ORDER : SENTHILKUMAR RAMAMOORTHY, J. 1. The petitioner was a partner of a joint venture between M/s.Puncak Niaga Holdings Berhad (PNHB), Lanco Infratech Limited (Lanco) and the petitioner (the JV). The JV was formed under a Joint Venture Agreement dated 28.01.2002(the JV Agreement). The JV Agreement was for purposes of bidding for and executing work for the Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board (the CMWSSB) in relation to the Chennai Water Supply Augmentation Project-I. After the execution of the JV Agreement, the parties modified the status of the petitioner under the JV Agreement by entering into an agreement titled Key Terms to the Supplementary Joint Venture Agreement(Key Terms Agreement). By virtue of the Key Terms Agreement, Package 8 under the work awarded to the JV was sub- contracted to the petitioner. Disputes arose between the parties in relation to the sub-contract and these disputes were referred for arbitration. 2. The petitioner was the claimant before the Arbitral Tribunal. By the claim statement, the petitioner raised 34 claims for an aggregate sum of Rs.8,44,26,981/-. The respondent filed a statement of defence along with five counter claims for an aggregate sum of Rs.13,61,61,931/-. On 07.03.2017, the Arbitral Tribunal framed seven issues, which are set out at internal pages 8 and 9 of the arbitral award dated 13.11.2019 (the Award). By the Award, the Arbitral Tribunal allowed four claims and interest thereon: a sum of Rs.36,43,463/- towards payment of final bill; a sum of Rs.11,41,703/- towards the balance refundable as security deposit, after giving credit to the amount of Rs.50,00,000/- deposited earlier; a sum of Rs.21,870/- towards expenses for services; a sum of Rs.2,44,750/- towards expenses for making holes in the pipes; and interest on the above claims at 18% per annum from the date of Award till the date of payment. All the counter claims were rejected. Out of the 30 rejected claims, the petitioner did not assail the Award with regard to two claims. The Award is assailed in respect of about 28 claims. 3. Oral arguments on behalf of the petitioner were advanced by Mr.Anirudh Krishnan, learned counsel, and on behalf of the respondent by Mr.Harishankar Mani, learned counsel. 4. Mr.Anirudh Krishnan submitted that the arbitral proceedings qualify as an international commercial arbitration as per the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996(the Arbitration Act). Therefore, he submitted that the Award is being assailed as being violative of public policy. 4. Mr.Anirudh Krishnan submitted that the arbitral proceedings qualify as an international commercial arbitration as per the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996(the Arbitration Act). Therefore, he submitted that the Award is being assailed as being violative of public policy. According to learned counsel, an award in an international commercial arbitration may be assailed on the same grounds as a domestic award except to the extent that the ground of patent illegality is unavailable. In support of this proposition, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay Karia and Others v. Prysmian Cavie Sistemi SRL and others (Vijay Karia) , 2020 SCC OnLine SC 177 . He also relied upon paragraph 27 of the judgment in Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority (Associate Builders) (2015) 3 SCC 49 ) to contend that an award in an international commercial arbitration may be interfered with if a binding precedent is disregarded and on paragraph 7 of the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Banu Constructions and another (2021) SCC Online Mad 724 for the proposition that reasons for conclusions are vital in an arbitral award and that such award may be interfered with in the absence thereof. 5. According to learned counsel, the Key Terms Agreement incorporated the terms of the agreement between the JV and CMWSSB except with regard to payment and payment terms. In order to substantiate this submission, he referred to Clause 19. By drawing reference to the Award, at internal pages 18 to 22 thereof, he pointed out that the Arbitral Tribunal summarized the delay events and set out discussions and conclusions at internal pages 26 and 27 of the Award in relation to such delay events. As regards delay in handing over the site, learned counsel submitted that the conclusion of the Arbitral Tribunal that such delay is not a compensation event in the contract between the CMWSSB and JV is untenable. Learned counsel further submitted that the conclusion that some of the delay events, such as delay in clearing the community water line, hindrances, obtaining permission for blasting, etc., were not attributable to the respondent is also untenable. 6. Since the delay is not attributable to the petitioner, learned counsel contended that the petitioner is entitled to escalation notwithstanding the clause in the contract stipulating that there shall be no escalation during the currency of the contract. 6. Since the delay is not attributable to the petitioner, learned counsel contended that the petitioner is entitled to escalation notwithstanding the clause in the contract stipulating that there shall be no escalation during the currency of the contract. In support of this contention, learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.N.Satyapalan v. State of Kerala (Satyapalan) , 2006(4) ARB.LR 275 (SC), and the judgment in Assam State Electricity Board and Others v. Buildworth Private Ltd (Assam SEB) , (2017) 8 SCC 146 . Since the above binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court were disregarded, learned counsel submitted that the conclusion of the Arbitral Tribunal at paragraph 4.9.2 of the Award is liable to be interfered with. 7. Learned counsel provided a note with regard to the 34 claims before the Arbitral Tribunal. He pointed out that the Award in respect of claims 3 and 18 are not under challenge. As regards the remaining rejected claims, he submitted that claims categorized as 'B' are claims that were rejected on the basis that the sub-contract is back to back with the contract between the joint venture and CMWSSB. The claims for damages on account of delay are classified as 'D'. The interest claims as 'I'. The claims for loss of profit as 'LP' and other claims as 'O'. 