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2023 DIGILAW 524 (KER)

Jaseena C. K. , W/o. Kamarudheen v. State of Kerala, rep. by its Secretary, General Education Department

2023-07-11

ALEXANDER THOMAS, C.JAYACHANDRAN

body2023
JUDGMENT : Alexander Thomas, J. These Original Petitions are directed against the impugned common order rendered on 22.03.2022 in O.A. (Ekm) Nos.954 of 2020 and 1732 of 2018 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench. 2. The sole petitioner in the first O.P. is the applicant no.2 in that O.A. and the sole petitioner in the latter O.P. is the applicant no.2 in the corresponding O.A. 3. Heard Sri. Kaleeswaram Raj, learned counsel instructed by Smt. Aparna Menon, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in these cases, Sri. B. Unnikrishna Kaimal, learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the official respondents in these cases and Sri. P.C. Sasidharan, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent Public Service Commission. 4. The petitioners herein are candidates included in the rank list for the post of High School Assistant (Hindi) in the Education Department, Palakkad District (Category No.662/2012), which was finalised by the respondent PSC on 12.07.2017 and expired on 11.07.2020, after running the maximum three year validity period. The main pleas in these O.As. are for directions to ensure the reporting of all existing substantive vacancies in the post of HSA in the Education Department, Palakkad District, before the expiry of the rank list so that advise and appointments can be made from the rank list dated 12.07.2017. It is the specific case of the petitioners that before the expiry of the rank list on 11.7.2020, the Tribunal had issued two interim orders directing the Deputy Director of Education concerned, Palakkad, to report if it is provisionally altogether 26 vacancies in the post of HSA (Hindi), Palakkad District, so as to reach the office of the respondent PSC well before the expiry of the rank list on 11.07.2020. It appears to be a common ground that the appointing authority has provisionally reported altogether 26 vacancies, HSA, which had reached the office of the PSC before the expiry of the rank list on 11.7.2020. The main pleas put up by the petitioners herein both before the Tribunal as well as before this Court are that altogether 19 vacancies were available, before the expiry of the rank list, in which, 60 vacancies were reported to the PSC and advises have been confined only to such 60 vacancies. The main pleas put up by the petitioners herein both before the Tribunal as well as before this Court are that altogether 19 vacancies were available, before the expiry of the rank list, in which, 60 vacancies were reported to the PSC and advises have been confined only to such 60 vacancies. Further that, the total number of vacancies that has arisen during the currency of the above said rank list in the post of HSA (Hindi) is 79 and that therefore atleast 19 more vacancies, viz., total 79 vacancies -60 advises = 19 vacancies, are still available for advice and appointment and that these 19 vacancies are substantive vacancies, which can be adjusted as against the 26 provisionally reported vacancies and that the Tribunal may order that the respondent PSC may make advice of candidates included in the above said rank list, as against atleast those 19 vacancies which may be adjusted as against the 26 provisionally reported vacancies. The main case put up by the petitioners is on the basis of a statement filed by them in O.A.(Ekm)No.1732 of 2018, which has been produced as Ext.P8 in O.P.(KAT)No.260/2022 (see pages 86 to 105 of that O.P.). It is common ground that the various quotas fixed for various methods of appointment is direct recruitment - 50%, interdistrict transfer - 25%, by promotion to the post of HSA from the feeder category of primary teacher -15% and by transfer appointment from qualified low paid employees - 10%. Further, it is the case of the petitioners that in the executive orders prescribing the method of appointment, it has been made clear that in case qualified candidates are not available in the other methods of appointment, then resort can be made to direct recruitment. 5. The details of the factual case set up by the petitioners, as made out in the above referred Ext.P8 produced in O.P. (KAT)No.260/2022, are given in internal pages 5 to 7 of Ext.P8 (see pages 93 to 95 of OP(KAT)No.260/2022) and the same reads as follows:- It is submitted that from the above facts supported by the documents 79 vacancies arose from the date of expiry of previous ranked list till the expiry of Annexure A1 ranked list out of which only 60 vacancies are filled leaving 19 unfilled. It is also evident from the records that 18 vacancies of H.S.A (Hindi) are still available in Palakkad District. An abstract of vacancy position is given below. Table A (Statement of Vacancies) Particulars Vacancy Documents Vacancy arose till 15.03.2019 after the expiry of earlier ranked list. 61 MA 1 and MA 2 in MA(EKM) 1072/2019 Vacancy occurred during 2019 March 31, April and May (2018-2019) 5 Annexure A9 Vacancy occurred during 2019-2020 7 Annexure A11 Vacancy occurred up to 12.07.2020 in the year 2020-2021 6 Annexure A12 and A13 Total vacancies occurred after the expiry of earlier ranked list and before the expiry of the current ranked list 79 Annexure A12 and A13 Table B (Statement of appointments made) Sl. No. Year Posting issued Total posting Remarks I 2016-17 Promotion 7 18 Annexure A11 IDT 1 