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2023 DIGILAW 535 (ALL)

Daya Shankar Tiwari v. Union Of India

2023-02-22

JASPREET SINGH

body2023
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri Daya Shankar Tiwari, the petitioner in person and Shri Om Prakash Mishra learned counsel for the Union of India. 2. By means of the instant petition the petitioner prays for the following reliefs which reads as under :- “i. to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned orders dated 30.05.2020 and 15.10.2018 passed by respondent No. 3. ii. to, issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing/ commanding the respondent no. 3 to provide the correct information and order about the re-enrolment in service of the petitioner and also provide the copy of dismissal order from service.” 3. The petitioner in person submits that he was enrolled as Sepoy Driver (MT) in the Army on 28.06.1977. The petitioner had met with an accident on 16.08.1980 while on duty and on account of the injury he was downgraded to “BEE” by means of Army Order 146/77. 4. It is further submitted that on 20.03.1987, a discharge order was proposed against the petitioner against which the petitioner filed a Writ Petition No.21823 of 1987 before this Court seeking quashing of the discharge order dated 20th March, 1987. The writ petition was disposed of on 28.01.1992 with liberty to the petitioner to file an application under the appropriate provisions before the concerned authority. 5. It is urged that in furtherance thereof the petitioner moved the representation, but no decision was taken which prompted the petitioner to file another writ petition bearing No.1458 of 2020 which was disposed of with the direction to decide the application of the petitioner by a speaking order. 6. The petitioner has further submitted that the representation moved by him was rejected and it was alleged in the order that the petitioner had been declared as deserter with effect from 02.05.1996 and his services has been dismissed with effect from 21.10.1999 against which another Writ Petition No.42424 of 2020 was preferred wherein the petitioner challenged the dismissal order dated 21.10.1999 and 12.04.2000, by means of Writ Petition No.47945 of 2003 which came to be allowed by means of order dated 17.09.2004 and aggrieved by the said order the respondents authorities preferred a Special Appeal No.1456/2004, which was dismissed by means of order dated 22.08.2006. 7. 7. It is in the aforesaid backdrop, it is urged by the petitioner that he moved an application under Right to Information Act, 2005 seeking information. No information was granted and in view thereof the petitioner preferred an appeal and then a second appeal. It is thereafter that the respondents passed an order on 18.09.2018 directing the respondent No. 3 to provide a gist of events regarding the service tenure of the petitioner leading to his dismissal and resultant non-payment of pension to the petitioner. 8. It is in furtherance thereof, the respondent no.3 has provided a false information vide orders dated 30.05.2020 and 15.10.2018, which have been brought on record as Annexure No.12 and 13 and are under challenge. 9. The petitioner has also referred to a supplementary affidavit, filed by him, dated 04.03.2022 to bring certain documents on record. With the said supplementary, the petitioner has filed a copy of an application which was moved along with copy of the judgment dated 22.08.2006 and its reply given by the respondents authorities on 04.06.2007, which has been placed on record as Annexure No.SA-1. The petitioner has also brought on record a copy of the judgment dated 15.03.2011 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, whereby the claim petition of the petitioner was rejected by a detailed order, against which the petitioner had preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court, which also came to be dismissed on 18.09.2012 and the said order is on record as Annexure No.SA-3, thereafter, the application moved by the petitioner, addressed to His Excellency, the President of India, dated August, 2016 has been filed as Annexure No.SA-4 to the supplementary affidavit. 10. In the aforesaid backdrop, the petitioner claims that the information as provided is false and the aforesaid orders be set aside and further a mandamus be issued to the respondents to provide the correct information, and for the said reasons, the petitioner appears in person, before the Court claiming the relief as quoted hereinabove first. 11. Shri Om Prakash Mishra learned counsel for the respondents has raised objection regarding the maintainability of the petition and submits that there is no candid disclosure of material facts by the petitioner. It is also urged that the petitioner is merely perpetuating a litigation which has already attained finality. 