8. With this introduction, learned counsel addressed individual claims. With specific reference to claim-1 relating to quantity of rock excavation, he submitted that the findings at internal pages 28 and 29 of the Award disregard Clauses 5.3 and 5.6 at pages 1389 and 1390 of Volume-III. As regards claim No.5, which relates to rectification of floatation of mild steel (MS) pipes, he submitted that the finding is entirely premised on the assumption that the contract is back-to-back. As regards the claim for re- excavation for M-10 concrete(Claim 13), he submitted that the finding at internal page 44 of the Award contradicts the measurement sheets at page 2599 of Volume - IV. With regard to the claim for refund of deductions(Claim 16) and the claim for EB clearance and re-routing of community waterlines (Claim 21), he submitted that the claims were, once again, rejected entirely on the basis that the contract between the petitioner and the respondent is on back-to-back basis with the contract between the JV and CMWSSB. With regard to the claim for refund of deductions(Claim 16) and the claim for EB clearance and re-routing of community waterlines (Claim 21), he submitted that the claims were, once again, rejected entirely on the basis that the contract between the petitioner and the respondent is on back-to-back basis with the contract between the JV and CMWSSB. According to learned counsel, the loss of profit claims for reduction in scope of mass concrete works for concrete blocks and on account of unoperated bill of quantities (BOQ) items were rejected on the untenable ground that it is an item rate contract. 9. Learned counsel submitted that the interest claims for the pre-reference and pendente lite periods were rejected without intelligible reasons and that only post-award interest was granted. According to learned counsel, the rejection of claim 4 relating to working along waterways, Claim 7 relating to cost towards extra expenses due to oversized pipes and claim 27 relating to removal of pre-stressed concrete (PSC) pipes from other packages were erroneous. He concluded his submissions by pointing out that the Award may be set aside in part by separating the parts of the Award which are unsustainable from those which are not. For this proposition, he relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Judgment in JG Engineers v. Union of India (2011) 5 SCC 758 . 10. In response, Mr.Harishankar Mani submitted that the sub contractor failed to complete the work awarded under package 8. Therefore, a non-completion certificate was issued. This certificate is referred to at internal page 27 of the Award. Learned counsel stated that the contract between the JV and CMWSSB and the contract between the JV and the petitioner were on back-to-back basis. Therefore, the terms of the contract between the JV and CMWSSB were incorporated by reference in the contract with the petitioner. With regard to the nature of back-to-back contracts, he relied on the judgment of the Singapore High Court in Gib Automation Pte Ltd v. Deluge Fire Protection (SEA) Pte Ltd [2007] SGHC 48 (Gib Automation) , particularly paragraphs 45, 48 and 50 thereof. As per the terms of the contract, he submitted that a three-tiered dispute resolution mechanism is provided. In the first instance, all claims are required to be submitted to the Engineer, a person defined in the contract, for consideration. As per the terms of the contract, he submitted that a three-tiered dispute resolution mechanism is provided. In the first instance, all claims are required to be submitted to the Engineer, a person defined in the contract, for consideration. If dissatisfied with the decision of the Engineer, the contractor has the option of raising a dispute with the Adjudicator (also a defined person in the contract). Any party dissatisfied with the decision of the Adjudicator may refer such dispute to an arbitral tribunal. In the case on hand, he submitted that the petitioner failed to adhere to the dispute resolution mechanism specified in the contract. On this ground, he submitted that the claims were liable to be rejected, and that the Award does not call for interference. 11. Without prejudice to the above preliminary objection, learned counsel submitted that a BOQ was annexed to the contract. In respect of each primary item in the BOQ, all ancillary work was specified under a separate BOQ item which followed the primary item. Most of the claims made by the petitioner related to works ancillary to the respective primary item of work. Therefore, he submitted that the petitioner is not entitled to such claims. The next contention of learned counsel was that the force majeure claims are liable to be rejected because the petitioner failed to provide the requisite notification in accordance with the force majeure clause. The last submission of learned counsel was that the claims of the petitioner related to execution of work. Unless such claims were raised during execution of work before the Engineer, it is not possible to consider and adjudicate such claims before the Arbitral Tribunal. By relying on the judgment in The Project Director, National Highways No.45 E and 220 v. M. Hakeem and another (2021) 9 SCC 1 , he submitted that an arbitral award cannot be modified. In support of the submission that no interference is called for under the circumstances, learned counsel placed reliance on paragraph 83 of Vijay Karia and on Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC 131 , to underscore the limited scope of interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. 