2017-18 Promotion 8 IDT 1 2018-19 By Transfer 1 II Total advise issued by PSC from this ranked list 45 42 Annexure A8 Less: NJD 3 Balance 42 Total posting of H.S.A (Hindi) issued through PSC, Promotion, IDT and By Transfer 60 III (1) Total vacancy arose till 12.07.2020 after the expiry of earlier ranked list. 79 (2) Vacancy filled through PSC/Promotion/IDT By Transfer 60 Balance substantive vacancies to be filled from this ranked list 19 2. It is therefore submitted that here were 19 more vacancies arose during the currency of the ranked list. With abundant caution 26 vacancies were reported as stated above before the expiry of the ranked list. Fortunately enough the Honourable Minister for Education admitted on the floor of the house as evident from Annexure A14 that 18 more vacancies are still available in the post of H.S.A (Hindi) in Palakkad. No further ranked list has been published after the expiry of Annexure A1 ranked list. Since it is evident without any scintilla of doubt from the schedules above the PSC is legally bound to advise candidates from Annexure A1 ranked list against the reported vacancies forthwith. When there are vacancies and they are duly reported during the currency of the ranked list there cannot be any legal or factual embargo in advising the candidates from Annexure A1 ranked list. The applicants are prohibitively over aged and they are now over aged to be considered for being considered for public employment. When there are vacancies and they are duly reported during the currency of the ranked list there cannot be any legal or factual embargo in advising the candidates from Annexure A1 ranked list. The applicants are prohibitively over aged and they are now over aged to be considered for being considered for public employment. It is very, much apparent from the facts and figures that the respondents have not brought out clearly number of vacancies available and number of appointments made hitherto from all source of recruitments. It goes without saying that even if quota earmarked for direct recruitment is considered to be over the remaining vacancies can be filled from the ranked list in the absence of candidates from other sources viz, IDT, By Transfer, By promotion etc relying on Exhibit A15.” 6. These aspects of the matter have been evaluated and examined in detail by the Tribunal and the Tribunal has found that the above said contentions and pleas of the petitioners are not tenable. The reference in that regard could be made to paras 4 to 6 of the impugned verdict of the Tribunal, which reads as follows:- “4. Pursuant to the directions by this Tribunal, the 4th respondent Deputy Director of Education (O.A. (Ekm) No.1732 of 2018), has filed a statement providing the details of the cadre strength for the academic years during which the ranked list was in existence and also providing the strength in each category during the above academic years. It also deals with the vacancies that have arisen during the academic years and the manner in which the appointment was carried out. Paragraph 2 of the above statement is extracted herein below:- "2. The statement is filed in compliance of the directions of this Tribunal dated 30.06.2021 and 12.01.2021. The details regarding the number of sanctioned posts and the strength in this category is explained as below. 1. Cadre strength for the year 2017-18. Total number of sanctioned post 159 Total number of teachers working 156 Total number of available vacancies 3 Among the above 3 vacancies available, one was NCA (Low Vision) and one was NCA (Hearing Impaired) and one vacancy was set apart for by-transfer appointment and the same was filled on 04.1.2019. The above 2 NCA vacancies are still in existence. Strength in each category. The above 2 NCA vacancies are still in existence. Strength in each category. Direct recruitment (PSC) 50% 116 (72.95%) IDT (25%) 7 (4.40%) Promotion (15% ) 31 (19.49%) By transfer (10%) 2 (1.25%) II. Cadre strength for the year 2018-19 Total number of sanctioned post 175 Total number of teachers working 175 Total number of available vacancies Nil Strength in each category. Direct recruitment (PSC) 151 (86.28%) IDT (25%) 02(1.14%) Promotion (15%) 21 (12%) By transfer (10%) 01 (0.57%) II. Cadre strength for the year 2019-20 Total number of sanctioned post 177 Total number of teachers working 172 Total number of available vacancies 05 Strength in each category. Direct recruitment (PSC) 50% 147 (83.05%) IDT (25%) 03(1.69%) Promotion (15%) 21 (11.86%) By transfer (10%) 01 (0.56%) During the year 2019-20 including the above 5, a total of 9 vacancies in HST Hindi were arisen out of which 50% of vacancy that is 05 (five) vacancies were substantively reported to Kerala Public Service Commission. Balance 04 (four) vacancies were set apart for the following categories. Inter district transfer (25%) 02 Promotion (15%) 01 By transfer (10%) 01 There were no candidates available for the inter district transfer 2019-20. Hence the vacancy set apart for inter district transfer were substantively reported to Kerala Public Service Commission for direct recruitment. Vacancy set apart for promotion were filled vide order No.A3/21646/2019 dated 07.02.2020. One vacancy set apart for by transfer has also been reported to Kerala Public Service Commission on 26.11.2019. Thus a total of 07 (seven) vacancies were reported to Kerala Public Service Commission and 01 (one) vacancy for by transfer. II. Cadre strength for the year 2020-21 Total number of sanctioned post 177 Total number of teachers working 174 