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2023 DIGILAW 540 (UTT)

Harish Singh Aithani v. State of Uttarakhand

2023-09-19

RAVINDRA MAITHANI

body2023
JUDGMENT : Ravindra Maithani, J. The challenge in this petition is made to an office order dated 28.04.2023, passed by the respondent no.1 the State of Uttarakhand (“the State Government”) by which, the petitioner has been removed from the post of Member, Jila Panchayat, Bageshwar under Section 138 Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016 (“the Act”) and the petitioner has further been disqualified for being chosen a member of the Panchayat and being elected a Panchayat/Pradhan/Up-Pradhan/ Pramukh/Up-Pramukh/Chairman/Vice-Chairman for a period of five years. The petitioner also challenges the enquiry proceedings including inquiry report dated 18.10.2018 submitted by the respondent no.3 the Commissioner Kumaon Mandal (“the Commissioner”); the petitioner also seeks restoration of his status as Member of Jila Panchayat forthwith. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 3. The petitioner was Chairman, Jila Panchayat, Bageshwar (“the Chairman”) from the year 2014 to 2019. 4. The facts, briefly stated, are as follows:- (i) In the year 2014, the petitioner contested the election of Chairman, Jila Panchayat Bageshwar. The respondent no.7 Govind Singh Danu was one of the contestants. The petitioner was elected as Chairman. But, the election of the petitioner was challenged by the respondent no.7 Govind Singh Danu before the Election Tribunal. The Election Tribunal allowed the petition and set aside the election of the petitioner as Chairman. That order of the Election Tribunal was challenged by the petitioner before this Court. By the judgment and order dated 01.10.2015 passed in AO No. 449 of 2014, Harish Chandra Singh Aithani Vs. Govind Singh Danu and other, this Court set aside the order of the Election Tribunal and the petitioner was declared successful to the post of Chairman. The respondent no.7 unsuccessfully challenged the order of this Court before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. (ii) The respondent no.7 Govind Singh Danu made a complaint about functioning of the petitioner as Chairman. On 21.09.2017, the respondent no.6 Sher Singh Gariya, Ex Member of the Legislative Assembly forwarded the complaint of the respondent no.7 Govind Singh Danu to the Chief Minister for taking action against the petitioner. (ii) The respondent no.7 Govind Singh Danu made a complaint about functioning of the petitioner as Chairman. On 21.09.2017, the respondent no.6 Sher Singh Gariya, Ex Member of the Legislative Assembly forwarded the complaint of the respondent no.7 Govind Singh Danu to the Chief Minister for taking action against the petitioner. On this communication of the respondent no.6 Govind Singh Gariya, the Chief Minister noted that “matter is very serious, action should be taken by ensuring that the entire matter is investigated within a month.” (iii) On 29.11.2017, the Principal Secretary to the Government of Uttarakhand conveyed the direction of the Chief Minister to the District Magistrate, Bageshwar for conducting preliminary enquiry within a week. (iv) The respondent no.4, the District Magistrate, Bageshwar (“the District Magistrate”) constituted an Inquiry Committee under the Chairmanship of the Additional District Magistrate, Bageshwar. The Inquiry Committee submitted its report, which was forwarded by the District Magistrate, Bageshwar on 14.02.2018 to the Principal Secretary, State of Uttarakhand. (v) Final inquiry was thereafter entrusted to the Commissioner. (vi) The Commissioner, on 22.06.2018 forwarded the charge sheet to the petitioner. The petitioner on 10.07.2018 filed his response to the charges levelled against him. (vii) On 18.10.2018, the Commissioner submitted the inquiry report to the Principal Secretary, State of Uttarakhand. (viii) On 16.02.2022, a show cause notice was issued by the State Government to the petitioner. The petitioner replied to the show cause notice on 18.08.2022. (ix) On 28.04.2023, the impugned order has been passed. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that the action that has been initiated against the petitioner is not in accordance with law because enquiry against Chairman could have been conducted only in accordance with the Uttar Pradesh Kshetra Panchayats and Jila Panchayats (Removal of Pramukshs, Up-Pramukhs, Adyakshas and Up-adyakshas) Rules, 1997 (“the 1997 Rules”). Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules provides for a procedure for filing a complaint. But, it is the case of the petitioner that the complaint in the instant matter is not in accordance with Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules. 6. The entire proceedings which culminated in the passing of the impugned order have also been challenged on the following grounds:- (i) By its communication dated 29.11.2017 of the District Magistrate was required to conduct an inquiry. The District Magistrate could not have delegated it further. But, it has been delegated. 6. The entire proceedings which culminated in the passing of the impugned order have also been challenged on the following grounds:- (i) By its communication dated 29.11.2017 of the District Magistrate was required to conduct an inquiry. The District Magistrate could not have delegated it further. But, it has been delegated. It is violative of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules. (ii) After submission of a report, by the Commissioner in the year 2018, after long delay of four years in the year 2022, the petitioner was given show cause notice. It is much delayed action. (iii) The authorities were duty bound to follow the procedure given under 1997 Rules, but they acted in contravention to it. 7. The respondent nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 have filed their separate counter affidavits. According to respondent no.5, Jila Panchayat, the enquiry was conducted in the matter as per the directions of the Chief Minister and the petition is devoid of merits. 