11. Shri Om Prakash Mishra learned counsel for the respondents has raised objection regarding the maintainability of the petition and submits that there is no candid disclosure of material facts by the petitioner. It is also urged that the petitioner is merely perpetuating a litigation which has already attained finality. The issues have already been adjudicated regarding the service tenure of the petitioner and has been affirmed upto the Apex Court. It is thereafter, the same issue has been indirectly raised by seeking information under Right to Information Act and once the said information has been provided which is derived from the litigation already decided between the parties, the petitioner terms it to be false information and is now seeking to challenge it by means of the instant petition. The relief of mandamus is also vague and no such relief can be granted to the petitioner. It has been urged that the petitioner is a chronic litigant and has engaged in several litigations in the past but, the details have not been indicated in the writ petition, however, it finds place in the judgments of Coordinate Bench of this Court as well as the judgment of the Armed Forces Tribunal, which have been brought on record by the petitioner without specifying the same. 12. It is also urged that the petition has been drafted in mischievous manner where only selective facts have been narrated. It has been pointed out that in Paragraphs 12 and 13, it has been indicated that the writ petition filed by the petitioner bearing no.47945 of 2003 quashed the dismissal order against which the respondents filed a Special Appeal no.12456 of 2004 which has been dismissed by the Court on 22.08.2006. It has been pointed out that in Paragraphs 12 and 13, it has been indicated that the writ petition filed by the petitioner bearing no.47945 of 2003 quashed the dismissal order against which the respondents filed a Special Appeal no.12456 of 2004 which has been dismissed by the Court on 22.08.2006. It is urged that this is not the correct position rather the special appeal filed by the Union of India was partly allowed and while passing the order dated 22.08.2006 which has been brought on record as Annexure No.5, it would indicate that the Appellate Court held that issues which had been raised by the petitioner and decided in earlier litigation could not have been made the subject matter of the writ and thus, the special appeal was partly allowed with specific finding that the Hon'ble Single Judge has erred in law in observing that the petitioner had re-enrolled in the year 1993 and should be treated as retained in service and the entire service from 1997 be taken to be continued for the purposes of retiral benefits. The Division Bench of this Court in special appeal modified the judgment rendered by the Single Bench as shall be evident from the perusal of the decision of the Division Bench which is on record. Thus, it is urged that the petitioner has not disclosed the true and correct facts, moreover, the issues which have already attained finality in the earlier round of litigation and is now sought to be reopened through this novel method by assailing the information received by the petitioner under the Right to Information Act which is legally not permissible, and thus, for the aforesaid reasons the writ petition must fail. 13. The Court has considered the rival submissions and also perused the material on record. 14. At the outset, it may be noted that the petitioner has not indicated the entire chronology of litigation between the petitioner and the respondents. 15. From the record, it indicates that the petitioner has approached the Court about six times. The details of the past litigation can be noted from the decisions of the Division Bench as well as the order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal which has been filed with the supplementary affidavit before this Court. Details of Past Litigation:- (A). 15. From the record, it indicates that the petitioner has approached the Court about six times. The details of the past litigation can be noted from the decisions of the Division Bench as well as the order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal which has been filed with the supplementary affidavit before this Court. Details of Past Litigation:- (A). The petitioner approached this Court in writ petition No. 21823 of 1987 seeking the following relief:- "(1) Call for the records of the case, issue writ direction or order in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 20.3.1987 passed by Opposite party No. 4 annexed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition which was served to the petitioner on 31.8.1987." "(2) Issue mandamus commanding the opposite parties to send the petitioner to be examined by the Medical Board constituted for the said purpose under the Army Act and Rules and take the petitioner in service forthwith." The aforesaid writ petition was disposed of vide judgment dated 28.1.1992 and relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced as under:- "It is contended that on account of fracture in the left leg the petitioner became disabled for discharging his normal functions, therefore, he was discharged. However, his services can be retained as per the provisions contained in Annexure CA-1 to the counter affidavit. The grievance of the petitioner is that despite