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2023 DIGILAW 522 (KAR)

Indian Potash Limited v. S. M. Sadalage

2023-03-29

P.N.DESAI

body2023
JUDGMENT : This appeal arising out of judgment of acquittal passed by the V Addl. Judge, Court of Small Causes and XXIV Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mayo Hall Unit, Bengaluru (SCCH-20), wherein, respondents/accused were acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred as 'N.I. Act') in CC.No.28722/2006 dated 25.08.2012. 2. The appellant was the complainant and respondents were the accused before trial court. They will be referred as such as per their respective ranks held before the trial court for the sake of convenience. 3. Brief case of the complainant before the trial Court was that: Complainant was a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, it was engaged in importing of fertilizers and marketing. They are suppliers and distributors of M.O.P. DAP.17:17:17 and 20:20:20 etc. Accused No.1 is the Chairman and accused No.2 is the Director of M/s. Ganeshanugraha Fertilizers and Chemicals Private Limited, who are the dealers and manufacturers of chemicals and fertilizers. Complainant used to supply raw-materials and fertilizers to accused who in turn used to market it and supply of the materials by the complainant to the accused is made on credit basis and running account is maintained in respect of transactions between the parties. The transactions were going on for several years. The complainant used to supply the fertilizers and raw materials to the accused and accused in turn used to supply finished goods. The unrealized payment was adjusted on the basis of the quantity of Micro nutrients supplied to the complainant and in those transactions, there is accumulation of payments. As on 27.10.2005 an amount of Rs.1,00,00,000/-was due to the complainant from the accused including interest and over due interest. Towards discharge of the same, accused issued a cheque bearing No.428106 dated 27.10.2005 for a sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/-in favour of the complainant drawn on the Bank of India, Hotel Dharwad building, P.B. Road, Dharwad. But when the said cheque was presented for encashment, it was returned dishonored with a Bank endorsement as 'exceeds arrangement'. In this regard, complainant issued a legal notice calling upon the accused to pay the amount, but the accused did not pay amount and sent untenable reply. Hence, complaint was lodged. 4. Before the trial Court, complainant got examined himself as PW.1 and got marked eighteen documents as Exs.P1 to P18. The statement of accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. was recorded. Hence, complaint was lodged. 4. Before the trial Court, complainant got examined himself as PW.1 and got marked eighteen documents as Exs.P1 to P18. The statement of accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. was recorded. The accused denied the incriminating evidence against them. Accused No.1 examined himself as DW.1 and got marked thirty two documents as Exs.D1 to D32. After hearing the arguments, learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint and acquitted the accused. Aggrieved by the same, this appeal is filed. 5. Heard the learned counsel Sri. Rishikesh Madhav, for Sri. T.Satyanarayan, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri. V.M. Sheelvant, learned counsel for the respondents. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the impugned judgment of acquittal is illegal, perverse and needs to be set aside. Learned counsel argued that the appellant/complainant has satisfied all the ingredients of Section 138 of N.I. Act. The judgment of acquittal is on technicalities as the trial Court found that the documents are interchanged with another case in C.C.No.28723/2006 filed between the same parties in respect of other cheque issued. Therefore, the trial Court's finding on technical ground is erroneous. The Appellate Court has got ample power to appreciate the documentary evidence available in both the cases. The inference drawn are erroneous, it is only a technical ground and not on merits. Therefore, the acquittal has resulted in miscarriage of justice. 7. Learned counsel argued that, in this case the accused have filed an affidavit evidence, which is not permissible as no leave is sought under Section 315 of Code of Criminal Procedure (for short hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C'). Section 145 of N.I. Act provides only an evidence of complainant by way of affidavit can be taken, but there is no provision regarding taking evidence of accused on affidavit. He relied upon decision of this Court reported in AFZAL PASHA VS. MOHAMMED AMEERJAN reported in ILR 2016 KAR 4145. Therefore, on that ground, the matter requires to be remanded. 8. Learned counsel also argued that the Appellate Court has power to remand the matter directing the trial Court to correct the technicalities, wherein, the cheque and legal notice which are interchanged and produced in other case instead of producing them in relevant case can be interchanged to concerned cases and the cases can be decided a fresh on merits. 