JUDGMENT : This writ petition is directed against an order of compulsory retirement from service passed by the Superintendent of Police, Mahoba against the petitioner, a Police Constable, in exercise of powers under Rule 56(c) of the U.P. Financial Handbook, Volume II (Part II-IV). The order impugned says that the Superintendent of Police is the Appointing Authority for the post held by the petitioner and that in public interest, he directs that the petitioner stands retired from service with effect from the date of the impugned order in the forenoon. The impugned order further says that the petitioner would be entitled to receive a sum equivalent to three months of his salary together with all allowances due, computed on the basis of his emoluments that he was receiving immediately before the date of retirement. The petitioner has come up challenging the aforesaid order of compulsory retirement dated 28th March, 2018, which shall hereinafter be referred to as 'the impugned order'. 2. It is the petitioner's case that his date of birth is 01.05.1963 and he is aged 55 years. He is physically and medically fit to perform his duties. The petitioner has been performing his duties with extraordinary devotion and integrity. His service record is unblemished and exemplary. The petitioner is an honest and diligent policeman. He has always discharged his duties with utmost responsibility and worked to the full satisfaction of his superiors. The petitioner was appointed as a constable on 20.02.1984 in the Uttar Pradesh Police, and after completing his training, has been discharging his duties regularly, until the date of the impugned order. 3. Pending admission, parties have exchanged affidavits in compliance with the orders of this Court dated 19.04.2018 – a counter on behalf of respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5 and a rejoinder to it. A personal affidavit of the Superintendent of Police, Mahoba was also required to be filed on an ancillary issue. That affidavit was filed and the matter dealt with. By an order dated 10.06.2022, the petition was admitted to hearing, which proceeded on that day. 4. On 16.07.2022, when the matter came up, this Court vide order of that date also summoned the petitioner's service-book and all other records, on the basis of which the impugned order has been passed. The petitioner's service-book was produced by the learned Standing Counsel on 21.07.2022. 4. On 16.07.2022, when the matter came up, this Court vide order of that date also summoned the petitioner's service-book and all other records, on the basis of which the impugned order has been passed. The petitioner's service-book was produced by the learned Standing Counsel on 21.07.2022. The service-book and the entries therein were perused by the Court. Thereafter, the records were directed to be placed in a sealed cover with the Registrar General. 5. The matter was adjourned on 04.08.2022 to 01.09.2022 without a hearing. The service-book that was forwarded to the Court in sealed cover by the Registrar General was not opened for the said reason on the dates that the matter was not heard. On 12.09.2022, a rejoinder affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioner to a counter affidavit dated 3rd August, 2022 on behalf of respondent No.5. The service-book received in sealed cover from the Registrar General was opened for the purpose of perusal and duly perused. Learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel were heard and judgment reserved. 6. Heard Mr. Nand Kishore Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State. 7. It is argued by Mr. Nand Kishore Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner that no Screening Committee was constituted in accordance with the Government Orders dated 26.10.1985, 06.07.2017 and 08.09.2017, and the impugned order was passed by the Appointing Authority without the Screening Committee's appraisal. It is further argued that the impugned order has been passed by the Superintendent of Police in colourable exercise of powers under Fundamental Rule 56(c), ordering the petitioner's compulsory retirement. It is also argued that the respondents have done a pick and choose while passing the impugned order and acted arbitrarily in invoking their powers under Fundamental Rule 56(c). 8. It is also argued that the petitioner has been compulsorily retired by the respondents abusing their powers under the law and in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is urged that the impugned order has been passed mala fide and vitiated by arbitrariness and perversity in decision making. 8. It is also argued that the petitioner has been compulsorily retired by the respondents abusing their powers under the law and in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is urged that the impugned order has been passed mala fide and vitiated by arbitrariness and perversity in decision making. It is the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that an order of compulsory retirement if bad on any of the three grounds of mala fides, arbitrariness and perversity, is open to judicial review in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Baikuntha Nath Das and another v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and another, (1992) 2 SCC 299 . It is also argued that in this case, the petitioner has been retired compulsorily as a measure of punishment, which is not permissible. In support of this proposition, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel, (2001) 3 SCC 314 . 9. It is argued further that the impugned order is based on no evidence as there is no material with the respondents to form an opinion that the petitioner ought to be compulsorily retired under Fundamental Rule 56(c). The absence of any material to proceed under the Rule vitiates the order. In this regard, reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner upon the guidance of the Supreme Court in M.S. Bindra v. Union of India and others, (1998) 7 SCC 310 . Reliance has also been placed upon the authority in Pritam Singh v. Union of India and others, (2005) 9 SCC 748 . 