his several representations and applications for being appointed, nothing has been done. In the counter affidavit, refuting the submission of the petitioner, it is contended that at no point of time, the petitioner made any application for being appointed in accordance with the rules. The relevant rule referred to above finds placed in Annexure-CA-1 to the counter affidavit wherein in clause (2) a general principle has been enumerated for retention in service in alternative employment. According to it, ordinarily permanent low medical category personnel will be retained in service till completion of 15 years service in the case of J.C. Original suit and 10 years in the case of OR. According to it, ordinarily permanent low medical category personnel will be retained in service till completion of 15 years service in the case of J.C. Original suit and 10 years in the case of OR. In the circumstances of the case, if the petitioner is still entitled to get benefits of the above provisions, and if he makes appropriate application for it within a month from today, his application shall be considered and decided according to the Rules within a period of three months from the date of its receipt and the decision taken thereon will be intimated to him." With the above observations, the petition is disposed at the admission stage." (B). The petitioner-respondent thereafter again approached this court in writ petition No. 13885 of 1995 filed on 19.5.1995 seeking following reliefs:- "(i). Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 20.3.1987 passed by opposite party No. 2 annexed as Annexure No. 4 to the writ petition, which was served to the petitioner on 31.8.1987; (ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to pay the arrears of salary from the date of discharged period. (iii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to treat the petitioner as a continuation in service; (iv) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to give all consequential service benefits to the petitioner; (v) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus to direct the respondents to consider the application dated 4.11.1982 of the petitioner to Religious Teacher." The writ petition was decided vide judgment dated 27.11.1996 passed by Hon'ble D. K. Seth J. The Hon'ble Single Judge found that the relief No. 1 to 5 are hit by principle of res judicata since in the earlier writ petition also he challenged the discharge order but no such relief was granted and therefore second writ petition was not maintainable. So far as his claim for posting for Junior commission Officer, R.D. is concerned It was held by the Hon'ble Single Judge that the same was also not available since he was re-enrolled under Regulation 143. It further observed that the petitioner did not fulfill requisite qualification for the post of Junior Commission Officer and therefore, he cannot be considered for the same. It further observed that the petitioner did not fulfill requisite qualification for the post of Junior Commission Officer and therefore, he cannot be considered for the same. However, so far as the salary and arrears for the period it was observed that in case the petitioner has worked after joining duty, that he may be paid the same by the competent authority and with the said observations the writ petition was disposed of. The petitioner-respondent thereafter filed a review application before the Hon'ble Single Judge but the same was also rejected vide order dated 5.2.1997. Thereafter, he preferred two special appeals Nos. 132 of 1997 and 152 of 1997, which were dismissed by a Division Bench, vide judgment dated 4.9.1987. The Division Bench on merits also considered the correctness of discharge order dated 20.3.1987 but declined to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution, as is apparent from the following "We are of the considered view that on the material on record, no exception can be taken by this Court of the discharge order 03 of dated 1987 which was given effect to from 1.9.1987". It also held that claim of the petitioner-respondent for appointment as Religious Teacher was rightly rejected vide order dated 22.11.1982 and he was not eligible for such appointment and the said issue is not permissible to be resurrected after such a long time. In respect to other reliefs, the Division Bench confirmed the judgment of the Hon'ble Single Judge but with respect to the period i.e. from the date of discharge till the date of re-enrollment, the Division Bench held that no finding is being recorded and the aforesaid matter may be considered by the appropriate authority in accordance with law. The relevant extract is reproduced as under:- “It may however, be observed that this judgment shall not impinge upon the decision on the question as to how should interim period from the date of discharge to the date of re-enrollment be treated which is pending consideration before the appropriate authority to be decided in accordance with law." The petitioner-respondent approached the Apex court in special Leave Petition No. 14190 of 1998 and 14191 of 