JUDGMENT : Suneet Kumar, J. 1. Heard Shri P.K. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, Ms. Manisha Chaturvedi holding brief of Ms. Chandra Kala Chaturvedi, learned counsel appearing for the State-respondents and Shri Abhinav Krishna Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the Development Authority. 2. Petitioner by the instant writ petition, inter alia, seeks direction to the State-respondent not to interfere in the peaceful possession of Plot Nos. 1356, 1723, 1112, 1104 and 1163, situated in Village-Bara Sirohi, Tehsil and District-Kanpur Nagar. Petitioner has also sought quashing of the order dated 27 July 2011, passed by District Judge/Appellate Authority, Kanpur Nagar, in Misc. Appeal No. 20/70 of 1999 (Kailash Prasad Vs. Competent Authority). 3. The facts of the instant case, briefly stated, is that the predecessor in interest of the petitioner filed statement/return under Section 6(1) of U.P. Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 (for short 'Act'), giving details of his land/property being case No. 8683. Upon survey, the land/property, admeasuring 5758.81 square meter, was found in excess of the ceiling limit in possession of the petitioner. 4. Consequently, a draft statement came to be served upon the land owner under Section 8(3), along with notice dated 04 August 1979. Petitioner did not respond to the notice by filing objection, consequently, order under Section 8(4) came to be passed on 26 March 1983, declaring 5758.81 square meter of land in excess of the ceiling limit under the Act. On completion of proceedings under Sections 9 and 10(1) of the Act, on receiving no objection from the land owner or any other interested person under Section 10(2) of the Act, a notification under Section 10(3) of the Act was issued on 31 October 1985, duly published in the Official Gazette on 15 January 1986, vesting the surplus vacant land in the State. Thereafter, a notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued on 16 December 1986, pursuant, thereof, the authorized person of the competent authority had taken possession of the surplus land on 12 November 1991. 5. It appears that later on, one Ashok Kumar Kushwaha, son of Shri Babu, filed a representation on 1 April 2006, requesting that Plot No. 1192, declared surplus was not owned by the petitioner. 5. It appears that later on, one Ashok Kumar Kushwaha, son of Shri Babu, filed a representation on 1 April 2006, requesting that Plot No. 1192, declared surplus was not owned by the petitioner. It appears that the representation was accepted by the competent authority vide order dated 13 July 2006, consequently, the Plot No. 1192, was released in favour of Ashok Kumar Kushwaha and his name was duly mutated in the revenue record. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner is in possession of the plots even after repeal of the principal Act, w.e.f. 18 March 1999. It is urged that at this stage, petitioner cannot be dispossessed from the land declared surplus. Reliance has been placed on the decisions rendered by Supreme Court in State of U.P. Vs. Hari Ram, 2013 (120) RD 241 , as well as, decisions rendered by this Court in Ram Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2020 (147) RD 1 , Ikrar & Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2020 (2) AWC 1288 and State of U.P. Vs. Jagdish Chandra, 2014 (1) AWC 864 . 7. It is not the case of the petitioner that the land owner at any stage had protested with the declaration of surplus land or had objected before the authorities with regard to dispossession not being in accordance with the law. 8. It appears that an appeal being appeal no. 20/70 of 1999, came to be filed by the petitioner before the District Judge on 18 February 1999. The cause of action set up in the appeal is that on 30 December 1998, the Kanpur Development Authority was demarcating the land. Thereafter, petitioner approached the Lekhpal on 4 January 1999, and on perusal of the revenue record, it transpired that the name of the Kanpur Development Authority was mutated in the revenue record. Thereafter, petitioner contacted his lawyer and got inspected the file pertaining to urban ceiling and obtained copy of the order dated 6 March 1982, on 12 February 1999, thereafter, instituted the appeal. In the memo of appeal, it was pleaded that Plot Nos. 1356, 1723, 1104, 1112 and 1163, predecessor in interest of the petitioner was the land owner. Thereafter, petitioner contacted his lawyer and got inspected the file pertaining to urban ceiling and obtained copy of the order dated 6 March 1982, on 12 February 1999, thereafter, instituted the appeal. In the memo of appeal, it was pleaded that Plot Nos. 1356, 1723, 1104, 1112 and 1163, predecessor in interest of the petitioner was the land owner. On perusal of the pleadings set up in the writ petition, as well as, memo of appeal instituted on 18 February 1999, it is not the case of the petitioner that the petitioner or the predecessor in interest of the petitioner at any stage of the proceedings under the Act had protested their dispossession or declaration/acquisition of land declared in excess of the ceiling limit. 