12. By way of rejoinder, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that several claims were rejected largely or solely on the ground that the contracts are on back-to-back basis. 12. By way of rejoinder, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that several claims were rejected largely or solely on the ground that the contracts are on back-to-back basis. By relying on paragraph 10 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Zonal General Manager, Ircon International Ltd. v. Vinay Heavy Equipments and others (Vinay Heavy Equipments), MANU/TN/7590/2006, he submitted that back-to-back contracts are of different kinds. Specifically, he submitted that this contract is not on back-to-back basis as regards payment and payment terms. With regard to the contention that the claims relate to ancillary work, he submitted that the Award does not contain a finding that the claims were rejected because the claims related to works ancillary to the primary work and were covered by the BOQ. 13. As regards the three-tiered dispute resolution mechanism, he placed reliance on the judgment in M/s . Mitra Guha Builders (India) Company v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited, (2020) 3 SCC 222 , and Harsha Constructions v. Union of India and Ors., (2014) 9 SCC 246 , and submitted that parties waived such three-tiered mechanism by conduct. He also submitted that such objection was not raised before the Arbitral Tribunal. In conclusion, learned counsel referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dyna Technologies Private Limited v. M/s.Crompton Greaves Limited ( Dyna Technologies), 2019 SCC Online SC 1656, particularly paragraphs 36 and 37 thereof, and submitted that an award in an international commercial arbitration may be interfered with if such award is unintelligible. He reiterated, in conclusion, that the Award in respect of several claims is unintelligible. 14. The rival contentions are required to be examined closely from the perspective of deciding whether the petitioner has made out a case warranting interference with an award in an international commercial arbitration under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner conceded, in fairness, that such award can be assailed, on merits, only on the ground that it violates public policy and not on the ground that it is patently illegal. This position was clarified in Vijay Karia , in paragraph 43, in relevant part, as follows: “43. It will be noticed that in the context of challenge to domestic awards, Section 34 of the Arbitration Act differentiates between international commercial arbitrations held in India and other arbitrations held in India. This position was clarified in Vijay Karia , in paragraph 43, in relevant part, as follows: “43. It will be noticed that in the context of challenge to domestic awards, Section 34 of the Arbitration Act differentiates between international commercial arbitrations held in India and other arbitrations held in India. So far as “the public policy of India” ground is concerned, both Sections 34 and 48 are now identical, so that in an international commercial arbitration conducted in India, the ground of challenge relating to “public policy of India” would be the same as the ground of resisting enforcement of a foreign award in India. Why it is important to advert to this feature of the 2015 Amendment Act is that all grounds relating to patent illegality appearing on the face of the award are outside the scope of interference with international commercial arbitration awards made in India and foreign awards whose enforcement is resisted in India....” 15. In support of the contention that the Award contravenes public policy, learned counsel relied on Dyna Technologies and submitted that the Award is unintelligible. Learned counsel also relied on Vijay Karia and paragraph 27 of Associate Builders. The expression public policy in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act was re-defined by Act 3 of 2016 and is extracted below: S.34 (2)(b)(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. [Explanation 1.—For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if,— (i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81; or (ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or (iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. Explanation 2.—For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.] In Explanation 1 to Section 34(2), it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India only in three circumstances. The first circumstance is if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption. The first circumstance is if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption. It is not the case of the petitioner herein that the Award is tainted on grounds of fraud or corruption. The second circumstance specified in Explanation 1 is if the award is in contravention of the fundamental policy of India. The third circumstance is if the award is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. The petitioner did not canvass the proposition that the Award is in conflict with the basic notions of morality or justice. Therefore, the Award should be tested from the perspective of deciding whether it contravenes the fundamental policy of Indian law. 16. The limited scope of challenge under the public policy ground under Section 34, especially after the entry into force of Act 3 of 2016, is evident from paragraph 88 of Vijay Karia, which, in relevant part, reads as under: “88....The fundamental policy of Indian law, as has been held in Renusagar, must amount to a breach of some legal principle or legislation which is so basic to Indian law that it is not susceptible of being compromised. “Fundamental Policy” refers to the core values of India's public policy as a nation, which may find expression not only in statutes but also time- honoured, hallowed principles which are followed by the courts. Judged from this point of view, it is clear that resistance to the enforcement of a foreign award cannot be made on this ground.” Effectively, unless the Award contravenes a fundamental and non-derogable principle or core value, whether enshrined in statute or otherwise, setting aside the Award is not warranted. Indeed, even an erroneous interpretation of the law would not qualify as a ground to set aside the Award. This dispute should be decided by bearing in mind the nature of jurisdiction being exercised. At the outset, the preliminary objection of the respondent that the contractual mechanism for dispute resolution was not adhered to is addressed. 