8. Learned counsel also argued that the Appellate Court has power to remand the matter directing the trial Court to correct the technicalities, wherein, the cheque and legal notice which are interchanged and produced in other case instead of producing them in relevant case can be interchanged to concerned cases and the cases can be decided a fresh on merits. In this regard, he relied on the judgment of Gujarat High Court in the case of DILIPBHAI BHAGWANDAS AASHWANI Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. reported in 2019 SCC Online Guj 6621, wherein, the Gujarat High Court has observed in paragraph Nos. 5, 6 and 7 as under: "5. Having heard Ms. S.M. Ahuja, learned advocate for the appellant and Ms. Chetna M. Shah, learned APP for the respondent-State, the only question arises for determination of this Court is as to whether when the two separate proceedings between the same parties were being conducted by the same learned Judge, in that event, due to intermingling of the statutory notices as well as cheques which were mismatching to the respective proceedings, but upon joint perusal of both the complaints, it could have been tallied which has not been done so far by the learned trial Court or the learned trial Court has not even afforded reasonable opportunity of interchanging the statutory notices as well as cheques, in that case, in order to comply with the principles of natural justice, the matter is required to be remanded or not. 6. On going through the aforesaid factual scenario, it appears that since the proceedings before the same Judge and statutory notices as well as cheques and other documentary evidence alleged to have been intermingled due to which they were found to be mismatching with the pleadings, but the learned Magistrate could have afforded reasonable opportunity of interchanging the statutory notices as well as cheques in the complaint so as to match with the factual scenario that was merely a clerical mistake committed on behalf of learned advocate for the complainant which has rendered into grave prejudice as well as injustice to the complainant which deserves to be remanded with a liberty to the appellant-original complainant to give an opportunity of Interchanging statutory notices and cheques and correcting the records of respective cases. 7. In the result, the appeals are hereby allowed. 7. In the result, the appeals are hereby allowed. The impugned Judgment and order dated 02.04.2018 rendered by the learned 4th Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Anand in two different Criminal Cases being Criminal Case No. 1282 of 2017 and Criminal Case No. 1283 of 2017, acquitting the respondent-accused, is hereby quashed and set aside. The matters are remanded to the learned trial Court to afford a reasonable opportunity of interchanging the documentary evidence as well as to prove the license of the appellant for the year 2017 which is already on record and thereafter, after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing, the learned trial Court shall decide the matters afresh. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned forthwith. Direct service is permitted." 9. Therefore, the learned counsel argued that at this stage also, this Court being Appellate Court can correct the technical mistake. 10. Learned counsel also argued that the complainant has placed sufficient materials, but the trial Court has failed to notice the statutory presumption arising in favour of the complainant, the defence of the accused is not probable. But without referring to the presumption arising under Sections 118 and 139 of N.I Act, the trial Court has wrongly dismissed the case. In this regard, he relied upon the judgment in ROHITBHAI JIVANLAL PATEL VS. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. reported in (2019) 18 SCC 106 and at paragraph 14, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "14. We may usefully take note of the provisions contained in Sections 118 and 139, being the special rules of evidence applicable to the case as follows: "118. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. reported in (2019) 18 SCC 106 and at paragraph 14, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "14. We may usefully take note of the provisions contained in Sections 118 and 139, being the special rules of evidence applicable to the case as follows: "118. Presumption as to negotiable instruments.-Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made: (a) of consideration-that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration; (b) as to date-that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date; (c) as to time of acceptance-that every accepted bill of exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after its date and before its maturity; (d) as to time of transfer-that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was made before its maturity; (e) as to order of indorsements-that the indorsements appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the order in which they appear thereon; (f) as to stamps-that a lost promissory note, bill or exchange or cheque was duly stamped; (g) that holder is a holder in due course-that the holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course; Provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or for unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due course lies upon him. 139. Presumption in favour of holder.-It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability." 