9. The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (for short ‘Repeal Act’), came into effect on 18 March 1999, on the said date pending proceedings/appeal stood abated. Consequently, the appeal instituted by the petitioner stood abated by operation of law and the order dated 27 July 2012, passed on the said appeal rejecting the delay condonation application of the petitioner is nullity being void ab initio. 10. In State of Assam vs. Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma and others, (2015) 5 SCC 321 (Paras-16, 17 and 19), the Supreme Court was of the view that any grievance based on Section 10(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of dispossession and the land owner in not doing so must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. Paragraph 16, 17, and 19 is extracted: “16. The issue can be viewed from another angle also. Assuming that a person in possession could make a grievance, no matter without much gain in the ultimate analysis, the question is whether such grievance could be made long after the alleged violation of Section 10(5). If actual physical possession was taken over from the erstwhile land owner on 7th December, 1991 as is alleged in the present case any grievance based on Section 10(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession. If the owner did not do so, forcible taking over of possession would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In any such situation the owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. If the owner did not do so, forcible taking over of possession would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In any such situation the owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. Any other view would, in our opinion, give a licence to a litigant to make a grievance not because he has suffered any real prejudice that needs to be redressed but only because the fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act tempted him to raise the issue regarding his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed procedure. 17. Reliance was placed by the respondents upon the decision of this Court in Hari Ram's case (supra). That decision does not, in our view, lend much assistance to the respondents. We say so, because this Court was in Hari Ram's case (supra) considering whether the word 'may' appearing in Section 10(5)gave to the competent authority the discretion to issue or not to issue a notice before taking physical possession of the land in question under Section 10(6). The question whether breach of Section 10(5)and possible dispossession without notice would vitiate the act of dispossession itself or render it non est in the eye of law did not fall for consideration in that case. In our opinion, what Section 10(5)prescribes is an ordinary and logical course of action that ought to be followed before the authorities decided to use force to dispossess the occupant under Section 10(6). In the case at hand if the appellant's version regarding dispossession of the erstwhile owner in December 1991 is correct, the fact that such dispossession was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That is because Bhabadeb Sarma-erstwhile owner had not made any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at any stage during his lifetime implying thereby that he had waived his right to do so. 19. In support of the contention that the respondents are even today in actual physical possession of the land in question reliance is placed upon certain electricity bills and bills paid for the telephone connection that stood in the name of one Mr. Sanatan Baishya. It was contended that said Mr. 19. In support of the contention that the respondents are even today in actual physical possession of the land in question reliance is placed upon certain electricity bills and bills paid for the telephone connection that stood in the name of one Mr. Sanatan Baishya. It was contended that said Mr. Sanatan Baishya was none other than the caretaker of the property of the respondents. There is, however, nothing on record to substantiate that assertion. The telephone bills and electricity bills also relate to the period from 2001 onwards only. There is nothing on record before us nor was anything placed before the High Court to suggest that between 7th December, 1991 till the date the land in question was allotted to GMDA in December, 2003 the owner or his legal heirs after his demise had continued to be in possession. All that we have is rival claims of the parties based on affidavits in support thereof. We repeatedly asked learned counsel for the parties whether they can, upon remand on the analogy of the decision in the case of Gyanaba Dilavarsinh Jadega (supra), adduce any documentary evidence that would enable the High Court to record a finding in regard to actual possession. They were unable to point out or refer to any such evidence. That being so the question whether actual physical possession was taken over remains a seriously disputed question of fact which is not amenable to a satisfactory determination by the High Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution no matter the High Court may in its discretion in certain situations upon such determination. Remand to the High Court to have a finding