8. It is the case of the State Government that the petitioner has raised a hyper technical issue only to circumvent/dodge out the allegations leveled against him. The respondent State authorities have taken the following points in their counter affidavit:- (i) The petitioner cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time; i.e., to say that after participating in the enquiry process, the petitioner now cannot take a U turn to say that the entire proceedings are vitiated. (ii) Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules, provides for enquiry “otherwise” than any complaint as referred to in Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules. The enquiry under Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules is a preliminary enquiry or a fact finding enquiry. The District Magistrate has power to refer a case for preliminary enquiry even if there is no complaint or report or in other words he has the power to act suo motu. (iii) The enquiry was conducted by the District Magistrate, which was in consonance with the provisions of law. The word “conduct” in Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules has a wider connotation, which would also include – to guide, to present, manage or direct, organize and carryout and thus, the word “conduct” would not necessarily mean that the District Magistrate himself has to hold an enquiry. (iv) The decision is based upon the reports, which is in turn based upon the evidence collected. (iv) The decision is based upon the reports, which is in turn based upon the evidence collected. (v) The order passed by the answering respondent is legal, justifiable and just now. 9. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the entire action is bad in the eye of law. He would submit that under 1997 Rules, enquiry on an complaint may be conducted only in accordance with Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules. In the instant case, it stated that in defiance to the Rules, a complaint has been entertained. Learned Senior Counsel would also raise the following points in his submission:- (i) The preliminary enquiry has been vitiated as the District Magistrate instead of conducting the enquiry himself, as mandated under Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules, has abdicated his duties and delegated the enquiry to others. (ii) Entire proceedings are vitiated by mala fide. (iii) On the communication dated 21.09.2017 of the respondent no.6 Sher Singh Gariya, by which the complaint of the respondent No.7 Govind Singh Danu was forwarded to the Chief Minister, the Chief Minister has endorsed that “the matter is serious.” This remark by the Chief Minister vitiates the entire proceedings on account of the doctrine of dictation. By virtue of such observation made by the Chief Minister, the subordinates were restricted in their action. (iv) The Commissioner had submitted his enquiry report on 18.10.2018, but thereafter, notice was given to the petitioner on 16.02.2022, this action is much delayed. It has not been explained. It vitiates the entire process. 10. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the principles of law, as laid down by this Court in the case of Ranjeet Singh Vs. State of Uttarakhand, 2023 SCC OnLine Utt 556, Smt. Kesari Devi Vs. State of UP, MANU/UP/1039/2005, State of Punjab Vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770 , Orient Paper Mills Ltd. Vs. Union of India (1970) 3 SCC 76 , Manohar Lal Vs. Ugrasen, (2010) 11 SCC 557 , Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board Vs. Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd, (2019) 19 SCC 479 and State of A.P. Vs. N. Radhakishan (1998) 4 SCC 154 . 11. A similar controversy has been decided by this Court in the case of Ranjeet Singh (supra). In para 29 of the judgment, this Court observed as follows:- “29. Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd, (2019) 19 SCC 479 and State of A.P. Vs. N. Radhakishan (1998) 4 SCC 154 . 11. A similar controversy has been decided by this Court in the case of Ranjeet Singh (supra). In para 29 of the judgment, this Court observed as follows:- “29. What is important to note is the consequences, if the complaint is not filed in the manner provided under Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules declares that “A complaint which does not comply with any of the foregoing provisions shall not be entertained”. This sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 makes it abundantly clear that compliance of all the sub-rules of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules is mandatory. It is not a procedural part.” 12. In fact, in the case of Ranjeet Singh (supra), this Court has taken note of principles of law, as laid down in the case of Smt. Kesari Devi (supra). In the case of Kesari Devi (supra), in para 139, the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court had held as follows:- “139. In view of the law, referred to above, as the inquiry could be held only by the District Magistrate and no one else, the preliminary inquiry stood vitiated and there was nothing before the State Government on the basis thereof it could order the regular inquiry. Rule 5 of the 1997 Rules empowers the State Government to appoint the Investigating Officer for the purpose of regular inquiry only if it is of the opinion, on the basis of the preliminary inquiry report submitted under Rule 4 (2) of the 1997 Rules, that it requires a regular inquiry. Firstly, the complaint was not maintainable and secondly the preliminary inquiry has not been conducted in accordance with law by the District Magistrate himself. The State Government, therefore, could not hold the regular inquiry. While directing the regular inquiry against the petitioner, the State Government deprived her the right to exercise her administrative and financial powers and for that purpose a three member committee was appointed. One member of this Committee was the complainant herself. The matter had been contested and the order dated 19.06.20004 is pending consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court wherein the Hon’ble Court had been pleased to grant interim relief in favour of the petitioner.” 13. One member of this Committee was the complainant herself. The matter had been contested and the order dated 19.06.20004 is pending consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court wherein the Hon’ble Court had been pleased to grant interim relief in favour of the petitioner.” 