11. Further, learned counsel also relied on judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of JAIN P. JOSE VS. SANTOSH & ANR. in CRIMINAL APPEAL (SPL. (CRL.)) NO.5241/2016 dated 10.11.2022, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to its earlier decision and stated regarding presumption arising under Sections 118 and 139 of N.I. Act. Further, learned counsel also relied on judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of JAIN P. JOSE VS. SANTOSH & ANR. in CRIMINAL APPEAL (SPL. (CRL.)) NO.5241/2016 dated 10.11.2022, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to its earlier decision and stated regarding presumption arising under Sections 118 and 139 of N.I. Act. When the signature on cheques are admitted and even if a blank signed cheque was given then also it will amount to offence as stated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in its earlier decision in BIR SINGH vs. MUKESH KUMAR reported in (2019) 4 SCC 197 . The matter was remanded in that case. In that case the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court has not properly taken into account presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of N.I Act. With these main arguments the learned counsel prayed to allow appeal. 12. Against this Sri. V.M.Sheelvant, learned counsel for the respondents argued that the trial Court has rightly considered all the aspects and dismissed the complaint. The judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court needs no interference. The trial Court has rightly dismissed the case as the cheque -Ex.P2 and the bank memo -Ex.P4 do not tally with the amount claimed in the complaint. Therefore, only on that ground, the dismissal needs no interference. 13. Learned counsel further argued that before the trial Court, the order sheet discloses that there is an attempt by the complainant to interchange case numbers after noticing the filing of different documents and interchange of the documents. Learned counsel argued that in this regard, an appropriate steps were taken and the complaint was also lodged. Learned counsel further argued that the very conduct of the complainant disentitle him any relief as he tried to tamper the Court records. He further argued that now the matter cannot be remanded on that ground. Learned counsel argued that the complainant had filed a civil suit for recovery of the cheque amount involved in this case and cheque amount involved in another case which was subsequently transferred to Commercial Court, wherein, the suit was partly decreed. Against which, respondents had filed an appeal which is pending before this Court. Learned counsel argued that the complainant had filed a civil suit for recovery of the cheque amount involved in this case and cheque amount involved in another case which was subsequently transferred to Commercial Court, wherein, the suit was partly decreed. Against which, respondents had filed an appeal which is pending before this Court. Therefore, learned counsel argued that anyway there is a civil suit pending in respect of the said claim amount, therefore, remand of the matter at this stage is not necessary as there is absolutely no illegality committed by the trial Court. 14. Learned counsel further argued that there is one more legal aspect for which the Court cannot remand the matter at this stage. The Respondent/ Accused company is not made as a party in the case. When the principal accused is not arrayed as an accused, only the director of the company cannot be arrayed without arraying the company as party. In the instant case, the company is not arrayed as an accused though cheques were issued in the name of the company. In support of his arguments, learned counsel relied on decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of DILIP HARIRAMANI VS. BANK OF BARODA reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 579, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision, wherein, the question whether a director or a partner can be prosecuted without a company being prosecuted was considered. The reference was made to ANIL HADA V. INDIAN ACRYLIC LTD. and the said controversy was settled by three judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ANEETA HADA Vs M/S GODFATHER TRAVELS & TOURS PVT. LTD. reported in (2012) 5 SCC 661 wherein the Court has interpreted Section 141 of N.I. Act and with reference to its earlier decision in State of Madras Vs. C.V.Parekh And Another reported in (1970) 3 SCC 491 , a larger bench judgment which is a binding precedent, at paragraph Nos. 15 and 16 it is held as under: "15. At this juncture, we may refer to Section 141 which deals with offences by companies. As the spine of the controversy rests on the said provision, it is reproduced below:- "141. Offences by companies. 