Total number of available vacancies 03 Strength in each category. Direct recruitment (PSC) 50% 148 (83.61%) IDT (25%) 03(1.69%) Promotion (15%) 22(5.64%) By transfer (10%) 01(0.56%) During the year 2020-21, a total of 6 vacancies in HST Hindi arisen due to retirement of teachers. Out of which 50% of vacancies, that is 03 (three) vacancies were reported to Kerala Public Service Commission. Balance 03 (three) vacancies are set apart for the following categories. Inter district transfer (25%) 01 Promotion (15%) 01 By transfer 01 The one vacancy set apart for by transfer has been reported to Kerala Public Service Commission on 18.08.2020. Out of which 50% of vacancies, that is 03 (three) vacancies were reported to Kerala Public Service Commission. Balance 03 (three) vacancies are set apart for the following categories. Inter district transfer (25%) 01 Promotion (15%) 01 By transfer 01 The one vacancy set apart for by transfer has been reported to Kerala Public Service Commission on 18.08.2020. Vacancy set apart for inter district transfer is filled vide order No.A3/2264/2021 dated 28.06.2021. Vacancy set apart for promotion is filled vide order No.DDEPKD/10066/20521-A3 17.12.2021." As per the above statement, no further vacancies are available for advice and appointment from the ranked list against the direct recruitment category. 5. The dispute is regarding the appointments carried out in the year 2020-2021. The total sanctioned post for the above year is 177 against which 174 Teachers were on board and 3 vacancies were available. Of the 177 posts, direct recruits who were eligible for 50% quota were 148 in strength at 83.61%, inter-district transferees who were eligible for 25% quota had a strength of 3 at 1.69%, promotees who were eligible for 15% had a strength of 22 with 5.64% and by transferees eligible for 10% quota had only one candidate with 0.56%. It is also stated that during the year 2021, a total of 6 vacancies had arisen, of which 3 vacancies were reported to the Public Service Commission and the remaining 3 were set apart for inter-district transfer, promotion and by transfer, one each for these categories. The vacancies, set apart for inter-district transfer and promotion were filled up by orders dated 28.6.2021 and 17.12.2021, respectively. The remaining vacancy set apart for by transfer was reported to the Public Service Commission on 18.8.2020. The learned counsel for the applicant points out that the same has not been filled up till date and was available for advice. However, the above contention cannot be accepted, insofar as the reporting of the above vacancy was on 18.8.2020, after the expiry of the ranked list, which expired on 13.7.2020. 6. It is trite that no advice can be issued against a vacancy reported after the expiry of the ranked list, which would tantamount to extension of an already expired list. Moreover, it is noted that direct recruits have received more than their due of 50%, against the cadre strength of 177, there were 148 direct recruits on board with 83.61%. 7. Moreover, it is noted that direct recruits have received more than their due of 50%, against the cadre strength of 177, there were 148 direct recruits on board with 83.61%. 7. It can be seen, from the reading of the above said paras 4 to 6 of the verdict of the Tribunal, that the Tribunal has meticulously examined the cadre strength for each of the years in question from the academic year 2017-18 upto the academic year 2020-21, inasmuch as the currency of the rank list was for the period from 12.7.2017 to 11.7.2020. After a detailed consideration of various aspects, the Tribunal has found that the direct recruitment quota has been in far excess of the 50% and when it reached the academic year 2020-21, which is relatable to the day on which the rank list expired on 11.7.2020, the direct recruitment quota to PSC hands actually reached the level of 83.61%, with the result that, the other quotas of appointment, like inter-district transfer (25%), promotion quota (15%) and by transfer quota (10%), were reduced to a minuscule level of 1.69%, 5.64% and 0.56%. This so happened as the personnel in the other three quotas were not qualified at the relevant time, with the result that, vacancies in their respective quotas were reported to the PSC for resorting to direct recruitment. 8. After hearing both sides and after going through the pleadings on record, we are not in a position to hold that the above said fact findings made by the Tribunal, repelling the factual pleas of the petitioners, are, in any manner, grossly unreasonable or perverse. 9. The learned Senior Government Pleader would point out that, even if it is assumed that there is any minor mistake in the assessment of facts by the Tribunal, the same cannot be a ground for interference at the hands of this Court, in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction. Sri. B. Unnikrishna Kaimal, learned Senior Government Pleader, would point out that this is on account of two grounds, namely that, this Court is in the limited domain of supervisory function. The second ground being that it is well established that the appointing authority can take a considered decision not to fill up vacancy in a particular quota, for valid reasons. B. Unnikrishna Kaimal, learned Senior Government Pleader, would point out that this is on account of two grounds, namely that, this Court is in the limited domain of supervisory function. The second ground being that it is well established that the appointing authority can take a considered decision