10. In the counter affidavit dated 13.08.2018 filed on behalf of respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5 jointly, it has been averred in Paragraph No.8 that a Screening Committee was constituted in terms of the Government Orders dated 26.10.1985, 06.02.1989, 21.05.1998, 23.09.2000, 25.01.2007 and 28.03.2018. It is not an uninformed decision of the 5th respondent, the Appointing Authority, without scrutiny by the Screening Committee. It is pleaded that the Screening Committee in this case had the Appointing Authority, the Superintendent of Police, Mahoha as its Chairman, the Additional Superintendent of Police, Mahoba and the Circle Officer, Sadar, Mahoba as Members. In addition, the Reserve Inspector was also associated with the proceedings before the Screening Committee. It is pleaded that the Screening Committee in this case had the Appointing Authority, the Superintendent of Police, Mahoha as its Chairman, the Additional Superintendent of Police, Mahoba and the Circle Officer, Sadar, Mahoba as Members. In addition, the Reserve Inspector was also associated with the proceedings before the Screening Committee. It is pleaded that the impugned order has been passed on the basis of material in the petitioner's service-book, which shows him to be a drunkard, who was found on more than one occasion inebriated while on duty. The petitioner has attained the age of 50 years and the Screening Committee acted within their right, for the purpose of maintaining discipline in the police force and in the interest of public safety, to compulsorily retire the petitioner. It is incorrect to say that there is no material, on the basis of which the Screening Committee and the Appointing Authority have formed an opinion and passed the impugned order. 11. A perusal of Paragraph No.11 of the rejoinder affidavit shows a somersault by the petitioner, where he has given up the stand that no Screening Committee was constituted, a plea very emphatically raised in Paragraph Nos.13 and 27 to 31 of the writ petition. The petitioner has acknowledged the fact in the rejoinder affidavit that there was a Screening Committee, but says that there was no material before them to find the petitioner unfit to be retained in service. In the rejoinder affidavit, another point that has been raised is that the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity or given a notice to show cause before the impugned order was passed. Denial of opportunity has been pleaded with much emphasis, as a fact, vitiating the exercise of jurisdiction under Fundamental Rule 56(c). 12. A further counter affidavit dated 4th August, 2022, that was filed on behalf of the fifth respondent with leave of the Court, has referred to the material that was taken into consideration by the Screening Committee, headed by the Appointing Authority. It is specifically pleaded in Paragraph No.9 that the Reserve Inspector was directed to produce the petitioner before the Screening Committee on 28.03.2018. There is a reference generally to the effect that there are consistent instances of the petitioner turning up for duty drunk and emphasizing that he was a habitual drunkard. It is specifically pleaded in Paragraph No.9 that the Reserve Inspector was directed to produce the petitioner before the Screening Committee on 28.03.2018. There is a reference generally to the effect that there are consistent instances of the petitioner turning up for duty drunk and emphasizing that he was a habitual drunkard. There is a reference to an FIR lodged against the petitioner giving rise to Crime No.286 of 2017, under Section 354-A, Police Station Kotwali, District Mahoba, where he had misbehaved with a woman, who had come to the police station. In addition, there is also reference to a case against the petitioner under Section 34 of the Police Act, Police Station Kotwali, District Jhansi, wherein the petitioner earned a technical acquittal, because the proceedings were abated in consequence of a notification issued by this Court dated 6th January, 2017 under The Uttar Pradesh Criminal Law (Composition of Offences and Abatement of Trails) (Amendment) Act, 1979 (for short, 'the Act of 1979'). The case under Section 34 of the Police Act was said to be registered because the petitioner had indulged in rioting with people in a public place while drunk. The Annual Confidential Roll of the petitioner too has been referred to in Paragraph No.14 of the counter affidavit under reference, where it is mentioned that he was punished with a censure entry vide order dated 28.01.2011. 13. There is then a reference to a suspension order passed against the petitioner on 04.09.2013, where he had misbehaved while drunk at Chowki New Basti, P.S. Kotwali, District Jhansi, hurling furniture at others. This had led to the case under Section 34 of the Police Act, that was later on abated. There is also a reference to an order dated 25.01.2014, awarding a severe censure entry to the petitioner. There is still again a reference to an order dated 31.07.2017, where the petitioner was given a censure yet again. The last is a reference to an order dated 27.04.2018, where the petitioner was punished with the penalty of deduction of his pay equivalent to 30 days under Rule 14(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991. All the orders carrying these entries have been annexed as Annexure No.6 to the counter affidavit. There is also a reference to four petty punishments that were awarded to the petitioner. 14. All the orders carrying these entries have been annexed as Annexure No.6 to the counter affidavit. There is also a reference to four petty punishments that were awarded to the petitioner. 14. The stand of the respondents is that the petitioner's service record was scrutinized as a whole and he was found unfit to be retained in a disciplined force like the police. The petitioner has attained the age of 50 years. He fell into the age zone where he could be considered for compulsory retirement and the Screening Committee, on the basis of very tangible material, decided to retire him in public interest. 