13. In the case of Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “if initial action is not in consonance with law, all subsequent and consequential proceedings would fall through for the reason that illegality strikes at the root of the order”. 14. In the case of Orient Paper Mills Ltd, (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “the superior officer cannot issue directions by which the subordinate officer is bound, no role is than left for the exercise of own independent judgment by the subordinate officers.” In the case of Manohar Lal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that “ If the appellate or revisional authority takes upon itself the task of the statutory authority and passes an order, it remains unenforceable for the reason that it cannot be termed to be an order passed under the Act.” This principle of law, as laid down in the case of Manohar Lal (supra), has been followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board (supra). 15. In the case of N. Radhakishan (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the factor of delay in disciplinary proceedings and held that “If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations. 16. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations. 16. Learned Advocate General, would submit that the proceedings have not been vitiated by virtue of non compliance of any Rule of 1997 Rules. He would submit that Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules permits that the State Government may on receipt of the complaint referred to in Rule 3 or “otherwise” appoint an officer for enquiry. He would submit that scope of word “otherwise” is quite wide. Even in the absence of any complaint, such enquiry may be ordered. It is argued that this matter proceeded under “otherwise” mode. Learned Advocate General also raises the following points in his submission:- (i) Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules does not get attracted in the instant case because under Rule 3, a complaint may be sent to the Secretary to the State Government, whereas, in the instant case, the complaint was sent to the Chief Minister, who under the “otherwise” mode directed for conducting an enquiry. (ii) The District Magistrate has marked the enquiry to other Committees, which is lawful. It is not violation of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules. (iii) Sections 19 and 19 A of the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1904 (“the General Clauses Act”) and Article 367 of the Constitution of India, protects such actions. The District Magistrate was required to conduct an enquiry, so whatever was to be done to conduct an enquiry, all those ancillary and incidental powers also may be exercised by the District Magistrate. (iv) Every State action shall be presumed to be done in good faith. If there is any allegation of mala fide, it has to be proved by the person, who alleges such mala fide. (v) In the instant case, after enquiry, corruption charges have been found proved. Therefore, no interference is warranted. 17. In support of his contention, learned Advocate General has placed reliance on the principles of law, as laid down in the cases of Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta Division Vs. National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 2563 , Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Therefore, no interference is warranted. 17. In support of his contention, learned Advocate General has placed reliance on the principles of law, as laid down in the cases of Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta Division Vs. National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 2563 , Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others, AIR 1981 SC 606 and Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. General Manager (PJ) Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. Haldia and others (2005) 7 SCC 764 . 18. In the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta Division (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, observed that “It is well-established rule of construction that a power to do something essential for the proper and effectual performance of the work which the statute has in contemplation may be implied.” 19. In the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that “But it is a well known rule of statutory construction that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. In a case of this nature, we are of the view that the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the statute to the contrary………………………………………………..” 20. In the case of Ajit Kumar Nag (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, held that “ It is well settled that the burden of proving mala fide is on the person making the allegations and the burden is “very heavy”. (vide E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. (1974) 4 SCC 3 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 165) There is every presumption in favour of the administration that the power has been exercised bona fide and in good faith. It is to be remembered that the allegations of mala fide are often more easily made than made out and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high degree of credibility. As Krishna Iyer, J. stated in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra [ (1976) 1 SCC 800 ] (SCC p. 802, para 2):“It (mala fide) is the last refuge of a losing litigant.” 21. As Krishna Iyer, J. stated in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra [ (1976) 1 SCC 800 ] (SCC p. 802, para 2):“It (mala fide) is the last refuge of a losing litigant.” 21. During the course of argument, while arguing on compliance of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also referred to the judgment in the case of Vivekanand Yadav Vs. State of U.P. 2010 SCC OnLine All 2702 to argue that the ratio of that judgment may not be applicable in the instant case because in the Vivekanand Yadav (supra), the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court interpreted the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhans and Up-Pradhans and Members) Enquiry Rules, 1997 (“the Panchayat Raj Rules1997”). 