17. On perusal of the terms of contract, it is clear that the contract envisages the decision of the Engineer on issues relating to execution of work. It enables the contractor to assail the decision of the Engineer before the Adjudicator. The contract further enables either party to assail the Adjudicator's decision before an arbitral tribunal. 17. On perusal of the terms of contract, it is clear that the contract envisages the decision of the Engineer on issues relating to execution of work. It enables the contractor to assail the decision of the Engineer before the Adjudicator. The contract further enables either party to assail the Adjudicator's decision before an arbitral tribunal. With reference to these clauses, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the claims should be rejected because the petitioner/contractor did not adhere to the contractually mandated dispute resolution mechanism. On examining the pleadings before the Arbitral Tribunal, it appears that the respondent did not raise this objection in its statement of defence. Instead, the respondent even made counter claims. The Arbitral Tribunal also did not examine this issue because parties did not raise this issue. This objection does not relate to jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal over the subject of the claims. Put differently, it is not the respondent's contention that the adjudication of these claims is outside the scope of the arbitration clause. The respondent's contention is that these claims were not raised in the manner prescribed by contract and, therefore, are inadmissible. An objection as to inadmissibility, as opposed to fundamental jurisdictional objections, cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time before the arbitration court. Besides, by raising counter claims without resorting to the three-tiered process, the respondent waived its right to raise this objection and acquiesced in the adjudication by the Arbitral Tribunal. For such reasons, this preliminary objection is rejected. Before concluding the discussion on this issue, it should also be recognized that only work related claims may be put through the three-tiered dispute resolution process and some of the claims before the Arbitral Tribunal, such as claims for loss of profit, could not, in any event, have been raised before the Engineer and Adjudicator under the contract. Having dealt with the preliminary objection, the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on individual claims is examined next. 18. The claim for escalation(Claim 9) is dealt with first. The petitioner raised a claim for a sum of Rs.60,43,619/-. This claim was rejected. The letter of award of the sub-contract provides as under in clause 1 thereof: “ 1. Bills of Quantities Except for fixed lump sum item, the Bills of Quantities as attached in Appendix 1 are to be taken as provisional quantities. The petitioner raised a claim for a sum of Rs.60,43,619/-. This claim was rejected. The letter of award of the sub-contract provides as under in clause 1 thereof: “ 1. Bills of Quantities Except for fixed lump sum item, the Bills of Quantities as attached in Appendix 1 are to be taken as provisional quantities. The actual final quantities shall be ascertained by joint measurement upon the completion of the Works. However, the rates for respective items in the Bills of Quantities shall remain as firm rates to be applied for the calculation of the final Contract Sum irrespective of the final quantity and this firm rates are not subjected to any cost escalation during the currency of this Contract.” The main contract deals with escalation in Clause 5 of Part-IV of the Special Conditions of Contract. The said clause is set out below:- '' 5. Rates The Contractor shall particularly note that the accepted rates of the various items shall be inclusive of all incidental charges such as bailing by manual labour, dewatering, shoring etc. if found necessary during the execution and no extra shall be due therefore on any account during the currency of the contract, unless stated other wise. ''(emphasis added). In respect of this claim, the petitioner set out the relevant delay events. After attributing responsibility for such delay events to the respondent, the petitioner relied upon a formula purportedly based on the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) price indices. On that basis, an aggregate escalation claim of Rs.60,43,619/- was made for the period running from January 2004 to December 2004. The respondent refuted the claim on the ground that the contract stipulates that the rates are firm. The findings of the Arbitral Tribunal on this issue are set out below: “ 4.9.2. Discussion and findings of the Tribunal: The contract between CMWSSB and Respondent (PLK JV) does not provide for price escalation. The Tribunal observes that the delay events were not attributable to the PLK JV. There was also no evidence that the claims were made before the CMWSSB (Principle (sic)Employer) for the alleged delay by the employer and claim obtained by the respondent wherein the claimant was also a party. The Tribunal observes that the delay events were not attributable to the PLK JV. There was also no evidence that the claims were made before the CMWSSB (Principle (sic)Employer) for the alleged delay by the employer and claim obtained by the respondent wherein the claimant was also a party. Further the contract between the Employer and the JV specifically stipulates that the rates and prices quoted by the bidder shall be fixed for the duration of the contract and shall not be subject adjustment on any account. Being a back to back contract the claimant is not entitled for the claim which was not fought and obtained from the CMWSSB. Hence the claim is rejected.” 