15. In the rejoinder affidavit, it has been averred in answer to the last mentioned counter affidavit that in the case registered with the Police at Jhansi, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi vide order dated 19.03.2018 has ordered the proceedings to abate. So far as Crime No.286 of 2017, under Section 354-A IPC, Police Station Kotwali, District Jhansi is concerned, it is asserted in Paragraph No.5 that after investigation, the Police did not find any material to support the prosecution. A final report has been put in on 18.09.2017. A copy of the Magistrate's order dated 19.03.2018 and the final report put in by the Police dated 18.09.2017 have been annexed as Annexure Nos. RA-1 and RA-2, respectively. It is pleaded in Paragraph No. 13 of the rejoinder affidavit that the petitioner's character roll carries excellent entries continuously from 2007 to 2016. It is just that in a deliberate and mala fide buildup to tarnish the petitioner's otherwise good record, he has been awarded a few adverse entries. This has been done by the respondents mala fide in order to engineer the impugned order. The action of the respondents, therefore, is mala fide as asserted in the writ petition. Since mala fide is a ground for judicial review, it is urged that the impugned order is vitiated. 16. It is appropriate to dispose of the various contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner in challenge to the impugned order under definitive heads as indicated hereinafter: (i) Non-adherence to the procedure of consideration by the Screening Committee 17. Since mala fide is a ground for judicial review, it is urged that the impugned order is vitiated. 16. It is appropriate to dispose of the various contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner in challenge to the impugned order under definitive heads as indicated hereinafter: (i) Non-adherence to the procedure of consideration by the Screening Committee 17. Though urged as one of the principal grounds of challenge to the impugned order by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the opening of his case, a short way into the hearing, the learned Counsel for the petitioner could not substantiate at all the fact that no Screening Committee, as required in terms of the Government Orders dated 26.10.1985 and 06.07.2017 was constituted in this case. Here, apparently, a Screening Committee was constituted, comprising the Superintendent of Police, Mahoba, as Chairman, the Additional Superintendent of Police, Mahoba and the Circle Officer, Sadar, Mahoba as its Members, who have scrutinized and screened the petitioner's case for compulsory retirement in accordance with the Government Orders under reference. It is in accordance with the resolve of the Screening Committee that the Appointing Authority has considered and passed the order impugned. An assertion to this effect has been made in Paragraph No.13 of the counter dated 9th August, 2018 filed on behalf of respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5, already noticed hereinbefore, which has not been denied in the rejoinder affidavit. Rather, the position that a Screening Committee was constituted has been acknowledged by the petitioner in Paragraph No.11 of the relative rejoinder, a fact also noticed earlier. Therefore, this submission of the petitioner’s that the genesis of the impugned order is flawed, because the mandatory procedure of scrutiny by a Screening Committee has not been adhered to, is without substance. (ii) Absence of material before the Screening Committee to form opinion against the petitioner under Fundamental Rule 56(c) 18. The substance of the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner on this count is that there is absolutely no material on record on the basis of which the Appointing Authority, or for that matter the Screening Committee, could form a subjective satisfaction that the petitioner is unfit to be retained in service. 19. The substance of the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner on this count is that there is absolutely no material on record on the basis of which the Appointing Authority, or for that matter the Screening Committee, could form a subjective satisfaction that the petitioner is unfit to be retained in service. 19. Learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State has invited the attention of the Court to the material on record, which according to him is enough for the Screening Committee to form their subjective satisfaction about the petitioner to be considered for compulsory retirement. 20. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties and perusing not only the record annexed to the counter affidavit, but also the petitioner's service-book, produced in original before the Court, this Court finds that it is incorrect to say that there is no material against the petitioner, on the basis of which the Screening Committee, or for that matter the Appointing Authority, could not form their subjective satisfaction under Fundamental Rule 56(c). The fundamental principles, on the basis of which an order of compulsory retirement can be passed by the Government and the limited grounds on which it can be judicially reviewed, have been laid down in Baikuntha Nath Das (supra) by the Supreme Court, where it has been held: “34. The following principles emerge from the above discussion: (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary — in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order. (iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter — of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above. This aspect has been discussed in paras 30 to 32 above.” 21. The sufficiency of material and the subjective satisfaction of the Screening Committee or the Appointing Authority, based on existing material, cannot be interfered with by the Court, if there is relevant material on record. It is for the Screening Committee and the Appointing Authority, invested with the power under Fundamental Rule 56(c) to exercise it, based on their subjective satisfaction. It can, of course, still be interfered with, if shown to be the result of mala fides or the product of arbitrariness. 