22. The petitioner has been removed under Section 138 sub Section (1) of the Act and he has been disqualified under Section 138 (3) of the Act. Sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 138 of the Act are as follows:- “138. 22. The petitioner has been removed under Section 138 sub Section (1) of the Act and he has been disqualified under Section 138 (3) of the Act. Sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 138 of the Act are as follows:- “138. Separation from their posts to the officers of the three tiers Panchayat.- (1) The State Government may remove a Pradhan, Up-Pradhan of Gram Panchayat or any of its member or any member of Joint Committee or Land Management Committee or Pramukh or Up-Pramukh of Kshettra Panchayat or any its member or Chairman, Vice Chairman of Zila Panchayat or any of its member, on any of the following grounds (a) that he has acted as a member of the Gram Panchayat, Kshettra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat or member of any committee by voting or taking part in the discussion of any matter in which he has directly or indirectly, a personal interest or in which he is professionally interested on behalf of a client, principal or other person; (b) that he has become physically or mentally incapacitated for performing his duties as such member, Pradhan, Up-Pradhan, Pramukh, Up pramukh, Chairman, Vice-Chairman; (c) that he has been guilty, whether in his present or an earlier term of office, of misconduct in the discharge of his duty as such member, Pradhan, Up-Pradhan, Pramukh, Up pramukh, Chairman, Vice-chairman or has contravened any of the provisions of this Act or caused loss or damage to the fund or property of Panchayats and such misconduct, contravention or causing of loss or damage renders due to conduct of work as unauthorised in place by women representative, her husband or family members or relatives, such women shall be in eligible as member, Pradhan Up-Pradhan, Pramukh, Up-pramukh, Chairman, Vice-chairman, in such case they may be suspended upto the departmental final enquiry and their work and duties may be hand over to a committee of three elected members of the concerning Panchayat. In addition to the disciplinary action also may be taken against the departmental employees/ officer, if found guilty in the enquiry. In addition to the disciplinary action also may be taken against the departmental employees/ officer, if found guilty in the enquiry. (d) The Pradhan, Up-Pradhan or member of a Gram Panchayat or any members of Joint Committee or Land Management Committee, or a Pramukh, Up-pramukh or any member of Kshettra Panchayat or Chairman, Vice chairman or any member of Zila Panchayat may also be removed from his office in the following conditions- (i) If he makes himself absent without sufficient cause for more than three consecutive meetings or sittings or refuses to act; or (ii) If he has taken the benefit of reservation under sub-section (1) of Section 10-A or sub-section (1) of Section 11, sub-section (1) of Section 55-A or Section 56 or sub-section (1) of Section 92-A or Section 93, as the case may be, on the basis of a false declaration subscribed by him stating that he is a member of the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes or the Backward Classes, as the case may be; or (iii) If he suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in clauses (a) to (u) of sub-section (1) of Section 8, clauses (a) to (u) of sub-section (1) of Section 53 and in clauses (a) to (u) of sub-section (1) of Section 90. (iv) No order shall be passed adversely affecting a person to remove under this section by State Government/ prescribed authority shall not be given till the concerned is given a reasonable opportunity to present the reason for the thing. (e) No objection shall be made in any court on the order made by the State Government under this Section. Notwithstanding anything in any other enactment, if any member, Pradhan, Up Pradhan, Pramukh, Up Pramukh, Chairman and Vice-Chairman is removed from membership under this section he shall with effect from the date of publication of notification of removal, cease to hold the office of member, Pradhan, Up-Pradhan, Pramukh Up-Pramukh, Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively and a vacancy shall be deemed to have been created in that office. (3) A person who has been removed from membership of the Panchayat under sub-section (1) shall be disqualified for being chosen a member of the Panchayat and being elected a member, Pradhan, Up Pradhan, Pramukh, Up Pramukh, Chairman, Vice-chairman of a Panchayats for a period of five years from the date of his removal : Provided that the State Government may, at any time by order, remove the disqualification.” 23. The procedure relating to complaint under the 1997 Rules is given under Rule 3 of it. It is as follows:- “3. Procedure relating to complaints.-(1) Any person making a complaint against a Pramukh, Up-Pramukh, Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha may send his complaint to the Secretary to the State Government in the Panchayati Raj Department, Vidhan Bhawan, Lucknow. (2) Every complaint referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by the complainant’s own affidavit in support thereof and also affidavits of all persons from whom he claims to have received information of fact relating to the accusation, verified before a notary, together with all documents in his possession or power pertaining to the accusation. (3) Every complaint and affidavit under this rule as well as any schedule or annexure thereto shall be verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings and affidavit respectively. (4) Not less than three copies of the complaint as well as of each of its Annexures shall be submitted by the complainant. (5) A complaint which does not comply with any of the foregoing provisions shall not be entertained.” 24. Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules makes provision with regard to the preliminary enquiry. It reads as follows:- “4. Preliminary Enquiry.