ORDER : 1. The present petition is filed by being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order dated 11.11.2020 passed below Ex.21 in Regular Civil Suit No.411 of 2019, by which the trial Court has partly allowed the application filed by the respondent Nos.1.1 and 2.1, which is filed for impleadment of third party under the provisions of Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 2.1 Brief facts of the case are as such that the petitioner and others had instituted Regular Civil Suit No.411 of 2019 before learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Una, for declaration to the effect that the part of the suit property, which is in dilapidated condition, may be permitted to be pulled down by the plaintiffs and that the defendants may be injuncted from causing any disturbance for the same. On 07.10.2019, the learned Judge has granted the application below Exh.5 moved in Regular Civil Suit No.411 of 2019 and directed that if the petitioner wants to pull down the construction, the defendants shall not cause any obstruction for the same. 2.2 It is further the case of the petition in the present petition that the respondent Nos.1.1 and 2.1 filed an application below Exh.18 under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, inter alia, stating that the aforesaid order passed below Exh.5 may be stayed recalled and it may be declared that the said order will not be applicable to them and aforesaid two persons are third parties applicants and they have also gave an application below Exh.21 for being joined as parties in Regular Civil Suit No.411 of 2019 under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Thereafter, the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Una, by order dated 08.09.2020 has partly allowed the aforesaid application below Exh.18 moved Regular Civil Suit No.411 of 2019 and directed that the status-quo be maintained with regard to the suit property in question and no demolition be done. Impugned order is purportedly passed under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Impugned order is passed on the application below Exh.18 moved by the third parties, who are not yet joined as parties in RCS No.411 of 2019. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application below Exh.24 to vacate the impugned order and also filed reply below Exh.18 and 21 applications. Impugned order is passed on the application below Exh.18 moved by the third parties, who are not yet joined as parties in RCS No.411 of 2019. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application below Exh.24 to vacate the impugned order and also filed reply below Exh.18 and 21 applications. Thereafter, learned Judge, Una by the order dated 16.09.2020 has rejected the application below Exh.24 filed by the petitioner. 2.3 Thereafter, being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders below Exh.18 and 24, the petitioner has preferred Special Civil Application No.13243 of 2020, which came to be partly allowed by this Court vide order dated 02.11.2020, whereby this Court remanded the matter back to learned trial Court to decide application below Exh.18 as well as the joining party application of the third party, which was filed below Exh.21. Thereafter, the learned trial Court vide order dated 11.11.2020 has allowed the application below Exh.21 and has joined the third parties as parties in Regular Civil Suit No.411 of 2019. Thereafter, the learned trial Judge by separate order of the same date i.e. 11.11.2020 allowed application below Exh.18 moved in Regular Civil Suit No.411 of 2019 and has granted status-quo in the matter. 2.4 Hence, the present petition is filed. 3. Heard learned advocate Mr. S.P. Majmudar with Mr. H.J. Karathiya, learned advocate for the petitioner and learned senior advocate Mr. Mehul S. Shah with Mr. Vishal C. Mehta, learned advocate for the respondent Nos.1, 1.1, 2 and 2.1. 4.1 Learned advocate Mr. S.P. Majmudar for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order passed by the trial court is highly erroneous as the applicants are neither necessary nor proper party in the suit proceedings as the original tenants have expired and the applicants in the application which is filed under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure at Exh.21 cannot be considered as a necessary party. He has further submitted that the trial court has not properly dealt with the contention raised at the bar by the present petitioner and as the material available on the record and has erroneously found that the proposed parties are necessary parties in the suit proceeding by allowing the application filed under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC. He has further submitted that the trial court has not properly dealt with the contention raised at the bar by the present petitioner and as the material available on the record and has erroneously found that the proposed parties are necessary parties in the suit proceeding by allowing the application filed under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC. He has further submitted that the trial Court has not properly considered the tax receipt produced by third parties and it is clear that the owner is one Shri Vijaybhai, who has no connection with the suit property in question and he has further submitted that the location shown in that receipt is also different. He has further submitted that the petitioner has demines litis and therefore, it is against the wish of the petitioner, and as the parties cannot be impleaded by exercising power under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC. 4.2 Her has further submitted that the trial Court has not properly appreciated the documentary evidence produced on the record and has wrongly decided the application below Exh.21 by exercising power under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC, and therefore, the impugned order passed by the trial Court is apparently erroneous and illegal and is required to be quashed and set aside by excising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5.1 Per contra, Mr. Mehul S. Shah, learned senior advocate appearing for the respondent Nos.1, 1.1, 2 and 2.1 has submitted that the trial Court has rightly considered the submissions made at the Bar and has also rightly considered the material available in the case. He has submitted that the proposed parties – contesting respondents herein have approached the trial Court by filing the application under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC by claiming that the suit shops are occupied by such parties as tenants of the said premises, and therefore, they have prayed themselves to implead as the defendant Nos.2 and 3 as party defendant in the suit filed by the present petitioner. 