22. The scope of interference with the decision of the Screening Committee or the Appointing Authority or the Government in exercise of powers under Fundamental Rule 56(c), rather a provision corresponding to it, fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Posts and Telegraphs Board and others v. C.S.N. Murthy, (1992) 2 SCC 317 , where it was held: “5. It will be clear from the extracts referred to above, that though the respondent's conduct was quite satisfactory till March 1970, his standard of work had declined in the last two years under review. In both these years, it was found that he was not taking adequate interest in his work and was responsible for delays of various kinds. As has already been pointed out, an order of compulsory retirement is not an order of punishment. In both these years, it was found that he was not taking adequate interest in his work and was responsible for delays of various kinds. As has already been pointed out, an order of compulsory retirement is not an order of punishment. F.R. 56(j) authorises the Government to review the working of its employees at the end of their period of service referred to therein and to require the servant to retire from service if, in its opinion, public interest calls for such an order. Whether the conduct of the employee is such as to justify such a conclusion is primarily for the departmental authorities to decide. The nature of the delinquency and whether it is of such a degree as to require the compulsory retirement of the employee are primarily for the Government to decide upon. The courts will not interfere with the exercise of this power, if arrived at bona fide and on the basis of material available on the record. No mala fides have been urged in the present case. The only suggestion of the High Court is that the record discloses no material which would justify the action taken against the respondent. We are unable to agree. In our opinion, there was material which showed that the efficiency of the petitioner was slackening in the last two years of the period under review and it is, therefore, not possible for us to fault the conclusion of the department as being mala fide, perverse, arbitrary or unreasonable. The Division Bench seems to have thought that, since the adverse remarks mentioned in the earlier letter of April 29, 1971 were not repeated in the subsequent letter, it should be taken that they had been given up subsequently or that the respondent had improved in the subsequent year. We do not think that this is a legitimate inference, for the report for 1971-72 only shows that the respondents' propensity to delay matters persisted despite the warning of the previous year. But, even if one assumes that the High Court was correct on this, the adverse remarks made against the respondent in relation to the period 1971-72, standing by themselves, can constitute sufficient material for the department to come to a conclusion in the matter. But, even if one assumes that the High Court was correct on this, the adverse remarks made against the respondent in relation to the period 1971-72, standing by themselves, can constitute sufficient material for the department to come to a conclusion in the matter. It is true that the earlier record of the respondent was good but if the record showed that the standard of work of the respondent had declined and was not satisfactory, that was certainly material enabling the department to come to a conclusion under F.R. 56(j). We are of opinion that the High Court erred in setting aside the order of compulsory retirement on the basis that there was no material at all on record justifying the action against the respondent.” 23. There is also valuable guidance in this regard to be found in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Central Industrial Security Force v. HC (GD) Om Prakash, (2022) 5 SCC 100 . There were some wider issues involved there about the effect of adverse entries awarded to the constable in that case, who had subsequently earned a promotion to the post of head constable with the objection being that old entries prior to promotion stood washed out. But, one of the fundamental issues that was considered was about the scope of the power of the Government in passing an order of compulsory retirement. It was observed in HC (GD) Om Prakash (supra): “7. A three-Judge Bench of this Court reported as Union of India v. Dulal Dutt [Union of India v. Dulal Dutt, (1993) 2 SCC 179 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 406] examined the order of compulsory retirement of a Controller of Stores in Indian Railways. It was held that an order of compulsory retirement is not an order of punishment. It is a prerogative of the Government but it should be based on material and has to be passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government and that it is not required to be a speaking order. This Court held as under : (SCC pp. 184-85, para 18) “18. It will be noticed that the Tribunal completely erred in assuming, in the circumstances of the case, that there ought to have been a speaking order for compulsory retirement. This Court held as under : (SCC pp. 184-85, para 18) “18. It will be noticed that the Tribunal completely erred in assuming, in the circumstances of the case, that there ought to have been a speaking order for compulsory retirement. This Court, has been repeatedly emphasising right from R.L. Butail v. Union of India, (1970) 2 SCC 876 and Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, (1970) 2 SCC 458 that an order of a compulsory retirement is not an order of punishment. It is actually a prerogative of the Government but it should be based on material and has to be passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. Very often, on enquiry by the Court the Government may disclose the material but it is very much different from the saying that the order should be a speaking order. No order of compulsory retirement is required to be a speaking order. From the very order of the Tribunal it is clear that the Government had, before it, the report of the Review Committee yet it thought it fit of compulsorily retiring the respondent. The order cannot be called either mala fide or arbitrary in law.” 24. Here, this Court finds that though there are good entries earned by the petitioner for the years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995-96, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002/2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and also a record of good service, besides awards earned by the petitioner in the years 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1995 and 1999, yet there are definite adverse entries awarded to the petitioner on 28.01.2011, 25.01.2014 and 31.07.2017, all of which are censure entries. The entry dated 25.01.2014 is a severe censure. There is then an order of minor penalty dated 27.04.2018, ordering deduction of a sum of money equivalent to 30 days' pay passed against the petitioner. There are four petty punishments also awarded in the years 1985, 1986, 2000 and 2003. 