JUDGMENT : 1. This application filed under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code assails the F.I.R. dated 19-5-2020 in Crime No. 298/2020. 2. In short, the case of applicant is that on 19-5-2020 complainant lodged the F.I.R alleging that applicant developed physical relation with her from 9-11-2018. As per the complaint, the complainant was in contact with applicant for more than two years. They had friendship which converted into a love affair. The applicant gave a promise to marry the complainant and on that pretext, developed physical relation with her at Narmada Mall, Hoshangabad. 3. Grievance of complainant is that when she made a request to actually solemnize marriage, the applicant declined to do so. 4. Shri Deepak Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance on the statement of complainant recorded under section 161 and 164 of Criminal Procedure Code. In addition, statement of her father recorded under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code was also relied upon. On the basis of these statements, it is submitted that it is a case of mutual consent of two adult persons. The offence as alleged against the applicant is not made out. If story of prosecution is read as such, offence under section 375/376 of Indian Penal Code is not made out. He placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court reported in AIR 2019 SC 4010 , Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra and another and prayed for interference in the F.I.R. 5. Per contra, learned Government Advocate supported the F.I.R. and submits that at this stage, question of interference does not arise. 6. Shri R. S. Mehndiratta, learned counsel for the complainant supported the F.I.R. and submits that it is a question of trial whether complainant would be able to make out a case or not. At this stage, in this proceeding, no interference may be made. He placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in Cr. A. No. 629 of 2019, Anurag Soni vs. State of Chhattisgarh. In addition, he placed reliance on Karnataka High Court judgment passed in Criminal Appeal No. 3587/2013, Shravan vs. State of Karnataka and a judgment of this Court in M.Cr.C. No. 16161/2019, Deepesh Bain vs. State of M. P. and another decided on 25-9-2019. 7. Parties confined their arguments to the extent indicated hereinabove. 8. I have heard the parties at length and perused the record. 9. 7. Parties confined their arguments to the extent indicated hereinabove. 8. I have heard the parties at length and perused the record. 9. In the recent judgment of Apex Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra) the Apex Court has considered its previous judgments including the judgment in the case of Anurag Soni (supra) on which reliance is placed by learned counsel for the private respondent. It is apposite to quote certain portions of the judgment of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra) because Supreme Court considered the impact of section 375 and 90 of Indian Penal Code. Relevant portion of this judgment reads as under :— “14. In the present case, the “misconception of fact” alleged by the complainant is the appellant’s promise to marry her. Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. In Anurag Soni vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 13 SCC 1 , this Court held : “37. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions would be that if it is established and proved that from the inception the accused who gave the promise to the prosecutrix to marry, did not have any intention to marry and the prosecutrix gave the consent for sexual intercourse on such an assurance by the accused that he would marry her, such a consent can be said to be a consent obtained on a misconception of fact as per section 90, Indian Penal Code and, in such a case, such a consent would not excuse the offender and such an offender can be said to have committed the rape as defined under sections 375, Indian Penal Code and can be convicted for the offence under section 376, Indian Penal Code.” Similar observations were made by this Court in Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 (Deepak Gulati) : “21. …..There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the Court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused…..” (Emphasis Supplied) 10. …..There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the Court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused…..” (Emphasis Supplied) 10. In the same judgment, the Apex Court considered the previous judgment in Yedla Srinivasa Rao vs. State of A. P., (2006) 11 SCC 615 . In another previous judgment, Deepak Gulati (supra) was considered and it was recorded as under :- “21. …...There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the Court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently.” (Emphasis Supplied) 11. After considering the previous judgments, the principles were culled out and summed-up in para-18 which reads thus :— “18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.” (Emphasis Supplied) 12. In para-20 of the same judgment, the Apex Court opined that as per the FIR in the said case, on the face of it, it is not clear that promise by appellant therein was false in its inception or the complainant engaged in sexual relation on the basis of this promise. In para-20 of the same judgment, the Apex Court opined that as per the FIR in the said case, on the face of it, it is not clear that promise by appellant therein was false in its inception or the complainant engaged in sexual relation on the basis of this promise. In absence of any such allegation in the FIR coupled with the fact that thereafter also on several occasions the complainant therein developed sexual relations and even visited and stayed in the house of appellant therein, the Apex Court interfered with the F.I.R. in exercise of powers under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code. 13. In the instant case relevant part of FIR reads as under :— 14. Apart from this, the statement of complainant recorded under section 161 and 164 of Criminal Procedure Code are also relevant. The FIR shows that there is clear allegation in the FIR itself that since inception the appellant gave a false promise to the complainant that he will solemnize marriage. On that pretext, the complainant developed sexual relation with the appellant. The same prima facie finds support on the basis of combined reading of both the statements of complainant aforesaid. Thus, present case is a case where ‘consent’ of a woman appears to have been taken on the basis of a false promise itself. In that event, the present case does not fall within the ambit of such cases where promise initially given was bona fide but because of subsequent events could not be translated into reality. In this backdrop, this Court is unable to hold that it is a fit case for interference on the FIR in exercise of powers under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. 15. Resultantly, the application fails and is hereby dismissed. It is made clear that this Court has not made any conclusive opinion on the merits of this case.