JUDGMENT : 1. The unsuccessful plaintiff has preferred this second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 15.12.2018 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No.1, Beawar, District Ajmer (for brevity, “the learned Appellate Court”) in Civil Appeal No.36/2013 (CIS No.91/2014) whereby, while dismissing the appeal, the judgment and decree dated 17.09.2013 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) No1. Beawar (for brevity, “the learned trial Court”) dismissing the Civil Suit No.113/02(55/87) for declaration, possession and permanent injunction, has been affirmed. 2. The relevant facts in brief are that the plaintiff filed a suit against the respondents/defendants (for brevity, “defendants”) stating therein that the suit shop No.20 situated outside Chang Gate, Gandhi Chowk, Beawar, as described in Para No.1 of the plaint, was taken on rent by him on 24.10.1966 from the defendant No.2-Municipal Council, Beawar for a period of 5 years which was extended from time to time and lastly on 01.11.1981 for a period of 5 years. It was averred that possession of the entire suit shop along with its furniture and fitting was handed over by him to the defendant No.1 on 24.02.1982 executing a general power of attorney in his favour; but, since, the defendant No.1 failed to fulfill the purpose of the power of attorney, it was cancelled by the plaintiff vide a registered deed dated 20.10.1985. Apprehending that in the interregnum, a lease deed might have been executed by the defendant No.2 in favour of the defendant No.1, a decree of declaration as to such lease deed, if any, being null and void, possession and permanent injunction was prayed for. 3. The defendant No.1 in his written statement, admitting that initially the subject premises were let out to the plaintiff, submitted that with the plaintiff’s consent and knowledge, its lease deed was executed by the defendant No.2 in his favour on 24.02.1982 on a joint application and its possession was handed over to him for which he paid a consideration of Rs.38,500/- to the plaintiff. 4. 4. The defendant No.2 in its written statement submitted that initially a lease deed of the subject shop dated 24.10.1966 was executed by it in favour of the plaintiff; but, subsequently, it was executed in favour of the defendant No.1 on 20.07.1987 as the plaintiff has handed over its possession to the defendant No.1 in violation of the terms of the lease deed and did not respond to the notice furnished to him. 5. The plaintiff in rejoinder denied that he ever consented for transfer of his lease hold shop in favour of the defendant No.1 accepting a consideration of Rs.38,500/-. 6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, 14 Issues were framed. Issue No.14 pertained to pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. It is noteworthy to observe here that initially the suit was filed in the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Beawar; but, on account of change in pecuniary jurisdiction, it was transferred to the court of learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) No.1 Beawar for its trial and disposal. 7. After recording evidence of the respective parties, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit deciding the Issues No.1 to 6 & 12 against the plaintiff. While deciding the Issue No.14, it was held that the Court had pecuniary jurisdiction to try and decide the suit, the plaintiff has paid deficit Court fee undervaluing the suit and he was directed to pay the same valuing the subject matter of the suit at Rs.50,000/-. The civil first appeal preferred thereagainst has been dismissed by the learned Appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 15.12.2018. 8. The only contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, while assailing the validity of the judgment and decree dated 15.12.2018, is that while deciding the Issue No.14, the learned Court failed to appreciate that the Court of learned Civil Judge did not have pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. Referring to the provisions of Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity, “Code of 1908”), he canvassed that once the suit was valued at Rs.50,000/-for getting the tenancy declared null and void-ab-initio as also for possession, adding valuation of Rs.400/- for the decree of the permanent injunction, it was rendered beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Civil Judge. He, therefore, prays that the civil second appeal be allowed, the judgment and decree dated 15.12.2018 be quashed and set aside and the matter be remanded to the competent court having pecuniary jurisdiction to decide the suit. 9. Heard. Considered. 