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2023 DIGILAW 552 (PNJ)

Sikander Singh v. State of Punjab

2023-02-06

AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, VIKRAM AGGARWAL

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JUDGMENT : Vikram Aggarwal, J. The present appeal (originally filed as a Criminal Revision and subsequently treated as a Criminal Appeal vide order dated 23.02.2022) assails the order dated 28.04.2021 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (Special Judge), Amritsar vide which the application filed by the appellant under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. for the grant of default bail was rejected. 2. A secret information was received that the present appellant alongwith Amritpal Singh Bhullar, Gursewak Singh, Manoj Thakur etc. had formed a dangerous gang. These persons were involved in several cases of murder, robbery, extortion, attempt to murder etc. As per the information, these persons had several snatched/stolen cars in their possession and they were carrying a huge cache of deadly arms and ammunitions. The appellant Sikander Singh as also the other persons were wanted in several criminal cases. On receipt of the information, FIR No.4 dated 15.03.2020 was registered under Sections 379-B, 382, 399, 402-IPC, Section 25 of the Arms Act and Sections 15, 17, 18 and 18-B of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as 'the UAPA') at Police Station, SSOC, Amritsar. The appellant was arrested on 15.03.2020. Other persons were also arrested on different dates. A huge cache of arms and ammunitions, currency, mobile phones, gold weighing 10kg 490 grams stated to have looted from IIFL, Gold loan branch, Gill Road, Ludhiana, vehicles of different makes etc. were recovered. 3. On 06.06.2020, an application was presented before the Special Court, Amritsar seeking extension of 90 days under Section 43-D of the UAPA in completing investigation and submitting final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. The extension was granted by the Special Court on 15.06.2020. On 28.07.2020, a written request for the grant of sanction under Section 45 of the UAPA was moved. After completion of investigation, final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was prepared and submitted in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Amritsar on 11.09.2020. The case was committed for 15.03.2021 to the Court of Sessions. An application for the grant of default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. was moved on 20.04.2021 which was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar on 22.04.2021. Thereafter, another application seeking the same relief was moved in the Court of Sessions Judge, Amritsar which was dismissed by way of the present impugned order. An application for the grant of default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. was moved on 20.04.2021 which was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar on 22.04.2021. Thereafter, another application seeking the same relief was moved in the Court of Sessions Judge, Amritsar which was dismissed by way of the present impugned order. In the meantime, the sanction had been received and the supplementary charge-sheet was filed on 20.04.2021. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Special Judge, Amritsar erred in declining the relief of default bail. It has been submitted that once there was no sanction under the UAPA, the submission of an incomplete charge-sheet could not be taken as filing of the charge-sheet and would entitle the appellant to default bail. It has also been contended that ultimately the charge-sheet was presented on 11.09.2020 before the Court of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Amritsar who was not competent to try the case and the charge-sheet should have been submitted before the Special Judge. This also would entitle the appellant to the grant of default bail. Learned counsel has further submitted that even the supplementary charge-sheet after the receipt of sanction, though filed on 20.04.2021, the same was filed after the filing of the application for default bail on the same day i.e. 20.04.2021 which is clear from the statement of the concerned Ahlmad. Learned counsel has referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Fakhrey Alam vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh 2021(1) Apex Court Judgments (SC) 509. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment dated 26.04.2022 passed by this Court in Gursewak Singh Vs. State of Punjab and it has been submitted that as per this Court, the accused would have a right to default bail if the application for the grant of same had been filed prior to 20.04.2021. It has been submitted that in the present case, the application for the grant of default bail was submitted on 20.04.2021 prior in time to the supplementary charge-sheet alongwith the sanction. 6. On the other hand, Shri J.S.Mehndiratta, learned counsel for the State has submitted that the initial report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was submitted within the extended period of time. 6. On the other hand, Shri J.S.Mehndiratta, learned counsel for the State has submitted that the initial report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was submitted within the extended period of time. It has been contended that the lack of sanction would not make the final report incomplete. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain Vs. State of Maharashtra and another 2013(3) SCC 77 . It has also been contended that the supplementary charge-sheet alongwith the sanction was filed on 20.04.2021 and merely because the application for the grant of default bail had been filed, even if accepted to be correct, a few hours before the challan, it would not entitle the appellant to default bail since both the challan and the application for the grant of default bail had been filed on the same day. Learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the provisions of Section 45 of UAPA. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment dated 26.04.2022 passed by this Court in CRA-D No.415 of 2021 titled as Gursewak Singh Vs. State of Punjab. 7. We have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. lays down as under:- "Section 167. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment dated 26.04.2022 passed by this Court in CRA-D No.415 of 2021 titled as Gursewak Singh Vs. State of Punjab. 7. We have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. lays down as under:- "Section 167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours.- (1) * * * * (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that- (a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;] (b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention of the accused in custody of the police under this section unless the accused is produced before him in person for the first time and subsequently every time till the accused remains in the custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend further detention in judicial custody on production of the accused either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage; (c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the police. Explanation I.- For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail. Explanation II.- If any question arises whether an accused person was produced before the Magistrate as required under clause (b), the production of the accused person may be proved by his signature on the order authorising detention or by the order certified by the Magistrate as to production of the accused person through the medium of electronic video linkage, as the case may be. Provided further that in case of a woman under eighteen years of age, the detention shall be authorised to be in the custody of a remand home or recognised social institution." 8. This provision has come under scrutiny and has been a subject matter of discussion on numerous occasions. The endeavour of accused is always to take the benefit of this provision whereas the investigating agencies always make an endeavour to prevent the accused from taking benefit of this provision. For the said purpose, multifarious actions are initiated by both sides and different arguments are also raised at different points of time. This happens more in cases where the allegations are very serious, the offences alleged are also very serious and the accused are again those having checkered criminal history. In such matters, where accused are arrested at different points of time, the investigation takes time and the accused try to take benefit of the provisions of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. whereas the investigating agencies, with a view to prevent the accused from securing bail under this provision, adopt different ways and means including the filing of incomplete charge-sheets, seeking extension in filing charge-sheets etc. In the case of Bikramjit Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, a 03 Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India was examining the issue. Apart from other questions which were settled, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction to extend time for filing of charge-sheet from 90 days to 180 days was with the Special Court alone and the Court of Judicial Magistrate was not competent to extend the said period. The Hon'ble Apex Court laid down as under in para 29 of the judgment:- "29. The Hon'ble Apex Court laid down as under in para 29 of the judgment:- "29. On the facts of the present case, the High Court was wholly incorrect in stating that once the challan was presented by the prosecution on 25.03.2019 as an application was filed by the Appellant on 26.03.2019, the Appellant is not entitled to default bail. First and foremost, the High Court has got the dates all wrong. The application that was made for default bail was made on or before 25.02.2019 and not 26.03.2019. The charge sheet was filed on 26.03.2019 and not 25.03.2019. The fact that this application was wrongly dismissed on 25.02.2019 would make no difference and ought to have been corrected in revision. The sole ground for dismissing the application was that the time of 90 days had already been extended by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ajnala by his order dated 13.02.2019. This Order was correctly set aside by the Special Court by its judgment dated 25.03.2019, holding that under the UAPA read with the NIA Act, the Special Court alone had jurisdiction to extend time to 180 days under the first proviso in Section 43-D(2)(b). The fact that the Appellant filed yet another application for default bail on 08.04.2019, would not mean that this application would wipe out the effect of the earlier application that had been wrongly decided. We must not forget that we are dealing with the personal liberty of an accused under a statute which imposes drastic punishments. The right to default bail, as has been correctly held by the judgments of this Court, are not mere statutory rights under the first proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code, but is part of the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which is, therefore, a fundamental right granted to an accused person to be released on bail once the conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2) are fulfilled. This being the case, we set aside the judgment of the High Court. The Appellant will now be entitled to be released on "default bail" under Section 167(2) of the Code, as amended by Section 43-D of the UAPA. This being the case, we set aside the judgment of the High Court. The Appellant will now be entitled to be released on "default bail" under Section 167(2) of the Code, as amended by Section 43-D of the UAPA. However, we make it clear that this does not prohibit or otherwise prevent the arrest or re-arrest of the petitioner on cogent grounds, and upon arrest or re-arrest, the petitioner is entitled to petition for the grant of regular bail which application should be considered on its own merit. We also make it clear that this judgment will have no impact on the arrest of the petitioner in any other case." 9. The Hon'ble Apex Court also held that so long as an application for the grant of default bail is made on the expiry of the period of 90 days before a charge-sheet was filed, the right to default bail becomes complete. It was held that so long as an application had been moved before 90 days or 180 days in case of extension of time, default bail, being an indefeasible right kicks in and must be granted. 