ORDER 1. The petitioner seeks the following reliefs:- "a. To issue a writ in the of habeas corpus commanding respondents, to release the petitioner forthwith, since he has already undergone the sentence awarded to him. b. To call for the relevant records, for kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court. c. Any other relief's deemed fit on facts and circumstances of the instant case." 2. It is the case of the petitioner that he was convicted for the offence punishable under section 324 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 3(2)(v-a) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 in Special Case No.129 of 2016 by the judgment dated 18.1.2019 and sentenced for a period of 3 years R.I. with fine of Rs.1,000/- and 3 years R.I. with fine of Rs.1,000/- respectively. The same was challenged by filing Criminal Appeal No.1670 of 2019. Thereafter by the order dated 24.1.2022 the appeal was dismissed as not pressed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it was dismissed as not pressed since according to the petitioner he has already undergone the sentence awarded by the trial Court. The petitioner was also convicted for the offence punishable under section 394 of the Indian Penal Code in S.T. No.309 of 2017 by the judgment dated 3.7.2018 and sentenced to R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs.5,000/-. The same was challenged in Criminal Appeal No.6353 of 2018. Thereafter by the order dated 16.9.2021 the sentence was suspended. The petitioner was also convicted for the offence punishable under section 392 of the Indian Penal Code in S.T. No.310 of 2017 by the judgment dated 3.7.2018 and sentenced to R.I. for 7 years with fine of Rs.5,000/-. However, the sentence passed in S.T. No.310 of 2017 was not made to run concurrent with sentence passed in S.T. No.309 of 2017. The judgment and sentence passed in S.T. No.310 of 2017 was challenged in Criminal Appeal No.6355 of 2018. Thereafter by the order dated 29.11.2021 the sentence was suspended. 4. Therefore, it is contended that so far as the sentence awarded in Special Case No.129 of 2016 is concerned, he has already undergone a sentence of 3 years as awarded in the said case. Thereafter by the order dated 29.11.2021 the sentence was suspended. 4. Therefore, it is contended that so far as the sentence awarded in Special Case No.129 of 2016 is concerned, he has already undergone a sentence of 3 years as awarded in the said case. The plea of the petitioner is that in terms of the order dated 18.1.2019 where a sentence of 3 years was awarded, he has already completed the said period as on 18.1.2022. After the withdrawal of Criminal Appeal No.1670 of 2019 on 24.1.2022, he moved the trial Court by filing an application seeking his release on the ground that he has already undergone custody for a period of 3 years as awarded in Special Case No.129 of 2016. The trial Court by the order dated 14.2.2022 sought the information from the jail authorities. Thereafter communication was addressed vide Annexure P-3 indicating that the sentence which he has served is with reference to S.T. No.309 of 2017. Therefore, even though he has undergone custody of 3 years, it is not with reference to the sentence as awarded in Special Case No.129 of 2016. That the period of sentence in the second crime would commence after the period of sentence in first crime has been undergone or suspended. It is also indicated that in terms of calculating such period of custody, he still has to undergo a period of 2 years 7 months and 9 days as on 13.02.2022. Thereafter, the instant petition is filed. Three grounds are raised by the petitioner which reads as follows:- "a. For that, the act and action of the respondent, is against the law, which cannot be sustained in the eye of law, hence the interference of this Hon'ble Court is warranted. b. For that, the petitioner has completed his sentence in the case no.129/2016, since, the petitioner is under custody since from the date judgment i.e. 18/01/2019, hence, the non releasing of the petitioner amounts to illegal custody of petitioner and is against the constitutionality, hence interference is warranted of this Hon'ble Court. c. For that, if the petitioner is being compelled to undergo sentence one after the other, that would amount to unwarranted hardship to the petitioner which amount to miscarriage of justice, as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, hence, the interference of this Hon'ble Court is warranted in present case." 5. c. For that, if the petitioner is being compelled to undergo sentence one after the other, that would amount to unwarranted hardship to the petitioner which amount to miscarriage of justice, as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, hence, the interference of this Hon'ble Court is warranted in present case." 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the sentence awarded in S.T. No.309 of 2017 and S.T. No.310 of 2017 have since been suspended by the appellate Court. Therefore, the custody that he has undergone has to be accounted so far as Special Case No.129 of 2016 is concerned. It is not disputed by the State that he has undergone the custody of more than 4 years. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Iqram v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others passed in Criminal Appeal No.2319 of 2022 dated 16.12.2022 and pleads that the writ court may please to order that the sentences to run concurrently and he be released from custody forthwith. The same is disputed by the State. Their contention is that the sentences that have been awarded to the petitioner in three different cases are directed to run consecutively and not concurrently. Therefore, the custody, if any, undergone in one case would be referable to the custody in that case only. Only after the custody in that case is completed or has been suspended then the custody in the second case would commence. In the instant case, admittedly, he has been in custody with reference to S.T. No.309 of 2017 and S.T. No.310 of 2017. Therefore, only after the order of sentence was suspended in the aforesaid two criminal appeals, the