not to fill up vacancy in a particular quota, for valid reasons. If that be so, they cannot be compelled to report vacancies to the PSC and to resort to direct recruitment, to the prejudice of the other quotas. In this regard, it is urged that it may be true that the executive order may envisage that in the absence of qualified candidates at the relevant time, in the other three quotas, then it is open to the appointing authority to resort to the method of direct recruitment. That does not mean that the candidates included in the rank list have an indefeasible right to seek for a direction from the judicial organ that the appointing authority should be compelled to report vacancies which are otherwise available in the other quotas and to resort to direct recruitment. It is well settled that for bonafide policy reasons, the appointing authority can refuse to make appointments from any other quotas, including a direct recruitment quota. In the instant case, even if there is any error in the factual findings made by the Tribunal, if this Court is going to overrule the same, then the effect would be that, the personnel in the other quotas, who may have qualified later, will be seriously prejudiced. For the academic year 2020-21, the other three quotas had reached a very low level of 1.69%, 5.64% and 0.56% as against the prescribed quota of 25% (IDT), 15% (promotion) and 10% (by transfer). 10. After hearing both sides, we are of the view that the above said contentions of the learned Senior Government Pleader are to be countenanced and have to be accepted. Further, Note-3 to Rule 5 of the KS & SSR Part II has been inserted as an amendment made as per SRO 194/1993 published in Kerala Gazette dated 2.2.1993, with effect from 2.2.93. Further, Note-3 to Rule 5 of the KS & SSR Part II has been inserted as an amendment made as per SRO 194/1993 published in Kerala Gazette dated 2.2.1993, with effect from 2.2.93. It is mandated in Note-3 appended to Rule 5 of KS & SSR Part II that wherever an issue of percentage is fixed for different methods of recruitment/appointment to a post, the number of vacancies to be filled up by candidates from each method shall be decided by applying to fix the ratio of percentage to the cadre strength to the post to which the recruitment from transfer is made and not to the vacancies arising at that time. The relevance and necessity to adhere to the quotas which have been in the cadre strength and not on the basis of arising vacancies, has been highlighted in a detailed judgment rendered by this Court on 24.6.2021 in O.P.(KAT)No.191/2019. That apart, it is common ground that altogether 45 advises have been made by advising candidates from the above said rank list in question. 11. The Apex Court has held in various decisions as in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India [ 1991 (3) SCC 47 ], para 7 thereof that a candidate included in a direct recruitment rank list has no indefeasible right to be appointed even in the vacancy that exists under the State Authorities. Filling up of the vacancies have to be made for clear and bonafide reasons and not arbitrarily and for bonafide or reasonable grounds, the appointing authority can even take the stand that they do not intend to fill up the existing vacancy, etc. It is pertinent to note paragraph 7 of the decision of the Apex Court in Shankarsan (supra), which reads as follows : “7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha and Others, [1974] 1 SCR 165; Miss Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana and Others, [1986] 4 SCC 268 and Jitendra Kumar and Others v. State of Punjab and Others, [1985] 1 SCR 899.” 12. Further, the Full Bench of this Court in Kerala Public Service Commission v. Sheejamol [ (2020) 5 KLT 718 (F.B.)] has also dealt with the same issue as to whether the court can be approached to compel an appointing authority to fill up vacancies from a rank list prepared by the PSC. Issue No.2 raised before the Full Bench in Sheejamol's case (supra) is as follows:- "(ii) Can this Court be approached to compel an appointing authority to fill up vacancies from a rank list prepared by the Public Service Commission even if the appointing authority/employer does not intend to fill up that particular vacancy/vacancies genuine and bonafide reasons?" 13. The Full Bench has answered the said issue as per para No.13(II) of the said decision, as follows:- “13. xxx xxx xxx (I) xxx xxx xxx (II) An appointing authority may, for good and sufficient reasons, take a decision not to fill up existing vacancies and merely on account of the fact that there is a ranked list in force, this Court will not, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, compel the appointing authority to fill up those vacancies. Circumstances such as financial difficulties or as in the facts of these cases, orders of statutory authorities resulting in reduction of the number of vacancies or abolition of posts etc., would be good and sufficient reason for the appointing authority to take a decision not to fill up the vacancies.” 14. Hence, in the light of these aspects, even if we assume for argument's sake, that there may be some errors in the factual assessment made by the Tribunal in the impugned verdict, then it is the stand of the State that, since the other three quotas, have actually reached only very low level for appointments, if further vacancies are also compelled to be used for direct recruitment, then the direct recruitment quota will exceed to a very high level, with the result, that the other quotas will suffer and that personnel in the other three quotas, who may have qualified later, will have to be again denied appointment. Hence, we are not in a position, in any manner, to overrule the above said contention raised by the learned Senior Government Pleader. 