JUDGMENT (Ravindra Maithani, J.) : The challenge in this petition is made to an order dated 22.06.2018, passed by the respondent no.2 the District Magistrate, Tehri Garhwal, by which, freehold rights have been granted in favour of the respondent no. 3 over Khata No.3/7, Khasra No. 7 admeasuring 5 Nali, 7 Muthi i.e. 1090 Sq. Meters in Village Dhalwala, Rishikesh (“the disputed land”) as well as an order dated 29.01.2022, passed by the respondent no.2 the District Magistrate, Tehri Garhwal, by which an application for recalling order dated 22.06.2018 has been rejected. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 3. Facts necessary to appreciate the controversy, briefly stated, are as follows:- The petitioner is one of the important tour operators for Char Dham Yatra, which also starts from Rishikesh. The petitioner in the year 1992-93 requested the respondent no.2 the District Magistrate, Tehri Garhwal that a piece of land admeasuring 18 Nali or 37400 Sq. Meters (“the land”) situated in Village Dhalwala, Rishikesh be transferred to it for workshop-cum-parking space. The petitioner’s further case is as follows:- (i) The petitioner was given possession of the land. The petitioner also carried out the expenses of Rs.5 Lakhs in the construction of approach road etc. (ii) The disputed land is a part of the land. Its lease was granted in favour of one Sunil Kumar on 25.06.1994 and immediately, it was transferred in favour of the respondent no.3 on 30.06.1994. (iii) The petitioner objected to the lease in favour of the respondent no.3 and made a communication on 14.08.1997. (iv) On 31.03.1998, the lease granted in favour of the respondent no.3 of the disputed land was cancelled by the respondent no.2. (v) The petitioner requested the respondent no.2 for transfer of land in its favour. (vi) The respondent no.3 challenged the order dated 31.03.1998 cancelling his lease, before the Commissioner, Garhwal Mandal (“the Commissioner”) by filing a Misc. Appeal No. 1 of 1997/98 (“the appeal”). The appeal was dismissed on 28.09.2002. (vii) The Commissioner in its order recorded that the respondent no.2 could not have granted the lease of the disputed land to the respondent no.3. (viii) The order dated 28.09.2002 passed in the appeal was further challenged by the respondent no.3 before the High Court. The matter was remanded. But again, on 03.11.2006, the appeal stood dismissed. (vii) The Commissioner in its order recorded that the respondent no.2 could not have granted the lease of the disputed land to the respondent no.3. (viii) The order dated 28.09.2002 passed in the appeal was further challenged by the respondent no.3 before the High Court. The matter was remanded. But again, on 03.11.2006, the appeal stood dismissed. (ix) The Commissioner recorded a categorical finding that the petitioner was in possession of the disputed land. (x) The order dated 03.11.2006 passed in the appeal by the Commissioner was further challenged in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1896 of 2006 (“the petition”), which was finally withdrawn on 15.06.2016 by the respondent no.3 with the direction to the respondent no.2 to decide the application of the petitioner for converting his land into freehold in accordance with law and in view of the New Nazul Policy, 2011, but without being influenced by the earlier impugned orders passed by some authority concerned. (xi) After the order passed in the petition, the petitioner again approached the respondent no.2 raising his claim with regard to the disputed land. (xii) In one of the communications made by the petitioner, the respondent no.2 had on 15.11.2018 informed the petitioner that the proceedings to grant freehold rights to the respondent no.3 are under consideration. (xiii) Subsequently, it was revealed that on 22.06.2018, the respondent no.2 had ordered for grant of freehold rights in favour of the respondent no.3. (xiv) In WPPIL No. 132 of 2013, In Reference Nazul Policy of the State for Disposing & Management of Nazul Land Vs. State and Others (“the PIL”) this Court on 19.06.2018 had struck down the Clauses 4 (f) (g) (h) of the Nazul Policy and the Government was directed to take over the possession of all such properties. (xv) The order dated 19.06.2018, passed in the PIL by this Court was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.4692 of 2019 (“the SLP”), in which on 11.02.2019 status quo order was passed. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that the lease granted in favour of the respondent no.3 had already been cancelled. The order dated 22.06.2018 is absolutely erroneous. The respondent no.3 has never been in possession of the disputed land. The petitioner moved an application to recall the order dated 22.06.2018, but it had been rejected by the impugned order dated 29.01.2022. 5. The order dated 22.06.2018 is absolutely erroneous. The respondent no.3 has never been in possession of the disputed land. The petitioner moved an application to recall the order dated 22.06.2018, but it had been rejected by the impugned order dated 29.01.2022. 5. The respondent no.3 filed his counter affidavit. According to him, he is a bhumidhar of the disputed land. The lease had validly been granted to him. The order dated 22.06.2018 is in accordance with law. Pursuant to it, he had deposited sale consideration of Rs.13,08,000/- and a sale deed had been executed in his favour, which is a title document. It could be challenged only in the civil court. Therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. 