ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order as contained in Memo No.3894 dated 23.09.2014 passed by the Principal Secretary, Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, whereby 10% of the pension amount has been ordered to be deducted from the pension of the petitioner. Further prayer has been made for issuance of direction upon the respondent authorities to pay full pension as well as the arrears of the pension to the petitioner. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Settlement Officer in the year 1994 and he retired from service on 31.07.2011 from the Dumka Settlement Office. A departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner vide resolution as contained in memo no.4530 dated 21.10.2003 issued by the Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Department of Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi and Charge Officer, Dumka was appointed as Conducting Officer. Thereafter, a charge sheet was issued against the petitioner by the respondent authorities alleging that he had changed the order of his predecessor passed in Tasdik Camp, Pathargama, concerning village Jaranikola, Thana no.88, Jamabandi no.13, which was beyond his jurisdiction. It was also alleged that the petitioner had passed an order to include some raiyats other than Jamabandi raiyats in column-4 of the Khatiyan, concerning Moiuja Lakhanpahari, Jamabandi no.32 by making a genealogy through pencil beside previously made genealogy. The petitioner filed reply to the charges levelled against him and thereafter the respondent no.4 vide letter dated 07.12.2011 intimated the Joint Secretary, Department of Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand that the order passed by the petitioner was set aside by the then Deputy Commissioner-cum-Settlement Officer, Dumka vide order dated 26.09.2002 and as such it prima facie appeared that there was no loss to the State exchequer by the alleged conduct of the petitioner. It would be evident from the letter dated 07.12.2011 that after receiving reply from the petitioner, he was discharged from the charges levelled against him. However, after retirement of the petitioner, he was served with a second show cause notice vide memo no. 631 dated 26.02.2013 which was duly replied by him. Thereafter, vide impugned order as contained in memo no.3894 dated 23.09.2014, 10% of the pension amount of the petitioner has been ordered to be deducted from his pension. However, after retirement of the petitioner, he was served with a second show cause notice vide memo no. 631 dated 26.02.2013 which was duly replied by him. Thereafter, vide impugned order as contained in memo no.3894 dated 23.09.2014, 10% of the pension amount of the petitioner has been ordered to be deducted from his pension. It is further submitted that since the petitioner was already discharged from the charges levelled against him during his service tenure itself, there was no reason to pass the impugned order after his retirement. 3. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner was involved in corrupt practices causing loss to the concerned raiyats and as such a departmental proceeding was initiated against him. The petitioner was not discharged from the charges and after his retirement the departmental proceeding initiated under Rule 55 of the Bihar Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 was converted into a proceeding under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar (now Jharkhand) Pension Rules, 1950. It is also submitted that the impugned order was passed after following due procedure of law and as such no interference is warranted against the same under extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court. The punishment imposed upon the petitioner is also proportionate to the charge levelled against him. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The primary argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is that once the petitioner was already discharged from the charges during his service tenure, there was no question of issuing second show cause notice to him particularly after his retirement. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner puts much reliance on the letter dated 07.12.2011 issued by the respondent no.4- Settlement Officer, Santhal Pargana Division, Dumka, wherein it was observed that since the order of the petitioner was set aside by the appellate authority i.e. Deputy Commissioner-cum-Settlement Officer, Dumka, prima facie no revenue loss was caused to the State exchequer by the alleged conduct of the petitioner. 6. Bare perusal of the charge sheet issued against the petitioner would suggest that he was allegedly involved in corrupt practices by functioning beyond his jurisdiction causing loss to the concerned raiyats. 6. Bare perusal of the charge sheet issued against the petitioner would suggest that he was allegedly involved in corrupt practices by functioning beyond his jurisdiction causing loss to the concerned raiyats. This Court is of the view that on mere ground that the order of the petitioner was set aside by the then Deputy Commissioner-cum-Settlement Officer, Dumka, he cannot be absolved from the charges levelled against him and is also not discharged from the charge even if no revenue loss is caused to the State. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Others Vs. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 , has held as under:- “13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 8. In the case of Chairman and Managing Director, V.S.P. & Others Vs. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu, reported in (2008) 5 SCC 569 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 20. The jurisdiction of the High Court in this regard is rather limited. Its power to interfere with disciplinary matters is circumscribed by well-known factors. It cannot set aside a well-reasoned order only on sympathy or sentiments. (See Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal [ (2005) 2 SCC 638 ]; State of Bihar v. Amrendra Kumar Mishra [ (2006) 12 SCC 561 ]; SBI v. Mahatma Mishra [(2006) 13 SCC 727]; State of Karnataka v. Ameerbi [ (2007) 11 SCC 681 ]; State of M.P. v. Sanjay Kumar Pathak [ (2008) 1 SCC 456 ] and Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Surji Devi [ (2008) 2 SCC 310 ].) 21. Once it is found that all the procedural requirements have been complied with, the courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee. The superior courts only in some cases may invoke the doctrine of proportionality. Once it is found that all the procedural requirements have been complied with, the courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee. The superior courts only in some cases may invoke the doctrine of proportionality. If the decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when the misconduct stands proved. (See Sangfroid Remedies Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1999) 1 SCC 259 ].) 22. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India also cannot, on the basis of sympathy or sentiment, overturn a legal order.” 9. Thus, the High Court in exercise of power under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has limited jurisdiction of interference in disciplinary matter. The High Court is not supposed to re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the conclusion of the inquiry officer if the same has been done in accordance with law. If the disciplinary proceeding has been conducted by following due procedure of law, then the High Court should not interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon the delinquent employee on the basis of sympathy or sentiment unless it is found to the court that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the charges proved against the employee. 10. That apart, the petitioner has failed to show any lacuna in the procedure adopted by the respondent authorities while passing the impugned order. The petitioner has also failed to show that the impugned punishment against the petitioner is shockingly disproportionate or the inquiry conducted by the inquiry officer was not in accordance with law. This court finds that the petitioner was issued show cause notice for the alleged charges and thereafter he filed reply of the same. After the retirement of the petitioner the departmental proceeding was converted into the proceeding under rule 43(b) of the Bihar (now Jharkhand) Pension Rules, 1950. The petitioner was issued second show cause notice alongwith the enquiry report which was also replied by him and only thereafter the impugned order was passed which reflects that the due procedure of law was followed by the respondent authorities before passing the impugned order. 11. The petitioner was issued second show cause notice alongwith the enquiry report which was also replied by him and only thereafter the impugned order was passed which reflects that the due procedure of law was followed by the respondent authorities before passing the impugned order. 11. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order as contained in Memo No.3894 dated 23.09.2014 passed by the Principal Secretary, Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi under extraordinary writ jurisdiction. 12. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.