JUDGMENT : Deepak Kumar Tiwari, J. 1. The aforesaid Appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment, as they arise out of the same incident. 2. The appellants have been convicted for commission of offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for life and to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- each, in default of payment of fine, each of the appellant was directed to undergo SI for one year, vide judgment dated 3rd December, 2019 passed by the 2nd Additional Judge to the Court of 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur in ST No.25/2019. 3. Prosecution case, in brief, is that complainant Mohd. Sharif has lodged an FIR with the PS Azad Chowk on 21.9.2018 stating that on 20.9.2018 at about 10 pm after taking dinner he went to his room for sleeping and his son Mohd. Siraj went outside the home with his friends for taking stroll. Next day morning, one Sheikh Alam came to his house and informed him that accused Manav Pandey and his two friends have assaulted his son Mohd. Siraj with knife and sticks and he is lying unconscious at Jai Kali Chowk, Bhoipara. After receiving the information, the complainant went to the spot where he came to know that on account of old enmity, accused Manav Pandey and his two friends have assaulted his son. It is stated that accused Manav Pandey has caused grievous injuries by giving knife blow on his abdomen. His friends Prashant Patel and Aman Bhargav took him to Yashwant Hospital for treatment from where on the advise of the doctors, he was taken to Ramkrishna Care Hospital for treatment where he was declared brought dead. On receiving information, Dehati Merg intimation (Ex.-P/1) and Dehati First Information Report (Ex.-P/2) were recorded and subsequently, FIR (Ex.-P/21) was registered. 4. During investigation, statements of the witnesses were recorded. Statements of the accused persons were also recorded. Pursuant to memorandum statement of accused Manav Pandey, one knife was recovered vide Ex.-P/12 and in pursuance of the memorandum statement of accused Ritesh, one club was recovered vide Ex.-P/13. Spot map was prepared vide Ex.-P/4. Postmortem on the dead body of the deceased was conducted by Dr. M. Nirala (PW-6), who submitted his report vide Ex.-P/17, wherein he opined that the cause of death is haemorrhage and shock, and the death is homicidal in nature. 5. Spot map was prepared vide Ex.-P/4. Postmortem on the dead body of the deceased was conducted by Dr. M. Nirala (PW-6), who submitted his report vide Ex.-P/17, wherein he opined that the cause of death is haemorrhage and shock, and the death is homicidal in nature. 5. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellants for offence under Sections 302/34 of the IPC. On the date of the incident, since one juvenile conflict with law ‘A’ was involved, his trial was conducted at the Juvenile Justice Board, Raipur. The charges were read over and explained to the appellants, however, the appellants denied the same and claimed to be tried. The trial Court after hearing learned counsel for the parties and on the basis of material available on record, convicted and sentenced the appellants as mentioned in para-1 of this judgment. 6. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined as many as 12 witnesses and exhibited 25 documents. Statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC wherein the accused pleaded innocence and false implication. 7. Learned counsel for appellants would submit that the trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in its proper perspective. Sheikh Alam (PW2), Aman Bhargav (PW-4), Prashant Patel (PW-10) and Mohammad Aarif (PW-12) are related to the deceased, therefore, they are interested witnesses. There are various contradictions and omissions in their evidence and therefore their evidence is not credible. Though the incident happened in a crowded place, but the prosecution has failed to examine any witness. They would further submit that the offence under Section 302 of the IPC would not be attracted and the case would squarely fall under Section 304 part-I of the IPC. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellant Manav Pandey has placed reliance on the judgments in the matters of Arjun and Another Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2017) 3 SCC 247 and Gurmukh Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (2009) 15 SCC 635 . 8. Miss Saumya Sharma, learned counsel would submit that no test identification parade was conducted and the name of accused Ritesh is also not mentioned in the FIR and hence non-conduction of TIP is fatal. State of Chhattisgarh, (2017) 3 SCC 247 and Gurmukh Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (2009) 15 SCC 635 . 8. Miss Saumya Sharma, learned counsel would submit that no test identification parade was conducted and the name of accused Ritesh is also not mentioned in the FIR and hence non-conduction of TIP is fatal. She would further submit that even in the diary statement recorded under section 161 of the Cr.P.C, no eyewitness has named the appellant and from appellant Ritesh Ragde, only one club has been recovered which was also not sent to the FSL for examination, therefore, there is no evidence against him and he is entitled for benefit of doubt as his name has come for the first time before the Court. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the incident has been witnessed by more than one eyewitnesses and there is no dent in their testimonies, therefore, the judgment is well-merited and does not call for any interference. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and minutely perused the entire record. 11. The first question for consideration is whether the death of deceased Mohd. Siraj was homicidal in nature? 12. Learned trial Court has recorded an affirmative finding in this regard on the basis of medical opinion of Dr. M. Nirala (P.W.-6) as well as postmortem report (Ex. P/17) wherein the following injuries were found on the body of the deceased: “1. Stab wound present on left side middle quadrant of abdomen 1x 0.5 cm. Blood oozing out from incised wound. 2. Abrasion present on left knee 1x1 cm and medially from left knee 1×0.5 cm. 3. Grazed Abrasion present on left toe medially 3×1 cm and on right side toe medially 3.5×1 and 1 x 0.5 cm.” 13. The doctor has opined that Injury No.1 (intestinal injury) was caused with hard, sharp and pointed object. Injuries No. 2 & 3 were caused by hard and blunt object. Duration of the injuries within 24 hours prior to death and sufficient to cause death and death was homicidal in nature. He has categorically denied in his cross-examination that if any person is dashed against any trident or falls on any sharp object, such injuries could be caused. Injuries No. 2 & 3 were caused by hard and blunt object. Duration of the injuries within 24 hours prior to death and sufficient to cause death and death was homicidal in nature. He has categorically denied in his cross-examination that if any person is dashed against any trident or falls on any sharp object, such injuries could be caused. Taking into consideration the entire evidence available on record and looking to the injuries sustained by the deceased and relying upon the medical opinion of Dr. M. Nirala (P.W.6) as well as postmortem report (Ex. P/17), we are of the considered opinion that learned trial Court has rightly held the death of deceased Mohd. Siraj to be homicidal in nature. Moreover, the fact that death of the deceased was homicidal in nature has not even been seriously disputed by learned counsel for the appellants. As such, we hereby affirm the said finding recorded by the trial Court that the death of deceased Mohd. Siraj is homicidal in nature. 14. The next question for consideration is whether the appellants are the perpetrators of the crime in question? 15. Aman Bhargav (PW-4) and Prashant Patel (PW-10) have categorically deposed that on the date of the incident, they along with deceased Md. Siraj had gone to see Moharram Procession and they were watching the said procession from near Kankali Mata Mandir, and at that time, Appellant Manav Pandey caused stab injury to the deceased. They further stated that other co-accused has also assaulted the deceased by using club. They both had also taken the deceased after the incident to Yashwant Hospital wherefrom they took to him to Ramkrishna Hospital where he was declared brought dead. 16. Sheikh Alam (PW-2) has also witnessed the incident and deposed that Aman Bhargav (PW-4) and one Kitu took the deceased to the hospital and he had gone to inform the father of the deceased, Mohd. Sarif (PW-1). The father of the deceased has stated that on getting information from these witnesses that his son was assaulted by Appellant Manav Pandey and his two friends by using knife and club and the deceased was lying in injured condition at Jai Kali Chowk, he reached there, where he got information that Aman (PW-4) and Prashant (PW-10 ) already took him to the hospital, firstly he reached Yashwant Hospital and then reached Ramkrishna Hospital. The doctor has declared his son brought dead. He has lodged the Dehati (Zero) Merg intimation (Ex.P-1) and Dehati (Zero) F.I.R vide (Ex.P-2) on same day of the incident i.e. 21.09.2018 at 8.20 hours. He had reported the incident which took place on 21.09.2018 at 4.10 hours and on the basis of the same F.I.R (Ex. P-21) and Merg intimation (Ex.P-22) were recorded by D.D. Verma, A.S.I. (PW-9). In the said reports, the name of only Appellant Manav Pandey was mentioned that he assaulted the deceased on his abdomen by using knife and at that time one of his friends had caught hold of the deceased, and one another friend had assaulted him by using club. 17. During investigation, no test identification parade was conducted as the names of other two friends were not mentioned in the FIR (Ex. P-21). Even eyewitnesses namely, Aman Bhargava (P.W.4) in his statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Ex.D-1), Prashant Patel @ Kitu (PW-10) in Ex.D-3, Mohsin Khan (PW-11) in Ex. D-4 and Mohd. Aarif (PW-12) in Ex. P-25, have not named other co-accused Ritesh Ragde @ Nitesh Kumar Ragde. 18. Krishna Kumar Sahu (PW-7), Sub Inspector, has recorded Memorandum Statement (Ex. P-10) of Appellant Manav Pandey, and Appellant Ritesh vide Ex. P-11 at the same time on 21.09.2018 at 15.00 hours at Police Station Azad Chowk, Raipur, in pursuance of which from accused Manav Pandey, a blood stained knife vide seizure memo Ex. P-12, and from Ritesh Ragde one club vide Ex. P-12 were recovered in the presence of Shayan Das (PW-3), who corroborated the said fact. 19. Dr. M. Nirala (PW-6) has proved his report (Ex. P-18). He has stated that he examined the blood stained knife which was allegedly recovered from Appellant Manav Pandey and opined that the injury which was caused to the deceased on his stomach could be inflicted from the said knife. He had sealed the knife and sent the same to the FSL to confirm human blood stain on it. In the F.S.L. report (Ex. P-24), the soil which was collected from the spot (Art.