10. This judgment has been referred to in the subsequent judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Naser Bin Abu Bakar Yafai Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another Criminal Appeal No.1165 of 2021, decided on 20.10.2021, where reference was made to the judgment of a three Judge Bench in M.Ravindran Vs. The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 2021(2) SCC 485 , wherein dealing with Section 167(2) Cr.P.C, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had concluded as follows:- "25. Therefore, in conclusion: 25.1. Once the accused files an application for bail under the proviso to Section 167(2) he is deemed to have "availed of" or enforced his right to be released on default bail, accruing after expiry of the stipulated time-limit for investigation. Thus, if the accused applies for bail under Section 167(2) CrPC read with Section 36-A(4), NDPS Act upon expiry of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, the court must release him on bail forthwith without any unnecessary delay after getting necessary information from the Public Prosecutor, as mentioned supra. Such prompt action will restrict the prosecution from frustrating the legislative mandate to release the accused on bail in case of default by the investigating agency. 25.2. Such prompt action will restrict the prosecution from frustrating the legislative mandate to release the accused on bail in case of default by the investigating agency. 25.2. The right to be released on default bail continues to remain enforceable if the accused has applied for such bail, notwithstanding pendency of the bail application; or subsequent filing of the charge-sheet or a report seeking extension of time by the prosecution before the court; or filing of the charge-sheet during the interregnum when challenge to the rejection of the bail application is pending before a higher court. 25.3. However, where the accused fails to apply for default bail when the right accrues to him, and subsequently a charge-sheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is preferred before the Magistrate, the right to default bail would be extinguished. The Magistrate would be at liberty to take cognizance of the case or grant further time for completion of the investigation, as the case may be, though the accused may still be released on bail under other provisions of the CrPC. 25.4. Notwithstanding the order of default bail passed by the court, by virtue of Explanation I to Section 167(2), the actual release of the accused from custody is contingent on the directions passed by the competent court granting bail. If the accused fails to furnish bail and/or comply with the terms and conditions of the bail order within the time stipulated by the court, his continued detention in custody is valid." 11. Coming to the facts of the present case, the FIR was registered on 15.03.2020. The present appellant was arrested on 15.03.2020. Before the period of 90 days ended, application for extension was moved on 06.06.2020 which was granted by the Special Judge, Amritsar on 15.06.2020. It is, therefore, clear that the extension was granted by the Special Judge, Amritsar and not the Judicial Magistrate and, therefore, judgment in Bikramjit Singh's case (supra) would not help the appellant in so far as this aspect is concerned. 12. In fact, this judgment would act against the case of the appellant because in the present case the application for the grant of default bail was not moved before the expiry of 180 days or even before the date on which the supplementary charge-sheet was filed. On 28.07.2020, request for the grant of sanction to prosecute under the provision of UAPA was moved. On 28.07.2020, request for the grant of sanction to prosecute under the provision of UAPA was moved. On 11.09.2020, the charge-sheet was filed in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate and the same was committed to the Court of Sessions for 15.03.2021. The application for the grant of default bail was filed on 20.04.2021 and the same was dismissed on 22.04.2021 and subsequently the second application was dismissed by the Special Judge, Amritsar on 28.04.2021. The relevant date in the present case would, therefore, be 20.04.2021 and the filing of an incomplete challan on 11.09.2020 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate would not give any ground for release on default bail to the appellant as application for grant of default bail was not moved at that time and was moved only on 20.04.2021. Once the application for the grant of default bail and the supplementary charge-sheet were filed on the same day, it would not entitle the appellant to the grant of default bail. 13. In the case of M.Ravindran Vs. The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (supra), the application for the grant of default bail had been moved on 01.02.2019 at 10:30 A.M. and till that time the Public Prosecutor had not filed any application seeking extension of time to investigate into the crime. The Public Prosecutor participated in the arguments on the bail application till 04:25 P.M. but thereafter an additional complaint was lodged against the accused. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that such a practice could not be permitted because if such a practice was permitted, the provisions of 167(2) would be rendered nugatory as the investigating officers could drag their heels till the time the accused exercises his right and would conveniently file an additional complaint as soon as the application for bail was taken up for disposal. These findings would not help the appellant in the present case. The charge-sheet already stood filed on 11.09.2020 and it was only the supplementary charge-sheet alongwith the sanction which was filed on 20.04.2021 i.e. the same day on which the application for the grant of default bail was moved. The application for default bail was decided on 22.04.2021 and the second application was moved subsequently and was decided on 28.04.2021. The charge-sheet already stood filed on 11.09.2020 and it was only the supplementary charge-sheet alongwith the sanction which was filed on 20.04.2021 i.e. the same day on which the application for the grant of default bail was moved. The application for default bail was decided on 22.04.2021 and the second application was moved subsequently and was decided on 28.04.2021. It cannot, therefore, be said that the supplementary charge-sheet had been filed only with a view to defeat the right of the appellant for the grant of default bail. 14. Further, since the application for the grant of default bail was not filed when the right accrued to him, his right would be extinguished, as was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court. In Fakhrey Alam Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), the accused had been arrested under various sections under IPC and UAPA Act. 180 days time was granted by the Judicial Magistrate to the police to file the charge-sheet. The police filed the charge-sheet for other offences but not for offences under the UAPA Act as sanction had not been granted till that time. The accused filed an application for grant of default bail two days prior to the filing of the charge-sheet under the UAPA Act. The same was declined. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that on the expiry of 180 days the accused would be entitled to default bail, since he had filed the application for bail prior to the expiry of 180 days. This judgment would also not help the appellant as admittedly he had not filed the application for default bail before the expiry of 180 days i.e. till 15.09.2020. In so far as the bail application in question is concerned, the same was filed on 20.04.2021 i.e. the same day on which the supplementary charge-sheet was filed. The judgment in Fakhrey Atom's case (supra) would, therefore, not come to the aid of the appellant. 15. This Court also, while dealing with the issue in the case of Judgebir Singh @ Jaibir Singh Samra @ Jasbir and others Vs. National Investigation Agency, New Delhi, held as under:- "6. The judgment in Fakhrey Atom's case (supra) would, therefore, not come to the aid of the appellant. 15. This Court also, while dealing with the issue in the case of Judgebir Singh @ Jaibir Singh Samra @ Jasbir and others Vs. National Investigation Agency, New Delhi, held as under:- "6. We have dealt with the right of an accused for grant of default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. in similar facts as involved in the case in hand i.e. CRA-D No.415 of 2021 titled as Gursewak Singh Versus State of Punjab, pronounced today, where it has been held in paras 11 and 12 as follows:- 11. The judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on which reliance has been placed by the counsel for the appellant are cases where the accused had exercised his right under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. prior to the submission of the challan before the competent authority/Court. The proposition, therefore, as laid down in those judgments cannot be disputed. The basic judgment on which the counsel for the appellant has placed reliance is that of Bikramjit Singh's case (supra), where the Hon'ble Supreme Court had referred to the various judgments which have been passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and thereafter proceeded to decide the said case on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the case. What has been concluded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said judgment finds mention in para 28 thereof which reads as follows:- "28. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions would show that so long as an application for grant of default bail is made on expiry of the period of 90 days (which application need not even be in writing) before a charge sheet is filed, the right to default bail becomes complete. It is of no moment that the Criminal Court in question either does not dispose of such application before the charge sheet is filed or disposes of such application wrongly before such charge sheet is filed. It is of no moment that the Criminal Court in question either does not dispose of such application before the charge sheet is filed or disposes of such application wrongly before such charge sheet is filed. So long as an application has been made for default bail on expiry of the stated period before time is further extended to the maximum period of 180 days, default bail, being an indefeasible right of the accused under the first proviso to Section 167(2), kicks in and must be granted." This judgment has been referred to in the subsequent judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Naser Bin Abu Bakar Yafai's case (supra), where reference was made to the judgment of a three Judge Bench in M.Ravindran Versus The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 2021(2) SCC 485 , wherein while dealing with Section 167(2) Cr.P.C, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had concluded as follows:- "25. Therefore, in conclusion: 25.1. Once the accused files an application for bail under the proviso to Section 167(2) he is deemed to have "availed of" or enforced his right to be released on default bail, accruing after expiry of the stipulated time-limit for investigation. Thus, if the accused applies for bail under Section 167(2) CrPC read with Section 36-A(4), NDPS Act upon expiry of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, the court must release him on bail forthwith without any unnecessary delay after getting necessary information from the Public Prosecutor, as mentioned supra. Such prompt action will restrict the prosecution from frustrating the legislative mandate to release the accused on bail in case of default by the investigating agency. 