JUDGMENT : This is a claimant's appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act') arising out of a judgment and award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/ the 10th Additional District Judge, Allahabad dated 02.09.2000 in MACP No.584 of 1996, rejecting the claim petition. 2. A claim petition was instituted by the claimant-appellant, Smt. Bindu Singh (for short, 'the claimant') before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/ the District Judge, Allahabad on 04.09.1996 with the case that on 15.06.1996, the claimant along with her family members was travelling on board Jeep, bearing registration No. UP-70F-1028 from Allahabad (now Prayagraj) towards Rewa. At about 9 o'clock in the evening when the Jeep was moving on the Allahabad-Rewa Road and had reached a place called Village Barethi, within the local limits of Police Station Kaundhiara, District Allahabad, the Jeep driver, driving the vehicle at a high speed and negligently, hit a stationary truck on the rear side. The truck was proceeding to Rewa and was parked on the road at a place, which was dark. The tail lamps of the truck were not alight nor was it displaying any other signal about its stationary position. The Jeep driver owing to his negligence hit the truck involving the left side of the Jeep in the collision. The Jeep was badly wrecked due to the impact. The claimant, who was sitting on the left hand side of the Jeep, sustained grievous injuries and her son Sameer Kumar Singh, who was sitting by her side and another Harish Chandra @ Lallan, sitting behind the claimant, also on the left hand side, too sustained injuries. 3. The claimant asserts that she is an educated woman and would work from home under a scheme of the State Government for informal education as an Anudeshika. The said work was part time. In addition, she would carry on business of supplying milk on her own, take care of her family as well as carry on agriculture. On account of the injuries sustained in the accident, the claimant has been left incapable of performing any productive work in future. The claimant has also asserted that she was a healthy person, but after the accident, she is no longer in a position to work either for her family or outside, as she did before. On account of the injuries sustained in the accident, the claimant has been left incapable of performing any productive work in future. The claimant has also asserted that she was a healthy person, but after the accident, she is no longer in a position to work either for her family or outside, as she did before. Her body has been disfigured and the injuries have left her a depressed woman. In her personal life, she has to face difficulties and reverses. She has suffered a mental and physical setback on account of the injuries which are likely to be there throughout her life. 4. It is the claimant's case that after the accident, the owner of the Jeep and the Insurer did not take any action. She reported the matter to the Superintendent of Police, Trans Yamuna, Allahabad personally appearing before him on 23.08.1996. The Superintendent of Police aforesaid ordered the competent Officer at Police Station Kaundhiara, District Allahabad to lodge a report about the accident by his order dated 23.08.1996. Thereupon, Crime No.130 of 1996, under Sections 279, 337 IPC, Police Station Kaundhiara, District Allahabad was registered on 01.09.1996, where the claimant's husband, Ashok Kumar Singh is the informant. Hari Pratap Singh was impleaded as opposite party No.1 to the claim petition, who is the owner of the Jeep in question. He shall hereinafter be referred to as 'the owner'. The United India Insurance Company Limited, 5A, Sardar Patel Marg, Civil Lines, Allahabad through its Branch Manager are opposite party No.2 to the claim petition. The said Insurance Company are the Insurers of the Jeep. The Insurance Company is impleaded as respondent No.2 to the appeal. The Insurance Company aforesaid shall hereinafter be referred to as 'the Insurer'. 5. A written statement dated 30.07.1997 was filed on behalf of the owner, bearing paper No.10-A. The owner generally denied the allegations in the claim petition. The owner came up with a plea that the claimant's allegation that the accident happened on account of the rash and negligent driving by the Jeep driver is incorrect and without basis. He denied the factum of the accident in Paragraph No.11 of his written statement; and in Paragraph No.12 more specifically. It was not denied that the owner is the registered owner of the Jeep in question. He denied the factum of the accident in Paragraph No.11 of his written statement; and in Paragraph No.12 more specifically. It was not denied that the owner is the registered owner of the Jeep in question. It was also not denied that the Jeep aforesaid was insured with the Insurer, where the policy was effective from 17.12.1995 to 16.12.1996. It was also pleaded that the vehicle, in any case, was being driven by a duly authorized driver, of course, maintaining the stance that the Jeep in question was not involved in any accident. 