-A), clothes of the deceased Art. C-1 & C-2, his underwear C-3 and on the knife Art. -D blood was found and the same was disintegrated on these articles, so the origin and blood group could not be ascertained, as the sample was not sufficient for further examination. 20. P-24), the soil which was collected from the spot (Art.-A), clothes of the deceased Art. C-1 & C-2, his underwear C-3 and on the knife Art. -D blood was found and the same was disintegrated on these articles, so the origin and blood group could not be ascertained, as the sample was not sufficient for further examination. 20. From the above evidence, it is explicit that accused Ritesh Ragde has not been named in the F.I.R. and also the eyewitnesses have also not named him in their diary statement, and further no test identification parade was done, and the name of this accused came for the first time before the Court and the same cannot be acted upon safely. When the name of other assailant was not known during the investigation and TIP was also not done, appellant Ritesh was roped only on the basis of Memorandum Statement (Ex. P-11) through which only one club was recovered vide Ex. P-12 and the same is also not sufficient to connect him with the crime in question. Further the said memorandum and recovery was also recorded at the same time when the memorandum of main assailant Manav Pandey, who had used the knife, was recorded, though noone has disclosed the name of Appellant Ritesh that he had also participated in the said crime during the investigation. 21. For the foregoing, the aforesaid infirmities in the evidence available on record and the role attributed to appellant Ritesh, does not, in our opinion, establish that he had shared the common intention with main accused Manav Pandey who caused stab wound to the deceased by using knife and, therefore, he is entitled for the benefit of doubt. Hence the conviction of Appellant Ritesh Ragde under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is not sustainable. 22. It is well settled that motive is insignificant where the eyewitnesses are available. In the instant case, right from the beginning, the case of prosecution is consistent that appellant Manav Pandey had played prominent role in the said crime by using the knife, which was also seen by eyewitnesses namely, Aman Bhargav (PW-4), & Prashant Patel (PW-10) and they had also taken him to the hospital, and other witness Sheikh Alam (PW-2), immediately after the incident, informed the father Mohd. Sharif (PW-1), who had promptly lodged the merg intimation and F.I.R, in which the name of Appellant Manav Pandey and his role was mentioned and the same was also proved, and there was nothing to disbelieve the same. 23. Now the only question arises whether his act attracts Section 302 of the IPC or any lesser offences in the proved facts and circumstances of the case. 24. In the matter of Stalin v. State represented by the Inspector of Police, (2020) 9 SCC 524 , it was observed that when single injury was caused by the accused, offence under Section 302 IPC would be attracted or not, depends on facts and circumstances of each case and there is no principle that in all cases of a single blow Section 302 IPC is not attracted. Legal position was summarised and the relevant paras read as under : “7.1.1. In Mahesh Balmiki v. State of M.P. [Mahesh Balmiki v. State of M.P., (2000) 1 SCC 319 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 178], this Court while deciding the question of whether a single blow with a knife on the chest of the deceased would attract Section 302 IPC, held thus: (SCC pp. 322-23, para 9) “9. … there is no principle that in all cases of a single blow Section 302 IPC is not attracted. A single blow may, in some cases, entail conviction under Section 302 IPC, in some cases under Section 304 IPC and in some other cases under Section 326 IPC. The question with regard to the nature of offence has to be determined on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. The nature of the injury, whether it is on the vital or non-vital part of the body, the weapon used, the circumstances in which the injury is caused and the manner in which the injury is inflicted are all relevant factors which may go to determine the required intention or knowledge of the offender and the offence committed by him. In the instant case, the deceased was disabled from saving himself because he was held by the associates of the appellant who inflicted though a single yet a fatal blow of the description noted above. These facts clearly establish that the appellant had the intention to kill the deceased. In the instant case, the deceased was disabled from saving himself because he was held by the associates of the appellant who inflicted though a single yet a fatal blow of the description noted above. These facts clearly establish that the appellant had the intention to kill the deceased. In any event, he can safely be attributed the knowledge that the knife-blow given by him was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.” 