JUDGMENT : (Deepak Kumar Tiwari, J.) : 1. The instant Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 26.2.2022 passed by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Ambikapur, District Surguja in Civil Suit No.8-B/2015 whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant herein was partly decreed. 2. Henceforth the parties shall be referred as per their description before the Court below. 3. Facts of the case are that the plaintiff/appellant herein is the proprietor of the firm namely, M/s Balaji Traders, who was engaged in the business of supply of catering. Respondent No.2 had issued a tender (Ex.-P/2) for supply of the food to the indoor patients admitted in the District Hospital, Ambikapur, District Surguja. The plaintiff/appellant has participated in the tender process by submitting an application and his offer was duly accepted by the defendant/respondent No.2 on certain terms and conditions, and the work order (Ex.-P/3) was issued in his favour on 7.7.2011. Looking to the services of the appellant, he was also awarded additional work of food supply under the scheme namely, “Janani Shishu Suraksha Yojna” vide order dated 26.11.2011 (Ex.-P/4), and the period of contract was from 20.7.2011 to 19.7.2012. The food prepared by the appellant was tested and checked every day for which a taste and quality register was maintained by respondent No.2. 4. The appellant had submitted the bills for the work done during the period 20.7.2011 to March, 2012 to respondent No.2, the details of which are as under:- Food bill supplied to the indoor patients- Sr. No. Bill Number Date Amount 1. 140 02.12.2011 Rs.4,51,236/- 2. 182 02.11.2011 Rs.1,88,208.60/- 3. 183 02.12.2011 Rs.1,76,251.20/- 4. 184 05.01.2012 Rs.1,91,208.90/- 5. 185 08.02.2012 Rs.1,67,272.20/- 6. 186 01.03.2012 Rs.15,827.30/- 7. 191 05.03.2012 Rs.21,746.70/- Food bill provided under the Janani Shishu Suraksha Yojna Sr. No. Bill Number Date Amount 1. 187 02.01.2012 Rs.27,600/- 2. 188 08.02.2012 Rs.77,700/- 3. 189 01.03.2012 Rs.65,000/- 4. 190 05.03.2012 Rs.10,400/- Grand Total Rs.13,92,450.90/- 5. The aforesaid bills were presented before the respondent authorities for payment and process for payment has also been initiated and defendant No.2 had given the information that partial allotment was received from defendant No.1. So, payment will be made early. During the pendency of the bills, the concerned authorities of Human Rights Commission had inspected the food prepared by the appellant on 2.3.2012 and some adverse comments were also made (Ex.-P/8). So, payment will be made early. During the pendency of the bills, the concerned authorities of Human Rights Commission had inspected the food prepared by the appellant on 2.3.2012 and some adverse comments were also made (Ex.-P/8). As a result, the contract and the work order dated 7.7.2011 & 26.11.2011 respectively were terminated vide order dated 3.3.2012 (Ex.-P/18) and security amount of Rs.75,000/- and caution money of Rs.52,000/- had been forfeited, and payment of pending bills was also not paid by order dated 30.5.2012 (Ex.-P/17). The appellant was also blacklisted (Ex.-P/19). During the aforesaid proceedings, no opportunity was afforded to the appellant and without any factual enquiry, the order has been passed and even the pending bills were not cleared by the respondents. 6. Thereafter the appellant had challenged the impugned action of the respondent before this Court by way of WPC No.568/2013, which was dismissed vide order dated 7.5.2014 (Ex.-P/32) with an observation that the writ petition arises out of contract and disputed questions of fact are involved, and the petitioner (appellant herein) may file a civil suit with regard to recovery of the pending bills. Accordingly, the appellant after sending the legal notice under Section 80 of the CPC (Ex.-P/30) had filed a civil suit before the concerned Court for payment of pending bills relating to the period prior to 2.3.2012, amounting to Rs.13,92,450.90/- (details given at para-4), as also for refund of security amount of Rs.75,000/- and caution money of Rs.52,000/- and also prayed for damages of Rs.7 lakhs for loss of goodwill on account of termination of contract and consequent blacklisting order due to which he could not take up any other work. The appellant had also claimed damages at the rate of Rs.20,000/- per day separately. Thus, the appellant had claimed total amount of Rs.24,70,450/- along with interest @ 18% per annum from the date of institution of plaint till the date of payment and also sought that the order dated 30.5.2012 (Ex.-P/17) whereby the payment of pending bills has been refused and security and caution money has been forfeited be declared null and void and blacklisting of the plaintiff be removed. 7. 7. In the written statement, it has been accepted that in pursuance of the tender (Ex.-P/2) for supply of food to the indoor patients admitted in the District Hospital, Ambikapur, work order (Ex.P/3) has been issued in favour of the plaintiff on 7.7.2011 and the same was effective from 20.7.2011 to 19.7.2012 i.e. for one year. Further, an additional work order (Ex.