sentence in the third case would commence to run. Therefore, the sentence as awarded in Special Case No.129 of 2016 has commenced to run on the suspension of the order of sentence passed in Criminal Appeal No.6353 of 2018 by the order dated 16.9.2021 and in Criminal Appeal No.6355 of 2018 by the order dated 29.11.2021. Therefore, for that period alone, the sentence would continue so far as Special Case No.129 of 2016 is concerned. It is his further plea that so far as the judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned that has no relevance to the facts of this case. Therefore, for that period alone, the sentence would continue so far as Special Case No.129 of 2016 is concerned. It is his further plea that so far as the judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned that has no relevance to the facts of this case. That it is distinguishable on facts. That in the said case the accused was sentenced for 9 offences on the very same date. However, so far as the instant case is concerned, it was further noticed that the sentences as awarded therein were directed to run concurrently. Hence, the said judgment would not be applicable to the facts of the case in hand. Hence, he pleads that the petition be dismissed. 7. Heard learned counsels. 8. The facts are not disputed by the State. However, the bone of contention appears to be as to whether the sentences awarded by the trial Court are directed to run concurrently or consecutively. The provisions of section 427(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are quite clear. The same would read as follows:- "427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence. (1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence: Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately." 9. Therefore, it indicates that until and unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentences shall run concurrently, all such sentences shall run consecutively. It is indicated therein that when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is once again sentenced on a subsequent conviction, then the sentence for the subsequent conviction will commence after the sentence has been imposed for the first conviction unless the Court directs that the sentences shall run concurrently. Therefore, it is not mandatory for the court to hold that the sentence to run concurrently. Therefore, it is not mandatory for the court to hold that the sentence to run concurrently. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Neera Yadav v. CBI reported in (2017) 8 SCC 757 have held as follows:- “69. Section 31 relates to the quantum of the punishment that the court has jurisdiction to pass that the accused is convicted of two or more offences at one trial. Section 427 CrPC deals with sentence passed on an offender who is already sentenced for another offence. The power conferred on the court under section 427 to order concurrent sentence is discretionary. The salutary principle adopted by the court is the totality of the sentences. The maximum sentence awarded in one case against the same accused is relevant consideration while giving concurrent sentence in another case. The policy of the legislature is that normally the sentencing should be done consecutively. Only in appropriate cases, considering the facts of the case, the Court can make the sentence concurrently with an earlier sentence imposed...” Therefore, the sentences to run consecutively is what the law postulates under section 427(1) of the Cr.P.C. It is only when an exception is made for the sentences to run consecutively that the trial Court would have to say that the sentences would run concurrently. Therefore, it is not the question of the court not saying that the sentences should run concurrently. That is not what section 427(1) of the Cr.P.C. implies. It only implies that all sentences shall run consecutively and unless the Court directs that it shall run concurrently, all sentences to run consecutively. 10. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is a case wherein the petitioner therein was convicted on 9 different counts. They were all offences under section 136 of the Electricity Act and section 411 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial Court ordered a sentence of 2 years' simple imprisonment along with fine of Rs.1,000/-. The trial Court directed that the sentences shall run concurrently. Since the appellant had undergone a period of 3 years sentence, he moved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being a Habeas Corpus petition. The High Court noted that the writ petition was filed on the premise that the sentences of the appellant in 9 separate and distinct cases should run concurrently. Since the appellant had undergone a period of 3 years sentence, he moved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being a Habeas Corpus petition. The High Court noted that the writ petition was filed on the premise that the sentences of the appellant in 9 separate and distinct cases should run concurrently. The grievance of the appellant was that the jail authorities were not justified in treating the sentence to be consecutive. The Division Bench came to the conclusion that in view of the provisions of section 427 of the Cr.P.C. each subsequent term of conviction has to commence at the expiration of the imprisonment currently being undergone by the appellant. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the view that if the reasoning of the High Court were to be accepted then the appellant would have to undergo a total term of imprisonment for 18 years in respect of 9 convictions. Reliance was placed therein on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Zahid v. State through NCB, reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1183 wherein it was held as follows:- "9. Thus from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the principles of law that emerge are as under:- (i) if a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment, such subsequent term of imprisonment would normally commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he was previously sentenced; (ii) ordinarily the subsequent sentence would commence at the expiration of the first term of imprisonment unless the Court directs the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence; (iii) the general rule is that where there are different transactions, different crime numbers and cases have been decided by the different judgments, concurrent sentence cannot be awarded under section 427 of Cr.PC; (iv) under section 427 (1) of Cr.PC the court has the power and discretion to issue a direction that all the subsequent sentences run concurrently with the previous sentence, however discretion has to be exercised judiciously depending upon the nature of the offence or the offences committed and the facts in situation. However, there must be a specific direction or order by the court that the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence." 11. However, there must be a specific direction or order by the court that the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence." 11. On considering the said judgment, we are of the view that the same is not applicable to the facts of this case. In the case of V.K. Bansal v. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 7 SCC 211 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court have observed and held as follows:- “10. ... It is manifest from section 427(1) that the Court has the power and the discretion to issue a direction but in the very nature of the power so conferred upon the Court the discretionary power shall have to be exercised along the judicial lines and not in a mechanical, wooden or pedantic manner. It is difficult to lay down any straitjacket approach in the matter of exercise of such discretion by the Courts. There is no cut and dried formula for the Court to follow in the matter of issue or refusal of a direction within the contemplation of section 427(1). Whether or not a direction ought to be issued in a given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or offences committed, and the fact situation in which the question of concurrent running of the sentences arises.” 12. In the instant case, there are three different convictions and sentences awarded in three different cases against the petitioner. The sentence awarded to the petitioner in three separate crimes in respect of which the petitioner faced three separate trials, which resulted into his conviction and award of three separate sentences were not made to run concurrently with each other. The sentence with reference to ST No.129 of 2016 would commence after expiration/suspension of the imprisonment and sentence awarded in ST No.309 of 2017 and ST No.310 of 2017. The sentence with reference to ST No.129 of 2016 would commence after expiration/suspension of the imprisonment and sentence awarded in ST No.309 of 2017 and ST No.310 of 2017. The judgment and sentence dated 3.7.2018 in ST No.309 of 2017 has been suspended in Criminal Appeal No.6353 of 2018 by order dated 16.9.2021 and sentence awarded in ST No.310 of 2017 has been suspended in Criminal Appeal No.6355 of 2018 vide order dated 29.11.2021, therefore, the custody period with regard to the sentence awarded in ST No.129 of 2016 would commence from 2.12.2021 on which date the petitioner furnished bail bond and notionally released in view of the order dated 29.11.2021 passed in Criminal Appeal No.6355 of 2018 and order dated 16.9.2021 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 6353 of 2018. Further report was called from the jail authorities to clarify the custody period undergone by the petitioner/accused. The details thereof are as follows:- Description ST NO. 309 of 2017 ST NO. 310 of 2017 ST NO. 129 of 2016 Date of incident 22.5.2017 12.7.2017 22.7.2016 Date of arrest 18.8.2017 17.8.2017 26.11.2016 Crime No. 107/2017 184/2017 139/2017 Bail ..... .... 6.2.2017 Conviction under 394 of IPC 392 of IPC 324 IPC and 3(2)(V-A) of The Scheduled Caste and  Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities )  ACT, 198 Date of sentence 3.7.2018 3.7.2018 18.1.2019 Sentence 10 years R.I. with fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in case of default in payment of fine further period of one year R.I. 7 years R.I. with fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in case of default in payment of fine further period of one year R.I. 03-03 years R.I. (Concurrent) with fine of Rs. 1000/- each and in case of default in payment of fine further period of three months imprisonment in each sentence Under trial period 10 months 15 days (From 19.8.2017 to 3.7.2018) 10 months 15 days (From 18.8.2017 to 3.7.2018) 2 months 10 days (from 26.11.2016 to 6.2.2017) Sentence undergone 3 years 5 months 1 day (From 3.7.2018 to 2.12.2021) ........... 01 years 04 months 17 days (from 2.12.2021 to 17.4.2023) Remission 1 year 1 day (From 3.7.2018 to 2.12.2021) ........... 01 years 04 months 17 days (from 2.12.2021 to 17.4.2023) Remission 1 year 1 day (From 3.7.2018 to 2.12.2021) ........... 05 months 03 days (From 2.12.2021 to 15.4.2023) Suspension of sentence Criminal Appeal No. 6353 of 2018 vide order dated 16.9.2021 and was released on bail on 2.12.2021 Criminal Appeal No. 6355 of 2018 vide order dated 29.11.2021 and was released on bail on 2.12.2021 ............. Total period of         custody with remission 5 years 3 months 17 days 10 months 15 days (From 18.8.2017 to 3.7.2018) 2 year 13. So far as the judgment relied upon is concerned, even though there were 9 cases wherein the petitioner therein was convicted and sentenced, the trial Judge has specifically directed that the sentences shall run concurrently. Therefore, once the trial Court comes to the conclusion that the sentences shall run concurrently, the finding of the Division Bench of the High Court that the sentences should run consecutively, is not right. When the trial Court itself has ordered that the sentences shall run concurrently then necessarily all the sentences should run concurrently. Even in the case of Mohd. Zahid (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court after applying the principles of law enumerated hereinabove to the facts of the case therein rejected the plea of the