6. According to the respondent no.3, the impugned order has been put to challenge after four years, that too challenging the title documents. According to the respondent no.3, he has been in possession of the disputed land. 7. On behalf of the State, counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent no.2. The factual matrix is not in dispute. The respondent no.2 in his counter affidavit has simply reiterated the factual aspects, but enclosed the following communication along with the counter affidavit, which are important to be referred to:- (i) An application dated 30.06.1994 of one Sunil Kumar, seeking transfer of lease deed in favour of the respondent no.3 (Annexure 1 to the counter affidavit). (ii) Letter dated 25.09.1992 of the respondent no.2 addressed to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Narendra Nagar (Annexure No. 2 to the counter affidavit). (iii) Communication dated 07.01.1993 of the petitioner made to the respondent no.2 (Annexure No. 3 to the counter affidavit). (iv) Communication dated 15.01.1993 of the Vice President, Haridwar Development Authority addressed to the respondent no.2 (Annexure No. 4 to the counter affidavit). (v) Minutes of Meeting dated 05.12.2018 as well as the office note of the respondent no.2 (Annexure No. 5 to the counter affidavit). 8. The petitioner did file his rejoinder affidavit. In his rejoinder affidavit, dated 28.05.2023, in para 4, the petitioner has quoted the first paragraph of the freehold deed executed in favour of the respondent no.3, which recites that the respondent no.3 is a lease holder. 9. 8. The petitioner did file his rejoinder affidavit. In his rejoinder affidavit, dated 28.05.2023, in para 4, the petitioner has quoted the first paragraph of the freehold deed executed in favour of the respondent no.3, which recites that the respondent no.3 is a lease holder. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the order dated 22.06.2018 is bad in the eyes of law because the respondent no.3 is not entitled to lease or to freehold rights, as per the Government Policy. He would raise the following points in his submissions:- (i) The lease, which was granted in favour of the respondent no.3 on 30.06.1994, has already been cancelled by the respondent no.2 on 31.03.1998 and this order was unsuccessfully challenged in the appeal. The writ petition filed against it has been withdrawn. Therefore, the order cancelling lease of the respondent no.3 is final. The respondent no.3 is not a lease holder. (ii) In the month of November, 2018, the respondent no.2 had communicated to the petitioner that the proceedings with regard to the freehold rights in favour of the respondent no.3 are underway. But subsequently, it was revealed that prior to it on 22.06.2018, the order was passed. It is argued that the order dated 22.06.2018 is antedated. (iii) The petition was withdrawn by the respondent no.3 on 15.06.2016, seeking liberty, so that his application for freehold rights may be considered. But, one of the challans for freehold rights had already been prepared on 31.03.2012 and this fact was concealed by the respondent no.3 in the petition. It was a loss to the exchequer. (iv) A trespasser may not be granted freehold rights because that clause of the New Nazul Policy of 2011 has already been quashed in the PIL on 19.06.2018 against which SLP was preferred and status quo order was passed. (v) The lease granted to the respondent no.3 was cancelled on the ground that the respondent no.3 was not eligible for the grant of lease. He was not in possession. Therefore, it is argued that the order dated 22.06.2018 by which freehold rights were granted to the respondent no.3 was bad in the eyes of law. The respondent no.3 was not entitled to the freehold rights. He was not a lease holder. He was not in the possession of the disputed land. 10. He was not in possession. Therefore, it is argued that the order dated 22.06.2018 by which freehold rights were granted to the respondent no.3 was bad in the eyes of law. The respondent no.3 was not entitled to the freehold rights. He was not a lease holder. He was not in the possession of the disputed land. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent no.3 would submit that the petitioner has no locus standi to file a writ petition. The petitioner is neither in possession, nor an allottee. The petitioner is totally an outsider and stranger to the disputed land. On this ground alone, it is argued that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 11. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance on the principles of law, as laid down in the case of Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2013) 4 SCC 465 . 12. In the case of Ayaaubkhan (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the words “person aggrieved” and observed that “a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the authority/court, that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons. A person who raises a grievance, must show how he has suffered legal injury. Generally, a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, cannot be permitted to intervene in the affairs of others.” 13. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent no.3 would also raise the following points in his submission:- (i) The writ petition was withdrawn by the petitioner with a direction to the authorities concerned to consider the application of the petitioner for converting his land into freehold, in accordance with law and in view of the New Nazul Policy, 2011 without being influenced by the earlier impugned orders. (ii) Learned counsel would submit that as per the Nazul Policy, 2011, even a trespasser is entitled to freehold rights. (iii) During the course of argument, it has also been brought to the notice of the Court that, in fact, the order dated 19.06.2018, passed in the petition has been stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 27862 of 2018. (iv) Learned Senior Counsel would submit that the order dated 19.06.2018, passed in the PIL may not affect the grant of freehold rights in favour of the petitioner. (v) The petitioner is a title deed holder. (iv) Learned Senior Counsel would submit that the order dated 19.06.2018, passed in the PIL may not affect the grant of freehold rights in favour of the petitioner. (v) The petitioner is a title deed holder. A freehold deed has been executed in his favour on 18.06.2019. He had paid consideration for it. The title documents may only be challenged in the civil court. The freehold document has yet not been cancelled. (vi) The New Nazul Policy, 2011 has been promulgated to benefit the persons. Even trespassers have been given rights over it. The freehold rights have been given to the respondent no.3, as per Policy. (v) The petitioner has never been in possession of the disputed land. This is amply clear by the communications that was made by the petitioner. 14. The question is whether the petitioner has any right involved in the matter, so as to prefer a writ petition. Reference has been made to the judgment in the case of Ayaaubkhan (supra). In fact, in para nine of the judgment, the Hon’ble Court in that case has observed “therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can, of course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. In fact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same.” 15. It is true that lease deed has never been executed in favour of the petitioner, but it is equally true that according to the petitioner, he was granted possession of the land, which includes the disputed land in the year 1992-93 and subsequently, the petitioner had also developed the approach road and spent huge money on it. It is true that lease deed has never been executed in favour of the petitioner, but it is equally true that according to the petitioner, he was granted possession of the land, which includes the disputed land in the year 1992-93 and subsequently, the petitioner had also developed the approach road and spent huge money on it. But, in the year 1993-94, lease had been granted in favour of the respondent no.3. The lease has subsequently been cancelled on the application of the petitioner. That order has been confirmed up to the High Court. It is the petitioner, who has also been claiming his rights over the disputed land. After grant of freehold rights in favour of the respondent no.3, the petitioner further moved an application for recalling that order, but that has also been rejected by the impugned order dated 29.01.2022. 16. The petitioner, in fact, is seeking allotment of the land in his favour. According to him, he has been doing so since, 1992-93. The rights of the petitioner had never matured, in terms of grant of any lease or any freehold rights. But, it cannot be said that the petitioner is a stranger to the petition. The petitioner claims his right in the disputed land. Therefore, in fact, the petitioner has locus standi to file the writ petition. 17. The New Nazul Policy of 2011 has been discussed on behalf of the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that Clause 4 of the New Nazul Policy of 2011, provides for eligibility and illegal/unauthorized occupants were also entitled for freehold rights. But, he would submit that, that clause 4 (f) (g) (h) had been struck down by this Court in the PIL. 18. Fact remains that the order of this Court dated 19.06.2018, passed in the PIL has been stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Its effect is that the New Nazul Policy, 2011 shall be read as it is today without reading the order dated 19.06.2018, passed in the PIL. Resultantly, as per the New Nazul Policy, 2011 an illegal or unauthorized occupant subject to other conditions of the New Nazul Policy, 2011 is also entitled to freehold rights. 19. The New Nazul Policy, 2011 also provides that the lease holder is also entitled to freehold rights. 20. Resultantly, as per the New Nazul Policy, 2011 an illegal or unauthorized occupant subject to other conditions of the New Nazul Policy, 2011 is also entitled to freehold rights. 19. The New Nazul Policy, 2011 also provides that the lease holder is also entitled to freehold rights. 20. The question that falls for consideration is as to whether the respondent no.3 is the lease holder of the disputed land of which freehold rights were granted to him on 22.06.2018 or whether he is an illegal/unauthorized occupant of the disputed land. 21. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent no.3 referred to an order dated 15.06.2016, passed in the petition to argue that, in fact, the Court had given liberty to the respondent no.3 that his application for freehold rights shall be considered in accordance with the New Nazul Policy, 2011 without being influenced by the earlier orders. 