JUDGMENT : 1. Present Appeal is preferred by the State under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, against the judgment and order dated 30-11-2006 of acquittal passed in Special (ACB) Case No.09 of 2002 by the Presiding Officer and Special Judge, Fast Track Court No.14, Vadodara. vide the impugned judgment and order the respondent accused was acquitted of the charges framed against him. 2. It is the case of prosecution that the complaint was lodged by the complainant–Ashokbhai Keshubhai Solanki that the respondent-accused, who was working as Personal Assistant to the Deputy Director of Director General of Foreign Trade in Foreign Trade Office at Vadodara, had demanded an amount of Rs.750/- for issuing the Import-Export Certificate in the name of the Company of the complainant. 3. It is the case that the aforesaid amount was reduced to Rs.500/- and upon such information received by the ACB, Vadodara, the complaint was filed and the trap was laid. The trap being successful, the amount of tainted currency note of Rs.500/- was recovered from the respondent-accused, seizure memo being executed and upon conclusion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed. 4. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the trial Court has erroneously concluded that the respondent-accused had demanded illegal gratification, though there was sufficient evidence on record. It is submitted that running panchnama, which was proved by the panch-witness clearly establish the factum of acceptance and thereafter recovery of tainted money and therefore, all ingredients of the offence under Section-7 were fulfilled. However, the trial Court has failed to appreciate the same. 5. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has taken this Court through the evidence of witnesses, specially emphasizing on the evidence of PW-2; Kalpeshbhai Jayantilal Joshi, vide Exh-25 to submit that running panchnama was carried out after following all the require procedures and this panchnama vide Exh-26 is proved beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, this evidence of the panch-witness as well as the panchnama is sufficient to record the conviction of the respondent-accused. 6. 6. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has in detailed brought to the notice of this Court on the basis of aforesaid evidence that how in the due course of the trap, panch-witness had accompanied the complainant and the manner in which the respondent-accused accepted the bribe amount and upon making the pre-decided sign (move), the raiding Party rushed to the office of the respondent-accused to recover tainted money from the respondent-accused, which was smeared with anthracene powder and the spot experiment showing the presence of traces of anthracene powder on the hands and cloths of the respondent-accused, was also established and therefore, there could not be any other conclusion, but to convict the respondent-accused. 7. As against this, learned Advocate for the respondent–accused has submitted that the Special ACB Case No. 9 of 2002 was duly conducted by the learned Sessions Court, Vadodara and it is after examining the witnesses and other evidences of the prosecution that the Hon’ble Court was pleased to acquit the present respondent as the prosecution had failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. It is submitted that the entire case of the complainant was to falsely implicate the respondent and no single evidence of demand was established by the prosecution which is the first and foremost pillar to establish an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is submitted that the complainant was directed to lodge a complaint by his company’s Director. The complainant in his Examination in Chief has deposed that, his director had instructed him to lodge the complaint as discrepancies were raised in his application and that he wanted the Import Export Code on an urgent basis, which may have taken 7 to 15 days process. It is submitted that the complainant had never mentioned in his deposition that there was any demand of bribe money by the present respondent. It is submitted that the complainant had just filed the complaint upon the instructions of his Directors and the said Directors were neither arraigned nor examined as witnesses in this case and it is also pertinent to note that the complainant did not support the case of the prosecution. 8. It is submitted that the complainant in his cross examination (Exh- 21) had admitted that the fees for the application is Rs.1000/- which is paid after the documents are verified and the discrepancies are cleared. 8. It is submitted that the complainant in his cross examination (Exh- 21) had admitted that the fees for the application is Rs.1000/- which is paid after the documents are verified and the discrepancies are cleared. The complainant had also admitted that Import Export Code is sent by Post and is not handed over inperson. It is submitted that there is no need to meet the employees of DGFT for this kind of work. The complainant while in his cross examination also admitted that he knew that the Import Export Code had been issued by the Deputy Director of DGFT. Hence the present respondent was not the authority to issue the Import Export Code. It is submitted that the complainant in his cross examination also deposed that he didn’t inform the Senior Officials of DGFT for speedy issuance of Import Export Code and more particularly he was also told that his Import Export Code will be sent by post and it is in the dispatch department. 9. Having considered the rival submissions of the parties and having perused the documents on record, it appears that the charge was framed on the basis of the incident which took place, as discussed in the preceding paras, F.I.R. being C.R. No.I-3 of 1998 came to be filed with the ACB Police Station, Vadodara on 22-01-1998 and on completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed on 09-06-2002. 