25. There is suspension order passed against the petitioner on 04.09.2013, entered in the service-book in connection with the offence under Section 34 of the Police Act. There is also an FIR brought to the Court's notice regarding an offence under Section 354-A committed by the petitioner. 25. There is suspension order passed against the petitioner on 04.09.2013, entered in the service-book in connection with the offence under Section 34 of the Police Act. There is also an FIR brought to the Court's notice regarding an offence under Section 354-A committed by the petitioner. About that the petitioner has indicated that a final report has been put in by the Police finding no substance. Since there is no case that the final report was not accepted, it can be safely assumed that the final report would have been accepted in due course. The registration of the FIR would, therefore, not count as adverse material. But, so far as the case of rioting with the public in the Police Chowki and inviting registration of a case under Section 34 of the Police Act is concerned, the petitioner's exoneration was one under a special statute for abatement of trials in certain matters under the Act of 1979. It does not cease to be material of which cognizance cannot be taken by the Screening Committee. 26. Quite apart, there are three adverse entries and one minor punishment order dated 28.01.2011, 25.01.2014, 31.07.2017 and 25.01.2014, respectively. This Court thinks that these must be set out in order to understand the nature of the material that was there before the Screening Committee. These are: “ME 2010 ^^o"kZ 2005 es tc ;g vkj{kh Fkkuk dksrokyh tuin >kalh es vkj{kh ds in ij fu;qDr Fkk] rks iqfyl egkfujh{kd bykŒ tksu bykgkckn ds ek/;e ls izkIr 'kqHk fpard foHkkxh; deZpkjh ¼xqeuke½ f'kdk;rh izkFkZuk i= es vafdr Fkkuk dksrokyh ds dfeZ;ks }kjk turk dks ywV dj voS/k rjhdksa ls /ku dekus dh tkap vkns'k la[;k ,l,lih&23¼vkbZth½05 fnukad 14-06-05 }kjk djk;s tkus ij >kalh uxj es bl vkj{kh }kjk viuk edku cuok;kA bl edku ls lEcfa/kr Hkw[k.M o"kZ 1993&94 es bldh iRuh Jhefr ehjk nsoh ds uke ls eksgYyk iBkSfj;k Fkkuk dksrokyh >kalh esa fy;k x;k Fkk] ftlds fo"k; esa vfxze lqpuk foHkkx dks ugh fn;k vkSj Hkou fuekZ.k dh vuqefr izkIr ugh gqvk ik;k x;k tks mŒizŒ ljdkjh deZŒ vkpj.k fu;ekoyh ds izko/kkuks dk mYya?ku gS] ftlds fy, bldks nks ¼QVk½ tks bldk vius drZO; ds izfr ?kksj ykijokgh] vuq'kklughurk] vkns'kks dh vogsyuk] vdeZ.;rk ,oa izeksn dks iznf'kZr djrk gSA blds bl d`R; dh ifjfuUnk dh tkrh gSA i=kad n&663@10 Jans, 10 HOB-74 Dt. 28-1-11” ¼vfer pUnzk½ SSP JSL tc dkUl 0 o"kZ & 2013 es thŒvkjŒihŒ vuqHkkx] >kalh ds daaVªksy :e esa fu;qDr Fks] rks fnukad 2-9-2013 dks 'kjkc ds u'ks es pkSdh ubZcLrh Fkkuk dksrokyh tuin >kalh es tkdj deZpkjh@vf/kdkjhx.k ls vHknzrk dh rFkk pkSdh dh dqjfl;k Qsad nh ,o avHknz Hkk"kk dk iz;ksx fd;kA dkaLV 0 ds fo:) eqŒvŒlaŒ fuy@2013 /kkjk 34 iqfyl vf/kfu;e ds rgr jiV ua50 le; 21%15 ih,e ij Fkkuk dksrŒ tuin >kalh es iathd`r fd;k x;kA MkWDVjh ijh{k.k djk, tkus ij vydksgy dk lsou fd, tkus dh iqf"V gqbZA bl izdj.k esa izkjfaEHkd tkWp iqfyl mik/kh{kd] jsyos] >kalh Jh lqjsanz flag rsofr;k djk;s tkus ij tkWp ls dkaLVscy }kjk fd, x, mDr dh iqf"V gqbZ gSA dkaLVsŒ dk d`R;q ykijokgh] vdeZ.;rk ,oa vuq'kklughurk dk |ksrd gS ftldh ?kksj ifjfuank dh tkrh gSA i= laŒ&26@2013 fnukad 25-1-2014 HoBn-157 12.2.14 (Sd.) iqfyl v/kh{kd] jsyos >kalh izekf.kr gŒvŒ iqfyl v/kh{kd cknka^^ ^^ifjfuUnk izfof"V o"kZ&2017 izHkkjh fujh{kd dksrokyh egksck dh vk[;k fnukafdr 16-5-2017 ds vuqØe esa fnukad 16-5-17 dks tfj, lh;wth eksckby {ks=kf/kdkjh uxj }kjk lwpuk izkIr gqbZ fd ykdi M;wVh es dkŒ txr ukjk;.k vkj{kh 'kjkc ds u'ks es M;wVh es vk;k gS tks M;wVh ij vkis ds ckn ls dkQh le; ls vuqifLFkr gS bl lwpuk ij eS izHkkjh fujh{kd dksrokyh e; gejkgh QkslZ ds U;k;ky; ifjlj egksck vk;k ,oa mDr vkj{kh iqfyl dh ryk'k djokbZ] tks dkQh nsj ckn u'ks ds gkyr es lM+d fdukjs nqdku ij cSBk feyk ftlls okrkZ dh x;h rks mlds eqag ls 'kjkc dh nqxZa/k vk jgh Fkh rFkk vka[ks yky Fkh ftldk MkWDVjh ijh{k.k ftyk vLirky egksck es djk;k x;k ftles ,Ydksgy ysus dh iqf"V dh x;h budk ;g d`R; drZO; ds ifr ?kksj vuq'kklughurk] LosPNkpkfjrk] mnklhurk dks iznf'kZr djrk gS] ftldh ifjfuUnk dh tkrh gSA iŒlaŒn&27@2017 fnukad 31-7-2017 izekf.kr gŒvŒ SP MBA” ^^vFkZn.M SP MBA o"kZ 2017 tc vki o"kZ 2018 es iqfyl ykbu tuin egksck es fu;qDr Fks] rc fnuakd 26-3-18 dks iqfyl ykbu egksck ls vkidh M;wVh esfMdy >kalh cUnh lqj{kk gj izlkn iq= [kjtqok ds lqj{kk xkMZ es 'kL= bUlkl u(18630887 e; 02 eSxathu o 40 vnn dkjrwl ctk; vkj{kh f'koe dqekj ds yxk;h x;h Fkh] fdarq vki }kjk M;wVh gsrq esfMdy dkyst >kalh ds fy, jokuk fd, tkus ds mijkar lqj{kkxkMZ M;wVh u tkdj rFkk vius drZO;ks ds izfr lpsr u jgdj u'ks dh gkyr es vlygk bUlkl vkfn ls csijokg jkB jksM frjksg dh iqfy;k ds ikl ukys es iMs gq, ik, x,] ftlls vke tu&ekul es iqfyl dh Nfo /kwfey gqbZA vkidk ;g d`R;q vius inh; drZO; ds izfr ?kksj ykijokgh] vdeZ.;rk] vuq'kklughuRkk] LosPNkpkfjrk dk |ksrd gSA vr% iqfyl vf/kdkfj;ksa dh ¼n.M ,oa vihy½ fu;ekoyh 1991 ds fu;e 14¼2½ ds varZxr izLrkfor 01 ekg ¼30 fnol½ ds osru ds cjkcj vFkZn.M ls nf.Mr fd, tkus dk vkns'k ikfjr fd;k tkrk gSA iŒlŒnŒ 19@2018 Date 27-4-2018 izekf.kr gŒvŒ SP MBA” SP MBA 27. The principles in Baikuntha Nath Das and the subsequent authorities make the entire service record relevant for the purpose of a decision by the Government to compulsorily retire in public interest. In considering the entire record, according to the principles in Baikuntha Nath Das, more weight has to be attached to the performance of the employee during the later years. Here is a case, where the petitioner might have consistently earned good entries and rewards during the earlier period of his