirdly' of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. There is no provision in the Indian Penal Code, which envisages or refers to an injury described as 'dangerous to life'. The medicolegal examination of an injured person is intended to enable the Investigating Agency and the Court to find out the nature of the offence and, therefore, the doctor examining an injured person has to opine that the injury in question is one or the other of the type recognised in the Indian Penal Code for the purposes of a given offence. When a doctor describes an injury as 'dangerous to life' one has to see what had the doctor intended to convey thereby. Is one to hold that since the injury has not been described by the doctor as one which 'endangered life', so the concerned injury cannot be held to be grievous on the specious ground that an injury described as 'dangerous to life' is not as serious an injury which 'endangers life'. 11. It appears that the doctors who had been conducting the medico-legal examinations have been using the term 'dangerous to life' as synonymous with an injury, which 'endangers life'. 11. It appears that the doctors who had been conducting the medico-legal examinations have been using the term 'dangerous to life' as synonymous with an injury, which 'endangers life'. Even the Courts at times have considered an injury described as dangerous to life as an injury envisaged in clause 'Eighthly of Sec. 320 of the Indian Penal Code. In this regard reference can be made to Mahamed Rafi v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Lah 305 : (31 Cri LJ 77). In that case, the injury was on the right side of the neck about 2½" x -" in dimension inflicted with a sharp-edged weapon. The doctor had, in fact in that case deposed that there was every possibility of the deceased surviving but for the wound becoming septic apparently as a result of it being pressed with hands and bandaged with dirty cloth in the initial stages before the deceased was taken to the hospital. The Court held that though a finding that the appellant knew that his act was likely to cause death, was not justified but at the same time, a wound on the neck must at least be considered to be 'dangerous to life' within the meaning of Clause (8), Section 320, Indian Penal Code, and therefore, grievous'. 12. Palekar, J., too in Jai Narain Mishra v. State of Bihar, 1972 Cr App R 19 : (1972 Cri LJ 469) (SC), held, a penetrating wound 1½ x 1/2 x chest wall deep on the right side of the chest caused with a bhala and described as 'dangerous to life', as grievous injury and in the latter part of paragraph 11 called this injury as one endangering life. 13. The expression 'dangerous' is an adjective and the expression 'endanger' is a verb. An injury, which can put life in immediate danger of death would be an injury which can be termed as 'dangerous to life' and, therefore, when a doctor describes an injury as 'dangerous to life', he means an injury, which endangers life in terms of clause (8) of Section 320, Indian Penal Code, for, it describes the injury 'dangerous to life' only for the purpose of the said clause. He instead of using the expression that this was an injury which 'endangered life' described it as that the injury was 'dangerous to life', meaning both times the same thing. 14. K.S. Tiwana, J. in Crl. He instead of using the expression that this was an injury which 'endangered life' described it as that the injury was 'dangerous to life', meaning both times the same thing. 14. K.S. Tiwana, J. in Crl. Appeal No. 1489 of 1974, (Sukhdev Singh v. The State of Punjab), decided on January 18, 1979, was concerned with the statement of a doctor who had merely externally examined the injury and had opined it to be dangerous to life. The doctor who had performed the operation had not preferred any opinion. The injury was a penetrating wound with clean-cut margins of the size of 1¼" x 1/2" on the left side of the chest, 5" below the nipple. The depth of the wound was not measured by the doctor who had given the opinion. In this case, the learned Judge did not accept the opinion of the doctor that the injury was dangerous to life on the ground that he was not qualified to say so merely by looking at the injury and the one who had performed the operation and had seen the damage had not given any such opinion. The learned Judge did not go into the question that an injury described as dangerous to life in no case could be considered a grievous injury. 15. S.S. Dewan, J., in Crl. Appeal No. 1007 of 1975 (Harbans Singh v. The State of Punjab) decided on February 8, 1979, observed as did S. C. Mital, J., in Jagrup Singh's case (1973 Chand LR (Cri) 253) (Punj) that the term 'dangerous to life' is milder than the expression 'endangers life'. He merely followed his earlier decision holding that an injury described as dangerous to life cannot be considered grievous. 16. A.S. Bains, J., in Crl. Appeal No. 355 of 1976, (Surjit Singh v. The State of Punjab), merely followed the decision in Jagrup Singh's case (1973 Chand LR (Cri) 253) (Punj) and held that injury described as 'dangerous to life' would not satisfy the requirement of clause (8) of Section 320, Indian Penal Code and would not be a grievous injury. In all these decisions, with respect, there is no discussion in depth. 17. We are of the view that the Court is not absolved of the responsibility while deciding a criminal case to form its conclusion regarding the nature of the injury, the Expert's opinion notwithstanding. In all these decisions, with respect, there is no discussion in depth. 17. We are of the view that the Court is not absolved of the responsibility while deciding a criminal case to form its conclusion regarding the nature of the injury, the Expert's opinion notwithstanding. The Court has to see the nature and dimension of the injury, its location and the damage that it has caused. Even when an injury is described as to be one which endangers the life the court has to apply its mind and form its own opinion in regard to the nature of the injury, having regard to the factors that should weigh with the Court, already mentioned. We are also firmly of the view that wherever a doctor describes an injury as 'dangerous to life’ and the nature of the injuries is such which could merit such a conclusion then such an injury has to be treated as 'grievous hurt' of the description mentioned in the first portion of clause (8) of Section 320 of the Indian Penal Code.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. Therefore, on the basis of the status report, it cannot be said that the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC was made out. Since the matter has been compromised, therefore, the chances of securing conviction under Section 307 of IPC would be bleak. 8. Consequently, FIR No. 137/2023, dated 26.7.2023 for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 504, 307, 323, 325 read with Section 34 of IPC and consequent proceedings arising out of the FIR are ordered to be quashed on the basis of the settlement arrived at between the parties. 9. The pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.