15. Further, we also note that, the currency of the rank list has expired long ago and much more than the notified vacancies have been utilised for advise and appointment from the above said rank list. The Apex Court in the decision in High Court of Kerala v. Reshma A. & Ors. [ (2021) 3 SCC 755 ], has inter alia held that the recruitment over and above the notified vacancies, is not in accordance with the constitutional mandate of equal opportunity of unemployment, envisaged in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench of this Court in Sonia Alex & Others v. State of Kerala & Ors. [ 2017 KHC 465 : 2017 (4) KLT 774 ] has inter alia held that the candidates may not have any right to claim that they have any indefeasible right that all vacancies arising for a three year period of the rank list should necessarily be filled up from one rank list. It has been held therein that after expiry of the minimum one year period, envisaged in Rule 13 of the PSC Rules of Procedure, the Commission is at liberty to finalise a new rank list and recruitment to the public service is an ongoing and continuous process. It has been held therein that after expiry of the minimum one year period, envisaged in Rule 13 of the PSC Rules of Procedure, the Commission is at liberty to finalise a new rank list and recruitment to the public service is an ongoing and continuous process. In this regard, it is to be noted that, the rank list in question has been operated to the full three year maximum validity period and has expired quite some time ago. 16. In the decision in the case in A. Sreekantan Nair & Ors. v. M.K. Muraleedharan Nair & Ors. [1991 LabIC 2163 =1991 (2) KLT SN 3 (Case No.4)=MANU/KE/0647/1991], it has been held, in para Nos.25 & 26 thereof, that equal opportunity for public employment is one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution and that public employment opportunity is national wealth or property of the nation, which all citizens are equally entitled to, subject, of course, to the possession of qualifications necessary for holding the post. No class of people can monopolise public employment for any reason and the right to employment is no private property, but one to be shared equally by all those who are eligible for it. Further that, particularly in this country of perennial unemployment, the guarantee of equal opportunity in public employment assumes great importance and such opportunity must be available to succeeding generations of young men who become eligible for appointment from time to time, by acquiring the necessary qualifications. It should not be that the right to employment gets concentrated in a few hands and the right to compete and be selected for employment is consequently denied for long periods altogether. As far as possible, young talent and succeeding generations ought to find their avenues in public employment, if they so desire, and they should not be shut out from appointment, for the mere reason that selections have been made long ago, on an imaginary or inflated basis and those included in the old select lists remain to be appointed. Further that, otherwise, the guarantees under Articles 14 and 16 will become illusory and creation of such reservoirs from which appointments are to be made, for years to come, leads to arbitrariness, etc. It will be pertinent to refer to para Nos.25 & 26 of the decision of this Court in A. Sreekantan Nair’s case (supra), which read as follows:- “25. It will be pertinent to refer to para Nos.25 & 26 of the decision of this Court in A. Sreekantan Nair’s case (supra), which read as follows:- “25. Equal opportunity for public employment is one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. Public employment opportunity is national wealth or property of the nation which all citizens are equally entitled to subject of course to the possession of qualifications necessary for holding the post. No class of people can monopolise public employment for any reason. Right to employment is no private property, but one to be shared equally by all those who are eligible for it. 26. In this country of perennial unemployment, particularly, the guarantee of equal opportunity in public employment assumes great importance. Such opportunity must be available to succeeding generations of young men who become eligible for appointment from time to time by acquiring the necessary qualifications. It should not be that the right to employment gets concentrated in a few hands and the right to compete and be selected for employment consequently denied for long periods altogether. As far possible, young talent and succeeding generations ought to find their avenues in public employment if so desired and they should not be shut out from appointment for the mere reason that selections have been made long ago on an imaginary or inflated basis and those included in the old select lists remain to be appointed. Otherwise the guarantees under Articles 14 and 16 will become illusory. Creation of such reservoirs from which appointments are to be made for years to come leads to arbitrariness for the reason that any advice beyond the necessities of a particular period will result in stagnation of the list for a long number of years with resultant denial of opportunities for the subsequent eligible candidates.” 