6. A separate written statement dated 10th July, 1998 was filed on behalf of the Insurer, bearing paper No.17-A. The allegations in the claim petition were generally denied in the first part of the Insurer's pleadings, and in the additional pleas, it was averred that the registration book, the driving licence and the route permit of the vehicle in question, besides other papers, have not been filed along with the claim petition. There is a queer sentence in Paragraph No.24 of the Insurer's written statement, which says, quite without any sense to it that 'The petition being infructuous and ambiguous, is liable to be dismissed'. The written statement being signed by an Advocate, who would have certainly gone through its contents, one would not expect this kind of senseless pleading. It is then pleaded on behalf of the Insurer, on the same lines as the owner, that no accident ever took place, involving the Jeep in question. There is also a plea that the vehicle was being driven against the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy at the time of the accident. There is a plea on behalf of the Insurer that the Jeep in question was being driven as a taxi at the time of the accident, and, as such, the claim petition is not maintainable. There is also a plea about non-joinder of necessary parties, urged on foot of the fact that the owner and the Insurer of the truck have not been impleaded. It is averred that at the time of the accident, the driver of the vehicle in question did not hold a valid and effective driving licence to drive the particular type of vehicle. The Insurer has pleaded that, therefore, they are not liable. 7. It is averred that at the time of the accident, the driver of the vehicle in question did not hold a valid and effective driving licence to drive the particular type of vehicle. The Insurer has pleaded that, therefore, they are not liable. 7. On the aforesaid pleadings of parties, the Tribunal has framed the following issues (translated into English from Hindi): “1. Whether on the date of the alleged accident i.e. 15.06.1996, the driver of the vehicle, bearing registration No. UP-70F-1028 caused the accident (with vehicle, bearing registration No.CPA/3812) on account of driving the vehicle at a high speed and negligently? If yes, its effect? 2. Whether the driver of the said Jeep, bearing registration No. UP-70F-1028 at the time of the accident, did not possess a valid driving licence? Effect? 3. Whether the Jeep was being driven in contravention of the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy? If yes, its effect? 4. The claimant is entitled to receive what amount of compensation and from which of the opposite party? 5. Whether the claim petition is bad for non joinder on account of non-impleadment of the owner of vehicle No. CPA/3812? Effect?” 8. The claimant entered the witness-box testifying in support of her case as PW-1. Her husband, Ashok Kumar Singh was examined as PW-2. Through a list of documents, paper No.20-Ga, a carbon copy of the FIR dated 01.09.1996, a copy of the application dated 02.08.1996 moved before the Insurer, a carbon copy of the information sent to the S.S.P., Allahabad on 23.08.1996 and a cash-memo showing purchase of medicines etc. were filed. The owner filed a photostat copy of the driver's driving licence and Insurance Policy, besides the registration certificate of the Jeep. 9. This Court notices that apart from the summary of evidence which the Tribunal has noted in its judgment, there are also documents on record, such as the ultrasound scan report and injury report dated 16.06.1996 issued by the Emergency Medical Officer, S.R.N. Hospital, Allahabad, noting three injuries on the claimant's person with the remark that the injuries be kept under observation and advising an x-ray examination. There are also x-ray plates on record from a certain Raj Nursing and Maternity Home. In addition, there is a prescription dated 16.09.1996 by Dr. A.K. Pradhan, Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeon, Varanasi, noting it to be a case of accidental injury, already treated at Allahabad. There are also x-ray plates on record from a certain Raj Nursing and Maternity Home. In addition, there is a prescription dated 16.09.1996 by Dr. A.K. Pradhan, Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeon, Varanasi, noting it to be a case of accidental injury, already treated at Allahabad. There are prescriptions by other doctors as well. 10. The Tribunal in returning its findings on Issue No.1 has taken note of the fact that the Jeep in question being involved in the accident or the accident ever happening involving the vehicle has been denied. It has been remarked that the burden to prove the accident and the injuries sustained there, would, therefore, be upon the claimant. The Tribunal has noted that the claimant has testified herself as PW-1 and her husband, Ashok Kumar as PW-2. The Tribunal has remarked that both the witnesses are interested witnesses. It has been noted that both witnesses are said to be travelling on board the Jeep in question on 15.06.1996 in the evening hours at 9 o'clock when the accident is said to have happened, involving truck No. CPA/ 3812. The Tribunal has remarked that a prompt FIR about the accident has not been lodged by the driver of either vehicle. Ashok Kumar Singh has made his first written report on 01.09.1996, that is to say, after about two and a half months of the accident. No reason has been shown explaining this delay. 