-P/4) for supply of special diet under the scheme of “Janani Shishu Suraksha Yogna” was also issued in favour of the plaintiff on 26.11.2011 vide Ex.-P/4. In the work order (Ex.-P/3), it has been specifically mentioned that Food and Taste Register shall be maintained and in clause-5 of the said order, it has been further stipulated that if any complaint is received with regard to quality of the food from any patient, general public, staff, other reputed persons, two opportunities would be granted for improvement and after 3rd and last notice, the tender shall be cancelled and the security amount shall be forfeited. On 19th August, 2011, the plaintiff had not supplied food to the admitted patients in the Surgical Ward and 9 persons had made a complaint (Ex.-D/2). On 30.8.2011, the Resident Medical Officer has forwarded the complaint to respondent No.2 vide Ex.-D/3 about non-supply of the food to the admitted patients of the Surgical Ward on 19th August, 2011, wherein it was also mentioned that bread along with Tea was also not supplied to the patients, Egg was also not supplied as Special Diet and the clarified butter (Ghee) was also not applied on the bread. On 3.9.2011, vide Ex.-D/4, the Resident Medical Officer had issued notice to the plaintiff for improvement in the service, as the food was not supplied as per the norms. Again on 26.11.2011, vide Ex.-D/5, during inspection made by the Civil Surgeon on 21st September, 2011, it was found that the quality and standard of the food was not improved and up to the mark and, therefore, further warning was issued. On 3.11.2011, the Resident Medical Officer had issued another warning (Ex.-D/5) and 3 days’ time was allowed for improvement in the quality of the food. On 3.11.2011, the Resident Medical Officer had issued another warning (Ex.-D/5) and 3 days’ time was allowed for improvement in the quality of the food. It was admitted that the plaintiff has submitted the bills the details whereof are mentioned at para-4 of this judgment and it was further explained that the plaintiff has submitted the Bill Nos.182 & 183 twice, though he had earlier submitted the bills for payment and bill No.182 has already been cleared by bill No.119 on 1.11.2011 and similarly, bill No.183 has also been cleared by earlier bill No.140, dated 2nd September, 2011. After scrutiny of the bills Nos.140, 184, 185, 186, 191 submitted by the appellant/plaintiff, an amount of Rs.,14,041/-; Rs. 1,18,002/-; Rs.1,44,018/-; Rs.1,36,590/- & Rs.18,768/- was sanctioned for payment. Similarly, in respect of the bill Nos.187 to 190 submitted under the scheme of Janani Shishu Suraksha Yojna, an amount of Rs.27,600/-; Rs.70,500/-; Rs.64,900/- & Rs.10,400 was sanctioned for payment. 8. On 2nd March, 2012, a team of the Chhattisgarh Human Rights Commission has made a surprise inspection of the District Hospital, Ambikapur and in the kitchen being run by the plaintiff, insects and bugs were found on the vegetables, which were being used for supply to the patients vide inspection report (Ex.-P/8). The said inspection team has also directed for initiation of the legal proceeding. So, an FIR was registered against the plaintiff for offence under Sections 336 & 279 of the IPC and charge sheet was filed before the CJM, Ambikapur and the same is still pending consideration. The contract was rightly terminated and because of the act of the plaintiff, the image of the District Hospital is badly affected. Damages of Rs.72,42,000/-, as assessed by the committee was claimed against the plaintiff for the loss of goodwill of the State. It was prayed that the plaint be dismissed. 9. On the basis of pleadings, the trial Court has framed 8 issues and the suit was partly allowed with respect to the bills submitted by the plaintiff at Issue No.5, which has been admitted in the written statement by the respondent authorities, for which a partial decree was granted in favour of the plaintiff. 9. On the basis of pleadings, the trial Court has framed 8 issues and the suit was partly allowed with respect to the bills submitted by the plaintiff at Issue No.5, which has been admitted in the written statement by the respondent authorities, for which a partial decree was granted in favour of the plaintiff. Issue No.1 about the work contract given to the plaintiff was found proved and for the remaining issues, the trial Court was of the view that the plaintiff has failed to supply the food as per the norms, therefore, the respondent authorities after following due procedure has terminated the contract and forfeited the earnest money and caution money, and the claim preferred by the defendants against the plaintiff was also not found proved. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the impugned judgment and decree including the record with utmost circumspection. 11. In order to prove its case, the plaintiff has examined his father as Power of Attorney Holder Mr. Jugal Kishore Kesharwani (PW-1) & Dr. Ajay Kumar Tirki as PW-2 and exhibited as many as 46 documents vide Ex.-P/1 to P/46, whereas the defendants have not examined any witness, and during cross-examination of the plaintiff’ witnesses, exhibited 6 documents vide Ex.-D/1 to D/6. 