15 and 16 it is held as under: "15. At this juncture, we may refer to Section 141 which deals with offences by companies. As the spine of the controversy rests on the said provision, it is reproduced below:- "141. Offences by companies. -(1) If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly; Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence: Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a Company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act, has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly." 16. On a reading of the said provision, it is plain as day that if a person who commits offence under Section 138 of the Act is a company, the company as well as every person in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of business of the company at the time of commission of offence is deemed to be guilty of the offence. The first proviso carves out under what circumstances the criminal liability would not be fastened. Sub-section (2) enlarges the criminal liability by incorporating the concepts of connivance, negligence and consent that engulfs many categories of officers. The first proviso carves out under what circumstances the criminal liability would not be fastened. Sub-section (2) enlarges the criminal liability by incorporating the concepts of connivance, negligence and consent that engulfs many categories of officers. It is worth noting that in both the provisions, there is a 'deemed' concept of criminal liability." Therefore, the learned counsel argued that as the company is not made party, the complaint is liable to be dismissed. 15. The learned counsel further relied on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in DILIP SINGH VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS reported in (2010) 2 SCC 114 , wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that litigants who tried to meddle with records of the court are not entitled for any relief. Learned counsel referred to paragraph Nos.1 and 2 and stated that as the complainant in this case tried to interchange the documents and tamper the Court records, he is not entitled for any relief. Similarly, he relied on decision in the case of NAVEEN SINGH VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER reported in (2021) 6 SCC 191 and at paragraph No.12.3 held as under: 12.3. However, the High Court has not at all considered that the accused is charged for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC and the maximum punishment for the offence under Section 467 IPC is 10 years and fine/imprisonment for life and even for the offence under Section 471 IPC the similar punishment. Apart from that forging and/or manipulating the court record and getting benefit of such forged/manipulated court record is a very serious offence. If the court record is manipulated and/or forged, it will hamper the administration of justice. Forging/manipulating the court record and taking the benefit of the same stands on altogether a different footing than forging/manipulating other documents between two individuals. Therefore, the High Court ought to have been more cautious/serious in granting the bail to a person who is alleged to have forged/manipulated the court record and taken the benefit of such manipulated and forged court record more particularly when he has been charge-sheeted having found prima facie case and the charge has been framed. 16. He has also relied on the other decision in SH.AWANEESH CHANDRA JHA VS. ANIL PRASAD NANDA reported in CS (os) 161/2022 and NANJAPPA VS. 16. He has also relied on the other decision in SH.AWANEESH CHANDRA JHA VS. ANIL PRASAD NANDA reported in CS (os) 161/2022 and NANJAPPA VS. STATE BY CHIKKAJALA POLICE STATION in Criminal Petition No.1653/2022 dated 24.03.2022 wherein, it is held that the person not approached the Court with clean hands is not entitled for any relief. Therefore, learned counsel argued that viewed from any angle the remand of the appeal is not feasible at this stage and as the civil suit is already filed, he prays to dismiss the appeal. 17. Against this learned counsel for the appellant replied that no criminal case or proceedings regarding tampering of documents or interchanging the documents is pending. On the other hand, one petition was filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., before this Court and the said complaint registered against appellant was quashed by this Court with a directions to initiate proceedings if any, under Section 340 of Cr.P.C in accordance with law. Therefore, the learned counsel stated that the question of tampering or interchanging the records are attempted by the complainant/appellant does not hold good. There is a direction to the learned Magistrate to hold an enquiry and if he finds that there is a material then to proceed further. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that such a argument is not tenable and the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents' counsel has no application to the facts of this case. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant though fairly stated that the law is now settled in Anitha Hada's case referred supra. But when the complaint was filed the law which governs him is Anil Hada's case. Therefore, in view of the doctrine of prospective overruling, the said decision has application to the present case. Therefore, the learned counsel argued that the decision relied by the respondents' counsel has no application. Hence, prayed to remand the matter by allowing appeal. 19. I have gone through the impugned judgment and also records of the trial court. 20. The learned JMFC has raised a point for consideration, that whether the complainant proves that accused had issued a cheque dated 27.10.2005 bearing No.428106 for Rs.1,00,00,000/-in favour of the complainant and the said cheque was presented for encashment returned with an endorsement 'Exceeds Arrangement'. 19. I have gone through the impugned judgment and also records of the trial court. 