22. It would be apt to reproduce, the part of the order which is being referred to. It is as hereunder:- “By means of present writ petition, the petitioner seeks to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 31.03.1998 passed by the Collector/UP-Ayukta, Tehri Garhwal and order dated 03.11.2006 passed by the Appellate Authority/respondent no.3. Learned counsel for the petitioner confined his prayer only to the extent that the District Magistrate / authority concerned be directed to decide the application of the petitioner for converting his land into freehold in accordance with law and in view of New Nazul Policy, 2011 but without being influenced by the earlier impugned orders passed by the some authority concerned. Learned counsel for the petitioner wants to withdraw the writ petition subject to above. Learned State counsel submits that he has no objection if such an order is passed. In view of the above, the writ petition is disposed of with liberty as above. The petitioner is also granted liberty to challenge the impugned orders if required, but in accordance with law. All pending applications stand disposed of.” 23. The lease granted in favour of the petitioner had already been cancelled on 31.03.1998. Its appeal was dismissed finally on 03.11.2006. It is this order dated 03.11.2006, passed in the appeal that was challenged in the petition, which was disposed of with the liberty, as quoted hereinabove. All pending applications stand disposed of.” 23. The lease granted in favour of the petitioner had already been cancelled on 31.03.1998. Its appeal was dismissed finally on 03.11.2006. It is this order dated 03.11.2006, passed in the appeal that was challenged in the petition, which was disposed of with the liberty, as quoted hereinabove. The effect of order dated 15.06.2016 passed in the petition is not that of revival of the lease. The lease granted in favour of the respondent no.3 had already been cancelled and, in fact, it had been upheld in the petition on 15.06.2016 also. 24. By its order dated 15.06.2016, passed in the petition, the Court had also accepted the contentions of the respondent no.3 that his application for conversion of the disputed land into freehold may be considered by the Competent Authority without being influenced by the impugned orders. Its effect is that if any application was to be filed by the respondent no.3 that was to be considered, as per law and in accordance with the New Nazul Policy, 2011. 25. At the cost of repetition, it may be reiterated that on 15.06.2016, this Court did not uphold the lease in favour of the petitioner. Instead, the Court had upheld the order by which the lease of the petitioner was cancelled on 31.03.1998. The petitioner was not a lease holder of the disputed land, when he had applied for the freehold rights. The petitioner’s application for freehold rights could not have been considered under the category of lease holder. 26. Now, the question is whether the petitioner was eligible for grant of free hold rights of the disputed land on the basis of his possession? Can it be said that he was an illegal/unauthorised occupant of the disputed land? This question of possession is, in fact, much factual. But, since the freehold rights have been granted to the petitioner and it is being argued on behalf of the respondent no.3 that he was in possession of the disputed land, therefore, he was entitled to the freehold rights. This Court is examining this aspect. 27. It may be noted that during the course of argument learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent no.3 would also submit that according to the petitioner, the land admeasuring 18 Nali was given to them in the year 1992-93. This Court is examining this aspect. 27. It may be noted that during the course of argument learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent no.3 would also submit that according to the petitioner, the land admeasuring 18 Nali was given to them in the year 1992-93. It is up to the petitioner to tell the Court as to where is the remaining land? It is so because the claim in the instant petition is with regard to the disputed land, which is about 5 Nali. 28. It is true that according to the petitioner, he was given possession of the land, which was about 37400 Sq. Meters. But, in the instant case, by the impugned order, freehold rights have been given in favour of the respondent no.3 for 5 Nali, 7 Muthi i.e. 1090 Sq. Meters. But, merely because it has not been disclosed, as to where the remaining part of the land is, this Court is not divested from examining the issue raised in the petition. 