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2023 DIGILAW 527 (HP)

Surinder Singh v. Dharam Singh

2023-12-14

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2023
JUDGMENT : (Rakesh Kainthla, J.) The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. against the order dated 06.11.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Poanta Sahib in case No. 299 of 2023, titled Surinder Singh Vs. Dharam Singh, whereby the application for an extension of time for complying with the order dated 28.06.2023 was dismissed. It has been asserted that the petitioner was convicted by the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 (in short N.I.Act). He was sentenced to undergo six months of simple imprisonment and directed to pay compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) to the complainant. He filed an appeal and an application for suspension of his sentence under Section 389 of Cr.P.C. The learned Appellate Court suspended the sentence subject to furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court and also to deposit 20% of the compensation amount within two months from the date of the order. The petitioner could not comply with the order and sought extension of time, which was granted to him. The petitioner again could not comply with the order and he filed another application for seeking more time, however, this application was dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate court wrongly construed the provisions of the N.I.Act and held that no further time could be granted. It failed to appreciate that petitioner could not comply with the order on the genuine ground. In case the petitioner is sent to jail for non-compliance of the order dated 28.06.2023, he would be unable to arrange the requisite amount. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Appellate Court Sahib be set aside. 2. I have heard Mr. V.S. Chauhan, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Rajul Chauhan, learned counsel, for the petitioner and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent no.2. 3. Mr. V.S.Chauhan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments of Solar4Max Com vs. Oxide Power Product Pvt. Ltd. 2021(1) Civil Court Cases 232 and Ravinder Kumar Vs. V.S. Chauhan, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Rajul Chauhan, learned counsel, for the petitioner and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent no.2. 3. Mr. V.S.Chauhan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments of Solar4Max Com vs. Oxide Power Product Pvt. Ltd. 2021(1) Civil Court Cases 232 and Ravinder Kumar Vs. Salamudeen AIR Online 2020 P&H 144 to submit that the High Court has the power to extend the time under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and time be extended. 4. Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General supported the order passed by the learned First Appellate Court and submitted that no interference is required with the same. 5. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at Bar and have gone through the records carefully. 6. Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides that in an appeal by the drawer against conviction under Section 138, the Appellate Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent of the fine or compensation awarded by the Trial Court. This amount shall be deposited within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the appellant. Xxxxx 8. It is apparent from the bare reading of the Section that the amount has to be deposited within 60 days, which time can be extended by 30 days on showing sufficient cause. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Suridner Singh Deshwal vs Virender Gandhi & another 2019 (11) SCC 341 , that Section 148 of the N.I.Act was introduced to avoid the delaying tactics of the drawers due to easy filing of an appeal and obtaining the stay of the proceedings. This was frustrating the very purpose of enactment of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881; therefore, the Parliament decided to provide that 20% amount shall be deposited by the appellant:- 6.2. This was frustrating the very purpose of enactment of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881; therefore, the Parliament decided to provide that 20% amount shall be deposited by the appellant:- 6.2. While considering the aforesaid issue/question, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the NI Act, as amended by way of Amendment Act 20 of 2018 and Section 148 of the NI Act as amended, are required to be referred to and considered, which read as under: “The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (the Act) was enacted to define and amend the law relating to Promissory Notes, Bills of Exchange and Cheques. The said Act has been amended from time to time so as to provide, inter alia, speedy disposal of cases relating to the offence of dishonour of cheques. However, the Central Government has been receiving several representations from the public including the trading community relating to the pendency of cheque dishonour cases. This is because of delay tactics of unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due to the easy filing of appeals and obtaining stay on proceedings. As a result of this, injustice is caused to the payee of a dishonoured cheque who has to spend considerable time and resources in court proceedings to realise the value of the cheque. Such delays compromise the sanctity of cheque transactions. 2. It is proposed to amend the said Act with a view to address the issue of undue delay in final resolution of cheque dishonour cases so as to provide relief to payees of dishonoured cheques and to discourage frivolous and unnecessary litigation which would save time and money. The proposed amendments will strengthen the credibility of cheques and help trade and commerce in general by allowing lending institutions, including banks, to continue to extend financing to the productive sectors of the economy. 