12. Ms. Nupur Trivedi, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that the order of blacklisting dated 30.5.2012 (Ex.-P/19) is contrary to the principles of natural justice inasmuch as no notice was issued to the appellant/plaintiff with respect to the proposed penalty of blacklisting. Therefore, the said order is not sustainable. Reliance is placed on the judgments in the matters of Gorkha Security Services v. State (NCT of Delhi) : (2014) 9 SCC 105 , VetIndia Pharmaceuticals Limited Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another : (2021) 1 SCC 804 , UMC Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Food Corpn. of India : (2021) 2 SCC 551 , Kulja Industries Ltd vs Chief General Manager Western Telecom Project BSNL : (2014) 14 SCC 731 . 13. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another : (2021) 1 SCC 804 , UMC Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Food Corpn. of India : (2021) 2 SCC 551 , Kulja Industries Ltd vs Chief General Manager Western Telecom Project BSNL : (2014) 14 SCC 731 . 13. Learned counsel for the appellant would further submit that as the bills were submitted for the period prior to 5.3.2012 and the inspection by the Human Rights Commission was made on 2.3.2012, therefore, on such basis, payment of earlier bills could not be denied and the appellant has raised legitimate and genuine claims, and the respondent authorities have also not disputed the said liability. The order dated 30.5.2012 (Ex.-P/17) whereby the amount of pending bills, earnest money and caution money has been forfeited is bad in law, as there is acknowledgment of liability in the said order and establishing jural relationship as that of the debtor and creditor. In spite of such acknowledgment of the liability of pending bills, though denied for payment, the suit has also been filed within limitation. Reliance is placed in the matter of Food Corporation of India Vs. Assam State Cooperative Marketing and Consumer Federation Ltd. and others : (2004) 12 SCC 360 . 14. Learned counsel for the appellant would further submit that a proprietor of any concerned can appoint a Power of Attorney holder, as in the present case, father of the proprietor of the plaintiff concern was given power of attorney vide Ex.-P/1 and he has proved the fact that termination of contract vide Ex.-P/18 on 3.3.2012 is not proper. Learned counsel would place reliance in the matter of Shankar Finance and Investments Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others : (2008) 8 SCC 536 to submit that the power of attorney holder can depose on behalf of the plaintiff. The defendants have not examined any witness and the plaintiff by their evidence has successfully proved its case, but the trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in proper perspective. Therefore, learned counsel for the appellant prays to allow the Appeal and grant decree in favour of the plaintiff. 15. On the other hand, Ms. Astha Shukla, learned Govt. Advocate supported by Mr. Therefore, learned counsel for the appellant prays to allow the Appeal and grant decree in favour of the plaintiff. 15. On the other hand, Ms. Astha Shukla, learned Govt. Advocate supported by Mr. Trivikram Naik, PL, would submit that as welfare policy of the State Government and for early recovery of the patients admitted in the hospital by providing healthy diet, the subject work order has been issued in favour of the plaintiff, however, the plaintiff has violated the terms of the said work order and supplied inferior quality of the food to the patients putting their health condition at risk. In spite of several notices, quality of the food was not improved. Even during inspection by the team of Human Rights Commission on 2.3.2012 (Ex.-P/8), insects were found on the vegetables and, therefore, on 3.3.2012, the contract was terminated vide Ex.-P/18. On 16th April, 2012, a show cause notice was issued to the plaintiff vide Ex.-P/20 for forfeiture of the amount, to which the plaintiff had submitted its reply vide Ex.-P/21, and an order has been passed vide Ex.-P/17 on 30.5.2012 for forfeiture of the amount. Considering the gross negligence in the services rendered by the appellant putting the health condition of the indoor patients at risk, the plaintiff was blacklisted vide Ex.-P/19. She would further submit that father of the plaintiff was not aware about the management of the kitchen wherein the said deficiencies were found and he himself has admitted that he had visited Ambikapur only twice and he has no personal knowledge of the business and, therefore, he could not have deposed on behalf of the plaintiff/appellant in this regard. Reliance is placed in the matter of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and Another Vs. IndusInd Bank Ltd & Others : (2005) 2 SCC 217 . It was further submitted that as the pending bills were submitted after 3 years, therefore, the suit in respect of the same was time barred, and the impugned judgment is well merited and does not call for any interference. 16. First of all, we shall proceed to examine whether the order of blacklisting passed against the plaintiff on 30.05.2012 (Ex. P-17) is sustainable? 