5.2 He has submitted that the trial Court has rightly considered the judgments in the cases of (i) State of Assam Versus Union of India and Others reported in 2011 (3) G.L.H. 287 SC, (ii) Kankaltadas and Others Versus Nabakumardas and Others reported in 2018 (2) G.L.H. 253 SC and (iii) M/s Aliji Monoji & Co. 5.2 He has submitted that the trial Court has rightly considered the judgments in the cases of (i) State of Assam Versus Union of India and Others reported in 2011 (3) G.L.H. 287 SC, (ii) Kankaltadas and Others Versus Nabakumardas and Others reported in 2018 (2) G.L.H. 253 SC and (iii) M/s Aliji Monoji & Co. Versus Lalji Mawji and Others reported in AIR 1997 SC 64 . He has further submitted that the trial Court has also rightly considered the judgment cited at the Bar by the present petitioner – original plaintiffs, and thereafter, came to the conclusion that since from the document, which is produced at mark 4/1, where there is specific averment that there are said suit shops and also two tenants viz., Chandulal Gaurishankar Thakar and Jamnadas Harilal Gandhi and the proposed defendant Nos.2 and 3 are heirs of original tenants. He has further submitted that considering documents at mark 19/7, it also confirms the said aspect and accordingly, the contesting respondents are necessary and proper party. 5.3 He has further submitted that the judgment in the case of Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. Versus Govindbhai Lakhmanbhai Gahde reported in 1996 (2) GCD 641 , the case is squarely covered to the case of present petitioner, and therefore, the petitioner being necessary and proper party, the trial Court has rightly passed the order below Exh.21 application by allowing the application, and therefore, he has submitted that the present petition deserves to be dismissed as no ground is made out under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Garment Craft Vs Prakash Chand Goel reported in (2022) 4 SCC 181 , whereby the Apex Court has said that supervisory jurisdiction of High Court when to be exercised, more particularly, paragraph 15 to 17, which are relevant. 6.1 I have considered the rival submissions made at the bar. I have also perused the materials records available on the record. From the document considered by the trial Court produced at mark 4/1, which is sale deed, it clearly transpires and is averred in para 11 about the tenancy rights of the elders of the proposed defendant Nos.2 and 3. I have also perused the materials records available on the record. From the document considered by the trial Court produced at mark 4/1, which is sale deed, it clearly transpires and is averred in para 11 about the tenancy rights of the elders of the proposed defendant Nos.2 and 3. Further, the documents produced at mark 19/7 also supports the recital in the said document and in para 1 of that document, there is averment about tenancy right of two shops. 6.2 Further, I have considered Order I Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, which reads as under:- “Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure:- 10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff.— (1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just. (2) Court may strike out or add parties.—The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. (3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent. (3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent. (4) Where defendant added, plaint to be amended.— Where a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary, and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and, if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant (5) Subject to the provisions of the 1 [Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (XV of 1877)], section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons. 10A. Power of Court to request any pleader to address it.—The Court may, in its discretion, request any pleader to address it as to any interest which is likely to be affected by its decision on any matter in issue in any suit or proceeding, if the party having the interest which is likely to be so affected is not represented by any pleader.” 6.3 Further, the proposed defendant Nos.2 and 3, being heirs of original tenants, is necessary and proper party and the judgments, which are cited at the bar support the case of the present respondents, and therefore, this Court finds that there is no illegal or irregularity committed by the trial Court in passing the impugned order and has given cogent and convincing reasons for allowing the application filed under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC for impleding defendant Nos.2 and 3 as a party in the suit, and therefore, no illegality or irregularity is committed by the trial Court in passing the order below exhibit 21 in the said suit. 6.4 This Court finds no reason to interfere in the impugned order passed by the trial Court by excising my limited scope of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Garment Craft V/s Prakash Chand Goel reported in (2022) 4 SCC 181 , whereby the Apex Court has said that supervisory jurisdiction of High Court when to be exercised, more particularly, paragraph 15 to 17, which read as under: “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. 16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. has observed:- "6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to." 17. The factum that the counsel for the appellant had applied for the certified copy would show that the counsel for the appellant was aware that the ex-parte decree had been passed on the account of failure to lead defence evidence. This would not, however, be a good ground and reason to set aside and substitute the opinion formed by the trial court that the appellant being incarcerated was unable to lead evidence and another chance should be given to the appellant to lead defence evidence. The discretion exercised by the trial court in granting relief, did not suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record or was not a finding so perverse that it was unsupported by evidence to justify it. There could be some justification for the respondent to argue that the appellant was possibly aware of the ex-parte decree and therefore the submission that the appellant came to know of the ex-parte decree only on release from jail on 6th May 2017 is incorrect, but this would not affect the factually correct explanation of the appellant that he was incarcerated and could not attend the civil suit proceedings from 6th October 2015 to 6th May 2017. If it was felt that the application for setting aside the exparte decree was filed belatedly, the court could have given an opportunity to the appellant to file an application for condonation of delay and costs could have been imposed. If it was felt that the application for setting aside the exparte decree was filed belatedly, the court could have given an opportunity to the appellant to file an application for condonation of delay and costs could have been imposed. The facts as known, equally apply as grounds for condonation of delay. It is always important to take a holistic and overall view and not get influenced by aspects which can be explained. Thus, the reasoned decision of the trial court on elaborate consideration of the relevant facts did not warrant interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.” 7. In view of the aforesaid, the present petition is dismissed.