ORDER : (Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) : 1. Heard Mr. Kaushalendra Prasad, learned counsel for the Appellant, Mr. Munna Lal Yadav, learned counsel for the respondent-State and Mr. Sunil Singh, learned counsel for the respondent no. 10. 2. This appeal has been preferred against the part of judgment and order dated 25.03.2022 passed in W.P.(S) No. 121 of 2010 by the learned Single Judge who has been pleased to dispose of the writ petition not to pay the salaries for the period from 08.07.1980 till attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 30.06.1998 and the consequential reliefs and other benefits. 3. The original writ petitioner was Baburam Marandi and upon his death he has been substituted by the present petitioner/appellant. 4. The petitioner/appellant has preferred the writ petition for quashing of the district order dated 09.04.2009 issued pursuant to direction dated 26.03.2009 by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Finance), Jharkhand, Ranchi. Prayer was also made for payment of arrears of salaries from November, 1979 to July 1998 and other consequential benefits provided time to time by the Pay Revision Committees as well as time bound promotion benefits. Prayer was also made for fixing the pension and pay the appellant his pension accounting full length of his service from 22.01.1962 to July 1998. 5. The learned Single Judge has been pleased to hold that the original petitioner has not worked during 08.07.1980 onwards till attaining the age of superannuation i.e 30.06.1998, having not taken appropriate steps at relevant point of time and was examined by the appropriate medical board only in the year 1986 and he remained completely silent from 1988 to 1997 and approached the respondent authorities almost at the fag end of his service period and in that view of the matter the learned Single Judge has held that the original petitioner is not entitled to any salary etc. for the intervening period from 08.07.1980 till attaining the age of superannuation i.e 30.06.1998. However, it was held that the original petitioner will be entitled to continuity of service till his attaining the age of superannuation i.e 30.06.1998 only for the purposes of calculation of his pensionable period of service and consequent revision of payable amount. for the intervening period from 08.07.1980 till attaining the age of superannuation i.e 30.06.1998. However, it was held that the original petitioner will be entitled to continuity of service till his attaining the age of superannuation i.e 30.06.1998 only for the purposes of calculation of his pensionable period of service and consequent revision of payable amount. The order dated 09.07.1980 was quashed by the learned Single Judge which was with regard to compulsory retiring the original petitioner on the ground that without holding a departmental enquiry during the service tenure of the original petitioner the said was passed and as per police manual, chapter- 25, paragraph 824 and 828, compulsory retirement is a major punishment and in that view of the matter that order was quashed. 6. Aggrieved with that part of order, present appeal has been has been preferred. 7. Mr. Kaushlendra Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant submits that the learned Single Judge has not considered that the respondents have harassed and tortured the father of the appellant and they have not permitted to join duty as the respondent no.7 has admitted in the counter-affidavit that the father of the appellant has not brought Medical Board Certificate and such order dated 25.03.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge not allowing the salary for the said period from 08.07.1980 till attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 30.06.1998 is not correct. He further submits that the Superintendent of Police, Dumka has recorded that leprosy is a contagious disease and a constable suffering from this disease cannot be allowed to perform duty with the other constable until he becomes fully cured. He submits that even after the medical certificate, he was not allowed to join which has not been appreciated by the learned Single Judge. He further submits that the father of the appellant earlier moved before this Court in W.P.(S) No. 5390 of 2004 and W.P.(S) No. 121 of 2010 challenging the order of the authority which was passed stating that the father of the appellant was found traceless and continuously absented him from duty since 1980. He further submits that the impugned order was quashed by the learned Single Judge and direction was issued upon the respondent no. 2 to pass afresh order on the claim of the petitioner/appellant. He further submits that thereafter aforesaid order was passed compulsorily retiring the father of the appellant. He further submits that the impugned order was quashed by the learned Single Judge and direction was issued upon the respondent no. 2 to pass afresh order on the claim of the petitioner/appellant. He further submits that thereafter aforesaid order was passed compulsorily retiring the father of the appellant. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the authority concerned has not allowed to work the father of the appellant for the aforesaid period that is why the appellant is entitled for the salary. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that learned Single Judge has rightly appreciated the law and thereafter has passed the said judgment. There is no illegality in the impugned judgment. 