19. From the above, it is noticeable that the Arbitral Tribunal assigned about three reasons to reject the claim. The first of these is based on the finding that the contract between CMWSSB and the JV does not provide for price escalation. This finding is based on an interpretation of clause 5, which is extracted supra, especially the portion emphasised. While it is conceivable that an arbitral tribunal could have interpreted clause 5 as being applicable only during the original term of the contract and not thereafter, it certainly cannot be said that the Arbitral Tribunal's interpretation is outside the spectrum of reasonable or credible interpretations. The Arbitral Tribunal also concluded that the delay events were not attributable to the JV. This finding is based on an appraisal of the evidence related to delay events and cannot be characterised as being violative of the fundamental policy of Indian law. The third reason was that the petitioner did not provide evidence that an escalation claim was raised before CMWSSB. While this reason is not convincing, it is only one of three reasons. Thus, the petitioner's claim was rejected by interpreting the relevant contractual clause in the context of a factual finding that the respondent was not responsible for the delay. 20. The petitioner relied on Satyapalan and Assam SEB to contend that these binding precedents were disregarded. Satyapalan was decided under the Arbitration Act, 1940. In that case, the arbitral tribunal granted the escalation claim of the contractor although the supplementary agreement between the parties did not permit such claim. 20. The petitioner relied on Satyapalan and Assam SEB to contend that these binding precedents were disregarded. Satyapalan was decided under the Arbitration Act, 1940. In that case, the arbitral tribunal granted the escalation claim of the contractor although the supplementary agreement between the parties did not permit such claim. After noticing that the contractor was prevented by unforeseen circumstances from completing work within time, the Supreme Court concluded that the grant of escalation was justified in those circumstances. Assam SEB also arose under the Arbitration Act, 1940 and, there, the arbitral tribunal had taken into account both delay attributable to the contractor and employer and eventually granted escalation for increase in prices beyond the scheduled contract period. Neither of these precedents hold that escalation should be granted even if the arbitral tribunal concludes that the delay is attributable to the contractor. Additionally, these judgments do not instruct that a reasonable interpretation of a contractual provision by an arbitral tribunal may be interfered with. Indeed, all precedents indicate otherwise. In the circumstances, the conclusion of the Arbitral Tribunal on escalation does not warrant interference. 21. About 11 claims were rejected at least partly because the principal contract (between CMWSSB and the JV) and the sub-contract (between the JV and the petitioner) were on back-to-back basis. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on Vinay Heavy Equipments to contend that back-to-back contracts are of different kinds and that the payment terms of the sub- contract were not on back-to-back basis. On this issue, learned counsel for the respondent relied on Jib Automation. Vinay Heavy Equipments dealt with a similar situation, as in the present case, where the appellant/main contractor contended that its liability to its sub-contractor was co-extensive with the liability of the employer to the main contractor. This contention was rejected by the arbitral tribunal and, thereafter, by the courts at each level of challenge with the Supreme Court concluding that the jural relationship was only between the sub-contractor and contractor. Jib Automation holds that the relevant contracts should be examined to determine how much of the main contract is incorporated by reference in the sub-contract. Thus, in substance, the judgments relied upon by both parties point in the same direction. 22. The letter of award of the sub-contract contains payment terms as clause 3 thereof. Jib Automation holds that the relevant contracts should be examined to determine how much of the main contract is incorporated by reference in the sub-contract. Thus, in substance, the judgments relied upon by both parties point in the same direction. 22. The letter of award of the sub-contract contains payment terms as clause 3 thereof. Clause 3 consists of the heads: advance, excavation and bedding, pipe laying and specials and all other civil works. By way of illustration, the payment terms for “all other civil works” is set out below: ''iv) All other Civil Works 90% of payment shall be released on pro rata monthly basis against certification by CMWSSB representative/PLK JV. This percentage shall be adjusted once the approved progress of work has exceeded 80% for the purpose of full recoupment from KHEC of the advance as scheduled in item 3 (i) above and thereafter it shall be adjusted to be 95%. 