JUDGMENT : SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellants herein under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.01.2014 passed in Sessions Trial No. 91/2011 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Raigarh Chhattisgarh by which the appellants stands convicted & sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence Default Stipulation U/s 201/34 of IPC RI for 2 years with a fine of Rs. 1,000/- In default of payment of fine amount additional RI for 3 months 2. Case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 22.06.2010, at about 06:30 pm at Village: Kiriya Dhamnadand, the co-accused Dhansai Ekka assaulted Manuel @ Gurda Tigga by hand & fist and by stone by which he suffered grievous injury and in order to conceal the evidence, the co-accused Dhansai Ekka with the help of present appellants, thrown the dead body of the deceased at Katomara Hill and thereby concealed the evidence. Dhansai Ekka has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced for life imprisonment by the Trial Court separately which is the subject matter of CRA No. 154 of 2016. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 22.06.2010 at 7-8 pm, the appellants along with other co-accused Dhansai Ekka and the deceased consumed liquor and thereafter a dispute arose between the deceased and co-accused Dhansai Ekka, and he assaulted the deceased Manuel @ Gurda Tigga by hand and fist and also with stone, by which he suffered grievous injuries and died, in order to save themselves from the aforesaid offence, they thrown the dead body of the deceased at Katomara Hill in order to conceal the evidence. Thereafter, on 26.06.2010, a missing report was lodged by son of the deceased Rameshwar Tigga (PW-2) vide Ex.P/20 in Police Chowki Rairmakhurd, Police Station: Dharamjaigarh and the dead body was recovered on 28.06.2010 at 08:30 pm in decomposed condition, pursuant to which, Merg Intimation Ex.P/19 and Ex.P/24 was registered and thereafter, the inquest was conducted vide Ex.P/14 and 9. Dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination which was conducted by Dr. B.L. Bhagat (PW-6), who has proved the postmortem report Ex.P/19, in which cause of death was stated to be due to head injury and death was homicidal in nature. 3. Dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination which was conducted by Dr. B.L. Bhagat (PW-6), who has proved the postmortem report Ex.P/19, in which cause of death was stated to be due to head injury and death was homicidal in nature. 3. Statements of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. After due investigation, the appellants were charge-sheeted before the jurisdictional criminal Court and the case was committed to the trial Court for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which appellants/accused abjured their guilt and entered into defence by stating that they have not committed the offence. 4. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses and exhibited 31 documents. The appellant-accused in support of his defence has not examined any witness but exhibited 1 document i.e. Ex.D/1, statements of Rameshwar Tigga (PW-2). 5. The trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted the appellants for the aforesaid offence and sentenced as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment against which the present appeal has been preferred. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that Trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellants for the aforesaid offence under Section 201/34 of IPC as by judgment delivered today in CRA No. 154 of 2016 (Dhansai Ekka vs. State of Chhattisgarh), the appellant-Dhansai Ekka has been acquitted and the main offence under Section 302 of IPC has not been found proved against co-accused Dhansai, therefore, the conviction of the present appellants for offence under Section 201/34 of IPC is liable to be set aside and they may be acquitted of the charge. 7. Learned counsel for the State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court is absolutely justified in convicting the appellants for the aforesaid offences and as such the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 9. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 9. It is correct to say that today we have delivered judgment in CRA No. 154 of 2016 (Dhansai Ekka vs. State of Chhattisgarh), in which the appellant who has been charged under Section 302 of IPC for causing murder of Manuel Tigga, has been acquitted of the said charge by extending him the benefit of doubt and in that light it has to be considered whether the conviction of the appellants for offence under Section 201/34 of IPC can be sustained? 10. Now, so far as the appellants are concerned, they have only been convicted for the offence under Section 201/34 of IPC. As such, the question for consideration would be that since the appellant in CRA No. 154 of 2016 (Dhansai Ekka vs. State of Chhattisgarh) is acquitted from the offence under Section 302 of IPC, whether the conviction of appellants under Section 201/34 of IPC can be sustained? 11. In order to judge the correctness of the finding recorded by the trial Court convicting the appellants for offence under Section 201/34 of IPC, it would be appropriate to notice Section 201 of IPC which states as under: “201. Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender - Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, or with that intention gives any information respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false. If a capital offence - shall, if the offence which he knows or believes to have been committed is punishable with death, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. If punishable with imprisonment for life - and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine. If punishable with imprisonment for life - and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine. If punishable with less than ten years’ imprisonment - and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for any term not extending to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of the imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both.” 12. The aforesaid provision relates to disappearance of any evidence of the commission of an offence and includes also the giving of false information with the intention of screening an offender. Sections 202 and 203 of IPC relate to the giving or omitting to give such information and Section 204 of IPC to the destruction of documentary evidence. The first paragraph lays down the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 201 of IPC. It must be proved firstly that an offence has been committed. Secondly, the accused must know or have reason to believe that the offence has been committed. Thirdly, the accused must either cause any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear or give any information respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false. Fourthly, the accused must have acted with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment. 13. The Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhram vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 502 has considered prerequisites for conviction for offence under Section 201 of IPC and held that the intent to screen the offender committing an offence must be the primary and sole aim of the accused and there must be on record cogent evidence to prove that intention and a mere suspicion is not sufficient to bring home the said offence. It was observed as under: “18. The first paragraph of the Section contains the postulates for constituting the offence while the remaining three paragraphs prescribe three different tiers of punishments depending upon the degree of offence in each situation. It was observed as under: “18. The first paragraph of the Section contains the postulates for constituting the offence while the remaining three paragraphs prescribe three different tiers of punishments depending upon the degree of offence in each situation. To bring home an offence under Section 201 IPC, the ingredients to be established are: (i) committal of an offence; (ii) person charged with the offence under Section 201 must have the knowledge or reason to believe that an offence has been committed; (iii) person charged with the said offence should have caused disappearance of evidence and (iv) the act should have been done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment or with that intention he should have given information respecting the offence, which he knew or believed to be false. It is plain that the intent to screen the offender committing an offence must be the primary and sole aim of the accused. It hardly needs any emphasis that in order to bring home an offence under Section 201 IPC, a mere suspicion is not sufficient. There must be on record cogent evidence to prove that the accused knew or had information sufficient to lead him to believe that the offence had been committed and that the accused has caused the evidence to disappear in order to screen the offender, known or unknown. 19. In Palvinder Kaur vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 354 this Court had said that in order to establish the charge under Section 201 IPC, it is essential to prove that an offence has been committed; that the accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence had been committed; with requisite knowledge and with the intent to screen the offender from legal punishment, caused the evidence thereof to disappear or gave false information respecting such offence knowing or having reason to believe the same to be false. It was observed that the court should safeguard itself against the danger of basing its conclusion on suspicions, however, strong they may be. [Also See Suleman Rehiman Mulani vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 829 , Nathu vs. State of U.P. (1979) 3 SCC 574 , V.L. Tresa vs. State of Kerala, (2001) 3 SCC 549 ]” 14. In Nagendra Nath Bhakta vs. Emperor, AIR 1934 Cal. [Also See Suleman Rehiman Mulani vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 829 , Nathu vs. State of U.P. (1979) 3 SCC 574 , V.L. Tresa vs. State of Kerala, (2001) 3 SCC 549 ]” 14. In Nagendra Nath Bhakta vs. Emperor, AIR 1934 Cal. 144 it has been held by the Calcutta High Court that removing the corpse of a murdered man from the scene of murder to another place does not come under Section 201 as the removal does not cause the disappearance of some evidence of the commission of the murder. 15. The Supreme Court in the matter of Duvvur Dasratharammareddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1971) 3 SCC 247 has held that if the evidence relating to the offence of murder and disappearance of evidence is the same and the case of the prosecution regarding the Offence of murder is not accepted, it follows that the accused cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 201 of IPC. 16. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of State of U.P. vs. Kapil Deo and Another, 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 170 following its earlier decision in Duvvur Dasratharammareddy (supra) has held that when the evidence against the accused person, ocular as well as circumstantial, has cautiously been weighed by this Court resulting in his acquittal, it is difficult to convict the said accused for offence under Section 201 read with 34 of IPC. “8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the evidence and material on the record. The fact staring at us is that the prosecution case collapsed so far as Vidya Sagar, accused is concerned and he stands acquitted of the charge of murder. It is to be borne in mind that he prominently was assigned the offensive part of the crime of murder. It is he who was seen cutting the throat of the deceased with a big knife. It is he who was seen escaping from the scene of the occurrence carrying a blood-stained knife in his hand. It is he who was sought to be apprehended by the eye-witnesses and others collected there. It is he who was seen cutting the throat of the deceased with a big knife. It is he who was seen escaping from the scene of the occurrence carrying a blood-stained knife in his hand. It is he who was sought to be apprehended by the eye-witnesses and others collected there. When the evidence against him, occular as well as circumstantial, has cautiously been weighed by this Court resulting in his acquittal, we find it difficult to convict the said accused for offence under section 201 read with Section 34 I.P.C. This Court though slightly in different circumstances in Duvvur Dasratharammareddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1971) 3 SCC 247 , observed as follows: “If the evidence relating to the offence of murder and disappearance of evidence is the same and the case of the prosecution regarding the Offence of murder is not accepted, it follows that the accused cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 201, I.P.C.” One of the circumstances which weighed in favour of Vidya Sagar. accused was that he alone was not in the house to be solely responsible for the murder when committed and at that time besides him therein were said to be Kapil Deo and Ramapati, accused. What has been spelled out in favour of Vidya Sagar can with equal force apply to the case of Kapil Deo and Ramapati, accused. If the so called opportunity to likewise commit the crime was available to Kapil Deo and Ramapati and not a circumstance to hold Vidya Sagar as one of the inmates of the house guilty, it can conversely be said in the same manner about the guilt of Kapil Deo and Ramapati. Their being avail- able in the house per se was not enough to hold them guilty for the offence of murder. Thus there is no occasion to convict Kapil Deo and Ramapati, accused-respondents in Criminal Appeal No. 579 of 1976 for the offence of murder in view of the verdict of acquittal in favour of Vidya Sagar. The High Court itself had observed that there was hardly any evidence to connect Kapil Deo, Ramapati & Smt. Sheo Kumari, accused with the murder of Vinod Kumar especially when the eye-witnesses account given by PWs. 1 to 3 was not very reliable. The High Court itself had observed that there was hardly any evidence to connect Kapil Deo, Ramapati & Smt. Sheo Kumari, accused with the murder of Vinod Kumar especially when the eye-witnesses account given by PWs. 1 to 3 was not very reliable. And further that from the circumstance that the aforesaid three accused were inside the house at the time of the murder it could not be inferred that they were accessories to the crime before the occurrence took place nor could it be inferred that the murder was committed in furtherance of the common intention of all. On this basis, these three accused were given the benefit of doubt and acquitted of the charge of murder and the view of the High Court, appears to us to be correct. The acquittal of Kapil Deo and Ramapati, respondents in Criminal Appeal No. 579 of 1976 thus must be and is hereby maintained, dismissing the Criminal Appeal No. 579 of 1976.” 17. Likewise, in the matter of Dinesh Kumar Kalidas Patel vs. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 313 the Supreme Court has laid down the circumstances under which the charge for the offence punishable under Section 201 of IPC can be laid and conviction can be maintained: “10. In V.L. Tresa vs. State of Kerala, (2001) 3 SCC 549 this Court has discussed the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 201 IPC at Para 12: (SCC p. 555) “12. Having regard to the language used, the following ingredients emerge: (I) committal of an offence. (II) person charged with the offence under Section 201 must have the knowledge or reason to believe that the main offence has been committed. (III) person charged with the offence under Section 201 IPC should have caused disappearance of evidence or should have given false information regarding the main offence. (IV) the act should have been done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment.” 11. In Sukhram vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 