service, but from 20102017, his record has been marred by adverse entries, minor penalty and the commission of an offence under Section 34 of the Police Act. The older record of good entries or the rewards earned and the adverse material available against the petitioner between the years 2010-17, cannot give rise to an inference that it is a case where there is no material whatsoever on record for the Screening Committee or the Appointing Authority to act under Fundamental Rule 56(c). The sufficiency of material is not a matter for the consideration of the Court. The ground here urged was total absence of adverse material against the petitioner, inasmuch as that is one ground on which an order of compulsory retirement may be judicially reviewed. But, the record here shows that material adverse to the petitioner and very tangible is available on record. Therefore, there is no force in the petitioner's submission on this count. (iii) Violation of principles of natural justice 28. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, which is also the case pleaded in the writ petition that the impugned order is bad, because no notice was issued to the petitioner or opportunity afforded to submit a reply. It is argued that the impugned order being one which visits the petitioner with adverse civil consequences could not have been made without affording opportunity. 29. Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State refuted the said submission and says that principles of nature justice have no application in a case of compulsory retirement under Fundamental Rule 56(c). The principles laid down in Baikuntha Nath Das, extracted hereinabove, make it evident that adherence to the requirement of natural justice has no place in the context of compulsory retirement. An order of compulsory retirement is neither stigmatic nor a punishment. The principles laid down in Baikuntha Nath Das, extracted hereinabove, make it evident that adherence to the requirement of natural justice has no place in the context of compulsory retirement. An order of compulsory retirement is neither stigmatic nor a punishment. Most of the remarks regarding exclusion of the principles of natural justice in Baikuntha Nath Das, considering older authority, have come in the context of uncommunicated adverse entries that have been later on taken into account by the Screening Committee or the Government to pass an order of compulsory retirement. It does not seem to have been suggested in the said authority, as done in the present case by the petitioner, that before passing an order of compulsory retirement, opportunity should be afforded in the form of a show cause. In Baikuntha Nath Das, there are some pertinent remarks, which form the basis of principles culled out in Paragraph No.34 of the report extracted hereinabove. The aforesaid observations in Baikuntha Nath Das read: “30. On the above premises, it follows, in our respectful opinion that the view taken in J.N.Sinha [ (1970) 2 SCC 458 : (1971) 1 SCR 791 ] is the correct one viz., principles of natural justice are not attracted in a case of compulsory retirement under F.R. 56(j) or a rule corresponding to it. In this context, we may point out a practical difficulty arising from the simultaneous operation of two rules enunciated in Brij Mohan Singh Chopra [Brij Mohan Singh Chopra v. State of Punjab, (1987) 2 SCC 188 : (1987) 3 ATC 496]. On one hand, it is stated that only the entries of last ten years should be seen and on the other hand, it is stated that if there are any adverse remarks therein, they must not only be communicated but the representations made against them should be considered and disposed of before they can be taken into consideration. Where do we draw the line in the matter of disposal of representation? Does it mean, disposal by the appropriate authority alone or does it include appeal as well? Even if the appeal is dismissed, the government servant may file a revision or make a representation to a still higher authority. He may also approach a court or tribunal for expunging those remarks. Should the government wait until all these stages are over? Does it mean, disposal by the appropriate authority alone or does it include appeal as well? Even if the appeal is dismissed, the government servant may file a revision or make a representation to a still higher authority. He may also approach a court or tribunal for expunging those remarks. Should the government wait until all these stages are over? All that would naturally take a long time by which time, these reports would also have become stale. A government servant so minded can adopt one or the other proceeding to keep the matter alive. This is an additional reason for holding that the principle of Union of India v. M.E. Reddy, (1980) 2 SCC 15 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 179 : (1980) 1 SCR 736 should be preferred over Brij Mohan Singh Chopra v. State of Punjab, (1987) 2 SCC 188 : (1987) 3 ATC 496 and Baidyanath Mahapatra v. State of Orissa, (1989) 4 SCC 664 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 38 : (1989) 11 ATC 886, on the question of taking into consideration uncommunicated adverse remarks. 35. Before parting with the case, we must refer to an argument urged by Sri R.K. Garg. He stressed what is called, the new concept of Article 14 as adumbrated in Maneka Gandhi [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 ] and submitted on that basis that any and every arbitrary action is open to judicial scrutiny. The general principle evolved in the said decision is not in issue here. We are concerned mainly with the question whether a facet of principle of natural justice — audi alteram partem — is attracted in the case of compulsory retirement. In other words, the question is whether acting upon undisclosed material is a ground for quashing the order of compulsory retirement. Since we have held that the nature of the function is not quasi-judicial in nature and because the action has to be taken on the subjective satisfaction of the government, there is no room for importing the said facet of natural justice in such a case, more particularly when an order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment nor does it involve any stigma.”