5% of the certified value shall be retained as retention and shall be released after the completion of Defects Liability Period. However, KHEC can get this money released upon submission of Bank Guarantee for equal amount along with the final bill.” The letter of award ends with the following: “This is an Item Rate Contract and the payment will be made based on actual quantity executed and certified by CMWSSB. All other terms and conditions will be back-to-back as per CMWSSB Order on PLK JV.” If the payment terms in clause 3 of the letter of award are read with the above clause, the inference that follows is that payment to the petitioner is not contingent on receipt of payment by the JV from CMWSSB but is contingent on certification by CMWSSB. It is also clear that all other terms in the main contract are incorporated by reference in the sub-contract. The individual claims and their determination by the Arbitral Tribunal should be examined against this contractual backdrop. 23. Claim No.1 related to the quantity of rock excavation. According to the petitioner/claimant, 26,683.62 cum of rock was excavated, whereas payments were made for a quantity of 14,465.91 cum. Therefore, the claim is for the alleged differential quantity of 12,217.71 cum. In order to substantiate this claim, the claimant relied on clauses 5.2, 5.3 and 5.6 of the contract between CMWSSB and the respondent. According to the petitioner/claimant, 26,683.62 cum of rock was excavated, whereas payments were made for a quantity of 14,465.91 cum. Therefore, the claim is for the alleged differential quantity of 12,217.71 cum. In order to substantiate this claim, the claimant relied on clauses 5.2, 5.3 and 5.6 of the contract between CMWSSB and the respondent. The respondent contended that the quantity of excavated rock was measured and certified by the certifying authority, MECON. After considering the rival contentions, the Arbitral Tribunal recorded a finding that rock excavation consisting of soil and rock is usually measured by stacking the rock, and that MECON adopted the said method, measured the quantity and issued the payment certificate. The Arbitral Tribunal also noticed that the JV made a claim on CMWSSB on this basis, received payment and, in turn, paid the petitioner. The petitioner's claim was rejected for the above reasons. Given that the payment terms in the sub-contract are contingent on certification by CMWSSB, which certification was done by MECON, this conclusion cannot be construed as unintelligible and does not call for interference. 24. The next claim in this category is the claim for rectification of floatation of MS Pipes. The petitioner/claimant contended that it incurred a loss of Rs.15,74,800/- to rectify the floatation of MS Pipes and that such loss was due to delay in obtaining permission for importing suitable earth for back filling purposes. The respondent contended that the delay in back filling was attributable to the petitioner/claimant and rectification was required because the petitioner did not adhere to the conditions with regard to not excavating more than 100 metres of pipe trench prior to pipe laying. The Arbitral Tribunal concluded that the sequence of trench and pipe line work was decided by MECON. The Arbitral Tribunal further held that the directions of CMWSSB/MECON were required to be followed by the petitioner. The Arbitral Tribunal also held that the petitioner did not establish that this claim had been made before CMWSSB. The claim was rejected for the above reasons. The Arbitral Tribunal cannot be faulted for concluding that the terms and conditions relating to the sequence, manner of excavation and laying of pipe line was specified in the contract between CMWSSB and the respondent. The petitioner appears to have relied upon Exs.C-148, C-260, C-262 and C-270. Ex.C-260 is a communication from the petitioner to the respondent. The Arbitral Tribunal cannot be faulted for concluding that the terms and conditions relating to the sequence, manner of excavation and laying of pipe line was specified in the contract between CMWSSB and the respondent. The petitioner appears to have relied upon Exs.C-148, C-260, C-262 and C-270. Ex.C-260 is a communication from the petitioner to the respondent. In the said communication, the petitioner alleges that pipe floatation occurred due to floating of sub soil/water inside the pipe trench. In response, the respondent relied upon several documents which are set out at internal page 33 of the Award. Upon examining the submissions, the Arbitral Tribunal recorded the above findings at paragraph 4.5.2 of the Award. No case is made out for interference therewith. 25. The next claim on which the petitioner focused was the claim for re-excavation for M-10 concrete. As regards this claim, the Arbitral Tribunal recorded the petitioner/claimant's contention that the quantity of work executed in erecting Type - B and Type - C concrete blocks over the pipe line was 5440.099 cum, but the certified quantity was only 3,694.577 cum. A claim of Rs.1,54,810/- was made towards the differential quantity. According to the respondent, the petitioner did not carry out the concreting work and only completed 2,354.738 cum. Upon considering these contentions, the Arbitral Tribunal rejected the claim for two reasons. The first reason is that the work was carried out as per the instructions of CMWSSB / MECON. The second reason is that the measurements recorded and certified by MECON were accepted by the petitioner. Since payments were made as per MECON's certification and the payment terms also provided for certification-based payment, no case is made out to interfere with this finding. 