1998, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 17.8.1998. (C). The third inning commenced with writ petition no.13165 of 1996preferred by the petitioner when he was served the order dated 14.8.1995 communicating that he shall stand discharge w.e.f.31.7.1996. (C). The third inning commenced with writ petition no.13165 of 1996preferred by the petitioner when he was served the order dated 14.8.1995 communicating that he shall stand discharge w.e.f.31.7.1996. The main prayer sought in the aforesaid writ petition were as following:- (a) "issue writ of mandamus in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 14.8.1995 discharging him in the afternoon on 31.8.1996; (b) issue writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to discharge him and not to give effect to the order dated 14.8.1995 prior to decision on the statutory complaint dated 19.12.1995 (c) issue a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to issue identity card, pay-books, kits etc., to the petitioner and also to give all consequential service benefits." The aforesaid writ petition was dismissed by the Hon'ble Single Judge (Hon. O.P. Garg, J.) vide judgment dated 5.7.1999 holding that the petitioner after attaining 40 years of age could not have continued in service under the statute and therefore had to discharge from service in the afternoon on 31.8.1996. His further contention that he is entitled to continue in service so as to enable himself minimum pension was also rejected. The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced as under:- "The grievance of the petitioner in nutshell is that for purpose of calculating pensionary benefits, the intervening period from the date of the original discharge to the date of re-enrolment, i.e. 1.9.1987 to 9.4.1994 should have been counted to reckon the qualifying service so that he could earn the minimum pension or in the alternative, he should have been given seniority fright from the date he was recruited in the year 1977 as Sepoy/ Driver (M.T.) or the benefit of extension of service beyond 31.7.1996 to earn the minimum pension should have been granted. In the counter affidavit, filed by Assistant Teacher L.T. Grade. Col. In the counter affidavit, filed by Assistant Teacher L.T. Grade. Col. C.A. Chawada Pillai on behalf of the respondents, it has been asserted that the petitioner could not be granted further extension in service to earn minimum pension beyond 31.7.1996 as he had completed 40 years of age on that date and that there is no provision of counting the intervening period from the date of discharge to the date of re-enrolment towards qualifying service to earn pension and that the seniority of the petitioner shall be counted w.e.f. 10.4.1993 on which date he was re-enrolled." It is an indubitable fact that the petitioner had completed 40 years of age on 31.7.1996. In no circumstance he could serve the respondents beyond the age of 40 years and, therefore, of necessity, he was to stand discharged in the afternoon of 31.7.1996. No rule or regulation has been cited to support the submission that extension of service to earn minimum pension beyond 31.7.1996 could be granted. It is also not disputed that the petitioner was placed in medical category 'CEE' (Temporary) for six months w.e.f. 11.2.1981 and again the same category for the same period w.e.f. 20.8.1981 and then his medical category was upgraded to 'BEE' (Permanent) w.e.f. 12.11.1982. Since the petitioner was not fulfilling the conditions for retention as laid down in Army order no. 40 of 1980 and there were surplus drivers in Trade category, the retention of the petitioner in service over and above the authorized strength became difficult and, therefore, ultimately he was discharged. The order of discharge in essence is an order of termination of service and the concerned employee ceases to work. However, in certain exigencies, a provision has been made for re-enrollment and accordingly the petitioner was re-enrolled on 10.4.1993 as Driver (M.T.). His date of birth is 1.8.1956 and accordingly in the afternoon of 31.7.1996, he completed 40 years of age. The petitioner was re-enrolled with terms and conditions of 17 years colour and two years of reserved service (including service rendered earlier) or till attainment of 40 years of age, whichever is earlier. The petitioner has sought re-enrollment and joined his duties as Driver (M.T.) accepting the above conditions. Therefore, in any case, the petitioner could not continue on the post on which he was re-enrolled after attaining 40 years age. The petitioner has sought re-enrollment and joined his duties as Driver (M.T.) accepting the above conditions. Therefore, in any case, the petitioner could not continue on the post on which he was re-enrolled after attaining 40 years age. Shri A.K. Gaur, learned counsel for the respondents urged that there is no provision for counting the intervening period i.e. from the date of the original discharge to the date of re-enrolment towards qualifying service to earn pension and that in any case the seniority of the petitioner is to be counted w.e.f. 10.4.1993 on