11. The Tribunal has observed that the natural course of action after an accident is that the driver or the injured would get an FIR lodged with the Police. The delay in lodging the FIR, therefore, leads to a situation, in the Tribunal's opinion, where the claimant's testimony in the witness-box, does not receive any support from it. The Tribunal has noted that PW-1 in her testimony has said that she was proceeding along with her family to Satna, Madhya Pradesh and PW-2, Ashok Kumar too has also said that the family were proceeding from Allahabad to Satna. The Tribunal has remarked that in the FIR dated 01.09.1996 lodged with the Police by Ashok Kumar Singh, it has been mentioned that the family were proceeding from Allahabad to Maihar. By contrast, the Tribunal observes that in the claim petition it is stated that the family were proceeding from Allahabad to Rewa. The Tribunal has remarked that in the FIR dated 01.09.1996 lodged with the Police by Ashok Kumar Singh, it has been mentioned that the family were proceeding from Allahabad to Maihar. By contrast, the Tribunal observes that in the claim petition it is stated that the family were proceeding from Allahabad to Rewa. The Tribunal has opined that this is a contradiction which makes the claimant's case suspect. 12. PW-2, Ashok Kumar has also been noted by the Tribunal to have said in his testimony that apart from the two witnesses, their family members were also travelling on board the Jeep and that in the accident, his wife and Harish Chandra alone sustained injuries. However, no injury report relating to Harish Chandra's injuries has been placed on record. Harish Chandra has also not been examined as a witness on behalf of the claimant. The Tribunal has opined that the claimant has, thus, not produced a material and important witness. 13. The Tribunal has gone on to say that the claimant has said in her testimony that after the accident, she lost consciousness and was examined at the S.R.N. Hospital, Allahabad on 16.06.1996 at 1.05 a.m. The Tribunal has observed that the medical examination report shows only three injuries, but does not record the fact that the claimant had fainted. Noting the injuries, the Tribunal records that according to the medico-legal report, the claimant had an injury between her forehead and cheek, measuring 1.5 cm x 3 cm, which was an open wound. She had a bone deep wound on her chin – 8 x 2cm, and a swelling on her chest 25x25 cm. The report, according to the Tribunal, notes that all injuries are simple in nature, caused by a blunt object. The injury report does not record the fact that the injuries have been sustained in a motor accident. It has been remarked that at the time of undergoing medical examination, the claimant had not said that she has sustained injuries in a motor accident. The Tribunal has held that in view of all these facts, the medico-legal evidence does not support the claimant's case about the accident. 14. The Tribunal has then gone on to examine the cause for the delay assigned by the claimant in lodging the FIR. The Tribunal has held that in view of all these facts, the medico-legal evidence does not support the claimant's case about the accident. 14. The Tribunal has then gone on to examine the cause for the delay assigned by the claimant in lodging the FIR. It has been noted that it is the claimant's case that the owner of the vehicle in question had promised the claimant that he would ensure that the Insurer paid the compensation due and that it is for the said reason that the claimant did not lodge an FIR. The Tribunal has taken note of the claimant's submission that the aforesaid assertion by the claimant in the claim petition has not been specifically denied by the respondents in their written statements. There is apparently no denial of the assertion. The Tribunal, however, has remarked that the provisions of Orders V and VI of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply proprio vigore to the trial of a claim under the Act. As such, non-traverse of the said plea in the Tribunal's opinion is not of much consequence. 15. The Tribunal has remarked that the owner in his additional pleas has specifically denied the involvement of the vehicle in the accident. On this state of pleadings if the claimant wanted to prove that she had laid a claim before the Insurer, burden lay upon her to prove it. The Tribunal has observed that to discharge the said burden, the claimant has filed a copy of an application made before the Insurer by Ashok Kumar on her behalf, but the said application, bearing paper No.20-Ga/4 has not been proved in accordance with law. There is a remark by the Tribunal that this application has not been made to the Insurer by the owner, and, therefore, it cannot be inferred that the owner had promised the claimant that he would secure compensation for her from the Insurer. There is then a mixed up remark by the Tribunal saying that if in a situation of this kind, the claimant wanted to benefit out of the fact, she had to specially prove it. 16. To all seeming the fact mentioned in this finding, which the Tribunal speaks about, appears to be about the claimed promise by the owner that he would ensure that the Insurer paid compensation to the claimant. 16. To all seeming the fact mentioned in this finding, which the Tribunal speaks about, appears to be about the claimed promise by the owner that he would ensure that the Insurer paid compensation to the claimant. The Tribunal next remarks that the said plea by the claimant is not liable to be accepted in the absence of evidence. The Tribunal says that it is noteworthy that Ashok Kumar, who had made the application to the Insurer, was examined as PW-2, but he has not proved the said application. Therefore, the claimant's case pleaded and her evidence are at variance. 17. The next reason to disbelieve the claimant's case assigned by the Tribunal is that the claimant was sitting not on the front seat, but the one behind it, whereas the owner of the vehicle in question and the claimant’s son was sitting on the front seat, next to the driver. It is remarked by the Tribunal that the claimant does not speak about the injuries sustained by the owner and her son, Sameer, who were sitting on the front seat, next to the driver, and it is unnatural that they would not sustain injuries. The Tribunal has proceeded to hold that the aforesaid fact shows that the claimant's testimony is one based on imagination. 18. It is next observed by the Tribunal that PW-2, Ashok Kumar in his testimony says that on the front seat, the driver, the owner, Harish Chandra and another man, were sitting, but none of these men have been produced in evidence by the claimant. It is also observed that the stationary truck's driver, cleaner or other person, who had witnessed the accident, have not been produced as witnesses too. The Tribunal has opined that on the basis of the said evidence, it cannot be held that the Jeep in question was involved in the accident, that is alleged to have happened on 15.06.1996 on account of the driver's mistake and negligence, and wherein the claimant sustained injuries. 19. The Tribunal has not ended its opinion on Issue No.1 with the aforesaid remark, but has gone ahead to consider some unnecessary submissions by the learned Counsel appearing for the Insurer. The Tribunal has noted the submission of the learned Counsel for the Insurer to the effect that the claimant is habitual in laying claims for compensation. 19. The Tribunal has not ended its opinion on Issue No.1 with the aforesaid remark, but has gone ahead to consider some unnecessary submissions by the learned Counsel appearing for the Insurer. The Tribunal has noted the submission of the learned Counsel for the Insurer to the effect that the claimant is habitual in laying claims for compensation. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel for the Insurer before the Tribunal had come up with a case that the claimant had purchased cattle after securing a loan. She had shown the cattle to have died and realized compensation from the Insurance Company. Papers in regard to loss on account of cattle heads dying have been noticed as paper Nos. 20-Ga/13 to 20-Ga/16. 20. There is then note of another argument by the learned Counsel for the Insurer, which says that papers relating to treatment undertaken by the claimant at the Jeevan Jyoti Hospital relate to breast cancer and the purchase vouchers for medicines also relate to drugs, which are meant for treatment of cancer. The Tribunal has remarked that there is nothing on record to show that the claimant has suffered from cancer on account of the injuries sustained in the accident. If the claimant wanted to prove that she suffered cancer on account of the injuries, burden lay upon her to prove it by medical evidence. The Tribunal has remarked that apparently the claimant has not suffered breast cancer in consequence of the accident. On the basis of these added remarks, the Tribunal has reiterated its opinion that the alleged accident on 15.06.1996 involving the Jeep in question never happened. 21. Issue No.2 has been decided against the Insurer as also Issue No.3, both for want of evidence being led by the Insurer. Issue No.5 has also been decided against the owner and the Insurer holding that the owner and the Insurer of the truck are not necessary parties. Issue No.4 has been decided against the claimant, being a sequitur to the findings on Issue No.1, holding that the accident never happened. 22. Heard Mr. Amit Kumar Sinha, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Ram Singh, learned Counsel for the claimant and Mr. Anubhav Sinha, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Amaresh Sinha, learned Counsel for the Insurer. No one appears on behalf of the owner. The lower court records have been perused. 23. 22. Heard Mr. Amit Kumar Sinha, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Ram Singh, learned Counsel for the claimant and Mr. Anubhav Sinha, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Amaresh Sinha, learned Counsel for the Insurer. No one appears on behalf of the owner. The lower court records have been perused. 23. The Tribunal has commenced appreciation of the testimony of PW-1 and PW-2 on a note of suspicion for no good reason. The Tribunal has observed that both the witnesses are interested witnesses, though not much is said thereafter. This remark of the Tribunal seems to have coloured its vision in appreciating the testimony of the two eye-witnesses. PW-1 is one of the injured and she has testified in intricate detail about the manner in which the accident happened, which has been largely corroborated by the testimony of PW-2, Ashok Kumar, her husband, also a passenger on board the ill-fated vehicle. There is no principle or even a rule of prudence by which the testimony of two passengers on board an ill-fated vehicle is to be held suspect merely because they are man and wife and one of them is the claimant. It is the claimant's case that she was travelling on board the ill-fated vehicle along with her family. In her testimony, she has given the details of the family members, who were travelling. It includes her husband, PW-2, Ashok Kumar, besides her two sons. In the circumstances, the Tribunal was not right in suspecting the testimony of PW-1 and PW-2 for reason that they are man and wife. 24. The next finding, which is more effectual than the first inchoate one, is that the FIR having been lodged on 01.09.1996 by the claimant's husband, Ashok Kumar Singh with no report being lodged about the accident earlier, does not lend support to the claimant's case. This finding by the Tribunal, though true about the fact that the FIR was registered two and a half months after the occurrence, is not sustainable. This finding by the Tribunal, though true about the fact that the FIR was registered two and a half months after the occurrence, is not sustainable. It is imperative to note that in Paragraph No.6 of the claim petition under Column No.23, there is a specific averment that information with the Police was not lodged, because the owner and his son R.K. Jaiswal, who are men of high reputation in the locale, had assured the claimant and her husband that they would ensure payment of compensation to the claimant, which later on they did not fulfil; and this averment has not been denied or rebutted in the least measure in the written statement filed on behalf of the owner, or for that matter the Insurer. The Tribunal has made small of this non-traverse by saying that the principles of Orders V and VI CPC do not apply proprio vigore to proceedings before the Tribunal. Non-denial of a material fact, whether in proceedings before a Court of civil jurisdiction governed by the Code of Civil Procedure or otherwise, would lead to the same result. A non-traverse leads to the inference that some kind of a promise was made by the owner and his son to the claimant that they would ensure payment of compensation. If in those circumstances, in a case of injury, an ordinary man does not promptly lodge an FIR, where there is other tangible evidence about the happening of the accident, the delay would not work to discredit the claimant's case. The lodging of an FIR is not a pleasant task for an ordinary man. It is common experience that unless the offence is serious, men of the world avoid interacting with the Police to lodge informations, though that is not the explanation here. In the opinion of this Court, it is certainly a relevant factor to judge the conduct of the claimant in not promptly reporting the accident to the police, in the face of a promise by the owner and his son that compensation would be ensured to her for the injuries. The FIR, in the opinion of this Court for the said reason, cannot be discounted altogether, though its probative value may be far lesser than an information promptly lodged with the Police. 25. The FIR, in the opinion of this Court for the said reason, cannot be discounted altogether, though its probative value may be far lesser than an information promptly lodged with the Police. 25. The next finding, which the Tribunal has recorded to disbelieve the claimant's case is that in their testimony PW-1 and PW-2 have said that they were proceeding from Allahabad to Satna whereas in the FIR lodged by PW-2 on 01.09.1996, it is alleged that the claimant and her family were proceeding to Maihar; as against this in the claim petition the averment is that the claimant was proceeding to Rewa. All this has been held to be a contradiction that renders the claimant's case undependable and suspect. A perusal of the testimony of PW-1 and PW-2, no doubt says that the family were proceeding from Allahabad to Satna, but to find a contradiction in it with reference to the FIR, because it mentions that the claimant and her family were proceeding to Maihar, is based on a pedantic reading of the evidence instead of one that is realistic. Maihar is a Tehsil of District Satna in Madhya Pradesh, reputed for its position as a place of pilgrimage. If, therefore, the claimant and her witnesses mentioned their destination as Satna in her testimony, but PW-2 has described it as Maihar in the FIR lodged, it may not be a contradiction at all. It would be a contradiction, if the respondents had confronted PW-2 with reference to his previous statement in the FIR, and he had not explained satisfactorily why the destination was differently described. Since that was not done, the evidence has to be liberally viewed in favour of the claimant, unless the discrepancy be inexplicable. It has to be liberally viewed, because after all a motor accident claim is a proceeding under a beneficial piece of legislation, which is not to be tried with the stickler approach of a money suit. 26. So far as the pleading in this regard is concerned, the Tribunal has observed in manifest error that in the claim petition, the claimant has asserted that the family were proceeding from Allahabad to Rewa. In Column No.9, the place of accident has been mentioned as 'Allahabad-Rewa Road'. 