26. Claim No.16 related to refund of allegedly unreasonable deductions. The Arbitral Tribunal examined this claim at internal pages 47 to 51 of the Award. The alleged eleven deductions were set out and explained by the Arbitral Tribunal. The responses of the respondent with regard to the eleven deductions were also set out. As regards items 1 to 10, the Arbitral Tribunal recorded findings that responsibility is imposed on the petitioner/claimant in respect thereof. The Arbitral Tribunal further recorded that some of the claims are an afterthought. As regards Item No.8, it was recorded that the claimant did not follow all statutory requirements. As regards items 1 to 10, the Arbitral Tribunal recorded findings that responsibility is imposed on the petitioner/claimant in respect thereof. The Arbitral Tribunal further recorded that some of the claims are an afterthought. As regards Item No.8, it was recorded that the claimant did not follow all statutory requirements. As regards item No.10, it was recorded that the claimant did not support the claim with evidence. With regard to item No.11, the Arbitral Tribunal recorded that the contracts are back to back and that certified measurements cannot be revisited. Although the petitioner is correct in contending that the contract between the petitioner and the JV did not stipulate that payments to the petitioner were contingent on receipt of payment by the respondent from CMWSSB, the other reason cited by the Tribunal, namely, that certified measurements cannot be re-visited or verified is an acceptable conclusion. Hence, no interference is called for. 27. Learned counsel for the petitioner also focused on Claim No.21, which relates to EB clearance and re-routing. According to the petitioner/claimant, there were EB installations such as transformers, electric posts, light posts, junction boxes and a community waterline. These installations had to be removed or re-located. The claim is towards alleged expenses incurred in such regard. The respondent stated that removal of such hindrances was within the scope of the claimant. The petitioner/claimant further stated that the respondent had withheld 5% from the contract price towards this kind of coordination between the petitioner and agencies such as the Electricity Board. This contention was expressly rejected on the ground that the 5% is towards preliminary and general expenses. The Arbitral Tribunal also referred to the failure of the claimant to establish that the respondent had received payment with regard to this claim from CMWSSB. Although the latter finding is not entirely convincing, in view of the earlier finding, no interference is warranted. 28. Claim 29 relates to expenses incurred on account of collection of quarry dust for back filling in low lying areas. This claim was considered by the Arbitral Tribunal at internal pages 64 and 65 of the Award. According to the petitioner/claimant, initially, a decision was taken to back fill low lying areas with imported quarry dust and that the claimant collected 79,095 cum of quarry dust. The decision was changed subsequently and concrete blocks were used instead. The claim is towards cost of collecting quarry dust. According to the petitioner/claimant, initially, a decision was taken to back fill low lying areas with imported quarry dust and that the claimant collected 79,095 cum of quarry dust. The decision was changed subsequently and concrete blocks were used instead. The claim is towards cost of collecting quarry dust. The respondent asserted that the claimant delayed the collection of quarry dust and that the pipe line area became waterlogged due to the onset of monsoon. This necessitated a change to concrete blocks at the instance of MECON. The Arbitral Tribunal noticed that MECON had suggested and advised the use of concrete encasement in the circumstances and that the claimant was responsible for the delay in back filling. The said findings are based on a reasonable appraisal of the evidence on record and do not warrant interference. 29. The next claim on which attention was focused was the claim towards wasteful resource mobilization due to non-execution of gabion works in Vikravandi low lying area. According to the petitioner/claimant, a quantity of 81.351 cum of gabion materials and 40 truckloads of stone boulders were mobilized along with 35 workers to take up gabion works. But the works were abandoned as per the directions of MECON. The respondent stated that MECON opted for concrete encasement because the above work was delayed by the claimant and the monsoon set in. Once again, the Arbitral Tribunal concluded that the petitioner/claimant is not entitled to this claim because it was responsible for the delay in back filling, which, in turn, necessitated the shift to concrete encasement. No interference is warranted with this finding. 30. Claim Nos.26 and 32 related to alleged loss of profit due to reduction in scope of mass concrete works for concrete blocks and non operation of BOQ items. Claim 26 was dealt with by the Arbitral Tribunal at internal pages 61 and 62 of the Award. This claim was made on the ground that the quantity of mass concrete work was reduced from 4,660 cum to 2535.00 cum. The respondent stated that the change to concrete blocks was made because of the delay by the claimant in completing back filling before the monsoon. 31. This claim was made on the ground that the quantity of mass concrete work was reduced from 4,660 cum to 2535.00 cum. The respondent stated that the change to concrete blocks was made because of the delay by the claimant in completing back filling before the monsoon. 31. Before examining the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal, it is necessary to recall the provisions in the letter of award(i.e. clause 1 and the final clause), both of which were set out supra, and stipulate that the quantities specified in the BOQ are provisional and that the contract is an item rate contract for which payment would be made based on actual quantities executed and certified by CMWSSB. In addition, I set out below the relevant contractual provision from the preamble to the BOQ: “1.3. Quantities given in the annexed Bill of Quantities for the various items are approximate only and are given to provide a common basis for tendering. The basis of payment will be the actual quantities of work ordered and carried out, as measured by the Engineer and valued at the rates or prices quoted in the Bills of Quantities where applicable, and otherwise at such rates for price as may be fixed within terms of the contract.” 