10. The plaintiff has valued the suit for less than Rs.50,000/-. While deciding the Issue No.14 framed on an objection raised by the defendants as to its undervaluation and payment of deficit Court fee, the learned trial Court assessed valuation of suit at Rs.50,000/- for the relief of declaration and permanent injunction and directed the plaintiff to pay deficit Court fee. Although, the plaintiff preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 17.09.2013 dismissing his suit; but, a perusal of the memo of first appeal submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant for perusal of this Court, does not reveal that any objection about competence of the learned trial Court qua its pecuniary jurisdiction was raised therein. The judgment impugned dated 15.12.2018 also does not reveal any such contention raised by the plaintiff as to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. Rather, the defendants have raised such objection by way of their separate applications filed under Order 41 Rule 22 CPC which did not favour with the learned Appellate Court. The plaintiff has, for the first time, raised this objection in the second appeal. It is trite law that an objection as to pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court trying the suit has to be raised at the earliest possible opportunity whereas, in the present case, the plaintiff did not raise any such objection in the first appeal preferred by him against the judgment and decree dated 17.09.2013 valuing the suit at Rs.50,000/- for the purpose of computation of Court fee. Therefore, it is not permissible for him to raise this objection for the first time in the second appeal. 11. In this regard, it would be profitable to refer relevant provision(s) of the Code of 1908. Section 21(2) of the Code of 1908 reads as under:- “21. Therefore, it is not permissible for him to raise this objection for the first time in the second appeal. 11. In this regard, it would be profitable to refer relevant provision(s) of the Code of 1908. Section 21(2) of the Code of 1908 reads as under:- “21. Objections to jurisdiction- (1) xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (2) No objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.” 12. Admittedly, the appellant did not raise objection as to pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned trial Court at the first available opportunity, i.e., in the first appeal. Further, to successfully raise this plea, a party is also required to satisfy that on account of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction, there has been a consequent failure of justice. However, in the present case, there is not a whisper of averment/contention as to how the plaintiff suffered prejudice on account of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction, if any. 13. While interpreting the provisions of Section 21-A CPC, which bars a suit to set aside the decree on objection as to place of suing, their Lordships have held in case of Subhash Mahadevasa Habib Vs. Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas (Dead) By Lrs. & Ors., (2007) 13 SCC 650 , as under : “35. Though Section 21A of the Code speaks of a suit not being maintainable for challenging the validity of a prior decree between the same parties on a ground based on an objection as to "the place of suing", there is no reason to restrict its operation only to an objection based on territorial jurisdiction and excluding from its purview a defect based on pecuniary jurisdiction. In the sense in which the expression "place of suing" has been used in the Code it could be understood as taking within it both territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. 36. Section 15 of the Code deals with pecuniary jurisdiction and, Sections 15 to 20 of the Code deal with “place of suing”. The heading “place of suing” covers Section 15 also. This Court in the Bahrein Petroleum Co. 36. Section 15 of the Code deals with pecuniary jurisdiction and, Sections 15 to 20 of the Code deal with “place of suing”. The heading “place of suing” covers Section 15 also. This Court in the Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu and Anr., AIR 1966 SC 364 made no distinction between Section 15 on the one hand and Sections 16 to 20 on the other, in the context of Section 21 of the Code. Even otherwise, considering the interpretation placed by this Court on Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act and treating it as equivalent in effect to Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it existed prior to the amendment in 1976, it is possible to say, especially in the context of the amendment brought about in Section 21 of the Code by Amendment Act 104 of 1976, that Section 21A was intended to cover a challenge to a prior decree as regards lack of jurisdiction, both territorial and pecuniary, with reference to the place of suing, meaning thereby the court in which the suit was instituted. 37. As can be seen, the Amendment Act 104 of 1976 introduced sub-Section (2) relating to pecuniary jurisdiction and put it on a par with the objection to territorial jurisdiction and the competence to raise an objection in that regard even in an appeal from the very decree. This was obviously done in the light of the interpretation placed on Section 21 of the Code as it existed and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act by this Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan and Ors., AIR 1954 SC 340 followed by Seth Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath, [1962] 2 SCR 747, and Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu, AIR 1966 SC 364. Therefore, there is no justification in understanding the expression "objection as to place of suing'" occurring in Section 21A as being confined to an objection only in the territorial sense and not in the pecuniary sense. Both could be understood, especially in the context of the amendment to Section 21 brought about the Amendment Act, as objection to place of suing. 