JUDGMENT : 1. This civil second appeal was admitted on the two substantial questions of law vide order dated 29.09.2016, which are reproduced as under: (i) Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by the limitation? (ii) Whether the Appellate Court has correctly interpreted Article 67 of Limitation Act Svt. 1995? 2. Before proceeding to adjudicate upon the above-mentioned substantial questions of law, this Court deems it appropriate to have a brief resume of the facts of the case, necessary for the disposal of this appeal. Since the original plaintiff has expired and his legal representatives have been brought on record, the plaintiff shall be referred to as ‘the respondent’. The respondent filed the suit for declaration to the effect that his date of birth was 16th Magh 1999 corresponding to 28th January, 1943 with consequential relief of injunction directing the appellants to pay the balance dues of voluntary retirement scheme by treating the date of birth of the respondent as 28th of January, 1943. It was stated that the respondent joined the service of the appellants and declared his date of birth as 16th Magh 1999 on the basis of the school leaving certificate and the same date of birth was recorded in the service book of the respondent. The original service book of the respondent got lost by the appellants in the flood and duplicate service books of all the concerned employees, including the respondent, were prepared by the appellants. While preparing the duplicate service book of the respondent and converting the date of birth of the respondent from Vikrami Samvat to Gregorian Era, a clerical mistake was committed and instead of mentioning the corresponding date of birth of the respondent as 28.01.1943, the same was recorded as 23.01.1942. The respondent applied for voluntary retirement as per the scheme floated by the appellants and the application of the respondent was accepted by the appellants. However, at the time of calculation of dues, the date of birth of the respondent was considered as 23.01.1942 and when he came to know about the wrong conversion made by the appellants, he immediately approached the appellants through the medium of a representation. However, at the time of calculation of dues, the date of birth of the respondent was considered as 23.01.1942 and when he came to know about the wrong conversion made by the appellants, he immediately approached the appellants through the medium of a representation. The representation remained pending for considerable period of time and ultimately on 29.10.2002, the appellant No. 2 conveyed the respondent in writing that his application could not be accepted on the ground that the respondent had himself declared his date of birth in the service book and had signed the same. Thereafter, the respondent filed the suit. 3. The appellants objected to the suit filed by the respondent through the medium of written statement by pleading that the suit was hopelessly time barred and that the respondent had declared his date of birth as 23.01.1942 at the time of joining of the service and he had also submitted a declaration of home town, wherein he had mentioned his date of birth as 23.01.1942 and it was also pleaded that the claim of the respondent cannot be entertained at a belated stage, that too after retirement from the service. Plea of estoppel was also raised by the appellants to object the suit filed by the respondent. The appellants admitted in their written statement that the service book of the respondent was washed away in the month of September, 1992 and during reconstruction of the service book, the respondent had signed and had accepted his date of birth as 23.01.1942 [16th Magh 1999]. It was further averred that the respondent had applied for voluntary retirement, which was accepted by the appellants and benefits were rightly calculated by considering the date of birth of the respondent as 23.01.1942. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed: (i) Whether actual date of birth of the plaintiff as per record is 16 Magh 1999 Bikrami and in Christian era is 28.01.1943.? OPP (ii) Whether plaintiff has declared his date of birth as 16 Magh 1999 Bikrami on the basis of School Leaving Certificate at the time of joining the service? OPP (iii) Whether plaintiff has signed and accepted his date of birth as 23.01.1942 in service book? OPD (iv) Whether suit is time barred and hit by law of limitation? OPD (v) Relief. 5. OPP (iii) Whether plaintiff has signed and accepted his date of birth as 23.01.1942 in service book? OPD (iv) Whether suit is time barred and hit by law of limitation? OPD (v) Relief. 5. The respondent besides examining himself, also examined one Munshi Ram, in support of his claim whereas the appellants examined Deepa and Romesh Chander Sharma as their witnesses. 6. After considering the evidence and hearing the parties, the court of learned Sub-Judge, Reasi (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the trial court’) dismissed the suit filed by the respondent by virtue of judgment and decree dated 29.09.2007 by holding that the suit was time barred. 7. The judgment and decree dated 29.09.2007 passed by the learned trial court was set aside by the court of learned District Judge, Reasi (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the appellate court’) vide judgment and decree dated 26.03.2009. 8. The learned trial court had dismissed the suit filed by the respondent on the ground that the suit was time barred as the respondent had voluntarily sought retirement with effect from 31.01.1998, whereas the suit was filed in the year 2002. The learned appellate court while accepting the appeal filed by the respondent came to the conclusion that Article 67 of the Limitation Act would not apply but Article 119 of the Limitation Act would apply. Though this Court has framed the abovementioned substantial questions of law but these questions need certain modifications. The court as such modifies and reframe the substantial question of law as under: (i) Whether the suit of the plaintiff was hit by Article 67 of the Limitation Act and Article 119 of the Limitation Act was not applicable at all ? 