JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner is common in both the Writ Petitions. As the issues arising for consideration are identical, these Writ Petitions can be disposed of by common judgment. The parties and the exhibits referred to in this judgment are as they appear/are marked in W.P (C) 15113/2023 unless otherwise indicated. The petitioner is one among the members of the three-member Administrative Committee constituted for the management of the Neyyattinkara Primary Cooperative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. (hereinafter also referred to as 'the Primary Bank') in terms of Ext.P.6 order dated 17-04-2023. An administrative committee had to be appointed on account of the fact that the term of the managing committee of the Primary Bank was to expire on 13-04-2023. Though the election to elect a new managing committee for the Primary Bank was notified, the same was subsequently cancelled. Apprehending that for one reason or the other, the elections to the managing committee of the Primary Bank will not be held before 13-04-2023, W.P (C) Nos.9342/2023, 9772/2023 and 9980/2023 were filed before this Court. By an interim order dated 13-04-2023 (Ext.P5), and for reasons indicated in that order, this Court had directed the constitution of an administrative committee consisting of the President, Vice President and another member of the then Managing Committee of the Primary Bank as its members. On 17-04-2023, in furtherance of the said order of this court, an administrative committee consisting of the President and Vice President (the petitioner herein) and the 2nd respondent in this writ petition was constituted by the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies (General), Thiruvananthapuram. The 2nd respondent was also appointed as the Convener of the administrative committee. 2. The Primary Bank is a member of the Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. (hereinafter also referred to as the 'Apex Bank') and is, as such, entitled to nominate a delegate to the elections to be held to the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the Apex Bank. The delegate of the Primary Bank could also contest in the election to the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the Apex Bank. Following the constitution of the administrative committee in terms of Ext.P6 order, the said committee took charge on 18-04-2023, as is evident from Ext.P7. The delegate of the Primary Bank could also contest in the election to the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the Apex Bank. Following the constitution of the administrative committee in terms of Ext.P6 order, the said committee took charge on 18-04-2023, as is evident from Ext.P7. On 19-04-2023, the Secretary of the Primary Bank called for a meeting of the Administrative Committee to be held on 25-04-2023 at 10 a.m. in the bank's Board room at Neyyattinkara. The agenda for the meeting, as can be seen from Ext.P1, were the following:- (i) Prayer. (ii) Loan disbursal and status of dues. On 25-04-2023, the members constituting the administrative committee other than the Convener met and Ext.P9 minutes were drawn up. Ext.P9 records that the former President of the Primary Bank (who was also one of the administrative committee members) would be the Chairman of the meeting. In that meeting, one of the decisions was to nominate the petitioner as the delegate to the elections to the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the Apex Bank scheduled on 15-05-2023. It appears that the 2nd respondent (Convener of the administrative committee) filed a complaint before the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies (Neyyattinkara), which is on record as Ext.R2 (a), pointing out that the meeting held on 25-04-2023 in his absence is illegal, and the resolutions taken thereon must be rescinded. Acting on Ext.R2 (a), which was submitted on 25-04-2023, the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies (General), Thiruvananthapuram, issued Ext.P13 order in exercise of jurisdiction under Rule 176 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1969 Rules' for short) rescinding all the decisions taken in the meeting of the administrative committee held on 25-04-2023. This 0rder (Ext.P.13) is under challenge in W.P (C) No.15113/2023. The rejection of the nomination filed by the petitioner to contest the election to the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the Apex Bank is under challenge in W.P (C) No.15147/2023. 3. Sri. George Poonthottam, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P (C) No.15113/2023 on the instructions of Smt. Nisha George and Sri. Arjun Raghavan, the learned counsel appearing for the very same petitioner in the connected writ petition (W.P (C) No.15147/2023), submits that Ext.P13 order of the Joint Registrar is illegal and unsustainable. 3. Sri. George Poonthottam, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P (C) No.15113/2023 on the instructions of Smt. Nisha George and Sri. Arjun Raghavan, the learned counsel appearing for the very same petitioner in the connected writ petition (W.P (C) No.15147/2023), submits that Ext.P13 order of the Joint Registrar is illegal and unsustainable. It is submitted that Ext.P1 notice issued by the Secretary of the Primary Bank to convene a meeting on 25-04-2023 was never cancelled. It is submitted that under Rule 44A of the 1969 Rules, a delegate of any society to another society must be a member of the Managing Committee of the society which sends him as a delegate. It is pointed out that in case of a delegate sent by an administrative committee or an administrator, it would be open to select any member of the society to be the delegate. It is submitted that the Convener of the administrative committee did not attend the meeting held on 25-04-2023, citing ill health. Reference is made in this regard to paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent. It is submitted that notwithstanding the fact that the 2nd respondent was indisposed on 25-04-2023, he filed Ext.R4 (a) complaint on the same day leading to Ext.P13 order on 26-04-2023. The lightning speed at which action was taken on the complaint submitted by the Convener (the nd respondent) is pointed out to establish that the entire action was vitiated by malafides. It is submitted that in the meeting held on 25-04-2023, it was decided that the petitioner would be the