17. Now, it may also be pertinent to refer to the aforecited recent decision rendered by the Apex Court in relation to Munsiff-Magistrate selection in the State of Kerala, in the case High Court of Kerala v. Reshma A. [ (2021) 3 SCC 755 ]. Without getting into the details, it may be pertinent to note the rules involved in that selection, which is “Special Rules in respect of Kerala Judicial Service” and Category (2) of Rule 3 thereof is in relation to the post of Munsiff-Magistrate. Without getting into the details, it may be pertinent to note the rules involved in that selection, which is “Special Rules in respect of Kerala Judicial Service” and Category (2) of Rule 3 thereof is in relation to the post of Munsiff-Magistrate. The unamended Rule 7 thereof has been given in para 14 of the decision in A. Reshma's case (2021) 3 SCC 755 , which reads as follows: “Rule 7. (1) .. .... … (2) The list consisting of not more than double the number of probable vacancies notified shall be forwarded for the approval of the Governor. The list approved by the Governor shall come into force from the date of the approval and shall remain in force for a period of three years or until a fresh approved list is prepared, whichever is earlier.” (emphasis supplied) 18. The abovesaid rules were amended w.e.f. 19.1.2019, pursuant to which the last sentence of Rule 7(1) was substituted (see para 16 of Reshma's case (supra)). As per the said amendment, Rule 7(2) was substituted by the following provision (see para 16 of Reshma's case (supra)). Rule 7(2) of the existing Rules be substituted by the following: “(2) The merit list prepared by the High Court shall be forwarded for the approval of the Governor. The list approved by the Governor shall come into force from the date of the approval and shall be valid till the notified vacancies and the vacancies that may arise within one year from the date of approval of the list, are filled up or a fresh list comes into force, whichever is earlier.’” (emphasis supplied). So the substance of Rule 7(2) is that the approved list shall come into force from the date of approval of the competent authority and shall be valid till the notified vacancies and the vacancies that may arise. 19. The unamended Rule No.7(2) earlier stipulated that the approved list will be in force for a period of three years or until a fresh list is prepared and after the 2019 amendment, the stipulation in Rule 7(2) is that the approved list shall be valid till the notified vacancies and the vacancies that may arise within one year from the date of approval of the list are filled up or a fresh list comes into force, whichever is earlier. 20. 20. Only for easy comparison, it may be apposite to extract the contents of the operative portion of Rule 13 of the Kerala Public Service Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads as follows : “Rule 13. The ranked lists published by the Commission shall remain in force for a period of one years from the date on which it was brought into force provided that the said list will continue to be in force till the publication of a new list after the expiry of the minimum period of one year or till the expiry of three years whichever is earlier. 5 provisos thereto are omitted. xxx xxx xxx ”] 21. The list in question in that case was approved by the competent authority on 7.5.2020 and the one year period thereof was upto 6.5.2021 (see paras 3 & 4 in Reshma's case (supra) [ (2021) 3 SCC 755 ]). The subject writ petitions were filed before this Court in May 2020, contending that as on 7.5.2020 and thereafter, several vacancies of Munsiff-Magistrate had arisen, which were not specified in the selection notification inviting applications. The petitioners therein claimed that, in accordance with Rule 7(2), as amended w.e.f. 14.1.2019, all vacancies which arise for a period of one year after approval of the merit list are to be filled up from the approved merit list. The specific factual plea was that the appointments of Munsiff-Magistrates from the said approved list must not be limited to 32 vacancies and must take into account all other vacancies that have arisen or which may arise till 6.5.2021, i.e. within one year from the date on which the merit list dated 7.5.2020 was notified. 22. Per contra, the High Court on the administrative side contended that appointments to vacancies in the judicial service are regulated by statutory rules and that the directions and time line fixed by the Apex Court by virtue of directions issued under Art.142 of the Constitution of India are contained in the cases as in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission [ (2008) 17 SCC 703 ]. Relying on Malik Mazhar Sultan's case (supra) [ (2008) 17 SCC 703 ] the respondent administration therein contended that the selection notification inviting applications is issued only for those vacancies that are available till 31st of December of the year in which the notification is issued and only these notified vacancies can be filled by the recruitment process of a given year. During the pendency of the writ petitions a fresh selection notification dated 30.6.2020 was issued by the High Court on the administrative side for 47 posts of Munsiff-Magistrate. The Single Bench of this Court in the impugned judgment rendered on 9.7.2020 in Swetha Sasikumar v. State of Kerala [2020 SCC Online Ker. 2633] held that Rule 7(2) provides that vacancies existing and arising within one year from the date of approval of the list