20. The learned JMFC has raised a point for consideration, that whether the complainant proves that accused had issued a cheque dated 27.10.2005 bearing No.428106 for Rs.1,00,00,000/-in favour of the complainant and the said cheque was presented for encashment returned with an endorsement 'Exceeds Arrangement'. In answering the said point, the learned JMFC found that the cheque number produced in the case is bearing No.428101 dated 25.10.2005 and it is for a sum of Rs.83,30,100.61/-as per Ex.P2. The bank endorsements is dated 29.10.2005 and 10.11.2005 produced as per Exs.P3 and P4 is also for the same amount. Therefore, the cheque number, the bank memo and the date of cheque and the number of cheque mentioned in the complaint and evidence affidavit of complainant does not tally with the documentary evidence produced in this case. The learned JMFC observed that may be due to inadvertence these documents are produced. Therefore, learned JMFC found that as the initial burden of proving that the cheque was issued and it was dishonoured are not proved, the complainant has failed to prove the initial burden and as the oral evidence and documentary evidence are contradictory to each, acquitted the accused. 21. I have also perused the original records produced in this case. The complainant is a company represented by his power of attorney holder -Sri. S.Chandrashekar, Senior Regional Manager. Respondent No.1 is a chairman and respondent No.2 is a director of M/s. Ganeshanugraha Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd. The respondents' company is not made as a party. The complainant/Sri. S.Chandrashekar, power of attorney holder has filed his sworn statement. In his examination-in-chief-affidavit, he has stated about business transaction between the complainant's company and accused company. 22. The complainant further stated that complainant used to supply the fertilizers and raw materials to the accused and accused also used to supply some finished goods to the complainant. In those transactions payments have been accumulated by the accused to the complainant. As on the date i.e., on 27.10.2005 an amount due to the complainant from the accused was Rs.1,00,00,000/- comprising of interest component towards over due outstanding from the year of commencement of business between the parties. In those transactions payments have been accumulated by the accused to the complainant. As on the date i.e., on 27.10.2005 an amount due to the complainant from the accused was Rs.1,00,00,000/- comprising of interest component towards over due outstanding from the year of commencement of business between the parties. Therefore, he has stated that in this regard, accused Nos.1 and 2 have issued a cheque bearing No.428106 dated 27.10.2005 for a sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/-in favour of the complainant. He further states that the said cheque was returned with an endorsement 'Exceeds Arrangement' dated 14.11.2005. But as per Ex.P4 the bank endorsement is dated 29.10.2005. Hence, the averments in the affidavit is again contrary to the documentary evidence produced in this case. 23. Therefore, evidence filed by the complainant by way of affidavit and contents of complaint does not corroborate with the documentary evidence produced in this case. The complaint is based on different cheque and the amount mentioned in the complaint is also different. I have also perused Ex.P2-cheque which is dated 25.10.2005 issued for Rs.83,30,100.61/-and Ex.P4/the bank memo is also for the same amount. The legal notice is also for Rs.83,30,100.61/-. The reply notice at Ex.P7 wherein the contents of notice is denied. Though the appellant has produced number of documents, but as the complaint averments, and affidavit of complainant and the documents produced in this case are inconsistent with each other, the learned JMFC has dismissed the complaint. Therefore, the evidence filed by the complainant by way of affidavit and the averments in the complaint are inconsistent with the documents produced by the complainant particularly cheque, bank endorsement are not in respect of cheque number or amount mentioned in the written complaint. 24. As stated by the learned counsel for the appellant, the complainant has also filed another private complaint against the same respondents/accused in PCR No.5737/2005 in respect of dishonour of cheque bearing No.428106 dated 27.10.2005 for Rs.1,00,00,000/-. Therefore, he submits that due to inadvertence or without noticing the same, the documents in this case are produced in that case and the documents in that case are produced in this case. The contention of learned counsel is that Court can set right that mistake by remanding matter. In this regard, he relied on the decision of Gujarath High Court in the case of Dilipbhai Bhagwandas Aashwani Propreitor Pappu Finance Vs. The contention of learned counsel is that Court can set right that mistake by remanding matter. In this regard, he relied on the decision of Gujarath High Court in the case of Dilipbhai Bhagwandas Aashwani Propreitor Pappu Finance Vs. State of Gujarat and Others -2019 SCC Online Guj 6621 wherein it is held that if there were two different proceedings between the same parties and due to inadvertent mistake on the part of learned advocate who was appearing for the appellant-original complainant before the learned Magistrate of intermingling statutory notice as well as cheques and therefore it was not matching with the pleadings, the learned Magistrate acquitted the accused. The Court remanded matter. it is true that the documents are interchanged in this case also, but here the evidence on oath is totally inconsistent with the contents of document and written complaint. It is nothing but total negligence on the part of the complainant and carelessness of complainant in filing the examination-in-chief affidavit. When the appellant is a company and it is represented by its officials, before filing the affidavit they must verify or atleast at the time of marking of documents, the documents should be verified by the concerned. 