which date he was re-enrolled and that he is not entitled for the benefit of the previous service for purposes of computing seniority. The petitioner could not cite any rule, regulation or administrative order pursuant to which he could claim the benefits, which, according to him, have been illegally denied. The crux of the matter is that on the re-enrolment, the petitioner was to stand discharged on attaining 40 years of age in terms of the conditions of his re-enrollment and that the discharge order dated 14.8.1995 was issued in terms of item no. 3-1 (i) of the table annexed to rule 13(2) of the Army Rules, 1954. Since there has to be cessation of the employment of the petitioner, on re-enrollment and on attaining the age of 40 years, which was a pre-known event, the question of violation of principles of natural justice did not arise, as the said order was not passed by way of punishment. In the result, the impugned notice/order dated 14.8.1995 discharging the petitioner from the post of Driver (M.T.) w.e.f. the forenoon of 1.8.1996 is found to be in accordance with the terms of re-enrolment as well as the Army Rules. The respondents have committed no error in passing the said order. It is, therefore, not a fit case in which extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be invoked. The writ petition is dismissed without any order as to costs." The petitioner-respondent preferred Special Appeal No. 540 of 1999, which was also dismissed by the Division Bench judgment dated 18.11.1999. While dismissing the appeal the Court held that intervening period i.e. from the date of discharge and the date of re-enrollment will not be counted for transfer to reserved service or for pensionary benefits. (D). While dismissing the appeal the Court held that intervening period i.e. from the date of discharge and the date of re-enrollment will not be counted for transfer to reserved service or for pensionary benefits. (D). The petitioner-respondent then preferred another writ petition No. 1458 of 2000 seeking interalia the following reliefs:- "(i) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus to direct the respondent to release amounts of retiral benefits like pension, gratuity Insurance, provident funds etc., along with Interest which is illegally retained by the respondent. (ii) to issue any other suitable writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case; (iii) to award the costs of the petition to the petitioner." The aforesaid writ petition was disposed of vide Judgment dated 11.1.2000 with the direction to the petitioner-respondent to prefer a representation within a period of six weeks and to be decided by the Officer-in-charge, in accordance with law by a speaking order within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of the order. Consequently, the petitioner preferred a representation dated 21.1.2000 which was rejected by the competent authority by order dated 12.4.2000. It appears that just before the date of discharge i.e. 31.7.1996 petitioner was absent from duty and therefore respondent-appellant declared him a "deserter" on 2.5.1996. This fact was mentioned in the order dated 21.10.1999 and 12.4.2000, passed by the respondent. (E). This resulted in fifth round of litigation i.e. writ petition No. 42424 of 2000which was preferred by the petitioner-respondent with the following reliefs:- (i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari calling for the records of the case and to quash the impugned orders dated 12.4.2000 and 21.10.1999 passed by the respondent No. 3; (ii) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to pay the post retirement benefits and arrears of salary to the petitioner with interest @ 18% till the date of payment; (iii) to issue any other such order or direction which may be deemed fit and proper under the circumstances of the case; (iv) Award costs to the petitioner." The aforesaid writ petition was allowed by the judgment dated 5.3.2002 passed by Hon'ble Single Judge holding order declaring the petitioner as deserter to be illegal. The appellant preferred special appeal No. 376 of 2003 against the judgment dated 5.3.2002 which was allowed by Division Bench vide judgment dated 22.7.2003 setting aside the Hon'ble Single Judge's judgment passed in writ petition only on the ground that Union of India was necessary party but the writ petition having been filed without Impleading Union of India therefore, not maintainable. However, petitioner was permitted to file a fresh petition in accordance with law. (F). This caused in sixth writ petition No. 47943 of 2003 preferred by the petitioner challenging orders dated 21.10.1999 and 12.4.2000, which has been decided, vide dated judgment dated 17.09.2004 allowing the writ petition and the relevant portion reads as under: “For the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs, the impugned orders dated 02.05.1996 abolition of the districts 21.10.1999 it appears that the impugned order passed by the authorities are out and out arbitrary, illegal and in violation of law. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders dated 02.05.1996 treating him to be a deserter and dated 21.10.1999 dismissing him from service, as well as order dated 12.04.2000 rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for pension are quashed. The word ‘retention’ which contains an element of continuity has to be given normal meaning in common parlance. The petitioner was enrolled in army in June 1977. He was to be retained in service and was not to be enrolled. As such, his services put in by him from 1977 have to be given continuity. The respondents are directed to pay the petitioner his entire retiral benefits as well as pension. The pension papers shall be finalized by the respondents within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment and the amount of arrear of pension shall be paid to the petitioner together with interest as per law. The sum of Rs.3900/-deducted/adjusted from his dues shall also be paid with 10% interest. Cost of Rs.5000/-(Rupees Five Thousand) only on respondents to be paid by respondent no. 5 on their behalf to the petitioner within two months from today.” (G). This judgment was challenged in Special Appeal No.1456 of 2004 Union of India Vs. The sum of Rs.3900/-deducted/adjusted from his dues shall also be paid with 10% interest. Cost of Rs.5000/-(Rupees Five Thousand) only on respondents to be paid by respondent no. 5 on their behalf to the petitioner within two months from today.” (G). This judgment was challenged in Special Appeal No.1456 of 2004 Union of India Vs. Daya Shankar Tiwari wherein the Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 22.08.2006 partly allowed the appeal and the relevant portion reads as under:- “The Hon’ble Single Judge in the earlier part of the judgment has referred to the Division Bench judgment in special appeal no. 540 of 1999 but in the concluding part while discussing the issue, has addressed himself to the meaning of the word “retention” etc., without considering the question that issue of intervening period between date of discharge and re-enrollment was already considered by this Court and the same was not open to the reagitated in the judgment under appeal. Since this issue was already decided and adjudicated inter parties by this Court in Special Appeal No.540 of 1999 (Supra) it was not open to the Hon’ble single Judge to enter this issue afresh and record the finding that to contrary to the judgment of the Division Bench. To this extent the judgment under appeal cannot be sustained. Therefore, in our view the Hon’ble Single Judge has erred in law in observing that the petitioner having been re-enrolled in the year 1983 should be treated as retained in service and the entire service from 1977 is taken to be continued to be for the purposes of retiral benefits. In our view, this part of the judgment under appeal is unsustainable and therefore is set aside”. In the result, the special appeal partly succeeds, the judgment under appeal is modified and the directions contained in para 51 of the judgment under appeal shall be read as hereunder:- “The orders dated 21.10.1999 and 12.04.2000 dismissing the petitioner from service treating him as deserter are illegal and therefore quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled for consequential benefits if any payable under law by applying Regulation 143 and in view of the discussion made hereinabove, no order as to costs”. With the above order the special appeal and the writ petition stand disposed of.” 16. The petitioner shall be entitled for consequential benefits if any payable under law by applying Regulation 143 and in view of the discussion made hereinabove, no order as to costs”. With the above order the special appeal and the writ petition stand disposed of.” 16. Though, it would have been appropriate for the petitioner to have come forward with full disclosure of facts, however, he has failed to do so. Nevertheless, considering the material before the Court and especially the copy of the judgment dated 17.09.2004 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.47943 of 2003 which contains copious description of the earlier litigation between the parties. In this context, the order passed by the Division Bench dated 22.08.2006, wherein the order of the Single Judge dated 17.09.2004 was under challenge and is on record as Annexure No.5 also gives an insight to the litigation and how it has unfolded over the period of years including the respective contentions and issues which were raised by the petitioner before the Court of Law from time to time. The decision rendered by the Armed Forces Tribunal, 15th March 2011 in TA No. 1493 of 2010 is also helpful to trace the full facts and the chronology of events. Needless to say, that the Armed Forces Tribunal dismissed the claim of the petitioner by means of order dated 15th March 2011 and the relevant portion reads as under:- In view of the decisions aforesaid, neither the period of service between 1987 and 1993 can be counted as service for the purpose of pension nor can the validity of the discharge in 1987 the first spell of service nor the validity of discharge in 1996 (the second spell of