9. Articles 67 and 119 of the Limitation Act are extracted as under: Article Description of Suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 67. For relief on the ground of mistake 3 years When the mistake becomes known to the plaintiff. 119. Suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule 6 years When the right to sue accrues. 10. For relief on the ground of mistake 3 years When the mistake becomes known to the plaintiff. 119. Suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule 6 years When the right to sue accrues. 10. The sole grievance projected by the respondent in the suit was in respect of the wrong entry of date of birth, which in fact amounts to mistake on part of the appellants while converting the date and year from Vikrami Samvat to Christian era at the time of reconstruction of service book. Article 67 of the Limitation Act specifically deals with the reliefs sought by the plaintiff on the ground of mistake, which in fact had been sought by the respondent, though in the form of declaration. The nomenclature or the frame of the suit can in no way change the nature of the suit. The respondent was in fact seeking the relief on the basis of mistake committed by the appellants while converting his date of birth from Vikram Samvat to Gregorian calendar. The learned appellate court while allowing appeal of the respondent has stated that Article 67 of the Limitation Act will not apply in the case of the respondent and Article 119 of the Limitation Act, which provides the maximum period of limitation of 6 years from the day when right to sue accrues, shall be applicable. Article 119 of the Limitation Act is a residuary provision which deals with the suits where no time limit has been provided elsewhere in the schedule of the Limitation Act, but once there is a specific provision providing a time limit for a particular suit, then the resort cannot be made to Article 119 of the Limitation Act. The learned appellate court while observing that the Article 119 of the Limitation Act would apply has simultaneously observed that the appellants never acted responsibly to rectify the mistake committed by them. The findings and the conclusion returned by the appellate court are contrary to each other. Once the appellate court admitted that there was mistake on part of the appellants, then the appellate court could never have banked upon Article 119 of the Limitation Act. The respondent admittedly filed the suit in the year 2002 when in 1998, he became aware of the mistake committed by the appellants. Once the appellate court admitted that there was mistake on part of the appellants, then the appellate court could never have banked upon Article 119 of the Limitation Act. The respondent admittedly filed the suit in the year 2002 when in 1998, he became aware of the mistake committed by the appellants. In Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, (2020) 17 SCC 260 , Apex Court has held as under: 17. The expression used in Article 113 of the 1963 Act is “when the right to sue accrues”, which is markedly distinct from the expression used in other Articles in First Division of the Schedule dealing with suits, which unambiguously refer to the happening of a specified event. Whereas, Article 113 being a residuary clause and which has been invoked by all the three courts in this case, does not specify happening of particular event as such, but merely refers to the accrual of cause of action on the basis of which the right to sue would accrue. 18. Concededly, the expression used in Article 113 is distinct from the expressions used in other Articles in the First Division dealing with suits such as Article 58 (when the right to sue “first” accrues), Article 59 (when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded “first” become known to him) and Article 104 (when the plaintiff is “first” refused the enjoyment of the right). The view taken by the trial court, which commended to the first appellate court and the High Court in the second appeal, would inevitably entail in reading the expression in Article 113 as — when the right to sue (first) accrues. This would be rewriting of that provision and doing violence to the legislative intent. We must assume that Parliament was conscious of the distinction between the provisions referred to above and had advisedly used generic expression “when the right to sue accrues” in Article 113 of the 1963 Act. Inasmuch as, it would also cover cases falling under Section 22 of the 1963 Act, to wit, continuing breaches and torts. (Emphasis Added) 11. Thus, this court is of the considered view that Article 119 of the Limitation Act is not applicable at all and the suit filed by the respondent would be governed by Article 67 of the Limitation Act. (Emphasis Added) 11. Thus, this court is of the considered view that Article 119 of the Limitation Act is not applicable at all and the suit filed by the respondent would be governed by Article 67 of the Limitation Act. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. The suit filed by the respondent was rightly held as time barred by the learned trial court. 12. In view of above, this Civil Second Appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree dated 26.03.2009 passed by the court of learned District Judge, Reasi is set aside. The judgment and decree of the trial court is restored. The suit of the plaintiff shall stand dismissed. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. Record be sent back forthwith. No order as to costs.