3. It is, therefore, proposed to introduce the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Bill, 2017 to provide, inter alia, for the following, namely— (i) to insert a new Section 143-A in the said Act to provide that the court trying an offence under Section 138, may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant, in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and in any other case, upon framing of charge. The interim compensation so payable shall be such sum not exceeding twenty per cent of the amount of the cheque; and (ii) to insert a new Section 148 in the said Act so as to provide that in an appeal by the drawer against conviction under Section 138, the appellate court may order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court. 4. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.” *** 7.1. Having observed and found that because of the delay tactics of unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due to easy filing of appeals and obtaining stay on proceedings, the object and purpose of the enactment of Section 138 of the NI Act was being frustrated, Parliament has thought it fit to amend Section 148 of the NI Act, by which the first appellate court, in an appeal challenging the order of conviction under Section 138 of the NI Act, is conferred with the power to direct the convicted appellant-accused to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court. By the amendment in Section 148 of the NI Act, it cannot be said that any vested right of appeal of the appellant-accused has been taken away and/or affected. Therefore, submission on behalf of the appellants that amendment in Section 148 of the NI Act shall not be made applicable retrospectively and more particularly with respect to cases/complaints filed prior to 1-9-2018 shall not be applicable has no substance and cannot be accepted, as by amendment in Section 148 of the NI Act, no substantive right of appeal has been taken away and/or affected. Therefore the decisions of this Court in Garikapati Veeraya [Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540 ] and Videocon International Ltd. [Videocon International Ltd. v. SEBI, (2015) 4 SCC 33 ], relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. Therefore the decisions of this Court in Garikapati Veeraya [Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540 ] and Videocon International Ltd. [Videocon International Ltd. v. SEBI, (2015) 4 SCC 33 ], relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. Therefore, considering the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the NI Act stated hereinabove, on a purposive interpretation of Section 148 of the NI Act as amended, we are of the opinion that Section 148 of the NI Act as amended, shall be applicable in respect of the appeals against the order of conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, even in a case where the criminal complaints for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act were filed prior to Amendment Act 20 of 2018 i.e. prior to 1-9-2018. If such a purposive interpretation is not adopted, in that case, the object and purpose of amendment in Section 148 of the NI Act would be frustrated. Therefore, as such, no error has been committed by the learned first appellate court directing the appellants to deposit 25% of the amount of fine/compensation as imposed by the learned trial court considering Section 148 of the NI Act, as amended. 8. Therefore, as such, no error has been committed by the learned first appellate court directing the appellants to deposit 25% of the amount of fine/compensation as imposed by the learned trial court considering Section 148 of the NI Act, as amended. 8. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants that even considering the language used in Section 148 of the NI Act as amended, the appellate court “may” order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court and the word used is not “shall” and therefore the discretion is vested with the first appellate court to direct the appellant-accused to deposit such sum and the appellate court has construed it as mandatory, which according to the learned Senior Advocate for the appellants would be contrary to the provisions of Section 148 of the NI Act as amended is concerned, considering the amended Section 148 of the NI Act as a whole to be read with the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amending Section 148 of the NI Act, though it is true that in the amended Section 148 of the NI Act, the word used is “may”, it is generally to be construed as a “rule” or “shall” and not to direct to deposit by the appellate court is an exception for which special reasons are to be assigned. Therefore amended Section 148 of the NI Act confers power upon the appellate court to pass an order pending appeal to direct the appellant-accused to deposit the sum which shall not be less than 20% of the fine or compensation either on an application filed by the original complainant or even on the application filed by the appellant-accused under Section 389 CrPC to suspend the sentence. The aforesaid is required to be construed considering the fact that as per the amended Section 148 of the NI Act, a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court is directed to be deposited and that such amount is to be deposited within a period of 60 days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding 30 days as may be directed by the appellate court for sufficient cause shown by the appellant. Therefore, if amended Section 148 of the NI Act is purposively interpreted in such a manner it would serve the Objects and Reasons of not only amendment in Section 148 of the NI Act, but also Section 138 of the NI Act. The Negotiable Instruments Act has been amended from time to time so as to provide, inter alia, speedy disposal of cases relating to the offence of the dishonour of cheques. So as to see that due to delay tactics by the unscrupulous drawers of the dishonoured cheques due to easy filing of the appeals and obtaining a stay in the proceedings, an injustice was caused to the payee of a dishonoured cheque