(emphasis by Court) 30. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, that the impugned order is vitiated, because no notice was issued to the petitioner or opportunity afforded to submit his reply before the impugned order was passed, is misconceived and, accordingly, rejected. (iv) The impugned order is bad for arbitrariness 31. It is next argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order is arbitrary, because there is no material on record to show that the petitioner was a man of doubtful integrity or fit to be retained in service. It is also arbitrary because a policy of pick and choose has been followed on a punitive tenor, where the order has been passed for the collateral purpose of securing immediate removal of the petitioner from service, rather than in public interest. 32. The learned Standing Counsel has refuted the above submission and says that after a thorough scrutiny of the petitioner's service record, where the different good entries and the adverse ones are written by different officials, a Screening Committee of three officers has come to a definitive opinion on the basis of tangible material that the petitioner deserves to be compulsory retired. There is nothing arbitrary about the decision. 33. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties, this Court may say that arbitrariness for all that it would mean in the context of exercise of power of compulsory retirement is perversity of opinion. If the Screening Committee or the Appointing Authority or the Government, in reaching their conclusion to retire an employee compulsorily under Fundamental Rule 56(c), take a view of the material on record, which no reasonable person would subscribe to on the basis of that material, the order would be arbitrary. This was precisely the import of the word 'arbitrary' as enunciated in Baikuntha Nath Das. The principles there were endorsed in Rajesh Gupta v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others, (2013) 3 SCC 514 . 34. The question here is whether the decision of the Screening Committee or the Appointing Authority can be held to be arbitrary. A careful look at the petitioner's service record shows that he has been given good entries recorded in his service-book in the part relating to 'General Conduct and Police Work for each year' for the years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, mostly awarded by Deputy Superintendents of Police concerned. A careful look at the petitioner's service record shows that he has been given good entries recorded in his service-book in the part relating to 'General Conduct and Police Work for each year' for the years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, mostly awarded by Deputy Superintendents of Police concerned. But, it is equally true that in the service-book relating to the part entitled 'particulars of misconduct and punishment', the petitioner has been given a censure entry vide order dated 28.01.2011, a severe censure vide order dated 25.01.2014, and still again, a censure vide order dated 31.07.2017. By a subsequent order dated 27.04.2018, the petitioner has been awarded a minor punishment of deduction equivalent to 30 days of his salary. All these orders awarding censure entries and minor penalty are reasoned orders, already quoted hereinabove. The good entries for the years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, have been awarded by different officers than those, who awarded censure entries or made the orders of minor punishment based on certain misconduct. 35. Apparently, the routine good entries by different officers in the part relating to General Conduct and Police Work each year for the period 2011-2016 ought not to have been there in the face of the orders dated 28.01.2011, 25.01.2014, 31.07.2017 and 24.07.2018, but this discord between the two sets of entries is no ground to hold the opinion of Screening Committee to be arbitrary. The Screening Committee has looked into the entire service record of the petitioner and on the basis of all material have formed a subjective satisfaction that the petitioner falls in the class of 'deadwood', who ought not to be retained in service having way long crossed his 50th birthday. Upon a look into the censure entries, that have been awarded, including the minor punishment, not for the purpose of judging the correctness of the impugned order, but for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether it is arbitrary, in our opinion, cannot be termed arbitrary. It is the entire service record that has to be looked into to form a subjective satisfaction by the Screening Committee, the Appointing Authority or the Government. If all materials have not been considered, the decision may be vitiated. 36. Here, there is no case that the entire material was not considered. The stand of the respondents is that they have scrutinized the entire service record. If all materials have not been considered, the decision may be vitiated. 36. Here, there is no case that the entire material was not considered. The stand of the respondents is that they have scrutinized the entire service record. There is no reason to doubt that assertion. The three censure entries and the order awarding minor punishment show that the petitioner has been a drunkard and misconducted himself on duty in an inebriated condition on more than one occasion. There is one entry reflecting on his integrity. He has exhibited lack of discipline and insubordination. It is this material, which the Screening Committee have taken into consideration apart from the other service record, which carry good entries. With this kind of material available on record, it is not possible to hold that the decision of the Screening Committee or its expression in the impugned order of compulsory retirement is a product of arbitrary decision making. The material on record read as a whole cannot lead this Court to the inference that the conclusion of the Screening Committee or the Appointing Authority is one that no reasonable person could have ever reached. 37. In the circumstances, it is held that the impugned order is not vitiated due to the vice of arbitrariness. (v) The plea of mala fides 38. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order is mala fide and has been passed in colourable exercise of powers in order to punish the petitioner. It is argued that the petitioner has all good entries up to the year 2016, but there is a sudden buildup of adverse material in order to provide edifice for the impugned action. This, the petitioner says, is a feature demonstrative of mala fides on the part of the officers passing the impugned order. It has been observed in Baikuntha Nath Das in the context of the way mala fides would work in the case of compulsory retirement, thus: “31. Another factor to be borne in mind is this: Most often, the authority which made the adverse remarks and the authority competent to retire him compulsorily are not the same. There is no reason to presume that the authority competent to retire him will not act bona fide or will not consider the entire record dispassionately. Another factor to be borne in mind is this: Most often, the authority which made the adverse remarks and the authority competent to retire him compulsorily are not the same. There is no reason to presume that the authority competent to retire him will not act bona fide or will not consider the entire record dispassionately. As the decided cases show, very often, a Review Committee consisting of more than one responsible official is constituted to examine the cases and make their recommendation to the government. The Review Committee, or the government, would not naturally be swayed by one or two remarks, favourable or adverse. They would form an opinion on a totality of consideration of the entire record — including representations, if any, made by the government servant against the above remarks — of course attaching more importance to later period of his service. Another circumstance to be borne in mind is the unlikelihood of succession of officers making unfounded remarks against a government servant.” 39. What the petitioner argues in this case is mala fides in fact on the part of the officers, who passed the impugned order, in regard whereto the petitioner has pleaded in Paragraph No.13 of his rejoinder affidavit, filed in response to the counter affidavit on behalf of respondent No.5. Paragraph No.13 of the rejoinder affidavit reads: “13. That, the contents of the paragraph Nos. 13, 14 and 15 of the counter affidavit are misconceived hence denied and it is submitted that since the excellent character roll has been awarded to the petitioner continuously from 2007 to 2016 by his appointing authority thus other proceedings has been falsely developed against the petitioner by some police officers out of mala-fide attitude otherwise petitioner never disobeyed the command of his superior officers and never committed misconduct in any manner.” 40. Now, if this plea of the petitioner were to be examined, it is immediately discernible that the petitioner's case about an excellent character roll from 2007-2016 is incorrect for a fact. It is true that routine entries during this period of time were good, but it is equally true that the petitioner for specific acts of misconduct received censure entries vide order dated 5th 28.01.2011, 25.01.2014 and 31.07.2017. He was also awarded a minor punishment by way of deduction of salary equivalent to 30 days salary. It is true that routine entries during this period of time were good, but it is equally true that the petitioner for specific acts of misconduct received censure entries vide order dated 5th 28.01.2011, 25.01.2014 and 31.07.2017. He was also awarded a minor punishment by way of deduction of salary equivalent to 30 days salary. All these orders that were passed against the petitioner span across a period of 8 years from 2010 to 2018 and have been made by different officers of superior rank; in none of the cases, below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police. Two of these orders, that is to say, the ones dated 28.01.2011 and 25.01.2014 were passed at Jhansi, whereas the later ones were passed at Mahoba. It is difficult, therefore, to accept the petitioner's contention that all these different officers were acting as if in concert to buildup a record against the petitioner out of malice, which would provide basis for later action. Also, the impugned order is founded on the opinion of a Screening Committee of three members. There is no reason why all members of the committee would join hands in acting mala fide against the petitioner. All this apart, a plea of malice in fact cannot be examined without giving particulars of the mala fides attributed to a named official or officials. Then the officials involved after pleading particulars of the mala fides attributed to them has/ have to be impleaded eo nomine. In this case the petitioner has neither pleaded particulars of the mala fides with reference to a named officer or officers or impleaded the officer/ officers concerned eo nomine. In the absence of all this being done by the petitioner, it is difficult to examine the plea of mala fides canvassed on the petitioner's behalf. 41. In the above conspectus of facts, this Court is of opinion that no case of mala fides vitiating the impugned order is made out. 42. It is to be remarked here that given the conduct of the petitioner, where he has exhibited indiscipline and misbehaviour on duty while drunk on numerous occasions is a serious matter. The petitioner is a member of a disciplined force, where discipline and rectitude are not only the hallmark of a member of such force but a sine qua non for the efficient discharge of their functions. The petitioner is a member of a disciplined force, where discipline and rectitude are not only the hallmark of a member of such force but a sine qua non for the efficient discharge of their functions. For the said reason, in particular, the opinion of the Screening Committee, given the material on record, cannot be held to be arbitrary or vitiated by mala fides or an instance of a colourable exercise of power in any manner. 43. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. Costs easy. 44. Let the petitioner’s Service Book be returned to the respondents through Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi, learned Standing Counsel.