are to be filled up from the select list, unless a fresh list comes into force before the last date of the year. The learned Single Judge thus held that, since the special rules govern the selection and appointment, the respondent administration therein could not deny appointment on the ground that the recruitment would not fall within the time lines prescribed in Malik Mazhar Sultan's (3) case supra [ (2008) 17 SCC 703 ] and it was specifically held that denial of appointment to the additional vacancies would be violative of Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, etc. Thus, the prayers in the Writ Petition were allowed and the respondent administration therein was directed to forward an additional list of candidates from the approval list dated 20.2.2020 to the competent authority for approval and appointment. The abovesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge in Swetha Sasikumar's case supra was affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in intra court appeal, wherein it was held that the amended Rule 7(2) provides that the approved list is valid for the notified vacancies and the vacancies arising within one year from the date of approval of the list or till a fresh list comes into force and that consequently, the merit list approved on 7.5.2020 would be valid for vacancies till 6.5.2021 or till a fresh list comes into force, whichever is earlier, etc. Aggrieved by the abovesaid verdict in the writ proceedings, the respondent administration therein (High Court on the administrative side) preferred SLPs, which resulted in the civil appeals, which culminated in the judgment dated 11.1.2021 in the abovesaid civil appeal in A.Reshma's case (supra) [ (2021) 3 SCC 755 ]. Therein the Apex Court specifically noted the impact of a series of directions issued by the Apex Court under Art.142 of the Constitution, regarding timely and annual based selection to fill up posts in judicial services like Munsiff-Magistrate, etc. and the time lines given by the Apex Court in those series of judgments, as in Malik Mazhar Sultan's case supra [ (2008) 17 SCC 703 ] and ultimately upheld the contentions and pleas of the appellant therein (High Court on the administrative side) and reversed and set aside the impugned judgments of the Division Bench and the Single Bench, which interfered in the matter. Interference made by the Apex Court was on various grounds. One such vital ground was on the basis of the well known constitutional principle that ordinarily, appointment of direct recruitment selection notifications should be confined to notified vacancies, as otherwise, it would affect the rights of later qualified persons for public employment, which is guaranteed under Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, etc. The Apex Court, in paras 48 to 53, 71.2, etc., has dealt with the various laws enunciated by the Apex Court on the issue as to limiting appointment, on the basis of selection process, to the notified vacancies, etc. The case laws elaborately considered by the Apex Court in A. Reshma's case (supra) [ (2021) 3 SCC 755 ] are with reference to the decisions in Prem Singh v. Haryana State Electricity Board [ (1996) 4 SCC 319 , para 25], Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi, [ (2010) 2 SCC 637 ], UOI v. Ishwar Singh Khatri, [1992 Supp (3) SCC 84], Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Assn. v. State of Gujarat, [1994 Supp (2) SCC 591], State of Bihar v. Secretariat Asstt. Executive Engineers' Assn. v. State of Gujarat, [1994 Supp (2) SCC 591], State of Bihar v. Secretariat Asstt. Successful Examinees Union 1986, [ (1994) 1 SCC 126 ], Ashok Kumar v. Banking Service Recruitment Board [ (1996) 1 SCC 283 ], Anurag Kumar Singh v. State of Uttarakhand [ (2016) 9 SCC 426 ], Rahul Dutta v. State of Bihar [ (2019) 5 SCC 158 ], Bedanga Talukdar v. Saifudaullah Khan [ (2011) 12 SCC 85 ], etc. 23. Brief reference to 2 of such decisions may not be out of place at this instance. A 3-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi, [ (2010) 2 SCC 637 ] has held as follows in paras 7 and 12 : “7. It is a settled legal proposition that vacancies cannot be filled up over and above the number of vacancies advertised as “the recruitment of the candidates in excess of the notified vacancies is a denial and deprivation of the constitutional right under Article 14 read with Article 16(1) of the Constitution”, of those persons who acquired eligibility for the post in question in accordance with the statutory rules subsequent to the date of notification of vacancies. Filling up the vacancies over the notified vacancies is neither permissible nor desirable, for the reason, that it amounts to “improper exercise of power and only in a rare and exceptional circumstance and in emergent situation, such a rule can be deviated from and such a deviation is permissible only after adopting policy decision based on some rationale”, otherwise the exercise would be arbitrary. Filling up of vacancies over the notified vacancies amounts to filling up of future vacancies and thus, is not permissible in law. (Vide Union of India v. Ishwar Singh Khatri [1992 Supp (3) SCC 84 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 999 : (1992) 21 ATC 851], Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Assn. v. State of Gujarat [1994 Supp (2) SCC 591 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 1159 : (1994) 28 ATC 78], State of Bihar v. Secretariat Asstt. (Vide Union of India v. Ishwar Singh Khatri [1992 Supp (3) SCC 84 