16. First of all, we shall proceed to examine whether the order of blacklisting passed against the plaintiff on 30.05.2012 (Ex. P-17) is sustainable? In the instant matter, admittedly, no notice relating to the proposed action of blacklisting was ever issued to the plaintiff, The notice dated 16.04.2012 (Ex.P-20) was issued to the plaintiff for forfeiture of security amount and payment of pending bills, but it is completely silent about blacklisting and as such, it could not be inferred that such an action could be taken by the defendants in pursuance of this notice. 17. In the matter of UMC Technologies (P) Ltd. (Supra), it is held that before passing an order of blacklisting, in the notice, the penalty/action proposed should be mentioned specifically and unambiguously and the relevant paras 13 to 16 are reproduced herein below : “13. At the outset, it must be noted that it is the first principle of civilised jurisprudence that a person against whom any action is sought to be taken or whose right or interests are being affected should be given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The basic principle of natural justice is that before adjudication starts, the authority concerned should give to the affected party a notice of the case against him so that he can defend himself. Such notice should be adequate and the grounds necessitating action and the penalty/action proposed should be mentioned specifically and unambiguously. An order travelling beyond the bounds of notice is impermissible and without jurisdiction to that extent. This Court in Nasir Ahmad v. Custodian General, Evacuee Property [Nasir Ahmad v. Custodian General, Evacuee Property, (1980) 3 SCC 1 ] has held that it is essential for the notice to specify the particular grounds on the basis of which an action is proposed to be taken so as to enable the noticee to answer the case against him. If these conditions are not satisfied, the person cannot be said to have been granted any reasonable opportunity of being heard. 14. Specifically, in the context of blacklisting of a person or an entity by the State or a State Corporation, the requirement of a valid, particularised and unambiguous show-cause notice is particularly crucial due to the severe consequences of blacklisting and the stigmatisation that accrues to the person/entity being blacklisted. 14. Specifically, in the context of blacklisting of a person or an entity by the State or a State Corporation, the requirement of a valid, particularised and unambiguous show-cause notice is particularly crucial due to the severe consequences of blacklisting and the stigmatisation that accrues to the person/entity being blacklisted. Here, it may be gainful to describe the concept of blacklisting and the graveness of the consequences occasioned by it. Blacklisting has the effect of denying a person or an entity the privileged opportunity of entering into government contracts. This privilege arises because it is the State who is the counterparty in government contracts and as such, every eligible person is to be afforded an equal opportunity to participate in such contracts, without arbitrariness and discrimination. Not only does blacklisting take away this privilege, it also tarnishes the blacklisted person's reputation and brings the person's character into question. Blacklisting also has long-lasting civil consequences for the future business prospects of the blacklisted person. 15. In the present case as well, the appellant has submitted that serious prejudice has been caused to it due to the Corporation's order of blacklisting as several other government corporations have now terminated their contracts with the appellant and/or prevented the appellant from participating in future tenders even though the impugned blacklisting order was, in fact, limited to the Corporation's Madhya Pradesh regional office. This domino effect, which can effectively lead to the civil death of a person, shows that the consequences of blacklisting travel far beyond the dealings of the blacklisted person with one particular government corporation and in view thereof, this Court has consistently prescribed strict adherence to principles of natural justice whenever an entity is sought to be blacklisted. 16. The severity of the effects of blacklisting and the resultant need for strict observance of the principles of natural justice before passing an order of blacklisting were highlighted by this Court in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B. [Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B., (1975) 1 SCC 70 ] in the following terms: (SCC pp. 74-75, paras 12, 15 & 20) “12. … The order of blacklisting has the effect of depriving a person of equality of opportunity in the matter of public contract. 74-75, paras 12, 15 & 20) “12. … The order of blacklisting has the effect of depriving a person of equality of opportunity in the matter of public contract. A person who is on the approved list is unable to enter into advantageous relations with the Government because of the order of blacklisting. A person who has been dealing with the Government in the matter of sale and purchase of materials has a legitimate interest or expectation. When the State acts to the prejudice of a person it has to be supported by legality. * * * 15. … The blacklisting order involves civil consequences. It casts a slur. It creates a barrier between the persons blacklisted and the Government in the matter of transactions. The blacklists are “instruments of coercion”. * * * 20. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist.” 18. In the matter of Gorkha Security Services (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has described blacklisting as being equivalent to the civil death of a person because blacklisting is stigmatic in nature and debars a person from participating in government tenders thereby precluding him from the award of government contracts. It has been held thus: (SCC p. 115, para 16) “16. It is a common case of the parties that the blacklisting has to be preceded by a show-cause notice. Law in this regard is firmly grounded and does not even demand much amplification. The necessity of compliance with the principles of natural justice by giving the opportunity to the person against whom action of blacklisting is sought to be taken has a valid and solid rationale behind it. With blacklisting, many civil and/or evil consequences follow. It is described as “civil death” of a person who is foisted with the order of blacklisting. Such an order is stigmatic in nature and debars such a person from participating in government tenders which means precluding him from the award of government contracts.” 19. With blacklisting, many civil and/or evil consequences follow. It is described as “civil death” of a person who is foisted with the order of blacklisting. Such an order is stigmatic in nature and debars such a person from participating in government tenders which means precluding him from the award of government contracts.” 19. In view of the aforesaid principles, it is explicit that before passing of an order for blacklisting, the notice is required to state the grounds necessitating the action and the penalty proposed specifically and unambiguously and is also required to adhere to the principles of natural justice. A blacklisting order entails civil consequences and as such, a show cause notice was required to be issued before issuance of order of blacklisting. Further, the blacklisting orders passed for an indefinite period are not sustainable under the law. 20. Reverting back to the facts of the case, the action of blacklisting was never proposed against the plaintiff, and a clear notice is essential for ensuring that the person against whom the penalty of blacklisting is intended to be imposed, has an adequate, informed and meaningful opportunity to show cause against his possible blacklisting. So, the order of blacklisting issued against the plaintiff clearly traversed beyond the bounds of the show-cause notice (Ex. P-20) which is impermissible in law. As a result, the consequent blacklisting order dated 30.05.2012 (Ex. P-17 ) cannot be sustained and the same is set aside. 21. Now, the next question that arise for consideration is whether the plaintiff has filed its suit for payment of pending bills within limitation? 22. In this regard, the law relating to suits for recovery of price of goods sold under a contract are governed by Articles 14 & 15 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act which prescribes the starting point of limitation as the date on which the goods are delivered where no fixed period of credit is agreed upon, or where it is so fixed, on expiry of the said term respectively. It is vivid that only a three-year period is prescribed in the Limitation Act, wherein one can file a civil recovery claim after the cause of action has arisen. A suit filed after the limitation will not be considered. The grounds for obtaining the exemption must be indicated if the case is filed after the limitation period has passed. It is vivid that only a three-year period is prescribed in the Limitation Act, wherein one can file a civil recovery claim after the cause of action has arisen. A suit filed after the limitation will not be considered. The grounds for obtaining the exemption must be indicated if the case is filed after the limitation period has passed. It is well settled proposition that Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, makes it obligatory on the part of the Court to dismiss the suit or appeal if made after the prescribed period even though the limitation is not set up as a defence and there is no plea to raise the issue of limitation even at the appellate stage because in some of the cases it may go to the root of the matter. (See State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 , Lachhmi Sewak Sahu v. Ram Rup Sahu [ AIR 1944 PC 24 ] and Kamlesh Babu v. Lajpat Rai Sharma [ (2008) 12 SCC 577 ].) 23. Reverting back to the facts of the case, admittedly, the plaintiff has filed the instant suit on 13.04.2015 for payment of the pending bills, prior to 05.03.2012. Apparently the suit was not filed within three years from the date of bills. Further, there is no pleading about extension of time, and when no foundation is laid, then no case for extension of period of limitation is available. 