10.The charge was framed vide Exh-7, the gist of which is as under: “Mr. Ashokbhai Keshubhai Solanki, the complainant in this case, filed an application to obtain Certificate of Import – Export as an Assistant Manager in the company namely - Shree Skate Consultant Private Limited, situated at Sayajiganj, Vadodara, which was rejected. Against the same, he gave application before the office of the accused i.e. the Office of the Deputy Director General of Foreign Trade, Vadodara on 20/01/1998. Upon contacting you i.e. the P.A. of the Deputy Director General of Foreign Trade frequently, the accused has demanded bribe of Rs.750/- from the complainant and upon agreeing for Rs.500/-, the complainant of the case gave the complaint against the accused before ACB Office. On the basis of the same, upon planning a raid in presence of two panchas, you the accused was caught accepting the amount of Rs.500/- other than legal remuneration in presence of two panchas in the lobby of your office.” 11. On the basis of the same, upon planning a raid in presence of two panchas, you the accused was caught accepting the amount of Rs.500/- other than legal remuneration in presence of two panchas in the lobby of your office.” 11. Under the statement as per Section-313, defence is taken that the respondent-accused is made scapegoat and has not taken any money, but involved in a false case. It is pertinent to observe that the complainant was an employee of M/s. SCAD Consultants Pvt. Ltd., which had applied for Import-Export Certificate, was examined vide Exh-21 as PW-1, was declared hostile. Therefore, the issue of demand by the respondent-accused is put under great doubt. After being declared hostile, this witness was cross examined and in so far as the issue of demand is concerned, this witness has not supported. He has categorically denied that the respondent-accused ever mentioned to him that if the Certificate is to be issued within 8 days, then this witness will have to pay amount of Rs.750/-. There is no other circumstance, which has come on record to establish the demand. 12. Even if the issue is examined of demand being made, while running raid was in progress, the evidence of PW-2; Kalpeshbhai Jayantilal Joshi vide Exh-25 as well as Panchnama vide Exh-26, which records on going raid, does not indicate any demand being made even in front of this panch-witness. 13. The evidence in chief of this witness in this regard, is as under: “Thereafter, we reached at the office at The Deputy Director of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce in A Block on Ninth Floor of Kuber Bhavan. From one window of 1x1 of the said office where employees of the office mentioned above sit, the complainant asked as to who was Unni. Thereafter, he started to walk in the western side lobby. I followed him. One person came out from the other door of the said office and Ashokbhai i.e. the complainant went to him, walked with him to the western side and I also joined him. Thereafter, the complainant introduced me as a manager of the company. As he asked my name, I told that my name is K.J. Joshi. Thereafter, he shook hands with me and said ‘nice to meet you’. Thereafter, the complainant asked the accused as to what is the status of my certificate. Thereafter, the complainant introduced me as a manager of the company. As he asked my name, I told that my name is K.J. Joshi. Thereafter, he shook hands with me and said ‘nice to meet you’. Thereafter, the complainant asked the accused as to what is the status of my certificate. Hence, the accused told him that your certificate has been prepared and sent for the dispatch. You will receive it by Wednesday. Thereafter, the complainant told him that I have brought as per your say. Shall I give it to you? The complainant took out the cover from his pocket and gave it to the accused Unni, which was accepted by him by right hand and kept on his back side with left hand. Thereafter, I excused myself and as per the instruction of ACB, went to the lobby and touched my head with left hand, hence, the staff of ACB, Mr. Gohel and Panch No.2 came to the office.” 14. Aforesaid sequence clearly indicates that even when the complainant and the panch-witness went to the office, at that time, the complainant had to inquire as to who is Unni (respondent-accused). Thereby, falsifying the case of the prosecution of prior demand. Again even in the sequence of event, this witness has not indicated that when this witness and the complainant met the respondent-accused when he made the demand of any bribe. 15. With regard to taking of the bribe, the case of the prosecution is still doubtful. In as much as, running panchnama record the sequence of accepting of bribe, as under : “…..Thereafter, the complainant told him that “As per our talk, I have brought the same, shall I give it to you?” He replied “Yes”. Therefore, the complainant took out the notes coated with anthracene powder with his right hand from the pocket on the right chest side part of his shirt and offerred him, the said notes were accepted by his right hand and thereafter, moving his right hand in which he caught the notes to the back, took his left hand on the backside to right hand, transferred currency notes from the right hand to the left hand and kept the said currency notes in the left side pocket of his pants with his left hand and immediately, went inside the office from the passage through western side door.” 16. But, this very witness in his deposition, has deposed as under: “Hence, the accused told him that your certificate has been prepared and sent for the dispatch. You will receive it by Wednesday. Thereafter, the complainant told him that I have brought as per your say. Shall I give it to you?” 17. Close perusal of this, would indicate that this witness has introduced new theory of cover (envelope), which was handed over by the complainant to the respondent-accused and therefore, theory of the prosecution of accepting of bribe is also now doubtful. 18. It appears that the entire deposition of the complainant itself makes it crystal clear with regard to the conduct of the complainant himself. The complainant was working as Assistant Manager in a company named M/s. SCAD Consultants Pvt. Ltd., having Directors — Chintan Mehta and Pragnaben and Chairman was Bharatbhai Swami. The complainant Mr. Ashokbhai Keshubhai Solanki (PW-1) has deposed that he had filed an application for obtaining Import Export Code Number for his office firm M/s. SCAD Consultants Pvt. Ltd., where he was working as an Assistant Manager, from the DGFT office and the present respondent (Org. Accused) had raised some discrepancies in the application which was duly sent to the Assistant Director Shri Katara for approval of the discrepancies. One of the deficiencies was that the parties have not affixed the photograph of the director Ms. Chintan Mehta at the appropriate place in the application form and it was not attested by the bank. 19. It appears that the deficiencies raised by the present respondent was thereafter sent to Deputy Director of DGFT Mr. B.H. Gameti for his approval and subsequently it was approved . Thus, from the records it is clear that it was not the Respondent who held the complete authority to issue the Import Export Code to the complainant and that there was a genuine discrepancy which had to be rectified by complainant so as to get him the Import Export Code. 20.It appears that as per the case of the prosecution the alleged demand is made to the complainant on 19/01/1998 and thereafter the trap is laid on 22/01/1998. 