who has to spend considerable time and resources in the court proceedings to realise the value of the cheque and having observed that such delay has compromised the sanctity of the cheque transactions, Parliament has thought it fit to amend Section 148 of the NI Act. Therefore, such a purposive interpretation would be in furtherance of the Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the NI Act and also Section 138 of the NI Act.” 10. The Punjab and Haryana High Court considered this provision in Harwinder Singh Vs. Mohan Lal AIR Online 2021 P&H 1555, and held that the Court has power to extend the time by 30 days but this time cannot be extended beyond 90 days. It was observed: “18. The Punjab and Haryana High Court considered this provision in Harwinder Singh Vs. Mohan Lal AIR Online 2021 P&H 1555, and held that the Court has power to extend the time by 30 days but this time cannot be extended beyond 90 days. It was observed: “18. A perusal of the provisions of Section 148 N.I. Act as well as the law laid down in the abovesaid judgments affirmatively bring out that notwithstanding anything contained in the Cr.P.C..1973, wherein an appeal is filed against conviction under Section 138 N.I.Act, the Appellate Court has the power to ask the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or the compensation awarded by the trial Court and since the said amount is to be deposited within the time as mentioned in subsection (2) of Section 148 N.I.Act and the said time cannot be extended beyond the period of 90 days, it is, thus, clear that the Appellate Court has the power to grant suspension of sentence by imposing the condition of deposit and also stipulate in the order that in case the said amount is not deposited, the suspension of the sentence so granted would be automatically vacated and even if the said condition is not specifically mentioned in the order while granting suspension of sentence, the appellate Court would have the power to vacate the order of suspension of sentence on non-deposit of said amount. Any other interpretation of the said provision, more so, the interpretation to the effect that the amount so ordered to be deposited is to be recovered as a fine under Section 421 Cr.P.C, would completely defeat the object of the amendment and instead of checking the delay in providing relief to the holder of cheque in due course, would in fact result in multiplicity of proceedings for recovery of the said amount which was not even remotely the object of the Amending Act.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Even in the judgment of Ravinder Kumar (supra) cited by the learned Senior Advocate the time was extended only by 90 days and not beyond that; hence, this judgment does not assist the petitioner. 12. Even in the judgment of Ravinder Kumar (supra) cited by the learned Senior Advocate the time was extended only by 90 days and not beyond that; hence, this judgment does not assist the petitioner. 12. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N., (2002) 3 SCC 533 : 2002 SCC OnLine SC 334 that the Courts cannot interpret the statute based on their preconceived notions and when the language is plain there is no reason to read something into it. It was observed at page 542: “13. In D.R. Venkatchalam v. Dy. Transport Commr. [ (1977) 2 SCC 273 : AIR 1977 SC 842 ] it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. 14. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of the process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd. [ (2000) 5 SCC 515 ] ) The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by the judicial interpretative process. The language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in the Narasimhaiah case [ (1996) 3 SCC 88 ]. In the Nanjudaiah case [ (1996) 10 SCC 619 ] the period was further stretched to have the time period run from the date of service of the High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clause (i) and/or clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1) but also by a non-prescribed period. The same can never be the legislative intent. 15. Two principles of construction — one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole — appear to be well settled. The same can never be the legislative intent. 15. Two principles of construction — one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole — appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear necessity and when the reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose, all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if the literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. “An intention to produce an unreasonable result”, said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou[ (1966) 1 QB 878 : (1965) 3 All ER 539 : (1965) 3 WLR 1011 (CA)] (at All ER p. 544-I), “is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available”. Where to apply words literally would “defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result”, we must “do some violence to the words” and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC [ 1963 AC 557 : (1963) 1 All ER 655 : (1963) 2 WLR 559 (HL)] where at AC p. 577 he also observed : (All ER p. 664-I) “This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges.”] 13. Bombay High Court held in Lyka Labs Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 560, that where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous and capable of only one meaning, there is no question of construction of the statute as the provisions speak for itself. It was observed: “22. Bombay High Court held in Lyka Labs Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 560, that where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous and capable of only one meaning, there is no question of construction of the statute as the provisions speak for itself. It was observed: “22. For appreciating submissions on the interpretation of the statute, a well-settled rule of interpretation of a statute needs to be borne in mind that when the language of a provision is plain and unambiguous and capable of only one meaning, there is no question of the construction of a statute, as the provision speaks for itself. The natural and ordinary meaning of words should only be departed from if it is shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning. In that case, it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the act. When the provision's plain meaning produces injustice, absurdity or contradiction of the statutory object, the language may be interpreted to avoid such disadvantage. When the legislature chooses appropriate words to express its intention, such intention must be employed so long as this does not result in absurdity. 