24. In this regard, in the matter of Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v. Veer Gurjar Aluminium Industries (P) Ltd., { (2020) 15 SCC 1 }, the following was observed at para-35: “35. Apart from the above and even if it be assumed that the principles relating to acknowledgment as per Section 18 of the Limitation Act are applicable for extension of time for the purpose of the application under Section 7 of the Code, in our view, neither the said provision and principles come in operation in the present case nor do they enure to the benefit of Respondent 2 for the fundamental reason that in the application made before NCLT, Respondent 2 specifically stated the date of default as “8-7-2011 being the date of NPA”. It remains indisputable that neither has any other date of default been stated in the application nor has any suggestion about any acknowledgment been made. It remains indisputable that neither has any other date of default been stated in the application nor has any suggestion about any acknowledgment been made. As noticed, even in Part V of the application, Respondent 2 was required to state the particulars of financial debt with documents and evidence on record. In the variety of descriptions which could have been given by the applicant in the said Part V of the application and even in residuary Point 8 therein, nothing was at all stated at any place about the so-called acknowledgment or any other date of default. 35.1. Therefore, on the admitted fact situation of the present case, where only the date of default as “8-7-2011” has been stated for the purpose of maintaining the application under Section 7 of the Code, and not even a foundation is laid in the application for suggesting any acknowledgment or any other date of default, in our view, the submissions sought to be developed on behalf of Respondent 2 at the later stage cannot be permitted. It remains trite that the question of limitation is essentially a mixed question of law and facts and when a party seeks application of any particular provision for extension or enlargement of the period of limitation, the relevant facts are required to be pleaded and requisite evidence is required to be adduced. Indisputably, in the present case, Respondent 2 never came out with any pleading other than stating the date of default as “8-7-2011” in the application. That being the position, no case for extension of period of limitation is available to be examined. In other words, even if Section 18 of the Limitation Act and principles thereof were applicable, the same would not apply to the application under consideration in the present case, looking to the very averment regarding default therein and for want of any other averment in regard to acknowledgment. In this view of the matter, reliance on the decision in Mahabir Cold Storage [Mahabir Cold Storage v. CIT, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 402] does not advance the cause of Respondent 2.” 25. In this view of the matter, reliance on the decision in Mahabir Cold Storage [Mahabir Cold Storage v. CIT, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 402] does not advance the cause of Respondent 2.” 25. For the foregoing discussion, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff that the defendants have not disputed the liability in written statement as also in the notice and confiscation order, and thus the said liability was duly acknowledged and the suit being filed with such enlarged period of limitation should have been allowed, however, we are unable to accept the same for the simple reason that the plaintiff should have applied for extension or enlargement of the period of limitation and the relevant facts are required to be pleaded. Further, the undisputed bills and the sanctioned amount which was admitted by the defendants has already been allowed and partly decreed in favour of the plaintiff and as such it cannot be said that the remaining part of the liability was acknowledged by the defendants. Therefore, we hold that the suit for payment of pending bills was not filed within limitation. 26. Now, the next question is whether termination order (Ex.-P/18) dated 3.3.2012 and the order of forfeiture of the earnest money and caution money vide Ex.-P/17 are justified and have been passed in a proper manner? 27. Admittedly, the work order (Ex.-P/3) was issued in favour of the plaintiff wherein it was categorically mentioned that Food and Taste Register shall be maintained, which would be verified regularly. There is further stipulation at clause-5 of the said order that if any complaint is received and after 2 notices, if the quality of the food is not improved, then after 3rd and final notice, the contract shall be terminated and the security amount shall be liable to be forfeited. Before passing the order dated 30.5.2012 (Ex.-P/17), a show cause notice was issued to the plaintiff on 16th April, 2012 vide Ex.-P/20 to which the plaintiff has also replied vide Ex.-P/21 on 19th April, 2012. Before passing the order dated 30.5.2012 (Ex.-P/17), a show cause notice was issued to the plaintiff on 16th April, 2012 vide Ex.-P/20 to which the plaintiff has also replied vide Ex.