25. It is to be stated here that in view of filing of evidence by way of examination-in-chief affidavit, mechanically, the affidavit evidence is filed without verifying whether same pertains to this case or not. Whatever the documents produced along with complaint are mechanically marked without verifying them. Infact it is the duty of the Court also at the time of taking cognizance itself to verify as to whether the documents produced before the Court along with the complaint makes out a prima facie case for taking cognizance and to register the case. 26. I have perused the order sheet of the trial court. It is evident that the complaint was filed belatedly and the delay was condoned under Section 142(b) of N.I Act. The learned JMFC by perusing the allegations of complainant stated that they constitute an offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act, hence, cognizance is taken and directed to register the case as PCR. The very order itself shows that mechanically, the learned JMFC has registered the case without verifying the documents, as they are not tallying with written complaint. The learned JMFC by perusing the allegations of complainant stated that they constitute an offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act, hence, cognizance is taken and directed to register the case as PCR. The very order itself shows that mechanically, the learned JMFC has registered the case without verifying the documents, as they are not tallying with written complaint. If at all the learned JMFC has verified the documents at the time of taking cognizance itself in the year 2006, the complainant could have taken appropriate steps. But the said documents were not noticed, though it is mentioned in the order that documents are perused. The documents shows that they are not at all perused and the case proceeded with trial by the Court. It is very unfortunate that even the evidence on oath is filed based on these documents which are not concerned to this case and the same were also marked without verifying them. Therefore, the learned JMFC finding cannot be said as either illegal or perverse. When the complaint, evidence filed by way of affidavit and the documentary evidence are inconsistent with each other, the Court has no other way but to dismiss the complaint. 27. It is also evident that the accused company is not made as party. At this stage, this Court cannot give any such direction to implead the company as a party to case by remanding the matter as the same is not permissible, in view of decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Himanshu Vs. B.Shivamurthy and another - (2019) 3 SCC 797 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered and discussed regarding the Sections 138 and 141 of N.I. Act and necessary conditions to be complied with for constituting an offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act, in general and against company and its directors/officers and where necessary conditions under Section 138 of N.I. Act are not complied with, company cannot subsequently be arraigned as accused in proceedings under Section 138 of N.I. Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to its earlier decision in the case of Anitha Hada's case. In that case also, the complaint was lodged for dishonour of cheque dated 26.12.2003 and it was returned with an endorsement funds insufficient. The complainant therein issued a notice to the appellant and the same was also served. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to its earlier decision in the case of Anitha Hada's case. In that case also, the complaint was lodged for dishonour of cheque dated 26.12.2003 and it was returned with an endorsement funds insufficient. The complainant therein issued a notice to the appellant and the same was also served. Upon the failure of the appellant to pay the amount due under the cheque, a complaint was instituted. The Civil Judge, Junior Division and JMFC, Tiptur took cognizance on 06.7.2004 and issued summons to the appellant. Against the same, the appellant instituted a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C before this Court. This Court held that on meticulously going through the cheque dated 23.12.2005, it discloses that the cheque was issued by one of the Directors of the company and that was not a cheque issued by any person in his individual capacity. If that is accepted, the complaint should have been against the company and its Directors and not against the accused. The said petition was dismissed by this Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to Anitha Hada's case supra and at paragraph No.7 it is held as under: "7. The first submission on behalf of the appellant is no longer res integra. A decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Aneeta Hada Vs. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd. governs the area of dispute. The issue which fell for consideration was whether an authorized signatory of a company would be liable for prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 without the company being arraigned as an accused. The three-Judge Bench held thus: 58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words “as well as the company” appearing in the Section make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected when a director is indicted. In similar terms, the Court further held: 59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. 28. Further regarding to Section 141 of N.I. Act it is held at paragraph Nos. 11, 12, 13 as under: 11. In the present case, the record before the Court indicates that the cheque was drawn by the appellant for Lakshmi Cement and Ceramics Industries Ltd., as its Director. A notice of demand was served only on the appellant. The complaint was lodged only against the appellant without arraigning the company as an accused. 12. The provisions of Section 141 postulate that if the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person, who at the time when the offence was committed was in charge of or was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished. 13. In the absence of the company being arraigned as an accused, a complaint against the appellant was therefore not maintainable. The appellant had signed the cheque as a Director of the company and for and on its behalf. Moreover, in the absence of a notice of demand being served on the company and without compliance with the proviso to Section 138, the High Court was in error in holding that the company could now be arraigned as an accused. 29. Therefore, in view of the principles stated in above decision, even this Court cannot remand the matter at this stage, even if there is any such material to remand the matter. But no purpose would be served to remand the matter, as company is admittedly not made as party. 30. 29. Therefore, in view of the principles stated in above decision, even this Court cannot remand the matter at this stage, even if there is any such material to remand the matter. But no purpose would be served to remand the matter, as company is admittedly not made as party. 30. It is the settled principles of law that this court being the Appellate Court will not interfere with the judgment of acquittal, unless it is shown that the judgment of acquittal is perverse, illegal and not based on proper appreciation of evidence on record and it has resulted in miscarriage of justice. 31. In the light of these principles, if the judgment of Trial Court, the case of the complainant, both oral and documentary evidence are perused, it is evident that they are totally inconsistent with each other. The complainant himself should be blamed for not filing proper evidence and not producing the proper documents. Therefore, at this length of time, no purpose would be served by remanding the matter in view of decision in the case of Himanhu referred supra. Therefore, viewed from any angle, the appeal being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed. 32. However certain directions needs to be issued to the Trial Courts in order to avoid waste of time of the Courts as well as case being pending for years together for not properly scrutinizing the complaint and documents produce along with complaint at the initial stage itself. Because if the complaint and documents are properly verified and scrutinized in view of Sections 138 and 141 of N.I Act at the initial stage itself, it would prevent waste of judicial time. 33. Accordingly, I pass the following: ORDER (i) The appeal is hereby dismissed. (ii) The judgment of acquittal passed by the V Additional Judge, Court of Small Causes & XXIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mayo Hall Unit, Bengaluru in C.C.No.28722/2006 dated 25.08.2012 is hereby confirmed. 33. Accordingly, I pass the following: ORDER (i) The appeal is hereby dismissed. (ii) The judgment of acquittal passed by the V Additional Judge, Court of Small Causes & XXIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mayo Hall Unit, Bengaluru in C.C.No.28722/2006 dated 25.08.2012 is hereby confirmed. (iii) The Trial Courts, before taking cognizance shall meticulously verify the documents produced by the complainant along with the contents of written complaint filed before Court and affidavit on oath if any, keeping in mind the provisions of Sections 138 and 141 of N.I. Act, satisfy as to whether proper parties are arrayed and proper documents in support of written complaint are filed, so that unnecessary hardship to the litigants and waste of precious time of Court could be avoided at the earliest point of time, so that the complainant will have an opportunity to rectify the mistake if any due to inadvertence, ignorance or negligence. (iv) Registrar Judicial is directed to place this order before Hon'ble The Chief Justice for perusal and obtain orders to circulate the same to all the Presiding Officers working in the Trial Courts. (v) Send back the records to the Trial Court. (vi) No costs.