23. It is also a settled rule of construction that all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together to ascertain the legislative intent. Each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose of the act itself. Words and phrases occurring in a statute are to be taken not in an isolated or detached manner dissociated from the context but are to be read together and construed in the light of the purpose and object of the act itself. The meanings of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear. The principle that the statute must be read as a whole equally applies to different parts of the same section.” 14. In the present case, the words of the statutes are clear that the amounts shall be deposited within 60 days or within such further time not exceeding 30 days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown. In the present case, the words of the statutes are clear that the amounts shall be deposited within 60 days or within such further time not exceeding 30 days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown. These words are capable of only one interpretation that an initial time of 60 days can be granted which can be extended by 30 days on sufficient cause being shown. There is no ambiguity in the words of the statute, hence, the plain words are to be given effect. 15. Rajasthan High Court held that this provision is not mandatory because it does not provide any consequences. With due respect, it is difficult to agree with the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court. Rajasthan High Court failed to notice that the failure to deposit the amount of 20% will result in the revocation of the suspension granted by the learned Appellate Court as laid down in Suridner Singh Deshwal (supra). Therefore, the penal consequences are inherent in the suspension because the suspension is conditional and if the person does not comply with the conditions of the suspension order, it gets revoked; therefore, it is not correct to say that there is no penalty for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 148(2) of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 16. The Rajasthan High Court did not consider the statement of objects and reasons and the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surinder Singh’s case (supra) and interpreted the statute in a manner so as to defeat the mischief sought to be avoided by the legislature, namely, avoidance of delay by the drawer, by filing the appeal. The Heydon rule of the interpretation provides that the interpretation which avoids the mischief sought to be avoided by enacting the provision should be accepted. This rule was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia, (2015) 10 SCC 161 : (2016) 1 SCC (Civ) 55: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 616 as under: 24. ….. It is a settled proposition of law that the interpretation of the provisions has to be such which prevents mischief. The said principle was explained in Heydon's case [Heydon's case, (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a: 76 ER 637]. According to the mischief rule, four points are required to be taken into consideration. ….. It is a settled proposition of law that the interpretation of the provisions has to be such which prevents mischief. The said principle was explained in Heydon's case [Heydon's case, (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a: 76 ER 637]. According to the mischief rule, four points are required to be taken into consideration. While interpreting a statute, the problem or mischief that the statute was designed to remedy should first be identified and then a construction that suppresses the problem and advances the remedy should be adopted. Heydon's [Heydon's case, (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a: 76 ER 637] mischief rule has been referred to in Interpretation of Statutes by Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edn., at pp. 124-25 thus: “(b) Rule in Heydon's case [Heydon's case, (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a: 76 ER 637]; purposive construction: mischief rule- When the material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions the most firmly established rule for construction of such words ‘of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law)’ is the rule laid down in Heydon's case [Heydon's case, (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a: 76 ER 637] which has now attained the status of a classic (Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [ AIR 1957 SC 907 ]). The rule which is also known as “purposive construction” or “mischief rule” (Anderton v. Ryan [ 1985 AC 560 : (1985) 2 WLR 968 : (1985) 2 All ER 355 (HL)] ), enables consideration of four matters in construing an Act: (i) What was the law before the making of the Act; (ii) What was the mischief or defect for which the law did not provide; (iii) What is the remedy that the Act has provided; and (iv) What is the reason of the remedy. The rule then directs that the courts must adopt that construction which “shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy”. The rule was explained in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar [ AIR 1955 SC 661 ] by S.R. Das, C.J. as follows: (AIR p. 674, para 22) ‘22. The rule then directs that the courts must adopt that construction which “shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy”. The rule was explained in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar [ AIR 1955 SC 661 ] by S.R. Das, C.J. as follows: (AIR p. 674, para 22) ‘22. It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as in 1584 when Heydon's case [Heydon's case, (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a: 76 ER 637] was decided that: (ER p. 638) “… for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered: 1st: What was the common law before the making of the Act. 2nd: What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. 