-P/21 on 19th April, 2012. Thereafter the respondent authorities have passed the order dated 30.5.2012 (Ex.-P/17) wherein it has been mentioned that in spite of several opportunities to improve quality of the food, no improvement has been made by the plaintiff and during inspection by the members of the Human Rights Commission, insects and bugs were found on the vegetables, which were being used for preparing food to be supplied to the indoor patients. For such gross negligence and on the recommendation of the Inspection Team, an FIR has also been lodged against the plaintiff, which was duly investigated by the police authorities and charge sheet was also filed. The respondents/defendants have also exhibited 4 letters dated 19th August, 2011, 3rd September, 2011, 26th September, 2011 & 3rd November, 2011 during cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witness which were marked as Ex.-D/2 to D/6 whereby the deficiencies have been pointed out to the plaintiff and a warning has also been issued by the respondent authorities. 28. It is well settled principle that the plaintiff has to prove his case on his own strength. In the present case, father of the plaintiff, who has deposed as power of attorney holder of the plaintiff, has admitted the fact at para-23 of the cross-examination that during the contractual period he had visited only one or two times at Ambikapur, however, has failed to explain as to on which date he came to Ambikapur. The said witness has also not able to furnish details of the employees engaged by the plaintiff and he has named only two employees i.e. Ramesh Kushwaha and Suresh Shriwas. He stated that he does not remember the names of other staff. There is specific allegation that the food was not supplied as per the norms and the plaintiff has failed to examine any of his staff to prove the said fact. 29. Considering the inspection report prepared by the Human Rights Commission dated 2nd March, 2012 (Ex.-P/8) and other attending circumstances, we are of the view that findings recorded by the trial Court concerning termination of the contract, forfeiture of the earnest money and caution money are in accordance with law. 30. 29. Considering the inspection report prepared by the Human Rights Commission dated 2nd March, 2012 (Ex.-P/8) and other attending circumstances, we are of the view that findings recorded by the trial Court concerning termination of the contract, forfeiture of the earnest money and caution money are in accordance with law. 30. The plaintiff has also claimed damages for illegal termination of the contract. We have already decided the said issue in favour of the defendants, as the contract was held to be terminated rightly. The other issue concerning blacklisting of the plaintiff has been decided in favour of the plaintiff. The law relating to damages is well settled and the circumstances under which the act was done must regulate the degree and certainty, particularly with which the damage was done ought to be pleaded and proved. The plaintiff has also not furnished any specific particular of the loss allegedly suffered by him. 31. In order to ascertain the damages, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Kanchan Udyog Limited Vs. United Spirits Limited : (2017) 8 SCC 237 , has observed at para-27 which reads thus:- “27. In Galoo Ltd. (supra) the emphasis was on the common sense approach, holding that the breach may have given the opportunity to incur the loss but did not cause the loss, in the sense in which the word “cause” is used in the law. The following passage extracted therein from Chitty on Contracts, 26th ed. (1989) Vol. 2, pp. 1128-1129, para 1785 may be usefully set out : (WLR p.1370 A-B) “The important issue in remoteness of damage in the law of contract is whether a particular loss was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties, but causation must also be proved: there must be a causal connection between the defendant’s breach of contract and the plaintiff’s loss. The courts have avoided laying down any formal tests for causation: they have relied on common sense to guide decisions as to whether a breach of contract is a sufficiently substantial cause of plaintiff’s loss.” 32. In view of the above legal position and facts of the case, we are of the opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court regarding damages claimed by the plaintiff is in accordance with law and the plaintiff is not entitled for any damages. 33. In view of the above legal position and facts of the case, we are of the opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court regarding damages claimed by the plaintiff is in accordance with law and the plaintiff is not entitled for any damages. 33. For the foregoing, the order of blacklisting passed against the appellant/plaintiff dated 30.5.2012 (Ex.-P/17) is hereby set aside and other claims preferred by the plaintiff relating to pending bills, forfeiture of earnest money and caution money are hereby rejected, as the same were not found to be proved. 34. Resultantly, the Appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above. 35. A decree be drawn up accordingly.