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2023 DIGILAW 509 (HP)

Shashank Thakur v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2023-12-12

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2023
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing of the F.I.R. No. 27 of 2021 dated 03.12.2021, registered at Women Police Station Kullu, District Kullu, H.P. for the commission of offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC and setting aside the order dated 04.04.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kullu, in Session Trial No. 14/2022, titled State Vs. Shashank Thakur. 2. It has been asserted that an F.I.R. was lodged against the petitioner by the informant stating that she was in a relationship with the petitioner for 5 years before her marriage. The petitioner impregnated her and administered some medicine to abort her fetus. He threatened to commit suicide by jumping into the river in case the informant refused to take the medicine. Subsequently, the petitioner started ignoring the informant and stopped talking to her. The informant asked the petitioner to marry her but he refused. The matter was also reported to the One Stop Centre and Women Police Station on 20.11.2021. The petitioner solemnized marriage with the informant in Trilogi Temple Pirdi. The informant withdrew the complaints on the asking of the petitioner. Subsequently, the petitioner deleted the data from the mobile phone of the informant. When the informant went to the home of the petitioner, the petitioner’s mother abused the informant and said that her family had nothing to do with her. The petitioner defrauded her by pretending to solemnise the marriage. The contents of the F.I.R. are false because the petitioner never promised to marry the informant. The informant asked the petitioner to marry her and she is claiming herself to be the wife of the petitioner. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kullu wrongly ordered the framing of the charge of rape against the petitioner. The continuance of the proceedings amounts to abuse of the process of the law, therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequent proceedings arising out of the same be quashed. 3. The State filed a reply asserting that the informant reported the matter to the police that the petitioner had sexually assaulted her on the pretext of the marriage, however, he did not solemnise the marriage. The police conducted the investigation and prepared the challan against the petitioner. The matter is listed for consideration of charge. 3. The State filed a reply asserting that the informant reported the matter to the police that the petitioner had sexually assaulted her on the pretext of the marriage, however, he did not solemnise the marriage. The police conducted the investigation and prepared the challan against the petitioner. The matter is listed for consideration of charge. The petitioner had committed a heinous crime, therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4. No reply was filed by respondent no.2, although the notice was issued to her. 5. I have heard Mr Rajiv Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Jitender Chauhan, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent no.1 and Mr. Ravinder Thakur, learned counsel for respondent no.2. 6. Mr. Rajiv Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the allegations made against the petitioner are false and the contents of the F.I.R. do not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The continuation of the criminal proceedings is an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequent proceedings be quashed. 7. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1/State submitted that the petitioner sexually assaulted the petitioner on the pretext of marriage and when the informant went to the house of the petitioner, his family members said that there was no proof of marriage and they have no concerned with her, therefore, he prayed that present petition be dismissed. 8. Mr. Ravinder Thakur, learned counsel for respondent no.2 supported the submissions advanced by the learned Additional General and he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the record carefully. 10. The principles of exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was observed at page 716:- “17. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to the quashing of a charge/proceedings either in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397CrPC or Section 482CrPC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to the quashing of a charge/proceedings either in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397CrPC or Section 482CrPC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this Court where upon a survey of almost all the precedents on the point, the principles have been summarised by this Court succinctly. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, this Court laid down the following guiding principles : (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27) “27. …27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in the exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in the exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith predominantly give rise to and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was the possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit a continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to deciding the admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the chargesheet, reported under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debitojustitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone, the courts exist. *** 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.” 11. Similar is the judgment in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603, wherein it was observed:- “26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. Similar is the judgment in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603, wherein it was observed:- “26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court held: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” (emphasis supplied) 12. It was laid down in CBI v. Aryan Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379, that the High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The allegations are required to be proved during the trial based on evidence led before the Court. It was observed : “10. From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of the trial. From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of the trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going in detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider “whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not”. 11. One other reason pointed by the High Court is that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the investigation was handed over to the CBI pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been charge-sheeted. Therefore, the High Court has erred in observing at this stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried.” 13. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried.” 13. It is apparent from these judgments that power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised to prevent the abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. The Court can quash the F.I.R. if the allegations do not constitute an offence or make out a case against the accused. However, it is not permissible for it to conduct a mini-trial to arrive at such findings. 14. It was submitted that no case for rape is made out because the victim had consented to the sexual act and the promise was related to something external to the act. The accused may be liable for breach of promise but cannot be held liable for rape. Reliance was placed upon Professor Glanville Williams Textbook of Criminal Law 3rd Edition Sweet and Maxwell (2012) at page 771 “It may be said that in rape, the issue is the woman’s consent to sexual intercourse with this man. If she does not know that the act is one of sexual intercourse, or if she is mistaken to the identity of the man, then she does not consent, but otherwise, she does. One must have regard to the decencies of the language, and it cannot properly be asserted that the woman does not consent where she merely mistakes some attributes of the man (that he has career prospects, that he has been vasectomised, that he intends to marry her, that he is free from venereal disease). If a side effect of sexual intercourse is that the victim is harmed in some other way, and she has not consented to that harm, the defendant should be criminalized for causing that harm. There is, therefore, no need to inflate the grave offence of rape to make it cover deceits in general” 15. With profound respect to the learned author and his brilliant discourse, this Court is bound by the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. There is, therefore, no need to inflate the grave offence of rape to make it cover deceits in general” 15. With profound respect to the learned author and his brilliant discourse, this Court is bound by the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It was laid down in Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1073 that where the accused entered into sexual relations with the victim after making her a promise to marry her which promise he never intended to keep, he is guilty of rape. It was observed : 14. In the present case, the “misconception of fact” alleged by the complainant is the appellant's promise to marry her. Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 13 SCC 1 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 509, this Court held : (SCC para 12) “12. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions would be that if it is established and proved that from the inception the accused who gave the promise to the prosecutrix to marry, did not have any intention to marry and the prosecutrix gave the consent for sexual intercourse on such an assurance by the accused that he would marry her, such consent can be said to be a consent obtained on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 IPC and, in such a case, such consent would not excuse the offender and such an offender can be said to have committed the rape as defined under Sections 375 IPC and can be convicted for the offence under Section 376 IPC.” Similar observations were made by this Court in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660 (Deepak Gulati) : (SCC p. 682, para 21) “21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused;” 15. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused;” 15. In Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 615 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 557 the accused forcibly established sexual relations with the complainant. When she asked the accused why he had spoiled her life, he promised to marry her. On this premise, the accused repeatedly had sexual intercourse with the complainant. When the complainant became pregnant, the accused refused to marry her. When the matter was brought to the panchayat, the accused admitted to having had sexual intercourse with the complainant but subsequently absconded. Given this factual background, the Court observed : (SCC pp. 620-21, para 10) “10. It appears that the intention of the accused as per the testimony of PW 1 was, right from the beginning, not honest and he kept on promising that he will marry her, till she became pregnant. This kind of consent obtained by the accused cannot be said to be any consent because she was under a misconception of the fact that the accused intended to marry her, therefore, she had submitted to sexual intercourse with him. This fact is also admitted by the accused that he had committed sexual intercourse which is apparent from the testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3 and before the panchayat of elders of the village. It is more than clear that the accused made a false promise that he would marry her. Therefore, the intention of the accused right from the beginning was not bona fide and the poor girl submitted to the lust of the accused, completely being misled by the accused who held out the promise for marriage. This kind of consent taken by the accused with clear intention not to fulfil the promise and persuading the girl to believe that he is going to marry her and obtained her consent for the sexual intercourse under a total misconception, cannot be treated to be a consent.” 16. This kind of consent taken by the accused with clear intention not to fulfil the promise and persuading the girl to believe that he is going to marry her and obtained her consent for the sexual intercourse under a total misconception, cannot be treated to be a consent.” 16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman's “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the grounds of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] this Court observed : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) “21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. *** 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, [Ed. : The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in the original.] unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her [Ed. : The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.].” (emphasis supplied) 17. In Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775 the complainant was a college-going student when the accused promised to marry her. In the complainant's statement, she admitted that she was aware that there would be significant opposition from both the complainant's and the accused's families to the proposed marriage. She engaged in sexual intercourse with the accused but nonetheless kept the relationship secret from her family. The Court observed that in these circumstances the accused's promise to marry the complainant was not of immediate relevance to the complainant's decision to engage in sexual intercourse with the accused, which was motivated by other factors : (SCC p. 58, para 25) “25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the prosecution in this case. In a case of this nature, two conditions must be fulfilled for the application of Section 90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must be proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or had reason to believe that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception. We have serious doubts that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with the appellant. She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her marriage with the appellant was difficult on account of caste considerations. We have serious doubts that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with the appellant. She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her marriage with the appellant was difficult on account of caste considerations. The proposal was bound to meet with stiff opposition from members of both families. There was therefore a distinct possibility, of which she was clearly conscious, that the marriage may not take place at all despite the promise of the appellant. The question still remains whether even if it were so, the appellant knew, or had reason to believe, that the prosecutrix had consented to having sexual intercourse with him only as a consequence of her belief, based on his promise, that they will get married in due course. There is hardly any evidence to prove this fact. On the contrary, the circumstances of the case tend to support the conclusion that the appellant had reason to believe that the consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of their deep love for each other. It is not disputed that they were deeply in love. They met often, and it does appear that the prosecutrix permitted him liberties which, if at all, are permitted only to a person with whom one is in deep love. It is also not without significance that the prosecutrix stealthily went out with the appellant to a lonely place at 12 o'clock in the night. It usually happens in such cases, when two young persons are madly in love, that they promise to each other several times that come what may, they will get married.” (emphasis supplied) 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. 16. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. 16. Similarly it was laid down in Naim Ahmad vs. State 2023 SCC Online 896 that sexual intercourse with a woman with the promise to marry her which promise was not intended to be fulfilled right from the beginning will amount to rape because the consent of the woman was obtained fraudulently. Therefore, the plea that no case for rape is made out is not acceptable. 17. The informant specifically stated in the F.I.R. that she had entered into sexual relations with the petitioner after accepting his promise to marry her. The petitioner did not marry her. He pretended to solemnize the marriage in the temple just to withdraw the complaints filed by her against the petitioner. Subsequently, he disowned the marriage. These allegations clearly show that a promise was made by the petitioner to marry her, which promise was never intended to be fulfilled. 18. It was submitted that the informant described herself as the wife of the petitioner and this shows that the promise was fulfilled by marrying her. This submission is not acceptable as the informant categorically stated that the petitioner had married her in the temple but subsequently, his family members stated that there was no proof of marriage. The petitioner never claimed the informant to be his wife. He even mentioned the informant as the daughter of someone and not his wife in the present petition, which corroborates the version of the informant that the petitioner never married her and simply pretended to marry her to get her to withdraw the complaints filed by her. Therefore, the allegations contained in the F.I.R. constitute the commission of a cognizable offence. Hence, the F.I.R. and consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.IR. cannot be quashed. 19. Consequently, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 20. Petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so also pending applications, if any. 21. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.