502 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 426 this Court discussed Kalawati and Ranjit Singh vs. State of H.P. AIR 1953 SC 131 , Palvinder Kaur (supra), Suleman Rehiman (supra) and V.L. Tresa (supra) among others. The essential ingredients for conviction under Section 201 IPC have been discussed at Para-18: (Sukhram case, SCC pp. 510-11) “18. The essential ingredients for conviction under Section 201 IPC have been discussed at Para-18: (Sukhram case, SCC pp. 510-11) “18. The first paragraph of the section contains the postulates for constituting the offence while the remaining three paragraphs prescribe three different tiers of punishments depending upon the degree of offence in each situation. To bring home an offence under Section 201 IPC, the ingredients to be established are: (i) committal of an offence; (ii) person charged with the offence under Section 201 must have the knowledge or reason to believe that an offence has been committed; (iii) person charged with the said offence should have caused disappearance of evidence; and (iv) the act should have been done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment or with that intention he should have given information respecting the offence, which he knew or believed to be false. It is plain that the intent to screen the offender committing an offence must be the primary and sole aim of the accused. It hardly needs any emphasis that in order to bring home an offence under Section 201 IPC, a mere suspicion is not sufficient. There must be on record cogent evidence to prove that the accused knew or had information sufficient to lead him to believe that the offence had been committed and that the accused has caused the evidence to disappear in order to screen the offender, known or unknown.” 12. In Vijaya vs. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 8 SCC 296 : (2003) SCC (Cri) 1998 though this Court held that the decision in V.L. Tresa (supra) was of no assistance to the State in the particular facts, it reiterated that: (Vijaya case, SCC p. 299, Para 10) “10......there is no quarrel with the legal principle that notwithstanding acquittal with reference to the offence under Section 302 IPC, conviction under Section 201 is permissible, in a given case.” 13. The decisions in Vijaya (supra) and V.L. Tresa (supra) were noticed in State of Karnataka vs. Madesha, (2007) 7 SCC 35 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 292. While the appeal of the State was dismissed, this Court in unmistakable terms held that: (Madesha case, SCC p. 39, Para 9) “9. The decisions in Vijaya (supra) and V.L. Tresa (supra) were noticed in State of Karnataka vs. Madesha, (2007) 7 SCC 35 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 292. While the appeal of the State was dismissed, this Court in unmistakable terms held that: (Madesha case, SCC p. 39, Para 9) “9. It is to be noted that there can be no dispute that Section 201 would have application even if the main offence is not established in view of what has been stated in V.L. Tresa and Vijaya cases.....” 14. Thus, the law is well-settled that a charge under Section 201 IPC can be independently laid and conviction maintained also, in case the prosecution is able to establish that an offence had been committed, the person charged with the offence had the knowledge or the reason to believe that the offence had been committed, the said person has caused disappearance of evidence and such act of disappearance has been done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment. Mere suspicion is not sufficient, it must be proved that the accused knew or had a reason to believe that the offence has been committed and yet he caused the evidence to disappear so as to screen the offender. The offender may be either himself or any other person.” 18. Returning to the facts of the case, it is quite vivid that in view of the findings recorded by this Court in the judgment of CRA No. 154 of 2016 (Dhansai Ekka vs. State of Chhattisgarh), it has not been established that these appellants have knowledge or reason to believe that offence under Section 302 of IPC has been committed as also the co-accused Dhansai has been acquitted in CRA No. 154 of 2016 by judgment passed separately and it has also not been established by the prosecution that the appellants have thrown the dead body of the deceased in order to conceal the evidence and to save the co-accused Dhansai from legal punishment. In that view of the matter the conviction of the appellants for offence under Section 201/34 of IPC is liable to be set aside. 19. Accordingly, the conviction of appellants for the offence under Section 201/34 of IPC is set-aside and they are acquitted of the said charges. In that view of the matter the conviction of the appellants for offence under Section 201/34 of IPC is liable to be set aside. 19. Accordingly, the conviction of appellants for the offence under Section 201/34 of IPC is set-aside and they are acquitted of the said charges. The appellants are reported to be on bail and they need not surrender, but their bail-bonds shall remain in operation for a period of six months in view of the provisions contained in Section 437-A of Cr.P.C. 20. In the result, the criminal appeal is allowed. 21. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned and concerned Jail Superintendent for necessary information and action.