9. We have carefully gone through the judgment of the learned Single Judge and find that learned Single Judge has considered the police manual, chapter- 25, paragraph 824 and 828 and found that the compulsory retirement is a major punishment and set aside the compulsory retirement order. 10. There is clear cut finding of the learned Single Judge that after the year, 1988 the original petitioner slept over the matter and gave his representation on 18.03.1997 as contained in Annexure-11 and ultimately he attained the age of superannuation in the year, 1998. The impugned order was passed in absence of any disciplinary proceeding but the original petitioner has been made compulsorily retired with effect from 09.07.1980 which was passed after attaining the age of superannuation with retrospective effect. 11. We find that it is well settled that no punishment order can be passed with retrospective effect and in that view of the matter learned Single Judge has rightly held that retrospectively passing such order is not in accordance with law. Learned Single Judge has rightly considered that respondents have not made out case of abandoning his service by the original petitioner nor the record of the case suggests that the original petitioner has abandoned his service. Once he has filed an application for joining in the year 1980 and thereafter the original petitioner did not take any step till 18.03.1997 and thereafter he filed another representation. Once he has filed an application for joining in the year 1980 and thereafter the original petitioner did not take any step till 18.03.1997 and thereafter he filed another representation. The respondent has neither issued any letter or notice to the original petitioner for joining nor issued any letter regarding unauthorized absence nor initiated any departmental proceeding against the original petitioner alleging unauthorized absence from duty and in that view of the matter the learned Single Judge has interfered with the impugned order and quashed the proceeding as discussed hereinabove finding that the father of the appellant have not worked from the period 08.07.1980 onwards till attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 30.06.1998 and not entitled for salary however learned Single Judge has rightly passed the order saying that for the pensionary benefits the service will be treated as continuity service. Thus, we find that the learned Single Judge has rightly applied the law with regard to principle of ‘no work no pay’, and relief has already been extended in faovur of the original petitioner. 12. It is well settled principle in service jurisprudence that a person must be paid if he has worked and should not be paid if he has not. In other words the doctrine of “no work, no pay’ is based on justice, equity and good conscience and in absence of valid reasons to the contrary, it should be applied. In the present case the appellant ought to have joined the post he has not taken any step and he has belatedly taken steps for joining which suggests that there is no laches on the part of the respondents. Reference may be made in the case of “Sukhdeo Pandey V. Union of India and another” (2007) 7 SCC 455 . Paragraph no. 17 of the said judgment is quoted here-in-below: “17. Before parting with the matter, however, we may make one thing clear. From the record, it appears that after the appellant was reverted from the cadre of Postman to his substantive post of EDBPM, he has not joined duty and has not worked. No interim relief was granted by any court including this Court in his favour. In the circumstances, it was obligatory on him to report for duty as EDBPM. He, however, failed to do so. No interim relief was granted by any court including this Court in his favour. In the circumstances, it was obligatory on him to report for duty as EDBPM. He, however, failed to do so. We, therefore, hold that if the appellant has not worked, he will not be paid salary for the period for which he has not worked. It is well–settled principle in service jurisprudence that a person must be paid he has worked and should not be paid if he has not. In other works, the doctrine of “no work, no pay” is based on justice, equity and good conscience and in absence of valid reasons to the contrary, it should be applied. In the present case, through the appellant ought to have joined as EDBPM, he did not do so. He, therefore, in our considered opinion, cannot claim salary for that period. But he will now be allowed to work as Postman. He will also be paid salary as Postman but we also hold that since the action of the respondent authorities in reverting him to his substantive post of EDBPM was strictly in consonance with law, the appellant would be entitled to pensionary and other benefits not as Postman but as EDBPM which post he was holding substantively.” 13. The deliberate abstention from work, whether by way of any resort legitimate or illegitimate, resulting in no work for the whole day or days or part of a day or days, the employee is not entitled for salary. 14. The salary cannot be claimed for period of unauthorized absence from duty without justification however the same can be claimed where employee is restrained from engaging in service due to conduct of the employer. In the case in hand the petitioner has abandoned the work without any justification and information and that is why we find that there is no error in finding of the learned Single Judge. 15. In view of above facts, reasons and analysis we find that there is no illegality in the judgment of the learned Single Judge and accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.