3rd: What remedy Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth, and 4th: The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief, and pro private commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.’ (Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar [ AIR 1955 SC 661 ] ).” 17. In the present case, the mischief was delay by the drawer in the payment of the compensation by filing an appeal; hence the interpretation to avoid the delay has to be preferred. By considering the provision as mandatory the mischief would be avoided whereas by considering the provision as directory the mischief will be perpetuated and the purpose of enacting the provision would be defeated 18. In view of the above, I respectfully disagree with the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Solar4Max Com’s case (supra) and hold the provision of Section 148(2) is mandatory and it is not permissible for the Court to extend the time beyond 90 days. 19. It was submitted that provision of Section 148 of the N.I. Act, 1881 binds the Appellate Court and not this Court. 19. It was submitted that provision of Section 148 of the N.I. Act, 1881 binds the Appellate Court and not this Court. This Court has inherent power vested under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to pass any order to do substantial justice. This submission cannot be accepted. Substantial justice has to be rendered to both the parties, namely, the complainant and the accused. The Court cannot do justice to the accused and injustice to the complainant. When the legislature has enacted a provision to ensure that the complainant should promptly get at least some of the amount, the Court cannot circumvent the intention of the legislature by holding that the time can be extended by the High Court. This would defeat the intention of the legislature as the power would be conferred on the High Court. Even otherwise, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee, (1990) 2 SCC 437 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 327 that inherent power cannot be exercised to give a go-by to the statutory provisions. It was observed at page 439: “5. Section 362 of the Code expressly provides that no court when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error save as otherwise provided by the Code. Section 482 enables the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The inherent powers, however, as much are controlled by principle and precedent as are its express powers by statute. If a matter is covered by an express letter of the law, the court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction. 6. The inherent powers, however, as much are controlled by principle and precedent as are its express powers by statute. If a matter is covered by an express letter of the law, the court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction. 6. In Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Mohan Singh [ (1975) 3 SCC 706 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 156] this Court held that Section 561-A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must therefore exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. In that case, the facts and circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent application were clearly different from what they were at the time of the earlier application. The question as to the scope and ambit of the inherent power of the High Court vis-a-vis an earlier order made by it was, therefore, not concluded by this decision. 7. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override the bar of review under Section 362. It is clearly stated in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal [ (1981) 1 SCC 500 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 188], that the inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. The law is therefore clear that the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that which cannot be done on account of the bar under other provisions of the Code. The court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of inherent power. We find that the impugned order in this case is in effect one reviewing the earlier order on a reconsideration of the same materials. The High Court has grievously erred in doing so. Even on merits, we do not find any compelling reasons to quash the proceedings at that stage. 20. Thus it is not permissible to exercise the power conferred under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to defeat the provisions of the law and extend the time beyond the period of 90 days. The High Court has grievously erred in doing so. Even on merits, we do not find any compelling reasons to quash the proceedings at that stage. 20. Thus it is not permissible to exercise the power conferred under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to defeat the provisions of the law and extend the time beyond the period of 90 days. Doing so will amount to encroachment in the field of the legislation, which is impermissible. Therefore, the submission that the power can be exercised to extend the time beyond that prescribed by the legislature is not acceptable. 21. Therefore, the learned First Appellate Court had rightly held that it had no power to extend the time beyond 90 days and this Court does not have the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to extend the time granted by the legislature under Section 148(2) of N.I. Act. Hence, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed.