ORDER 1. The present writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India has been filed challenging the order dated 29.1.2020, whereby services of the petitioner has been terminated by the Administrator of the Primary Krishi Saakh Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit, Tiholi. Further challenge is to the order dated 31.12.2020 passed by Joint Registrar (Judicial), Cooperative Societies, Gwalior Division, whereby the revision filed under section 80 (A) of the MP Cooperative Societies Act has been dismissed as not maintainable against the order of termination, holding that the order passed by the administrator required a detailed scrutiny which cannot be done under section 80 (a) of the MP Cooperative Societies Act rather the proper scrutiny can be done under the provisions of section 55 (2) of the MP Cooperative Societies Act. 2. Challenging the aforesaid orders the present petition has been filed. 3. Brief facts of the present case are that the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Clerk, District Cooperative Central Bank Maryadit Gwalior. That, vide order dated 29.1.2020 (Annexure P/2) under the instructions given by the higher authorities, respondent No.4 without serving any show cause notice and holding any departmental enquiry upon the petitioner terminated his service on the basis of some bald allegations and forged entries allegedly carried out by the petitioner. The petitioner was suspended and a criminal case was registered against him. The facts mentioned in the order by respondent no.4 was on the basis of some findings of exparte enquiry conducted by the enquiry team behind back of the petitioner. 4. The Registrar of M.P. Cooperative Societies in exercising his power under section 55 (1) of the MP Cooperative Socities Act, 1960 has framed “ Prathmik Krishi Saakh Sahakari Sanstha, Vrahtkar Saakh Sahkari Sanstha, Adim Jati Seva Sahkari Sanstha, Krishi Seva Sahkari Sanstha Karmchari Seva (Niyojan, Nibandhan and Karya Sthithi) Niyam (in short Karmachari Seva Niyam)” for regulating the recruitment and service condition of employees of Primary Agriculture Credit Co-operative Societies. 5. Rule 23 of the “Karmachari Seva Niyam” prescribes the incidences which constitute major mis-conduct and penalty for the aforesaid misconduct and rule 28 prescribes the procedure for conducting the enquiry for imposing penalty for serious misconducts. 5. Rule 23 of the “Karmachari Seva Niyam” prescribes the incidences which constitute major mis-conduct and penalty for the aforesaid misconduct and rule 28 prescribes the procedure for conducting the enquiry for imposing penalty for serious misconducts. As per rule 28 where the allegations against the delinquent employee is of serious misconduct, the competent authority has to serve articles of charges as per Schedule 4 requiring delinquent employee to submit his reply within prescribe time and thereafter, the employee shall be permitted to defend himself. Further tule 28 prescribes that after recovering explanation from the employee, documentary evidence shall be examined and the explanation of the employee if not found satisfactory then only departmental enquiry shall be initiated against him, but in the present case no pre-enquiry procedure was followed nor any enquiry was conducted later on. But, only on the basis of some instructions, the petitioner was terminated from his service. 6. The petitioner had earlier challenged the order of his termination dated 29.1.2020 by filing a W.P. No. 3466/2020 which was dismissed vide order dated 12.2.2020 on the ground that the petitioner has an alternative and efficacious remedy under section 55 (2) of the M.P. Cooperative Societies Act, which was challenged by the present petitioner in W.A No.481/2020 by order dated 12.4.2022 wherein the writ appeallate Court has observed that the petitioner instead of preferring an alternative remedy available under M.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 preferred a revision under section 18 (a) of the Act, 1960 alleging that since the order of termination was passed at the dictates of the Registrar himself then availing the remedy under section 55 (2) of the Act of 1960 would not be in efficacious alternative remedy and since against the order passed by the revisional Court, the petitioner has already preferred the present writ petitions, therefore, the writ petitions may be decided on its own merits without getting influenced by the earlier order whereby the petitioner was relegated to avail the remedy of raising dispute before the Registrar of the M.P. Cooperative Societies under the Act of 1960. Accordingly, this petition is being adjudicated upon on its own merits. 7. Accordingly, this petition is being adjudicated upon on its own merits. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that from bare perusal of the order Annexure P/2 dated 29.1.2020 it would be evident that the impugned order has been passed in flagrant violation of the “Karmchari Seva Niyam” framed in exercise of powers conferred under section 55 (1) of the Act of 1960 which regulates the recruitment and service conditions of the employees of the Primary Agricultural Credit Cooperative Societies, wherein on the incidence which constitutes serious misconduct procedure for conduting an enquiry is contemplated, but admittedly the impugned order has been passed without following the due procedure only on the directions issued by the higher officials on the ground that some case has been registered against the petitioner vide crime no. 12/2019 dated 8.2.2019 by P.S. Utila, District Gwalior. It was further argued that ultimate para of the order of termination dated 29.1.2020 would demonstrate the fact that it has been passed upon the instructions only and no procedure as prescribed under “Karmchari Seva Niyam” has been followed and, therefore, since the impugned order is totally against the principles of natural justice without following the due procedure and without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners is bad in law and in such event alternative remedy cannot be said to be barred for a person to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance was placed in the matter of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 . 8. It was further contended that so far as the order of Joint Registrar (Judicial) Cooperative Societies, Gwalior Division is concerned whereby the revision which has been preferred against the order of termination has been dismissed that the revenue authority without ascertaining the contentions of the petitioner which he had moved, on a very technical aspect dismissed the Revision, holding that the order of termination dated 29.1.2020 since involved some disputed question of facts which could only be ascertained by the competent authority under the provisions of section 55 (2) of the Act of 1960, the Revision is not maintainable, is per se illegal as from the impugned order it was very much clear that the same has been passed in utter violation of the “Karmchari Seva Niyam” which had statutory force and was required to be followed. Thus, the order passed by the revisional authority is bad in law and deserves to be set aside. 9. On the strength of the above arguments it was submitted that the impugned orders are per se illegal and the termination of the petitioner is bad, therefore, the petition deserves to be allowed with costs. 10. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that it is not in dispute that the petitioner was found involved in a criminal case in which a criminal appeal is pending before the competent court, but the allegations against the petitioner herein are that the petitioner has committed misappropriation of Government funds as he was found involved in extending benefit of the State Government Scheme known as “ Jan Kishan Fasal Rin Mafi Yojna” to ineligible persons with ulterior motives and before terminating the services of the petitioner proper procedure has been followed. It was further argued that instead of filing proper remedy as provided under section 55 (2) of the Act of 1960 before the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) which is a different and independent authority for exercising jurisdiction vested under section 55 (2) of the Act, went on to first prefer a W.P. No. 3466/2020, wherein vide order dated 12.02.2020 the petitioner was directed to avail the remedy under section 55 (2) of the Act of 1960, but instead of raising a dispute under section 55 (2) of the Act of 1960 he preferred a revision under section 80 (A) of the Act of 1960 and since the same was not maintainable it was rightly dismissed by the revisional authority. 11. It was further argued that the petitioner since is having an alternative efficacious remedy under section 55 (2) of the Act of 1960, the present petition is not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed. While placing reliance in the decision passed by Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Smt. Sunita Lodhi v. State of M.P. & Ors. in Writ Appeal No. 494/2021 on 9.6.2021 the counsel for the State tried to emphasize that when an alternative efficacious remedy is available, the Court shall not interfere in the matter particularly when by such an interference a person will be reinstated which will not be in the public interest. Wherein non issuance of notice before termination was not even disputed. 12. Wherein non issuance of notice before termination was not even disputed. 12. Thus, looking to the facts and circumstances of the instant case and also the prima facie the petitioner guilty of misappropriation of the funds and a criminal charge-sheet has already been filed before the competent authority and the trial is pending, learned Government advocate prayed for dismissal of the said writ petition. 13. Learned counsel appearing for respondent no.1 submits that the order dated 31.12.2020 passed by the revisional Court does not give rise to the real cause of action to the petitioner in as much as the revision has not been dismissed on merits, but was dismissed as not maintainable under section 80 (A) of the Act of 1960 and the petitioner had a remedy to raise a dispute under section 55 (2) of the Act of 1960 which is a proper remedy. It was further argued that if the petitioner is aggrieved by the order passed by revisional Court, the proper remedy to the petitioner is to approach the M.P. State Cooperative Tribunal and in alternate as has been observed by the revisional authority that he could have approached the competent authority invoking the provisions of section 55 (2) of the Act of 1960 and in either case there is no occasion for the petitioner to have filed the writ petition as he has not exhausted the alternative remedies available to him. 14. It has further been argued that the service rules which are applicable to the society have been framed in the year, 2013 and the petitioner has wrongly relied on the Rule of 2010 which have been repealed by Rules, 2013 and, therefore, it was argued that placing reliance on the said Rules is of no consequence. Lastly, it was argued that since a remedy under section 55 (2) is a full fledged remedy whereas the remedy under section 80 (A) is of some other procedure, the revisional authority has rightly dismissed the revision which cannot be adjudicated in this forum. Thus, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 15. Heard the counsels for the parties and perused the record. 16. Thus, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 15. Heard the counsels for the parties and perused the record. 16. The appex Court invariably had held that the High Courts can exercise their descretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in spite of availability of alternative remedy, where the authority has acted without jurisdiction or the act of the authority is in utter violation of principles of natural justice or where vireses of an Act has been challenged or for enforcement of fundamental rights. It would be trite to refer to the decision of the appex court in the matter of Whirlpool Cooperation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (supra), wherein it has been held as under: “Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by the Supreme Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly withouty jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.” 17. It would also be relevant to refer to the decision rendered in Harbanslal Sahnia and Another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. And Ors. reported in (2003) 2 SCC 107 , wherein the appex Court has carved out the exceptions, thus: “In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.” 18. Further in the matter of CIT and Ors. Further in the matter of CIT and Ors. v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal reported in (2014) 1 SCC 603 , the appex Court reiterated this preposition and struck a balance between admission and rejection of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in case of availability of alternative remedy and held as under: “Thus, it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. Where the statutory authority or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procefure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Than Singh Nathmal v. Supt. Of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 and Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Artilce 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. The same principle of law has been reiterated in the recent judgments of the appex Court in the matter of M/S Magadh Sugar and Energy Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors. passed in Civil Appeal No. 5728/2021 decided on 24.9.2021 and in the matter of Radha Krishna Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in 2021 SCC online SC 334.” 19. From the above judgments, it is clearly manifested consistently by the Apex Court that if exceptions are carved out, the High Courts should entertain writ although statutory remedy available. 20. passed in Civil Appeal No. 5728/2021 decided on 24.9.2021 and in the matter of Radha Krishna Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in 2021 SCC online SC 334.” 19. From the above judgments, it is clearly manifested consistently by the Apex Court that if exceptions are carved out, the High Courts should entertain writ although statutory remedy available. 20. It is not in dispute that the service conditions of the petitioner are governed by the Rules called “Karmchari Seva Niyam” framed under section 55 (1) of the Act of 1960 and as per rule 28 and 29 which is reproduced herein below:- 28- fdlh deZpkjh dks ml ij vkjksfir xaHkhj nqjkpj.k ds fy, rc rd nf.Mr ugha fd;k tkosxk tc rd fd tkap gsrq vf/kd`r vf/kdkjh }kjk fuEukuqlkj tkap djds deZpkjh ds fo:) nqjkpj.k dk nks"k fl) ugha dj fn;k tkrk%& ¼1½ l{ke vf/kdkjh vFkok mlds }kjk vf/kd`r vf/kdkjh deZpkjh dks ifjf'k"V 4 esa fn;s izk:i esa xaHkhj nqjkpj.k ds fy;s vkjksi i= nsxk vkSj lk/kkj.k nqjkpj.k ds fy;s ifjf'k"V 5 esa fn;s izk:i esa vkjksi i= nsxkA vkjksi i= esa nqjkpj.k dk rFkk mlds fo:) ifjfLFkfr;ksa dk Li"V mYys[k fd;k tkosxk vkSj mldk Li"Vhdj.k ekaxk tkosxkA ¼2½ deZpkjh dks mldk Li"Vhdj.k izLrqr djus gsrq le;] tks fd dkj.k crkvks lwpuk i= esa fufnZ"V gksxk] fn;k tkosxkA ¼3½ deZpkjh dks viuk cpko Lo;a djus vFkok bl gsrq laLFkk ds fdlh vU; deZpkjh dh lgk;rk ysus dh vuqefr gksxhA fdUrq fdlh ckgjh O;fDr dks deZpkjh ds cpko gsrq iSjoh djus dh vuqefr ugha gksxhA ¼4½ dkj.k crkvks lwpuk i= mRrj izkIr gksus ij] mldk nLrkosth; ijh{k.k fd;k tkosxk ,oa mRrj larqf"Vdkjd ugha ik;s tkus dh fLFkfr esa fuEukuqlkj foHkkxh; tkap dh dk;Zokgh izkjaHk dh tk,xhA ¼5½ l{ke vf/kdkjh }kjk vkjksiksa dh foHkkxh; tkap gsrq ,sls O;fDr dh fu;qfDr dh tkosxh] tks vkjksih deZpkjh ls inuke esa ofj"B gks lkFk gh vkjksiksa ds i{k leFkZu esa rF; izLrqr djus gsrq izLrqrdrkZ vf/kdkjh dh fu;qfDr dh tkosxhA l{ke vf/kdkjh vFkok vf/kd`r vf/kdkjh }kjk vkjksih deZpkjh dks vkjksiksa dk Li"V mYys[k djrs gq, ,oa nLrkost o xokg dh lwph tksa vkjksiksa dh iqf"V djrs gksa] layXu djrs gq, vkjksi i= tkjh fd;k tkosxk ,oa mldk mRrj izkIr fd;k tkosxkA ¼6½ ;fn vkjksih vf/kjksfir vkjksiksa dks vLohdkj djrk gS rks izLrqrdrkZ vf/kdkjh vkjksiksa dks fl) djus gsrq xokg ,oa vko';d nLrkost izLrqr djsxkA ¼7½ izLrqrdrkZ vf/kdkjh ds i{k leFkZu iw.kZ gksus ds mijkar vkjksih deZpkjh dks vius cpko esa i{k leFkZu gsrq rF; ,oa xokg izLrqr djus dk leqfpr volj iznku fd;k tkosxkA ¼8½ tkap vf/kdkjh] foHkkxh; tkap izfØ;k dk ikyu djrs gq, mHk; i{kksa }kjk izLrqr Lkk{;ksa o rF;ksa dh foospuk dj tkap izfrosnu izLrqr djsxkA ¼9½ tkap vf/kdkjh ls izfrosnu izkIr gksus ij vkjksi izekf.kr gks tkus ds vk/kkj ij l{ke vf/kdkjh }kjk xaHkhj nqjkpj.k gsrq izko/kkfur n.M izLrkfor djrs gq, vafre dkj.k crkvks lwpuk i= O;fDrxr lquokbZ dh frfFk fu/kkZfjr djrs gq, tkjh fd;k tkosxkA ¼10½ vkjksfir deZpkjh }kjk vafre dkj.k crkvks lwpuk i= ds izfr mRRkj esa fyf[kr vFkok ekSf[kd :i ls izLrqr rF;ksa dks fyfic) dj ,oa tkap izfrosnu esa mfYyf[kr rF;ksa dk laijh{k.k dj vkjksi izekf.kr ik;s tkus ds vk/kkj ij l{ke vf/kdkjh xaHkhj nqjkpj.k gsrq izko/kkfur n.M esa ls n.M dk fu/kkZj.k djsxk ,oa rn~uqlkj n.Mkns'k tkjh djsxkA 29- fdlh deZpkjh dks ml ij vkjksfir lk/kkj.k nqjkpj.k ds fy;s rc rd nf.Mr ugha fd;k tk ldsxk tc rd fd fuEu izfØ;k viukrs gq, deZpkjh nks"kh ugh ik;k tkrkA ¼1½ l{ke vf/kdkjh }kjk lk/kkj.k nqjkpj.k ds rgr fd;s x;s d`R;ksa ls lacaf/kr vkjksiksa dk Li"V mYys[k djrs gq, vkjksfir deZpkjh dk vkjksi i= tkjh fd;k x;k gksA ¼2½ vkjksfir deZpkjh dks lkr fnol dk le; mRrj izLrqr djus gsrq iznku fd;k tkosxkA ¼3½ vkjksih deZpkjh ls izkIr mRrj dk l{ke vf/kdkjh }kjk ijh{k.k fd;k tkosxk ,oa rRi'pkr nks"kh ik;s tkus ij lk/kkj.k nqjkpj.k gsrq izko/kkfur n.M fn;k tkosxkA vkjksfir deZpkjh }kjk O;fDrxr lquokbZ pkgh tkus ij n.M fu/kkZj.k ds iwoZ mls lquokbZ dk volj iznku fd;k tkosxkA 21. Under the aforesaid rules it has been clearly mentioned that any delinquent employee who is being charged of serious mis-conduct will not be punished, until and unless the person authorised conduct an enquiry and after enquiry had not found proved the person guilty. Thus, in the wake of the clear stipulation made in the aforesaid rules it is clear that without following due procedure no penalty can be imposed upon a delinquent alleging his act to be of serious mis-conduct, thus, it appears to this Court that this is a clear violation of a statutory provision and the principles of natural justice has not been folllowed, as no pre-enquiry notice was given to the petitioner nor a reply was called from him, no charge-sheet has been issued to the petitioner, no opportunity to defend himself was granted to him, no enquiry officer has been appointed neither Presenting Officer was appointed. 22. It is true that if any dispute with regard to the service conditions of an employee arises then a dispute is required to be raised as per section 55 (2) of the Act of 1960 and the Registrar or any officer appointed by him not below the rank of Assistant Registrar shall decide the dispute and his decision shall be binding on the society and its employees, but as it has already been discussed above that cases where the principles of natural justice have not been followed, then an alternative remedy shall not be a bar for entertaining the dispute under writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 23. This Court also finds it strange that when the matter went before the revisional authority invoking the provisions of Section 80 (A) and when the flagrant violation of the rules framed under section 55 (1) of the Act of 1960 was evident from the face of the impugned order dismissing the revision on the ground of technicality was not justified. This Court also finds it strange that when the matter went before the revisional authority invoking the provisions of Section 80 (A) and when the flagrant violation of the rules framed under section 55 (1) of the Act of 1960 was evident from the face of the impugned order dismissing the revision on the ground of technicality was not justified. section 80 (A) of the Act of 1960 for ready reference reads as under:- “80-A. Power of Registrar to call for proceedings of subordinate officers and Board of Directors of a Society and to pass orders thereon- The Registrar may, at any time on his own motion or on the application made by any party, call for and examine the record of any enquiry or the proceedings by any sub-ordinate officer or a decision of a Board of Directors of a Society for which Government has contributed to its share capital or has given loans or financial assistance or has guaranteed the repayment of loans granted in any other form for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer or Board of Directors. If in any case, it appears to the Registrar that any decision or order or proceedings so called for should be modified, annulled or reversed, the Registrar, may pass such order thereon as he may deem fit: Provided that no order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of any party unless such party has had an opportunity of being heard: Provided further that the powers conferred on the Registrar under this section, shall not be delegated to any officer below the rank of Joint Registrar.” 24. Aforesaid section gives ample power to the registrar to modify or reverse any order after calling and examining record or the enquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate officer or decision of Committee of society after satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any decision on the order passed as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer or Committee. But it is unfortunate that the revisional authority instead of interfering with the illegal order of termination of the petitioner dated 29.1.2020 had shied away without addressing upon the issue and had dismissed the revision. But it is unfortunate that the revisional authority instead of interfering with the illegal order of termination of the petitioner dated 29.1.2020 had shied away without addressing upon the issue and had dismissed the revision. This Court, thus, holds that the order dated 29.1.2020 (Annexure P/2) with regard to the termination of the petitioner's service as well as the order dated 31.12.2020 are per se illegal and, therefore, deserves to be set aside. 25. As a natural corollary, the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner with a liberty to initiate appropriate action against him under the provisions of the Act of 1960 and the rules framed there under and take appropriate decision in the matter in accordance with law, if contemplated. 26. With the aforesaid, the petition is allowed and is disposed of. 27. E-copy/Certified copy as per rules/directions.