service) can be questioned. Moreover, the validity of any of the discharge orders is not in issue in this T.A. In view of this Position only the two spells of service referred to above can be counted for the purposes of determining the length of service of the applicant. We have already found that the applicant has not rendered 15 years qualifying service. He is therefore not entitled to pension. By the Impugned order dated 04.06.2007, the Director General of supply and transport, QG Branch has already directed that service gratuity be paid to the applicant. We have already found that the applicant has not rendered 15 years qualifying service. He is therefore not entitled to pension. By the Impugned order dated 04.06.2007, the Director General of supply and transport, QG Branch has already directed that service gratuity be paid to the applicant. The claim of the applicant in pursuance of the direction given in the Special Appeal decided on 22.08.2006 has thus been considered. In the Writ Petition (present Transferred Application), the applicant has not made reference of any other retrial benefits to which he may be entitled or to any arrears of salary nor has the applicant addressed us upon any specific dues. However, we find from the order dated 12.04.2000 that the applicant was also entitled to the payment of AGI and AFPP find. In the Writ Petition (Present Transferred Application), the applicant has not made any grievance that any of these amounts has not been paid to the applicant and as such no specific direction can be granted in this Transferred Application. Shri K.D. Nag, Learned Senior Standing Counsel, who appears for the respondents submits that in view of the orders already passed namely, 12.04.2000 and impugned order dated 04.06.2007 if any of these amounts has not been paid to the applicant, no doubt the applicant would be entitled. However, as no grievance about non-payment of any specific amount has been made it is not necessary for us to give any specific direction. With these observations, the Transferred Application is dismissed. 17. The said order has also attained finality and has received an approval from the Apex Court in the order dated 18.09.2012 passed in SLP (Civil) No.26055 of 2011. 18. From the perusal of the aforesaid orders and considering the fractured pleadings of the petitioner as made in the instant petition, it appears that the petitioner is indirectly trying to achieve what he has failed to achieve by instituting the various earlier petitions. 19. The record would also indicate that the petitioner has challenged his discharge from the Army, and also sought enforcement of his right to claim higher pensionary benefits and the basis and genesis for such repeated challenge remains the same. The higher pensionary benefits which the petitioner is seeking is contingent on the orders passed earlier whereby the petitioner was discharged. The record would also indicate that the petitioner has challenged his discharge from the Army, and also sought enforcement of his right to claim higher pensionary benefits and the basis and genesis for such repeated challenge remains the same. The higher pensionary benefits which the petitioner is seeking is contingent on the orders passed earlier whereby the petitioner was discharged. The issue whether the continuity of the service is to be taken for the grant of higher pensionary benefits is the core issue which had been raised by the petitioner earlier and it has already been decided against him. Different angles have been used by the petitioner to come back to the same issue that the order of discharge was not valid and the petitioner be treated to be retained in the Army and not re-enrolled as that would permit him the requisite number of years to enable him to get higher pensionary benefits, however, unfortunately all the aforesaid issues have been considered and decided against the petitioner. 20. It is not disputed that the earlier orders which have been passed have attained finality and its validity, its correctness either factual or legally cannot be raked up in the present litigation either directly or indirectly. The petitioner has received information under the Right to Information Act and the said information as given, is based on the earlier litigation and the previous orders and the decisions rendered by the various Courts. The petitioner alleges the said information is false, whether it is false or not its not for this Court to decide and morevoer reference is taken by the Authorities to the earlier litigation which ensued between the parties and the information which has been given by the impugned orders is said to be based on the orders passed by the Courts. Thus, indirectly the petitioner is assailing the correctness of the orders which have already been rendered against him in the previous rounds of litigations and attained finality and any attempt at this stage to open up new ways to dig up old decided matters cannot be permitted nor is it appreciated in law. For the aforesaid reasons the petition is sans merit and is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.