32. The Arbitral Tribunal considered the petitioner/claimant's contention and held that the petitioner/claimant is not entitled to this claim because it is an item rate contract. Put differently, the Arbitral Tribunal concluded that, in an item rate contract, the contractor is only entitled to payment based on the quantity of work executed as per measurement. This finding is in consonance with the clauses extracted above and contains no infirmity. Claim No.32 was dealt with by the Arbitral Tribunal at internal page 68 of the Award. According to the petitioner/claimant, several BOQ items were not operated and that the petitioner suffered a loss of profit to the extent of Rs.37,88,357/- on this account. The respondent stated that it is an item rate contract and that the payment is based on actual quantity of work executed. The respondent's contention was accepted by the Tribunal, which recorded that payment is to be made at the BOQ rate for actual quantity of work executed. This finding cannot be regarded as contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law. 33. The petitioner/claimant made a claim for Rs.1,91,03,831/- for working along waterways. The respondent's contention was accepted by the Tribunal, which recorded that payment is to be made at the BOQ rate for actual quantity of work executed. This finding cannot be regarded as contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law. 33. The petitioner/claimant made a claim for Rs.1,91,03,831/- for working along waterways. This claim was made on the basis that the alignment of the pipe line was altered and, as a consequence, the pipes had to be laid along a water course for a considerable length. If laid along a water course, the claimant asserted that it falls within the scope of BOQ item 18 which prescribes the rate of Rs.1230.87 per sq.m. The respondent stated that the pipe line work was not along the water course. Except for a quantity of 55.55 sq. meters, which was certified by MECON, it was stated that this claim is not tenable. The Arbitral Tribunal recorded a finding that the extra rate under BOQ item 18 is applicable only in the case of a natural stream and not for dewatering of trenches and low lying areas. The Arbitral Tribunal further recorded that the claim was paid based on the certification by MECON. These conclusions cannot be construed as unintelligible or contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law and do not call for interference. 34. The petitioner/claimant also contended that the rejection of claim 7 towards extra expenses due to over sized pipes calls for interference. According to the claimant, extra welding was required because of the size of the pipes supplied by the respondent. In response, the respondent stated that the pipes comply with the prescribed specifications and are not oversized. The Arbitral Tribunal recorded that the size of pipes was accepted by CMWSSB / MECON and, therefore, the claim is liable to be rejected. The petitioner next focused on claim No.27. This claim relates to alleged additional expenses incurred for removal of PSC pipes from other packages. The claimant stated that it was required to remove PSC pipes lying along trenches between chainage 43500 to 71000, which were stacked within the radius of 50 kms. Since PSC pipes were not available between the above mentioned chainages, the claimant stated that it had to use PSC Pipes from package 5 and 6. The respondent stated that the claimant did not complete work and is not entitled to this claim. Since PSC pipes were not available between the above mentioned chainages, the claimant stated that it had to use PSC Pipes from package 5 and 6. The respondent stated that the claimant did not complete work and is not entitled to this claim. The Arbitral Tribunal held that the respondent was not responsible for the delay events and that the contract being an item rate contract, the claimant was paid for all executed work. This finding is also unexceptionable. 35. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that interest was awarded only in the post award period. On this issue, the Arbitral Tribunal noticed and recorded that, in a Section 37 order arising out of an interim order under Section 17, this Court directed the respondent, by order dated 08.12.2008, to create an interest bearing fixed deposit for a sum of Rs.50 lakhs as security for the final bill and refund of security deposit. After also recording that the petitioner/claimant is entitled to interest accruals on this amount, the Arbitral Tribunal noticed that a sum of Rs.61,41,703 was payable to the petitioner by way of refund of security deposit. Therefore, the respondent was directed to pay the remainder of Rs.11,41,703, after giving credit to the fixed deposit amount of Rs.50,00,000/-, with interest thereon only in the post award period. Under Section 31(7) of the Arbitration Act, the Arbitral Tribunal has considerable discretion with regard to the grant of interest if the relevant contract, such as in this case, does not provide for or govern interest. Although the denial of interest in the pre-reference and pendente lite periods on amounts awarded towards the final bill is not entirely justified by the reason set out in the Award, it does not lead to the conclusion that the Award is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law. Hence, I decline to interfere. 36. In the result, the petitioner/claimant has failed to establish that the Award is contrary to public policy. Therefore, O.P.No.488 of 2020 is dismissed. In this circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.