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2023 DIGILAW 51 (ALL)

Suresh Kumar Singh v. State Of U. P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Agri. Edu. And Research Lko.

2023-01-05

PANKAJ BHATIA

body2023
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Uttam Kumar Verma, learned counsel who has put in appearance on behalf of respondent nos.2 & 3. 2. Present petition has been filed challenging the order dated 24.8.2016 whereby the petitioner has been denied the payment of gratuity on account of a decree passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (for short 'MACT') fixing the joint liability of the petitioner to pay the amount as awarded against the claim by the said MACT. 3. The facts, in brief, are that the petitioner was employed as a driver with the respondent -university and retired after attaining the age of superannuation on 28.4.2014. It is on record that during the services rendered by the petitioner, no inquiry was pending or contemplated against the petitioner and even after retirement, no disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner. It is on record that while the petitioner was in employment of the respondent as a driver; he was driving a Jeep which met with an accident on 8.11.2011 resulting in death of two persons. The heirs of the said two persons preferred a claim petition under provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act which was decided on 15.9.2014 holding the petitioner as well as the owner of the vehicle jointly responsible and consequently liable for payment of compensation. Respondent No.2 preferred an appeal against the said order, however, the appeal was dismissed in default as is clear from the perusal of the order dated 29.4.2022 passed in FAFO No.2322 of 2018. The petitioner was not being paid the amount of gratuity, as such, the petitioner approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No.3832 (SS) of 2016 which was disposed off on 26.2.2016 directing the respondents to pass a reasoned order in respect of claim of the petitioner for payment of gratuity. In pursuance to the said direction, the order impugned dated 24.8.2016 has been passed. 4. A perusal of the said order reveals that the petitioner was not paid the gratuity only on account of the decree passed by the MACT; reliance has also been placed on Government Order dated 28.10.1980 for denying the benefit of gratuity. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the payment of gratuity is governed by Payment of Gratuity Act (for short 'the Act'). Section 4 of the Act specifically mandates the payment of gratuity on superannuation. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the payment of gratuity is governed by Payment of Gratuity Act (for short 'the Act'). Section 4 of the Act specifically mandates the payment of gratuity on superannuation. He further argues that in terms of the Section 4(6) of the Act, the gratuity can be stopped only in the event the services of the employee have been terminated. Section 4(1) and Section 4(6) are quoted herein below: "4. Payment of gratuity. -(1) Gratuity shall be payable to an employee on the termination of his employment after he has rendered continuous service for not less than five years,-- (a) on his superannuation, or (b) on his retirement or resignation, or (c) on his death or disablement due to accident or disease: Provided that the completion of continuous service of five years shall not be necessary where the termination of the employment of any employee is due to death or disablement: Provided further that in the case of death of the employee, gratuity payable to him shall be paid to his nominee or, if no nomination has been made, to his heirs, and where any such nominees or heirs is a minor, the share of such minor, shall be deposited with the controlling authority who shall invest the same for the benefit of such minor in such bank or other financial institution, as may be prescribed, until such minor attains majority. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, disablement means such disablement as incapacitates an employee for the work which he was capable of performing before the accident or disease resulting in such disablement. (2) ........ (3) ........ (4) ........ (5) ........ Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, disablement means such disablement as incapacitates an employee for the work which he was capable of performing before the accident or disease resulting in such disablement. (2) ........ (3) ........ (4) ........ (5) ........ (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),-- (a) the gratuity of an employee, whose services have been terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss to, or destruction of, property belonging to the employer, shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or loss so caused; (b) the gratuity payable to an employee 6[may be wholly or partially forfeited]- (i) if the services of such employee have been terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act violence on his part, or (ii) if the services of such employee have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of his employment." 6. He further argues that even in terms of the Government Order, which has been relied upon while passing the impugned order, there is a direction that the payment of gratuity can be stopped only when disciplinary proceedings or any criminal proceeding are pending against the employee. He, thus, argues that even the said Government Order cannot be taken as a defense for nonpayment of gratuity. 7. Shri Uttam Kumar Verma, learned counsel for respondent nos.2 & 3 tries to justify the order on the foundation of the Government Order dated 28.10.1980. He further justifies stopping of the gratuity on account of award which has been passed against the petitioner also. 8. Considering the submissions made at the Bar and on perusal of the mandatory provision as contained in Section 4(1) and Section 4(6) of the Act, it is clear that the mandate to pay the gratuity flows from Section 4(1); the gratuity can be stopped only in the event of happening of any eventuality as contemplated in Section 4(6). 9. Even, Government Order dated 28.10.1980 clarifies the said position to the extent that the payment of gratuity can be stopped only in the event any disciplinary proceedings are pending or any criminal proceedings are instituted against the employee. 9. Even, Government Order dated 28.10.1980 clarifies the said position to the extent that the payment of gratuity can be stopped only in the event any disciplinary proceedings are pending or any criminal proceedings are instituted against the employee. In the present case, no proceedings were either initiated or pending at the time of the retirement of the petitioner and even after the retirement, no proceedings have been initiated or are pending against the petitioner, thus, stopping of the gratuity only on the ground of a decree passed under the Motor Vehicle Act is clearly beyond the mandate of Section 4(6) and the mandate of the Government Order dated 28.10.1980. 10. The statutory mandate as flows from Section 4(1) confers right upon the petitioner which cannot be taken away except in the manner provided under Section 4(6) of the Act as otherwise, the same would be in violation of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 11. For all the reasons recorded above, the writ petition is allowed. 12. Order dated 24.8.2016 is set aside with direction to pay the amount of gratuity to the petitioner alongwith interest thereon as provided under Section 7(3A) of the Act, at the rate of 7% per annum. The interest shall be paid to the petitioner from the date of his retirement till actual payment/realization. 13. The said computation shall be done and the amount shall be paid to the petitioner with all expedition, preferably within a period of three months from today. 14. It is clarified that this Court has not gone into the liability of the petitioner that may arise from the award of the MACT.