on the question of dispossession, therefore, does not appear to us to be a viable solution.” (Emphasis supplied by us) 11. In Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma (supra) followed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in Shiv Ram Singh vs. State of U.P. and others, 2015 (7) ADJ 630 , the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of laches, observing as under: “We must also advert to another aspect of the matter particularly having regard to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra). The petitioner moved the first writ petition in 2002 nearly three years after the Repeal Act had come into force. The petitioner moved the first writ petition in 2002 nearly three years after the Repeal Act had come into force. After the earlier writ petition was disposed of by directing the District Magistrate to pass an order on the representation of the petitioner, an order was passed by the District Magistrate on 10 May 2007. The petitioner thereafter waited for a period of over two years until the present writ petition was filed in July 2009. If the petitioner had been dispossessed of the land without due notice under Section 10(5), such a grievance could have been raised at the relevant time. As a matter of fact, it has been the case of the State all along that a notice under Section 10(5) was, in fact, issued in the present case which would be borne out from the original file which has been produced before the Court. The issue is whether such a grievance could be made long after, before the Court. The petitioner had waited for nearly three years after the Repeal Act came into force to file the first writ petition and thereafter for a period of over two years after the disposal of the representation despite the finding of the District Magistrate that possession was taken over on 25 June 1993. In our view, such a belated challenge should not, in any event, be entertained.” (Emphasis supplied by us) 12. In Shivgonda Anna Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5 wherein, the Supreme Court while dealing with Section 10 of the Act held that the writ petition under Article 226 for reopening the proceedings on the ground that the competent authority had not taken into consideration certain facts, filed after ten years, after the excess land was vested in the State Government was rightly summarily dismissed by the High Court. 13. While deciding the question of delay and laches in preferring the petition under Article 226, Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar Vs. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 , held that the equitable doctrine, namely, “delay defeats equity” has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go-by to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of law. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go-by to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of law. 14. Recently, in Kapilaben Ambalal Patel and Others Vs. State of Gujarat, 2021 (12) SCC 95 , Supreme Court declined to accept the pleas setup by the legal heirs/representatives of the original land holder on the ground of inordinate delay. The Court noted the submission of the land owner: “Feeling aggrieved, the landowners have approached this Court. It is urged that there is no title of evidence to substantiate the fact asserted by the respondent State that physical possession of the land in question has been taken over on 20-3-1986. It was merely a paper-possession in the form of possession panchnama. According to the appellants, de facto possession of the subject land as on the date of the Repeal Act is crucial and entails in abatement of all the actions of the State authorities under the 1976 Act. Mere issuance of notification under Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act regarding deemed vesting of the land in the State is not enough for the purposes of the Repeal Act. Reliance has been placed on Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar Vs. Collector & Competent Authority, (2012) 4 SCC 718 , State of U.P. Vs. Hari Ram (2013) 4 SCC 280 , Gajanan Kamlya Patil vs. Additional Collector & Competent Authority (ULC) (2014) 12 SCC 523 and Mangalsen Vs. State of U.P. (2014) 15 SCC 332 . The consistent view of this Court is that physical possession must be taken by the State authorities, failing which the proceedings shall abate on account of the Repeal Act. The appellants have relied on revenue records to show that the continued possession remained with the appellants/landowners even after the possession panchnama was made on 20-3-1986. The revenue entries have presumptive value and the respondent State had failed to rebut the same.” 15. In Paragraph 25 of Kapilaben Ambalal Patel (supra), the Court noted the delay and declined to interfere with the order of the High Court. The revenue entries have presumptive value and the respondent State had failed to rebut the same.” 15. In Paragraph 25 of Kapilaben Ambalal Patel (supra), the Court noted the delay and declined to interfere with the order of the High Court. Relevant portion reads thus: “Furthermore, in the grounds all that is asserted is that the High Court erred in holding that there was delay of 14 years in filing of writ petition and in not appreciating that the notice under Section 10(5) of the 1976 Act dated 23-1-1986, was not served upon Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel as he had already expired on 31-12-1985 and notice sent to him was returned bacy on 2-2-1986 unserved with remark “said owner has expired”. Further, the legal heirs of Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel ought to have been served with the said notice………Be that as it may, we are not inclined to reverse the conclusion recorded by the Division Bench of the High court that the writ petition filed by the appellants was hopelessly delayed and suffered from laches. That is a possible view in the facts of the present case.” 16. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner rendered by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court is based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hari Ram (supra). The Supreme Court in Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma (supra), on considering Hari Ram (supra), was of the view that the word ‘may’ appearing in Section 10(5) gave the competent authority the discretion to issue or not to issue a notice before taking physical possession of the land in question under Section 10(6). The question whether breach of Section 10(5) and possible dispossession without notice would vitiate the act of dispossession itself or render it non est in the eye of law did not fall for consideration in Hari Ram (supra). Thereafter, the Court proceeded that even taking a case of the appellant regarding dispossession was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That is because the erstwhile land owner had not made any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at any stage during his lifetime implying thereby that he had waived his right to do so. 17. That is because the erstwhile land owner had not made any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at any stage during his lifetime implying thereby that he had waived his right to do so. 17. As per the Scheme of the Act, the excess land beyond the ceiling limit is to be determined on the date when the Act came into force, requiring every person holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit to file statement of his holding (Section 6). The other persons/third party/subsequent purchasers have no locus or authority to file objection until then. The provisions of Section 8 and Section 9 of the Act, make it incumbent on the competent authority to issue notice to or provide opportunity to be heard only to the ‘person concerned’, i.e., person who has filed the statement under Section 6 of the Act, (Refer paragraph 14 of U.A. Basheer Thr. G.P.A. Holder Vs. State of Karnataka and Another, Civil Appeal No. 3032 of 2010, decided on 17 February, 2021). It is only after notification under Section 10(1) of the Act, the claim of other persons/subsequent purchasers are to be considered. 18. As per the record, it is not in dispute that notice under Section 8(3) along with draft statement dated 4 August 1979, was duly served upon the land owner. No objection was filed within the stipulated time from the date of receipt of the notice, thereafter, an order under Section 8(4) of the Act came to be passed on 26 March 1982, declaring land in excess of the ceiling limit. The final statement under Section 9 followed, thereafter by notification under Sections 10(1) and 10(3) of the Act, duly published in the Official Gazette. Thereafter, pursuant to notice under Section 10(5), the possession of the land was taken. The land owner at no stage had protested implying thereby that he waived his right to do so. 19. The instant writ petition has been filed after 13 years from the Repeal Act, and after a lapse of over three decades (36 years) since the notice under Section 10(5). The question of possession is being raised for the first time in writ jurisdiction. The petitioner has not pleaded all the relevant facts, rather, suppressed material facts brought on record in the counter affidavit filed by the State-respondent. The question of possession is being raised for the first time in writ jurisdiction. The petitioner has not pleaded all the relevant facts, rather, suppressed material facts brought on record in the counter affidavit filed by the State-respondent. The only stand taken is based on a bald statement that he is in possession of the surplus land. But, petitioner is silent as to whether any objection at any point of time on being dispossessed, the land owner had filed objection/protest before the authorities. Neither, it is the case of the petitioner in the memo of appeal filed in 1999, that petitioner is in possession of the surplus land, nor, that his predecessor in interest had not voluntary surrendered the surplus vacant land or had protested the State action. 20. Further, the name of Development Authority, after possession was duly mutated in the revenue record as per the case setup by the petitioner. The issue of possession/dispossession being a question of fact cannot be raised belatedly after 13 years in writ jurisdiction. 21. In view thereof, the writ petition being devoid of merit is, accordingly, dismissed. 22. No cost.