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 999 : (1992) 21 ATC 851], Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Assn. v. State of Gujarat [1994 Supp (2) SCC 591 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 1159 : (1994) 28 ATC 78], State of Bihar v. Secretariat Asstt. Successful Examinees Union 1986 [ (1994) 1 SCC 126 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 274 : (1994) 26 ATC 500 : AIR 1994 SC 736 ], Prem Singh v. Haryana SEB [ (1996) 4 SCC 319 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 934] and Ashok Kumar v. Banking Service Recruitment Board [ (1996) 1 SCC 283 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 298 : (1996) 32 ATC 235 : AIR 1996 SC 976 ].) xxx xxx xxx 12. In view of above, the law can be summarised to the effect that any appointment made beyond the number of vacancies advertised is without jurisdiction, being violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India, thus, a nullity, inexecutable and unenforceable in law. In case the vacancies notified stand filled up, the process of selection comes to an end. Waiting list, etc. cannot be used as a reservoir, to fill up the vacancy which comes into existence after the issuance of notification/advertisement. The unexhausted select list/waiting list becomes meaningless and cannot be pressed in service any more.” 24. In Bedanga Talukdar's case (supra) [ (2011) 12 SCC 85 ], it has been held, in para 29 thereof, as follows (see pages 92 and 93 of the SCC report) : “29. We have considered the entire matter in detail. In our opinion, it is too well settled to need any further reiteration that all appointments to public office have to be made in conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In other words, there must be no arbitrariness resulting from any undue favour being shown to any candidate. Therefore, the selection process has to be conducted strictly in accordance with the stipulated selection procedure. Consequently, when a particular schedule is mentioned in an advertisement, the same has to be scrupulously maintained. There cannot be any relaxation in the terms and conditions of the advertisement unless such a power is specifically reserved. Such a power could be reserved in the relevant statutory rules. Even if power of relaxation is provided in the rules, it must still be mentioned in the advertisement. There cannot be any relaxation in the terms and conditions of the advertisement unless such a power is specifically reserved. Such a power could be reserved in the relevant statutory rules. Even if power of relaxation is provided in the rules, it must still be mentioned in the advertisement. In the absence of such power in the rules, it could still be provided in the advertisement. However, the power of relaxation, if exercised, has to be given due publicity. This would be necessary to ensure that those candidates who become eligible due to the relaxation, are afforded an equal opportunity to apply and compete. Relaxation of any condition in advertisement without due publication would be contrary to the mandate of equality contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.” 25. We are fully conscious of the difference in rules of procedure regulating selections as in the instant case, in the State of Kerala, in view of the provisions contained in Rules 13 and 14 of the PSC Rules of Procedure. However, we have referred these decisions only to underscore the jurisprudential basis of the reasonings of those judgments, which is that, the right to equal opportunity for public employment, guaranteed to candidates to get qualified, subsequent to issuance of a selection notification, flows from Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It is precisely the abovesaid aspects that form the bedrock of the jurisprudential foundation laid down by this Court in decisions as in A. Sreekandan Nair & Ors. v. M.K. Muralidharan Nair & Ors. [1991 Lab IC 2163 = 1991 (2) KLT SN 3 (case No.4) = MANU/KE/0647-1991, paras 25 to 28, etc. thereof. So also, we have referred to the abovesaid decisions of the Apex Court in A. Reshma's case (supra) [ (2021) 3 SCC 755 ], to appreciate the specific interpretative approach taken therein by the Apex Court that the rules of selection process should be interpreted in a manner, which is harmonious with the constitutional rights guaranteed for equal opportunity for public employment, given to candidates who qualify subsequently in terms of Arts.14 and 16 as also to be in consonance with the dictum laid down by the Apex Court, etc. The jurisprudential perspectives of the Apex Court in A. Reshma's case (supra) [ (2021) 3 SCC 755 ], should also be examined through the prisms of the abovesaid Rule 7(2) concerned in that case as well as the operative portion of Rule 13 of PSC Rules of Procedure. So also, it has to be appreciated and borne in mind that the abovesaid jurisprudential basis of respecting the constitutional right of equal opportunity for public employment to candidates, who qualify later, is also the very basis of the substantive reasonings rendered by this Court in A. Sreekandan Nair's case (supra) and the various other decisions of this Court as in Sonia Alex's case (supra) [ 2017(4) KLT 774 ], etc. In the light of the above said aspects, we are of the view that the verdict of the Tribunal is not amenable for interference at the hands of this Court in exercise of its power of judicial supervision and superintendence. Accordingly, these petitions fail and both these original petitions will stand dismissed.