- (1) The State Government may, on the receipt of a complaint referred to in Rule 3 or otherwise appoint an officer not below the rank of an Additional District Magistrate in the case of a Pramukh or Up-Pramukh and District Magistrate in the case of an Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha to conduct a preliminary enquiry with a view to finding out if there is a prima facie case for a formal enquiry in the matter. (2) The Officer appointed under sub-rule (1) shall conduct the preliminary enquiry as expeditiously as possible and submit his report to the State Government within a fortnight of his having been so appointed.” 25. (2) The Officer appointed under sub-rule (1) shall conduct the preliminary enquiry as expeditiously as possible and submit his report to the State Government within a fortnight of his having been so appointed.” 25. Reference to Section 19 and 19A of the General Clauses Act has been made. These sections are as follows:- “19. Official chiefs and subordinates.- In any (Uttar Pradesh) Act it shall be sufficient for the purposes of expressing that a law relative of the chief of superior of an office shall apply to the deputies or subordinates lawfully performing the duties of that officer in the place of their superior, to prescribe the duty of the superior. 19-A. Ancillary powers.- Where, by any Uttar Pradesh Act, a power is given to a person, officer or functionary to do or enforce the doing of any act or thing, all such powers shall be deemed also to be given as are necessary to enable that person, officer or functionary to do or enforce the doing of the act or thing.” 26. A bare perusal of Rule 3 and Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules, as quoted hereinabove, makes it clear that a mechanism has been given in the matters of complaints against the elected representatives as specified therein. 27. On behalf of the petitioner reference has also been made to the judgment in the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs. Collector (2012) 4 SCC 407 to argue that in the matter of removal of an elected representatives, the statutory provisions should be strictly observed. In the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that “the law on the issue stands crystallised to the effect that an elected member can be removed in exceptional circumstances giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and holding the enquiry, meeting the requirement of principles of natural justice and giving an incumbent an opportunity to defend himself, for the reason that removal of an elected person casts stigma upon him and takes away his valuable statutory right. Not only the elected office-bearer but his constituency/electoral college is also deprived of representation by the person of their choice.” 28. On behalf of the petitioner, reference has been made to the judgment in the case of Vivekanand Yadav (supra). Not only the elected office-bearer but his constituency/electoral college is also deprived of representation by the person of their choice.” 28. On behalf of the petitioner, reference has been made to the judgment in the case of Vivekanand Yadav (supra). In the case of Vivakanand Yadav (supra), the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court interpreted the provisions of the Panchayat Raj Rules, 1997 which are somehow different than the 1997 Rules. Rule 3 of the Panchayati Raj Rules, 1997 provides for the procedure relating to complaint, but there is a distinction. It also contains Rule 3 sub Rule (6) which is as follows:- “(6) It shall not be necessary to follow the procedure laid down in the foregoing provisions of this rule, if a procedure laid down in the foregoing provisions of this rule if a complaints against a Pradhan or Up-Pradhan is made by a public servant.” 29. In the case of Vivekanand Yadav (supra), in para 57 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court observed that “under Rule 4 of the Panchayati Raj Rules, 1997, the DM can order a preliminary inquiry on a complaint or report or otherwise.” While making discussion on the word “otherwise” in para 60 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court observed that “The normal meaning of ‘otherwise’ should be adopted: the DM has power to refer a case for preliminary enquiry even if there is no complaint or report or in other words he has powers to act suo motu.” 30. In the instant case, admittedly, District Magistrate has no power to direct for any enquiry. Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules empowers the State Government to direct for an enquiry. 31. In the case of Ranjeet Singh (supra), this Court has discussed the law on this point and referred to the judgments on the subject. This Court has held that sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules “makes it abundantly clear that compliance of all the sub-rules of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules is mandatory. It is not a procedural part.” 32. In view of the finding recorded by this Court in the case of Ranjeet Singh (supra), this Court is not required to further discuss the nature of Rule 3 of 1997 Rules. It is not a procedural part.” 32. In view of the finding recorded by this Court in the case of Ranjeet Singh (supra), this Court is not required to further discuss the nature of Rule 3 of 1997 Rules. It has been settled by this Court that compliance of all sub-rules of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules is mandatory: a complaint which does not comply with any of the sub Rule of Rule 3 of 1997 Rules shall not be entertained. 33. In the instant case, what is being argued on behalf the State is that the State Government may direct an enquiry “otherwise” also. It is argued that under “otherwise” mode, enquiry in the instant case has been initiated. In support of his argument, learned Advocate General has referred to paras 22 and 23 in the case of Ranjeet Singh (supra). There paragraphs are as follows:- “22. A bare reading of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules makes it abundantly clear that, in fact, based on a complaint referred to in Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules or otherwise the State Government may appoint an inquiry officer for conducting a preliminary inquiry with a view to find out if there is a prima facie case for a formal inquiry in the matter. 