7.1.2. In Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat [Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat, (2003) 9 SCC 322 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1809], this Court while discussing the ingredients of Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC, held thus: (SCC pp. 327-28, para 11) “11. The fourth exception of Section 300 IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said Exception deals with a case of prosecution (sic provocation) not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The Exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1, but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact, Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon an equal footing. A “sudden fight” implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor could in such cases the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight, (c) without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provision means “unfair advantage”.” 7.1.3. In Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P. [Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 444 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 500], this Court while deciding whether a case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II IPC, held thus: (SCC pp. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provision means “unfair advantage”.” 7.1.3. In Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P. [Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 444 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 500], this Court while deciding whether a case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II IPC, held thus: (SCC pp. 457-58, para 29) “29.Therefore, the Court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters — plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302, are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302, are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.” “7.1.4. In Singapagu Anjaiah v. State of A.P. [Singapagu Anjaiah v. State of A.P., (2010) 9 SCC 799 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1498], this Court while deciding the question whether a blow on the skull of the deceased with a crowbar would attract Section 302 IPC, held thus: (SCC p. 803, para 16) “16. In our opinion, as nobody can enter into the mind of the accused, his intention has to be gathered from the weapon used, the part of the body chosen for the assault and the nature of the injuries caused. Here, the appellant had chosen a crowbar as the weapon of offence. He has further chosen a vital part of the body i.e. the head for causing the injury which had caused multiple fractures of skull. This clearly shows the force with which the appellant had used the weapon. Here, the appellant had chosen a crowbar as the weapon of offence. He has further chosen a vital part of the body i.e. the head for causing the injury which had caused multiple fractures of skull. This clearly shows the force with which the appellant had used the weapon. The cumulative effect of all these factors irresistibly leads to one and the only conclusion that the appellant intended to cause death of the deceased.” 7.1.5. In State of Rajasthan v. Kanhaiya Lal [State of Rajasthan v. Kanhaiya Lal, (2019) 5 SCC 639 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 674] this Court in paras 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 held as follows: (SCC pp. 643-44) “7.3. In Arun Raj [Arun Raj v. Union of India, (2010) 6 SCC 457 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 155] this Court observed and held that there is no fixed rule that whenever a single blow is inflicted, Section 302 would not be attracted. It is observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision that nature of weapon used and vital part of the body where blow was struck, prove beyond reasonable doubt the intention of the accused to cause death of the deceased. It is further observed and held by this Court that once these ingredients are proved, it is irrelevant whether there was a single blow struck or multiple blows. 7.4. In Ashokkumar Magabhai Vankar [Ashokkumar Magabhai Vankar v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 10 SCC 604 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 397], the death was caused by single blow on head of the deceased with a wooden pestle. It was found that the accused used pestle with such force that head of the deceased was broken into pieces. This Court considered whether the case would fall under Section 302 or Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. It is held by this Court that the injury sustained by the deceased, not only exhibits intention of the accused in causing death of victim, but also knowledge of the accused in that regard. It is further observed by this Court that such attack could be none other than for causing death of victim. It is observed that any reasonable person, with any stretch of imagination can come to conclusion that such injury on such a vital part of the body, with such a weapon, would cause death. 7.5. It is further observed by this Court that such attack could be none other than for causing death of victim. It is observed that any reasonable person, with any stretch of imagination can come to conclusion that such injury on such a vital part of the body, with such a weapon, would cause death. 