29. On behalf of the respondent no.3 reference has been made to the communication dated 14.08.1997 (Annexure 1 to the petition) to argue that, in fact, on that date also, the petitioner had accepted that he was not in possession of the disputed land. 30. It is true that in his communication dated 14.08.1997, the petitioner had sought possession of the land and a request was made to the respondent no.2 the District Magistrate. But, the document has to be read as a whole. This document records that the land was to be transferred to the petitioner and the matter had been pending with the respondent no.2 since 1993. The petitioner was also given possession of it on 25.06.1992. This communication reveals that some person had tried to encroach upon the land, who had got the lease of the land. 31. The Court is examining the aspect of illegal/unauthorised occupant of the disputed land. Especially, the question that falls for examination is as to whether for the purposes of New Nazul Policy, 2011, the respondent no.3 may be said to be an illegal/unauthorised occupant to be eligible for the freehold rights of the disputed land. 32. Initially, the lease of the disputed land was granted to one Sunil Gupta on 25.06.1994. It is he, who got the lease transferred in favour of the respondent no.3 on 30.06.1994. 32. Initially, the lease of the disputed land was granted to one Sunil Gupta on 25.06.1994. It is he, who got the lease transferred in favour of the respondent no.3 on 30.06.1994. The lease granted to the respondent no.3 was cancelled on 31.03.1998 by the respondent no.2. This order is very important. It is on record. It records that the possession of the disputed land had been handed over by the administration to the petitioner, which is confirmed by the following:- (i) Communication dated. 25.09.1992 of the respondent no.2. (ii) Communication dated 25.09.1992 of the Haridwar Development Authority. (iii) Communication dated 15.01.1993 of the petitioner. (iv) The report dated 30.05.1993 of the Tehsildar, Narendra Nagar. (v) Report dated 18.06.1993 of the Assistant Collector, Narendra Nagar and thereupon, order dated 20.06.1994 of the District Magistrate, Narendra Nagar. (vi) The lease cancellation order dated 31.03.1998 also records the following illegality in grant of lease to the respondent no.3:- (i) The lessee had to construct within 36 months on the leased property. (ii) The right of the lessee shall be hereditary. (iii) Sunil Gupta and the respondent no.3 are not family members. (iv) The lease in the urban area could have been granted only for 150 Sq. Meters by the Collector. (v) In the instant case, beyond Rules, lease of the disputed land has been granted. (vi) For tourism purposes also the lease of only 100 Sq. Meters could have been sanctioned. It has also been violated in the matter for grant of lease to the respondent no.3. 33. As stated, this order dated 31.03.1998 is final. These factual aspects have attained finality. The respondent no.3 did not file the document by which lease was granted to him. The respondent no.2 alongwith his counter affidavit dated 29.04.2023, filed an application of Sunil Kumar dated 30.06.1994 by which he had requested that the lease granted to him may be transferred in favour of the respondent no.3. 34. The communication dated 25.09.1992 of the respondent no.2 addressed to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Narendra Nagar, which is on record shows that, in fact, the petitioner had approached the respondent no.2 and directions for inspection and preparation of map were issued by this communication. Also, Annexure No.3 to the counter affidavit of the respondent No.2 is an important communication between the petitioner and the respondent no.2, dated 07.01.1993. Also, Annexure No.3 to the counter affidavit of the respondent No.2 is an important communication between the petitioner and the respondent no.2, dated 07.01.1993. It records that a spot inspection of the land had been done and possession of the land had been handed over to the petitioner. But, formal orders had not been issued. Request was made for the formal orders. Another communication, which is Annexure 4 to the counter affidavit of the respondent no.2, dated 15.01.1993 reveals that, in fact, the petitioner had approached Haridwar Development Authority (“HDA”) for issuance of no objection with regard to the land and the HDA had issued no objection. 35. What is important to discuss is the minutes of meeting dated 03.12.2019 and the office note made thereafter. It is the claim of the petitioner that in the month of November, 2018, the petitioner was informed that the proceedings for freehold rights in favour of the respondent no.3 were underway, whereas, the freehold order was passed on 22.06.2018. Based on it, it is argued that the order is antedated. On this aspect, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent no.3 would submit that on 22.06.2018, the order was passed for freehold rights in favour of the respondent no.3, but freehold deed was issued on 19.06.2019, therefore, it cannot be said that order dated 22.06.2018 is antedated. 36. It so happened that in between, on a communication of the petitioner, a meeting was convened by the respondent no.2 on 03.12.2018. Its’ minutes and further note of the office of the respondent no.2 is Annexure 5 to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent no.2. It records that the lease granted in favour of the respondent no.3 had already been cancelled. On 05.12.2018, the note made by the Additional District Magistrate, Tehri Garhwal, which is part of this Annexure 5 to the counter affidavit of the respondent no.2, further records that the proceedings for freehold rights were undertaken, assuming as if the respondent no.3 is a lease holder, whereas, he is not a lease holder. He may at the most be considered as an unauthorised occupant and some fine should be imposed on him. 37. He may at the most be considered as an unauthorised occupant and some fine should be imposed on him. 37. The order dated 