23. A preliminary inquiry under Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules may be ordered “otherwise” also i.e. independent or without any complaint under Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules. But, the question of “otherwise” is not in issue in the instant matter. It is the categorical case of the petitioner that the complaint of Chandra Shekhar Mudela, based on which a preliminary inquiry was conducted and subsequently impugned order was passed, is bad in the eyes of law. Therefore, all the proceedings based on it and the complaint itself are liable to be quashed.” 34. Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner would also submit that if the argument as advanced on behalf of the State is accepted, it would render Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules, redundant. 35. It is true that Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules empowers the State Government to appoint an officer for conducting a preliminary enquiry and this may be done on the basis of complaint referred to in Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules or “otherwise”. 35. It is true that Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules empowers the State Government to appoint an officer for conducting a preliminary enquiry and this may be done on the basis of complaint referred to in Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules or “otherwise”. The word “otherwise” need not be interpreted in the instant case because the State Government did act on a complaint. The complaint given by the respondent no.6 Sher Singh Gariya, enclosing therewith the complaint of respondent no.7 Govind Singh Danu. The complaint was addressed to the Chief Minister. The scheme of 1997 Rules for conducting a preliminary enquiry on a complaint is given under Rules 3 and 4, as quoted hereinabove. How a complaint is to be entertained is given under Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules. 36. Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules, also defines as to whom the complaint is to be addressed. It has to be addressed in that manner alone and not otherwise. 37. In the instant case, a complaint has been filed. It is not addressed to the Secretary to the State Government in the Panchayati Raj Department. But it has been addressed to the Chief Minister. It is a complaint. The complaint does not confirm the provisions of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules. 38. It is argued that since the respondent no.6 Sher Singh Gariya made a complaint to the Chief Minister and the Chief Minister directed for an enquiry, it may be treated as an enquiry directed under the “otherwise” mode. This argument cannot be accepted for the following reasons:- (i) The provisions of the 1997 Rules for entertaining complaints are well designed. There appears to be a purpose behind it. (ii) An elected office bearer may not be disturbed on mere wild or vague allegations. The allegations should be substantiated by affidavits notarized with multiple copies of the complaint. (iii) The provision of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules, perhaps ensures that only genuine complaints are filed and entertained. (iv) If complaints filed otherwise then the mode provided under Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules, are entertained under the “otherwise” mode, it would render Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules, redundant. (v) A provision of statute cannot be made redundant. The interpretation should be so made that each provision of the statute or the Rules gets its meaning. (iv) If complaints filed otherwise then the mode provided under Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules, are entertained under the “otherwise” mode, it would render Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules, redundant. (v) A provision of statute cannot be made redundant. The interpretation should be so made that each provision of the statute or the Rules gets its meaning. Therefore, the word “otherwise” in Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules cannot include such complaints which are not inconformity with Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules. (vi) There may be situations that the State Government may suo motu or based perhaps on any police report or any other manner direct for conducting an enquiry. Those situations may perhaps fall under the “otherwise” mode in Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules. Any mode other than complaint may perhaps fall under “otherwise” mode. But in case, a complaint is entertained against a Jila Panchayat Adhyaksh, it has to meet the requirement of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules. 39. In the instant case, the complaint that was made by the respondent no.6 Sher Singh Gariya to the Chief Minister enclosing therewith the complaint of the respondent no.7 Govind Singh Danu, is not in conformity with Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules. Therefore, the provisions of sub-Rule (5) of the Rule 3 of the 1997 Rule would come into play and according to it, the complaint should not have been entertained. By entertaining such a complaint, an irregularity has been committed. It is incurable. Therefore, this Court is of the view that every consequential action taken on the complaint forwarded by the respondent no.6 Sher Singh Gariya gets vitiated. 40. The impugned order has also been assailed on the ground that on 29.11.2017, the respondent no.1, the State of Uttarakhand had directed the District Magistrate to conduct an enquiry. The District Magistrate instead of conducting an enquiry himself has further delegated the enquiry, based on which final enquiry was conducted which is not in accordance with Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules. 41. On this aspect, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would refer to the judgment in the case of Kesari Devi (supra), wherein, the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court observed as hereunder:- “55. 