26. So far as the pleading in this regard is concerned, the Tribunal has observed in manifest error that in the claim petition, the claimant has asserted that the family were proceeding from Allahabad to Rewa. In Column No.9, the place of accident has been mentioned as 'Allahabad-Rewa Road'. In Column No.26, where the case has been descriptively set out, the pleading is: thi okgu laŒ ;wih&70,Q&1028 ftles ;kfpuh vius ifjokj ds lnL;ksa ds lkFk bykgkckn ls jhok dh rjQ ;k=k dj jgh FkhA . The said plea does not show it to be a case that the claimant has asserted that she and her family were proceeding from Allahabad for destination Rewa. It rather says that the vehicle was moving towards Rewa. It is a fact of which judicial notice must be taken that in order to proceed to Maihar, which is located in District Satna, one has to take the Allahabad-Rewa Road, reach Rewa first before entering Tehsil Maihar, the pilgrimage being located 42 kilometers from Satna. Reading the evidence holistically, one can unmistakably infer that there is absolutely no contradiction in the claimant's testimony about their destination. In the claim petition, it may be a contextual reference to Rewa and elsewhere an incomplete reference to the destination. The Tribunal has completely lost sight of these facts and lost touch with reality while evaluating the claimant's evidence on this score. The finding of the Tribunal based on the contradiction about the destination cannot be sustained. 27. The other reason to disbelieve the claimant's testimony about the accident ever happening is that the claimant has not produced Harish Chandra, the other passenger on board besides her, who had sustained injuries. It has been held that failure to produce the aforesaid witness leads to withholding important evidence. From this, though not said explicitly, an adverse inference has been drawn. The said finding is also not sustainable. Merely because another injured on board the vehicle alongside the claimant has not been produced, would not render the claimant's case suspect, where by evidence aliunde it is proven. Also, there is no reason to draw an adverse inference against the claimant, because another injured on board the ill-fated vehicle has not been produced as a witness. 28. It is next held by the Tribunal that the claimant's case is belied by medico-legal evidence. Also, there is no reason to draw an adverse inference against the claimant, because another injured on board the ill-fated vehicle has not been produced as a witness. 28. It is next held by the Tribunal that the claimant's case is belied by medico-legal evidence. It is remarked that the claimant has said in her testimony that she had fainted at the time of the accident, but the medical report from S.R.N. Hospital dated 16.06.1996 recorded at 1.05 a.m. does not say that the claimant was unconscious. Lapse on the part of a doctor of this kind cannot be read to disbelieve that the claimant never sustained injuries. 29. The further feature of this finding about the medico-legal evidence is that the Tribunal has, after a description of the injuries, held that all injuries were found to be simple in nature, caused by a hard and blunt object. The said part of the finding suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. A perusal of the report dated 16.06.1996, authored by the Emergency Medical Officer, S.R.N. Hospital, Allahabad in original (which a document torn at some places) clearly shows in the ‘opinion’ that the injury was caused by a hard and blunt object, which was to be kept under observation with an advice for x-ray examination. The duration is fresh. The report further reads that the patient be admitted. It also says that the Police and RSO were informed. All this part of the report has been utterly misread by the Tribunal. The medico-legal report nowhere says that the injury is simple. Rather, it has opined it to be one that was to be kept under observation with an advice for x-ray examination. The Police too have been informed showing the medico-legal character of the injuries. If, therefore, the Doctor has omitted to mention that the case is one relating to a motor accident, the omission again is by the Doctor and not of any consequence to the claimant. The Tribunal, therefore, has erred in holding that the medico-legal report not mentioning the fact that the injuries were sustained in a motor accident casts doubt on the claimant's case. The concluding part of the finding by the Tribunal which says that the claimant's case is not supported by medico-legal evidence, for all the reasons above indicated, is not at all sustainable. The concluding part of the finding by the Tribunal which says that the claimant's case is not supported by medico-legal evidence, for all the reasons above