38. It appears that when the Law Commission recommended insertion of Section 21A into the Code, the specific provision subsequently introduced in sub-Section (2) of Section 21 relating to pecuniary jurisdiction was not there. Both could be understood, especially in the context of the amendment to Section 21 brought about the Amendment Act, as objection to place of suing. 38. It appears that when the Law Commission recommended insertion of Section 21A into the Code, the specific provision subsequently introduced in sub-Section (2) of Section 21 relating to pecuniary jurisdiction was not there. Therefore, when introducing Sub-section (2) of Section 21 by the Amendment Act 104 of 1976, the wordings of Section 21A as proposed by the Law Commission was not suitably altered or made comprehensive. Perhaps, it was not necessary in view of the placing of Sections 15 to 20 in the Code and the approach of this Court in Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd., AIR 1966 SC 364. But we see that an objection to territorial jurisdiction and to pecuniary jurisdiction, is treated on a par by Section 21. The placing of Sections 15 to 20 under the heading “place of suing” also supports this position. Taking note of the object of the amendment in the light of the law as expounded by this Court, it would be incongruous to hold that Section 21A takes in only an objection to territorial jurisdiction and not to pecuniary jurisdiction. We are therefore inclined to hold that in the suit O.S. No. 4 of 1972, the validity of the decree in O.S. No. 61 of 1971 could not have been questioned based on alleged lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. Of course, the suit itself was not for challenging the validity of the decree in O.S. No. 61 of 1971 and the question of the effect of the decree in O.S. No. 61 of 1971 only incidentally arose. In a strict sense, therefore, Section 21A of the Code may not ipso facto apply to the situation. 39. But the fact that Section 21(2) or Section 21A of the Code may not apply would not make any difference in view of the fact that the position was covered by the relevant provision in the Suits Valuation Act, 1887. In a strict sense, therefore, Section 21A of the Code may not ipso facto apply to the situation. 39. But the fact that Section 21(2) or Section 21A of the Code may not apply would not make any difference in view of the fact that the position was covered by the relevant provision in the Suits Valuation Act, 1887. Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act provided that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 578 (Section 99 of the present Code covering errors or irregularity) of the Code of Civil Procedure, an objection that a court which had no jurisdiction over a suit had exercised it by reason of undervaluation could not be entertained by an appellate court unless the objection was taken in the court of first instance at or before the hearing at which the issues were first framed or the appellate court is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that the overvaluing or undervaluing of the suit has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit. There was some confusion about the content of the Section. 40. The entire question was considered by this Court in Kiran Singh, AIR 1954 SC 340 . Since in the present case, the objection is based on the valuation of the suit or the pecuniary jurisdiction, we think it proper to refer to that part of the judgment dealing with Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. Their Lordships held: (AIR p. 342, para 7) “7…... It provides that objections to the jurisdiction of a Court based on overvaluation or undervaluation shall not be entertained by an appellate Court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the section. It is a self-contained provision complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation can be raised otherwise than in accordance with it. With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional Court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the Legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits.” In Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath, [1962] 2 SCR 747, it was held that: (AIR p. 201, para 4) “4.….It is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a court to try a case. Competence of a court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by enactments like Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” In Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu, AIR 1966 SC 364, it was held Section 21 is a statutory recognition of the principle that the defect as to the place of suing under Sections 15 to 20 of the Code may be waived and that even independently of Section 21, a defendant may waive the objection and may be subsequently precluded from taking it.” 14. In the aforesaid legal backdrop, contention of the learned counsel for the appellant does not merit acceptance. 15. This Civil second appeal is devoid of any substantial question of law and is dismissed accordingly with cost of Rs.5000/- which shall be deposited by the appellant with the Litigants Welfare Fund, Ajmer within a period of four weeks from today.