25.2. The right to be released on default bail continues to remain enforceable if the accused has applied for such bail, notwithstanding pendency of the bail application; or subsequent filing of the charge-sheet or a report seeking extension of time by the prosecution before the court; or filing of the charge-sheet during the interregnum when challenge to the rejection of the bail application is pending before a higher court. 25.3. However, where the accused fails to apply for default bail when the right accrues to him, and subsequently a charge-sheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is preferred before the Magistrate, the right to default bail would be extinguished. 25.3. However, where the accused fails to apply for default bail when the right accrues to him, and subsequently a charge-sheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is preferred before the Magistrate, the right to default bail would be extinguished. The Magistrate would be at liberty to take cognizance of the case or grant further time for completion of the investigation, as the case may be, though the accused may still be released on bail under other provisions of the CrPC. 25.4. Notwithstanding the order of default bail passed by the court, by virtue of Explanation I to Section 167(2), the actual release of the accused from custody is contingent on the directions passed by the competent court granting bail. If the accused fails to furnish bail and/or comply with the terms and conditions of the bail order within the time stipulated by the court, his continued detention in custody is valid." 12. These judgments have received approval of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and a perusal thereof would show that an accused is entitled to the benefit of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. provided he had applied for default bail and has exercised his right when it accrued to him. In case the accused fails to apply for release on default bail and subsequently a charge-sheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is submitted in Court, the right of default bail would be extinguished. This obviously mean that the report submitted under Section 173 Cr.P.C. to the competent Court having jurisdiction to try the said offence had proper approval from the competent Government/authority as mandated under the statutory provisions on the date when the application for grant of default bail has been submitted. In this situation, the right which might have been available to an accused earlier would stand extinguished the moment the challan is complete with required sanction(s)." 7. No doubt, on perusal of the judgments on which reliance has been placed by the counsel for the appellants, there is a right which accrue to an accused for grant of default bail in case of non-submission of challan before the competent Court within stipulated time under statute. A plea has been taken that without the sanction of the competent authority, a challan having been presented, the same would not be a proper challan, rather it is no challan in the eyes of law. A plea has been taken that without the sanction of the competent authority, a challan having been presented, the same would not be a proper challan, rather it is no challan in the eyes of law. The said plea on the first blush may appear to be attractive but when seen in the light of the legal position as held in Gursewak Singh's case (supra) as reproduced above as also in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the said plea as has been raised would be misplaced. The facts as are apparent from records would indicate that challan has been presented to the Court of Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ajnala, on 15.11.2019 and due sanction from the competent authority under the Explosive Substances Act as granted on 10.11.2020 was also submitted to the Court. It would not be out of way to mention here that till the presentation of the challan before the said Court on 15.11.2019, no decision had been taken by the Central Government that these cases warranted investigation by NIA and there was no reason for the same. This, we say in the light of the fact that the Bomb Disposal Squad, PAP Jalandhar, Punjab, which had seized two hand grenades, disposed them off and extracted material of these hand grenades was forwarded to FSL, Mohali for forensic examination/expert opinion. This opinion came on 29.11.2019, according to which these hand grenades were made by Pakistan Armed Forces containing Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate, which is a high explosive. No doubt, it did not bear any marking on its body but the conclusion of the experts pointed out towards not only national but international ramifications also. It is in pursuance to this report of the experts of FSL, Mohali, that Union of India stepped in and a decision was taken by it that these cases warrant investigation by NIA. It is thereafter that an order was passed on 20.01.2020 leading to re-registration of the original cases and taking over of the investigation of these cases by NIA on 20.02.2020. In the light of the above, it cannot be said that at the time of submission of the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C, sanction of competent authority was not available along with the challan." 16. In the light of the above, it cannot be said that at the time of submission of the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C, sanction of competent authority was not available along with the challan." 16. In view of the facts and circumstances discussed in the preceding paragraphs and applying the ratio of the judgments referred to above to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellant could not establish his right of being released on default bail under the provisions of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. and accordingly his application was rightly rejected by the Special Judge, Amritsar by way of order dated 28.04.2021. In view of the same, finding no merit in the present appeal, the same is hereby dismissed.