7.5. A similar view is taken by this Court in the recent decision in Leela Ram [State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram, (2019) 13 SCC 131 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 528] and after considering a catena of decisions of this Court on the issue on hand i.e. in case of a single blow, whether a case falls under Section 302 or Section 304 Part I or Section 304 Part II, this Court reversed the judgment [Leela Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2008 SCC OnLine Raj 945] and convicted the accused for the offence under Section 302 IPC. In the same decision, this Court also considered Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC and observed in para 19 as under: (Leela Ram case [State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram, (2019) 13 SCC 131 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 528], SCC pp. 140-41) ‘19. … Under Exception 4, culpable homicide is not murder if the stipulations contained in that provision are fulfilled. They are: (i) that the act was committed without premeditation; (ii) that there was a sudden fight; (iii) the act must be in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel; and (iv) the offender should not have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.’” 7.1.6. In Bavisetti Kameswara Rao [Bavisetti Kameswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2008) 15 SCC 725 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 175], this Court has observed in paras 13 and 14 as under: (SCC pp. 729-31) “13. It is seen that where in the murder case there is only a single injury, there is always a tendency to advance an argument that the offence would invariably be covered under Section 304 Part II IPC. The nature of offence where there is a single injury could not be decided merely on the basis of the single injury and thus in a mechanical fashion. The nature of the offence would certainly depend upon the other attendant circumstances which would help the court to find out definitely about the intention on the part of the accused. The nature of offence where there is a single injury could not be decided merely on the basis of the single injury and thus in a mechanical fashion. The nature of the offence would certainly depend upon the other attendant circumstances which would help the court to find out definitely about the intention on the part of the accused. Such attendant circumstances could be very many, they being (i) whether the act was premeditated; (ii) the nature of weapon used; (iii) the nature of assault on the accused. This is certainly not an exhaustive list and every case has to necessarily depend upon the evidence available. As regards the user of screwdriver, the learned counsel urged that it was only an accidental use on the spur of the moment and, therefore, there could be no intention to either cause death or cause such bodily injury as would be sufficient to cause death. Merely because the screwdriver was a usual tool used by the accused in his business, it could not be as if its user would be innocuous. 14. In State of Karnataka v. Vedanayagam [State of Karnataka v. Vedanayagam, (1995) 1 SCC 326 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 231] this Court considered the usual argument of a single injury not being sufficient to invite a conviction under Section 302 IPC. In that case the injury was caused by a knife. The medical evidence supported the version of the prosecution that the injury was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The High Court had convicted the accused for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC relying on the fact that there is only a single injury. However, after a detailed discussion regarding the nature of injury, the part of the body chosen by the accused to inflict the same and other attendant circumstances and after discussing clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC and further relying on the decision in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab [Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri LJ 818] , the Court set aside the acquittal under Section 302 IPC and convicted the accused for that offence. The Court (in Vedanayagam case [State of Karnataka v. Vedanayagam, (1995) 1 SCC 326 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 231], SCC p. 330, para 4) relied on the observation by Bose, J. in Virsa Singh case [Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri LJ 818] to suggest that: (Virsa Singh case [Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri LJ 818], AIR p. 468, para 16) ‘16. … With due respect to the learned Judge he has linked up the intent required with the seriousness of the injury, and that, as we have shown, is not what the section requires. The two matters are quite separate and distinct, though the evidence about them may sometimes overlap.’ The further observations in the above case were: (Virsa Singh case [Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri LJ 818] , AIR p. 468, paras 16-17) ‘16. … The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. But whether the intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of law. Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a totally separate and distinct question and has nothing to do with the question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in question. 17. But whether the intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of law. Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a totally separate and distinct question and has nothing to do with the question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in question. 