31.03.1998, by which the respondent no.2 cancelled the lease of the respondent no.3, makes it abundantly clear that, in fact, the possession of the land, which includes the dispute of land had already been given to the petitioner. The communications, which have been referred to on behalf of the respondent no.3, in fact, show that the possession was given to the petitioner and subsequently, it is the respondent no.3, who had encroached upon the disputed land. 38. It is the case of the petitioner that they had spent money on the land for construction of the approach road. The petitioner also claims its possession on the disputed land. The respondent no.3 also claims its possession over the disputed land. The dispute has been between the petitioner and the respondent no.3. As stated, in the order dated 31.03.1998, passed by the respondent no.2 while cancelling the lease deed of the petitioner, it was held that the possession was given to the petitioner. 39. There is one document, which is really very important, that is an application for grant of leasehold rights given by the respondent no.3. In the impugned order dated 22.06.2018, in fifth paragraph, it is recorded that against the order cancelling the lease deed, the respondent no.3 had preferred an appeal and it was stayed by the Commissioner. It further records that since then, the respondent no.3 is in possession of the disputed land. 40. It is a case of Possession versus Possession. State has admitted that the possession was given to the petitioner (in lease cancellation order dated 31.03.1998). The respondent no.3 claims that after stay granted by the Commissioner in appeal, he has been in possession. Even the petitioner has not been granted any lease and similarly, the respondent no.3 is also not a lease holder. Under these factual aspects, it cannot be said that the respondent no.3 is an illegal/unauthorized occupant of the disputed land qua the Government property. If the petitioner was handed over the possession by the State Administration, as recorded in the order dated 31.03.1998 of the respondent no.2, and thereafter, the respondent no.3 took over the possession, it cannot be said that the respondent no.3 is exclusively an unauthorized occupant of the disputed land. If the petitioner was handed over the possession by the State Administration, as recorded in the order dated 31.03.1998 of the respondent no.2, and thereafter, the respondent no.3 took over the possession, it cannot be said that the respondent no.3 is exclusively an unauthorized occupant of the disputed land. According to the State, the possession was handed over to the petitioner. In such a situation can’t it be said that from the starting, the petitioner is in possession of the disputed land; if subsequently the respondent no.3 had taken over possession, it is qua the petitioner only. They both had an inter se dispute. It has not been decided, while granting freehold rights to the respondent no.3 on 22.06.2018. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the respondent no.3 is an unauthorized/illegal occupant of the disputed land qua the State because the State admits that they had given possession of the disputed land also to the petitioner. If the respondent no.3 is in possession of the disputed land, he may be an unauthorized occupant qua the petitioner and not qua the State. 41. Even the question that falls for consideration is whether on 22.06.2018, the respondent no.2 had granted freehold rights on the ground that the respondent no.3 is in unauthorized occupation of it. It is not so. The impugned order dated 22.06.2018, nowhere mentions that based on illegal/unauthorized occupation of the disputed land, free hold rights have been granted. In fact, this order records that respecting the order dated 15.06.2016 of this Court, passed in the petition, freehold rights were sanctioned. There has been no question of grant of freehold rights by respecting this Court order dated 15.06.2016 because by its order dated 15.06.2016, passed in the petition, this Court has not directed the respondent no.2 to grant freehold rights in favour of the respondent no.3. What the Court had directed was that any application that may be moved by the respondent no.3 for grant of freehold rights, may be considered as per law and in accordance with the New Nazul Policy, 2011. 42. The respondent no.3 has filed a freehold deed alongwith the counter affidavit. The second paragraph of this free hold deed records that the respondent no.3 is a lease holder. This statement is factually incorrect. 42. The respondent no.3 has filed a freehold deed alongwith the counter affidavit. The second paragraph of this free hold deed records that the respondent no.3 is a lease holder. This statement is factually incorrect. It amply speaks that the respondent no.3 was granted freehold rights of the disputed land, assuming as if, he is a lease holder. It is not correct statement. 43. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that the whole premises of grant of freehold right is factually incorrect. Therefore, order dated 22.06.2018 as well as subsequent order dated 29.01.2022 deserves to be set aside. Accordingly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 44. The writ petition is allowed. 45. The impugned orders dated 22.06.2018 and 29.01.2022 passed by the respondent no.2 the District Magistrate, Tehri Garhwal are quashed.