20.It appears that as per the case of the prosecution the alleged demand is made to the complainant on 19/01/1998 and thereafter the trap is laid on 22/01/1998. It appears that the Panch Witness clearly deposed that on their visit to DGFT Office on 22/01/1998, the complainant was inquiring and shouted that “who is Unnibhai?”; this aspect raises a serious doubt about the complainant not knowing Unnibhai (the Respondent) 21. The Apex Court in case of K. Shanthamma v/s. State of Telangana reported in 2022 (4) SCC 574 , in Para-7, has held as under: “7. We have given careful consideration to the submissions. We have perused the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. The offence under Section 7 of the PC Act relating to public servants taking bribe requires a demand of illegal gratification and the acceptance thereof. The proof of demand of bribe by a public servant and its acceptance by him is sine quo non for establishing the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. In the case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh and another, (2015) 10 SCC 152 , this Court has summarised the well-settled law on the subject in paragraph 23 which reads thus: “23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.” 22. The Apex Court after taking into consideration several case law on the issue of interfering in acquittal recorded in case of Chaman Lal v/s. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2020) 17 SCC 69 , has observed as under: “9. The Apex Court after taking into consideration several case law on the issue of interfering in acquittal recorded in case of Chaman Lal v/s. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2020) 17 SCC 69 , has observed as under: “9. Before considering the appeal on merits, the law on the appeal against acquittal and the scope and ambit of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal is required to be considered. 9.1 In the case of Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 ), this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under: 12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P (1975) 3 SCC 219 , Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC 17 , Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P (2003) 1 SCC 761 , Narendra Singh v. State of M.P (2004) 10 SCC 699 , Budh Singh v. State of U.P (2006) 9 SCC 731 , State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102 , S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (2008) 5 SCC 535 , Arulvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 , Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P (2009) 16 SCC 98 and Ram Singh v. State of H.P (2010) 2 SCC 445 ). 13. 13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) “….the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.” 14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State AIR 1954 SC 1 , Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200 , Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P (2002) 4 SCC 85 and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 ). 15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 , this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42) “(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC 450 , this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368 , the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) “20. … an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.” 18. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271 , this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271 , this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28) “(i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; (iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; (vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.” A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State (2009) 10 SCC 401 . 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. 9.2 When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under: “20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn (1984) 4 SCC 635 , Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad (2001) 1 SCC 501 , Aruvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P (2009) 10 SCC 636 ).” (emphasis supplied) 9.3 It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999) 2 SCC 10 , that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 9.4 In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 , this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under: “31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 . In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p.233) “10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p.233) “10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.” 31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 , the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416) “8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court’s judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.” 31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 309 , after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinized the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court scrutinized the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807 , in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 80910) “5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State AIR 1952 SC 52 ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P AIR 1953 SC 122 ) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions. 31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1979) 1 SCC 355 , this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.” (emphasis supplied)” 23. Though an attempt was made on behalf of learned APP by relying upon the decision of Apex Court in case of Neeraj Dutta v/s. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi) reported in AIR 2023 SCC 330 to submit that even if the demand is not proved, other circumstances like acceptance of the offer made by the bribe giver, would not require to establish the prior demand. However, as discussed above, there being several infirmity in the case of the prosecution over and above aspect of demand, the Court is not to incline to accept the Appeal against the acquittal. 24.The reliance placed by learned APP in case of Neeraj Dutta (supra) regarding the demand not being essential requirement in presence of other circumstances, it is pertinent to note that the Constitution Bench of Apex Court had answered the reference. Thereafter the Division Bench of Apex Court in the facts of the very case, has examined in the light of the observation in the reference answered. The Apex Court then decided separately in case of Neeraj Dutta v/s. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi) reported in 2023 AIJEL-SC 70625. In Para-12, it is held as under: “12. Thereafter the Division Bench of Apex Court in the facts of the very case, has examined in the light of the observation in the reference answered. The Apex Court then decided separately in case of Neeraj Dutta v/s. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi) reported in 2023 AIJEL-SC 70625. In Para-12, it is held as under: “12. In the case of N. Vijayakumar (supra), another bench of three Hon’ble Judges dealt with the issue of presumption under Section 20 and the degree of proof required to establish the offences punishable under Section 7 and clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of PC Act. In paragraph 26, the bench held thus: “26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] and in [B.Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543]. In the aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the case under Sections 7,13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court.” (emphasis added) Thus, the demand for gratification and its acceptance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 25.The context relevant for the facts of this case from the judgment of Reference is also explained in Para-14 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads as under: “14. The allegation of demand of gratification and acceptance made by a public servant has to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision of the Constitution Bench does not dilute this elementary requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The allegation of demand of gratification and acceptance made by a public servant has to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision of the Constitution Bench does not dilute this elementary requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Constitution Bench was dealing with the issue of the modes by which the demand can be proved. The Constitution Bench has laid down that the proof need not be only by direct oral or documentary evidence, but it can be by way of other evidence including circumstantial evidence. When reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence to prove the demand for gratification, the prosecution must establish each and every circumstance from which the prosecution wants the Court to draw a conclusion of guilt. The facts so established must be consistent with only one hypothesis that there was a demand made for gratification by the accused. Therefore, in this case, we will have to examine whether there is any direct evidence of demand. If we come to a conclusion that there is no direct evidence of demand, this Court will have to consider whether there is any circumstantial evidence to prove the demand.” 26. In the light of above, if the facts of this case are examined, then the witness to demand is the complainant, who is hostile and not supported the case of demand at first instance, then the question of demand at second instance at the time of running panchnama, where panch witness has deposed that upon reaching the office of the respondent-accused, the complainant shouted the name of accused and inquired as to who is ‘Unni’. So even from the deposition of panch witness, it is doubtful that the complainant had earlier met the respondent-accused, when alleged demand of bribe was made. 27.The Court may also draw strength from the decision of the Apex Court in case of Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. reported in (2022) 3 SCC 471 , wherein the Apex Court has examined the case law with regard to the power of the High Court to overturned the decision of the Sessions Court where an another view is possible. Examining the case including that of Chandrappa & Ors. State of Bihar & Anr. reported in (2022) 3 SCC 471 , wherein the Apex Court has examined the case law with regard to the power of the High Court to overturned the decision of the Sessions Court where an another view is possible. Examining the case including that of Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the Apex Court has culled out the general principles regarding the powers of the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeal against the order of acquittal. The Apex Court has held that the appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, the appellate court has to keep in mind that in case of an acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence, and thereafter, upon securing of acquittal, the presumption is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened, and therefore, whenever there are two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, ordinarily, the Apex Court would not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial court. 28. This Court while accepting the reasoning given by the Sessions Court and so also the separate reasoning given herein above, the Court does not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order. 29. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The judgment and order dated 30-11-2006 passed in Special (ACB) Case No.09 of 2002 by the Presiding Officer and Special Judge, Fast Track Court No.14, Vadodara stands confirmed. Bail and bail bonds of the accused, if any, stands discharged. R & P be sent back to the concerned Trial Court, forthwith.