17. It is true that in a given case the enquiry may be linked up with the seriousness of the injury. For example, if it can be proved, or if the totality of the circumstances justify an inference, that the prisoner only intended a superficial scratch and that by accident his victim stumbled and fell on the sword or spear that was used, then of course the offence is not murder. But that is not because the prisoner did not intend the injury that he intended to inflict to be as serious as it turned out to be but because he did not intend to inflict the injury in question at all. His intention in such a case would be to inflict a totally different injury. The difference is not one of law but one of fact; ….’” (emphasis in original) 7.2. From the above stated decisions, it emerges that there is no hard-and-fast rule that in a case of single injury Section 302 IPC would not be attracted. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The nature of injury, the part of the body where it is caused, the weapon used in causing such injury are the indicators of the fact whether the accused caused the death of the deceased with an intention of causing death or not. It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever the death occurs on account of a single blow, Section 302 IPC is ruled out. The fact situation has to be considered in each case, more particularly, under the circumstances narrated herein above, the events which precede will also have a bearing on the issue whether the act by which the death was caused was done with an intention of causing death or knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without intention to cause death. It is the totality of the circumstances which will decide the nature of offence.” 25. It is the totality of the circumstances which will decide the nature of offence.” 25. Now reverting back to the facts of the present case, as regards the submission on behalf of accused Manav Pandey that the prosecution has failed to establish and prove the motive, it was submitted that only in the memorandum Statement of the Appellant Manav Pandey, it is recorded that Mohd Siraj was involved in bullying (dadagiri) in school and for that reason he changed his school and one year ago from date of the incident, Manav Pandey also spat in the well and when he and his friends objected for the same, Manav Pandey and his friends beat them. Except in the said statement no witness had deposed about any enmity with Mohd. Siraj. As on the date of incident, Moharram Procession was going on, in which knives are usually waved, the accused persons did not meet in any pre-planned manner, instead it might had happened that in a sudden quarrel and in heat of passion, the appellant Manav Pandey inflicted the deceased with a knife and single knife blow was caused. Therefore, section 302 of the IPC would not be attracted. 26. In view of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon’ble Surpeme Court, it is explicit that as per Exception IV to Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation or in a sudden fight or in a heat of passion or upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage and not acted in a cruel or unusual manner. If we examine the facts of the present case, the prosecution has not proved any motive, and it is also proved that on the date of the incident, Moharram Procession was going on and from the facts it can be safely inferred that the appellant was not in search of the deceased to commit his murder on such fateful day. Unfortunately, they met suddenly and a quarrel took place and in the said quarrel, out of sudden anger and in a heat of passion, appellant Manav Pandey caused single stab injury to the deceased and no further blow or assault was made when the deceased fell on the ground. 27. Unfortunately, they met suddenly and a quarrel took place and in the said quarrel, out of sudden anger and in a heat of passion, appellant Manav Pandey caused single stab injury to the deceased and no further blow or assault was made when the deceased fell on the ground. 27. So, considering the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly that the accused inflicted the blow with a weapon like knife and he inflicted the injury on the vital part of the body, it can be presumed that by causing such bodily injury, the accused was likely to cause death of the deceased. Therefore, the case would fall under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. 28. In view of the above stated reasons, CRA No.191/2020 preferred by appellant Ritesh Ragde @ Nitesh Kumar Ragde is allowed. Conviction and sentence imposed upon him under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC are set aside and he is acquitted of the said charge. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case, on his executing a personal bond in sum of Rs.10,000/- to the satisfaction of the concerned trial Court. The bail bond furnished by the appellant shall remain in operation for a period of 6 months from today in view of the provisions contained under Section 437-A of the CrPC. The appellant shall appear before the higher Court as and when directed. 29. CR.A. No.48/2020 preferred by appellant Manav Pandey is allowed in part. Conviction and sentence imposed upon him vide impugned judgment passed by the Additional Sessions Judge under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC are set aside and instead thereof he is convicted under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for 10 years with a fine of Rs.20,000/ and, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for one year.