indicated, is not at all sustainable. Rather, the medico-legal evidence supports the claimant's case as the injuries were noticed to be fresh and the Doctor instructed the Police to be informed. The injuries were kept under observation and advised for x-ray examination. The report is absolutely compatible with the initial and emergency examination in the case of a motor accident. It is, accordingly, held. 30. The Tribunal has also discredited the claimant's case, because an application dated 02.08.1996 moved before the Insurer for claiming compensation by the claimant's husband, Ashok Kumar Singh, though filed on record, has not been proved. Even if the said document has not been proved by PW2 in the witness-box, it can be excluded from evidence, but that by itself would not discredit the claimant's case, which is otherwise well proved by the parole evidence of both witnesses. Both the witnesses, who were on board the vehicle, are broadly consistent about the evidence, which is supported not only by the medico-legal examination done initially, but by other medical evidence. There is a treatment-cum-prescription memo dated 16.09.1996 by Dr. A.K. Pradhan, Surgeon, who has mentioned in his prescription that the case is one of accidental injury. The said prescription is by a Plastic Surgeon, who was consulted later on for reconstructive surgery. The patient has been for the most part treated at Raj Nursing Home, Allahabad and also NEMA Eye Hospital, Varanasi. The prescription by the Doctor at the NEMA Eye Hospital again mentioned it to be a case of accident. PW-1 has testified in her examination-in-chief that she was treated from 16.06.1996 to 30.06.1996 at Raj Nursing Home, Allahabad and thereafter as an outdoor patient. It is mentioned that Dr. A.K. Pradhan of Dr. Shiv Prasad Gupta Hospital, Varanasi also treated her. The medical prescriptions and the medicine vouchers on record from Raj Nursing Home and the prescription from Dr. Pradhan prove that the claimant was in the first instance treated for her injuries and then undertook treatment for some reconstructive facial surgery. She also had to undergo some treatment in respect of her eyes. All this evidence would go to show that the accident, which the claimant asserts was a reality. Pradhan prove that the claimant was in the first instance treated for her injuries and then undertook treatment for some reconstructive facial surgery. She also had to undergo some treatment in respect of her eyes. All this evidence would go to show that the accident, which the claimant asserts was a reality. It is not a farce as the Tribunal has held. The remarks by the Tribunal that the claimant was treated for cancer are completely misplaced. The medical records show that there was some kind of a lump somewhere that was suspected and an FNAC advised. The findings of the Tribunal that she was prescribed medicines for breast cancer do not appear to be justified at all. In any case, the development of a subsequent problem or a chance discovery alongside the treatment for injuries suffered in consequence of the accident, cannot benefit the owner or the Insurer. The claimant's case about the accident and the injuries sustained in it, would not stand discredited, because during treatment some other disease or problem was discovered, which too was treated, if that be the case. 31. In the considered opinion of this Court, the findings recorded by the Tribunal on Issue No.1 cannot be sustained. The findings on the said issue are set aside. Issue No.1 is, accordingly, answered in favour of the claimant and against the owner and the Insurer. Issues Nos.2, 3 and 5 have already been answered in favour of the claimant by the Tribunal. These need not be examined further either by this Court or by the Tribunal in consequence of the order that this Court proposes to make. This leaves this Court with the fourth Issue, about which there are no comments by the Tribunal at all. The issue has not at all been examined in consequence of the findings on Issue No.1. Since the findings on Issue No.1 have been reversed by this Court, Issue No.4 is required to be determined by the Tribunal in the first instance and the quantum of the award decided on the basis of the evidence of record. Parties would be at liberty to lead further evidence, if they so desire on the issue of quantum alone. No other matter is required to be redetermined by the Tribunal. 32. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed in part. The impugned judgment and award dated 02.09.2000 is set aside. Parties would be at liberty to lead further evidence, if they so desire on the issue of quantum alone. No other matter is required to be redetermined by the Tribunal. 32. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed in part. The impugned judgment and award dated 02.09.2000 is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Tribunal for hearing parties afresh on Issue No.4 and passing an award in accordance with law determining just compensation. The matter shall be decided afresh within a period of three months next from the date of receipt of certified copy of this judgment by the Tribunal. 33. Let the record be sent down at once to the Tribunal which now has jurisdiction in the matter.