appellant-accused that his subsequent sentence should run concurrently with the previous sentence. It has been observed that the appellant has been convicted with respect to two different transactions, there are different crime numbers and the cases have been decided by the different judgments. Therefore, the appellant is not entitled to any benefit of concurrent sentence under section 427 of CrPC. Only in appropriate cases considering the facts of the case the court can make the sentence concurrently with an earlier sentence. In the instant case, as narrated herein-above, the sentence as stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner for a period of 4 years is relatable to the sentence that he had to undergo in the previous two convictions. Therefore, the period spent by him for satisfying the order of sentence in other two cases cannot be set off against the sentence awarded in the subsequent case. It could only have happened if in the subsequent order of conviction the trial Court would have passed an order to the effect as contemplated under section 427(1) of the Cr.P.C. and ordered that the previous sentences shall run concurrently. It could only have happened if in the subsequent order of conviction the trial Court would have passed an order to the effect as contemplated under section 427(1) of the Cr.P.C. and ordered that the previous sentences shall run concurrently. That is not what the trial Court has held. Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. does not postulate a position to the contrary. It merely states that all sentences should necessarily run consecutively unless the Court finds that it should run concurrently. In the instant case, the Court has not found so that the sentences should run concurrently. 14. So far as Criminal Appeal No.1670 of 2019 is concerned, the same was dismissed as withdrawn by the order dated 24.1.2022. It is also noted in the order that the appellant therein has completed his sentence and, therefore, does not wish to press the appeal. Therefore, the plea of the petitioner presently that the sentence awarded by the trial Court requires to be modified in a writ petition, in our considered view, may not be appropriate. So far as holding that the sentences shall run concurrently is concerned, the same would amount to interfering with the quantum of sentence awarded by the trial Court. Whenever the quantum of sentence awarded by the trial Court requires to be modified, the same can only be done through the criminal appeal filed by the accused. We do not think that the writ Court is entitled to go into the entire merits of the case and thereafter alter an order of sentence. In order to modify an order of sentence, the entire facts and circumstances of the case require to be considered. It has to be considered whether the trial Court was justified in the given facts and circumstances and evidence on record that the sentence awarded by the trial Court is not appropriate and accordingly it requires to be modified one way or the other. This is a jurisdiction that only the appellate Court can exercise and not a writ Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. 15. This is a jurisdiction that only the appellate Court can exercise and not a writ Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Ranjit Kaur passed in SLP (Crl.) No. 654 of 2018 on 14.10.2019 considered whether the High Court was justified in ordering that the sentences imposed on the accused-respondent in 69 Challan cases run concurrently when admittedly such contention had not been raised by the accused-appellant in her appeals filed before the High Court or in the special leave petitions filed by her in Supreme Court against the orders of her conviction and sentence in the 69 Challan cases. The Hon’ble Court referred to its decision in M.R. Kundva v. State of A.P. (2007) 2 SCC 772 , wherein it was held as follows: “12. However, in this case the provision of section 427 of the Code was not invoked in the original cases or in the appeals. A separate application was filed before the High Court after the special leave petitions were dismissed. Such an application, in our opinion, was not maintainable. The High Court could not have exercised its inherent jurisdiction in a case of this nature as it had not exercised such jurisdiction while passing the judgments in appeal. Section 482 of the Code was, therefore, not an appropriate remedy having regard to the fact that neither the Trial Judge, nor the High Court while passing the judgments of conviction and sentence indicated that the sentences passed against the Appellant in both the cases shall run concurrently or section 427 would be attracted. The said provision, therefore, could not be applied in a separate and independent proceeding by the High Court. The appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed.” 16. Therefore, the appropriate remedy for the petitioner should have been to seek an order regarding modification of the sentence or that the sentences should run concurrently in the criminal appeal that was filed by him in CRA No.1670 of 2019. Since the same was not done and the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, we do not think it is appropriate for the writ court to go into the facts and circumstances involved and to modify the order or sentence. Since the same was not done and the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, we do not think it is appropriate for the writ court to go into the facts and circumstances involved and to modify the order or sentence. We say so because an order that the sentences should run concurrently or consecutively is nothing but an order modifying the award of sentence passed by the trial Court. When the trial Court prescribes that the sentences should run consecutively altering the sentences to run concurrently, is nothing but interfering with the quantum of sentence or the extent of sentence as awarded by the trial Court. Hence, we are not inclined to accept the plea of the petitioner to the said extent. 17. Under these circumstances, we do not find any ground to interfere. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.