41. On this aspect, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would refer to the judgment in the case of Kesari Devi (supra), wherein, the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court observed as hereunder:- “55. The aforesaid provisions make it crystal clear that a specific procedure has been prescribed under the statutory rules and there is no possibility of making any deviation there from by the Authorities concerned. 56. The 1997 Rules, quoted hereinabove, clearly provide that the preliminary inquiry has to be conducted, in the case of an Adhyaksha, by the District Magistrate and in the case of Upadhyaksha and Member, by Additional District Magistrate. It is, thus, clear that only the District Magistrate can hold the inquiry. The words used in the Statute have to be construed strictly. 57. In Kailash Nath Agarwal and Ors. V. Pradeshiya Indust. & Inv. Corporation of U.P. and Anr., MANU/SC/0114/2003 : 2003 (1) SCR 1159 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if the legislature has used two different words in the same statute, it is to be construed as carrying different meanings. 58. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to examine the said Rule 4 of 1997 Rules in State of U.P. and Ors. v. Smt. Janki Devi Pal MANU/SC/0148/2003 : 2003 (1) SCR 1075 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court interpreting the said rule held as under:- “The draftsman of the “Rules has clearly used the term “District Magistrate” as distinct from the term “Additional District Magistrate”. The definition of District Magistrate in clause (14) of Section 2 of the Act is not applicable if there be something repugnant in the subject or context. The very use of “Additional District Magistrate” and “District Magistrate” in the same rule, consisting of one sentence, clearly suggests that the two terms are used in two different meanings. The High Court appers to be right in holding that an inquiry against a Pramukh or Up-Pramukh can be held by an officer not below the rank of an Additional District Magistrate while as against Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha – these two being democratically elective offices, higher in status that that of Pramukh or Up-Pramukh- the inquiry should be held by the District Magistrate.” 59. Thus, it is evident from the above that the preliminary inquiry is to be conducted only by the District Magistrate and he cannot ask any other officer to hold the inquiry……………………………………………………………………………………………………….………………………………………………………………………………………………….………....” 42. Thus, it is evident from the above that the preliminary inquiry is to be conducted only by the District Magistrate and he cannot ask any other officer to hold the inquiry……………………………………………………………………………………………………….………………………………………………………………………………………………….………....” 42. Learned Advocate General has referred to the provisions of Section 19 and 19A of the General Clauses Act, to argue that while conducting an enquiry the District Magistrate was not divested of ancillary or incidental power to constitute the committees. Reference has also been made to the judgment in the case of Grindlays Bank (supra) and Ajit Kumar Nag (supra). 43. It is true that if an authority is invested with some powers to perform such duties, such authority must carry alongwith it, all the ancillary and incidental powers that are necessary to perform the duties. But the question is, is it such a case? 44. On behalf of the petitioner, reference has been to Section 3 of the General Clauses Act to argue that according to sub Section (2) to Section 3 of it, if there is any contrary requirement in any statute that shall have binding effect. Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1904 reads as follows:- “3. Application of the Act to other enactments. – (1) The provisions of this Act shall apply to this Act and to all Uttar Pradesh Acts, whether made before or after the commencement of this Act. (2) The provisions of this Act in their application to any enactment or statutory instrument shall be subject to any contrary requirements of the context of the enactment or instrument that is to be interpreted.” 45. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would submit that Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules, categorically makes distinction between the District Magistrate and the Additional District Magistrate. In the matter of Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha, only District Magistrate may be directed to conduct an inquiry and in the case of Pramukh and Up-Pramukh it is Additional District Magistrate, who can be appointed. 46. The District Magistrate, Bageshwar has filed counter affidavit. In para 20 and 21, on this aspect he has stated that “the fact remains that an enquiry against the petitioner was conducted by the District Magistrate, which was in consonance with the provisions of the law”. 46. The District Magistrate, Bageshwar has filed counter affidavit. In para 20 and 21, on this aspect he has stated that “the fact remains that an enquiry against the petitioner was conducted by the District Magistrate, which was in consonance with the provisions of the law”. In para 21 of the counter affidavit, the District Magistrate, writes that “the word “conduct” in Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules has a wider connotation, which would also include to guide, to present, manage or direct, organize and carryout etc.” 47. In the case of Kesari Devi (supra), the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has categorically dealt with this aspect and has held that “preliminary inquiry under Rule 4 has to be conducted in accordance with law by the District Magistrate himself.” 48. It is interesting to note that the District Magistrate, on the one hand, states that he himself had conducted an enquiry and also gives the meaning of word “conduct”, but Annexure 2 to the counter affidavit of the respondent nos. 3 and 4 reveals otherwise. It is a communication dated 14.10.2018 of the District Magistrate, made to Principal Secretary, State of Uttarakhand. By it, the inquiry report has been forwarded. This reads that after receipt of instructions from the State Government, the District Magistrate, Bageshwar had constituted an inquiry committee under the chairmanship of the Additional District Magistrate, Bageshwar. The Additional District Magistrate, Bageshwar submitted joint enquiry report to the District Magistrate, Bageshwar, which the District Magistrate, Bageshwar had merely forwarded. This communication dated 14.02.2018 (Annexure 2 to the counter affidavit of the respondent nos. 3 and 4) speaks in volume that the District Magistrate, Bageshwar had not conducted any enquiry. He simply constituted Committee on the documents received by him from the State of Uttarakhand dated 29.11.2017, by which he was required to conduct an enquiry. When enquiry report was submitted to him, the District Magistrate, Bageshwar simply forwarded it to the State of Uttarakhand. Even he did not comment on it. In view of the settled law, it is total non compliance of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules. The District Magistrate, Bageshwar could not have abdicated his duties. He could not have delegated the inquiry to any other authority. It is non compliance of the mandatory provision of the 1997 Rules. 49. Even he did not comment on it. In view of the settled law, it is total non compliance of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules. The District Magistrate, Bageshwar could not have abdicated his duties. He could not have delegated the inquiry to any other authority. It is non compliance of the mandatory provision of the 1997 Rules. 49. Arguments have been advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the action is mala fide because the respondent no.7 Govind Singh Danu had lost the election in the year 2014. He unsuccessfully challenged the action of the petitioner in the court of law. Thereafter, he filed a petition. Undoubtedly, the averments, as made by the petitioner reveals that there is a political rift between the petitioner and the respondent no.7, Govind Singh Danu but it may not be stretched to construe that the action per se is mala fide. 50. It is also argued that, in fact, entire proceeding is vitiated due to doctrine of dictation. 51. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would submit that on the complaint dated 21.09.2017 of the respondent no.6 Sher Singh Gariya, the Chief Minister had noted that “the matter is very serious.” It is argued that this has vitiated the entire proceeding. Reference has been made to principles of law, as laid down in the case of Orient Paper Mills Ltd.(supra), Manohar Lal (supra) and Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board (supra). 52. This argument, as advanced on behalf of the petitioner may not merit acceptance. What the Chief Minister has written on the communication is that the matter is serious, therefore, it may be investigated. Direction for investigation was made. The authority who were to conduct an enquiry were not bound by any direction to submit a report in a particular manner. Therefore, it cannot be said that proceedings are vitiated due to doctrine of dictation. 53. On behalf of the petitioner it is also argued that in the year 2018, the Commissioner had submitted an enquiry report and four years thereafter, on 16.02.2022 show cause notice was issued to the petitioner. It is after four years inordinate delay, which per se vitiates the proceedings. 54. In support of his contention, reference has been made to the principles of law, as laid down in the case of N. Radhakishan (supra). 55. It is after four years inordinate delay, which per se vitiates the proceedings. 54. In support of his contention, reference has been made to the principles of law, as laid down in the case of N. Radhakishan (supra). 55. It is the case of the petitioner that he was the Chairman of Jila Panchayat, Bageshwar from 2014 to 2019, when the complaints were made. The report was submitted in 2018. The petitioner was member of Jila Panchayat when the impugned order was passed. Delay per se does not vitiate any proceeding. But, if there is inordinate unexplained delay, perhaps it may have adverse effect. The State has not explained the delay. But the petitioner has filed the note-sheet of the Secretariat as Annexure 9 to the writ petition. It explains as to what had happened after receipt of the enquiry report dated 18.10.2018 passed by the Commissioner. The note-sheet reveals that when the Commissioner did not submit the enquiry report, on 12.10.2018, a note was made that reminder may be sent to the Commissioner. The process did not stop at any stage. On 11.01.2019, 03.07.2019, 31.01.2020, 23.08.2021 and 12.11.2021 notes were placed in the matter. Finally on 07.02.2022 draft of show cause notice was got approved and it was issued on 16.02.2022. This chain of events makes it clear that though after receipt of the inquiry report dated 18.10.2018, the State Government did not act promptly and finally issued show cause notice on 16.02.2022, but in between actions were taken as stated hereinbefore. Therefore, this Court is of the view that whatever delay has been done, that has been explained by the petitioner himself by filing the note-sheet of the Secretariat. Delay in the instant matter does not vitiate the proceedings. 56. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that the complaint on which action is taken against the petitioner is not in conformity with Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules. In view thereof, the provisions of sub-Rule (5) of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules would come into play and according to it, the complaint should not have been entertained. By entertaining such a complaint, an irregularity has been committed, which is incurable. In addition to it, the respondent no.4, the District Magistrate did not conduct an enquiry on his own, as mandated under Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules. By entertaining such a complaint, an irregularity has been committed, which is incurable. In addition to it, the respondent no.4, the District Magistrate did not conduct an enquiry on his own, as mandated under Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules. Therefore, initial enquiry is also bad in the eye of law. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that every consequential action taken on the complaint gets vitiated. In view thereof, the impugned order dated 28.04.2023 is liable to be quashed. 57. The writ petition is allowed. 58. Impugned order dated 28.04.2023 passed by the respondent no.1, State of Uttarakhand is quashed.