delegate to exercise franchise in the elections to be held to the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the Apex Bank on 15-05-2023. The provisions of Section 28 (5) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1969 Act' for short) are referred to point out that the quorum for a meeting of the managing committee is just above 50%, and if this provision is applied in the case of an administrative committee also, the meeting held on 25-04-2023 had the requisite quorum to take the necessary decisions. It is submitted that none of the affected parties were heard before Ext.P13 order was passed. It is submitted that none of the affected parties were heard before Ext.P13 order was passed. It is pointed out that the decisions taken at the meeting of the administrative committee held on 25-04-2023 include decisions regarding disbursal of loans, the status of dues etc. and since Ext.p13 proceeds to cancel all the decisions taken in the meeting, at the very least the society was required to be put on notice before the Joint Registrar exercised the powers under Rule 176 of the 1969 Rules. Specific passages from 'Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings' 13th Edn. are pointed out to show that there was absolutely no illegality in the procedure adopted and the decisions taken, in the administrative committee meeting held on 25-04-2023. It is submitted that Ext.P13 proceeds on the basis that the 2nd respondent was not aware of the meeting held on 25-04-2023, when, even the 2nd respondent has no case that he was unaware of the meeting held on 25-04-2023. It is submitted that pursuant to the interim order dated 05-05-2023, this court had permitted the petitioner to exercise his franchise by casting his vote , which is kept in a separate box. It is submitted that Ext.P13 order is liable to be set aside, and consequential directions are to be issued, taking into account the facts and circumstances of this case. 4. Sri. P.P. Thajudeen, the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the official respondents, would refer to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 33 of the 1969 Act to state that the administrative committee is always under the direct control of the Registrar/Joint Registrar (exercising the powers of the Registrar). It is submitted that when a patently wrong procedure had been adopted by the administrative committee, it was incumbent on the Joint Registrar to take immediate action and, therefore, the fact that Ext.P13 order was issued on a day after the meeting was convened is no reason to suggest that the said decision was vitiated by any malafides. It is submitted that when a patently wrong procedure had been adopted by the administrative committee, it was incumbent on the Joint Registrar to take immediate action and, therefore, the fact that Ext.P13 order was issued on a day after the meeting was convened is no reason to suggest that the said decision was vitiated by any malafides. The provisions of Section 33 (1) (b) of the 1969 Act are pointed out to show that every administrative committee must be constituted after specifying that a named person shall be the Convener of that committee, and therefore any meeting of the administrative committee without the participation of the Convener and decisions taken on matters outside the agenda and without the knowledge of the Convener would therefore have to be set aside and interfered with in the exercise of jurisdiction vested in the Joint Registrar under the Rule 176 of the 1969 Rules. It is submitted that clause 29 (4) of the by-laws of the Primary Bank indicates that no member who is interested in a matter being discussed in the meeting shall take part in the meeting, and therefore, the act of the administrative committee in selecting one among its own as the delegate to the elections to be held to the Apex Bank is clearly contrary to the stipulations in the by-laws. 5. During the course of the proceedings in this Court and after pleadings were filed on his behalf in this case, the 2nd respondent, who was the convener of the Administrative Committee, sadly expired on 12.06.2023. The petitioner has, therefore, filed a memo informing this Court that the 2nd respondent is no more and seeking his deletion from the array of parties. That memo is recorded, and the 2nd respondent is deleted from the array of parties to this writ petition. However, considering the legal questions raised in the writ petition, I have permitted Sri.N.Reghuraj, the learned Counsel who was appearing for the 2nd respondent, to address arguments in the matter. He submits that through Ext.P1, a meeting of the Administrative Committee was scheduled to be held on 25.04.2023. It is pointed out that selecting a delegate to represent the Primary Bank in the elections to the Apex Bank was not part of the agenda of the meeting scheduled for 25.04.2023. He submits that through Ext.P1, a meeting of the Administrative Committee was scheduled to be held on 25.04.2023. It is pointed out that selecting a delegate to represent the Primary Bank in the elections to the Apex Bank was not part of the agenda of the meeting scheduled for 25.04.2023. It is submitted that Ext.P10 resolution taken by the two members of the committee, including the writ petitioner, is ex facie illegal as the decision was taken without the junction of the Convener. It is submitted that though the 2nd respondent knew of the meeting, a copy of Ext.P1 was never served on the 2nd respondent. It is submitted with reference to paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent that the 2nd respondent could not take part in the meeting scheduled on 25.04.2023 due to illness. It is submitted that despite informing the Secretary of the Primary Bank that the meeting should be adjourned and despite personally informing the petitioner and the other member of the Administrative Committee that the meeting should be adjourned, the meeting was held on 25.04.2023 and Ext.P10 resolution was taken in the said meeting. It is submitted that since the Administrative Committee steps into the shoes of the Managing Committee, the provisions of the by-laws are clearly applicable to resolutions of the Administrative Committee. It is submitted that with reference to Clause 29 of the by-laws of the Primary Bank that as per sub-clause (6) of Clause 29 of the by-laws, the meeting could be convened with three days' notice to the members. It is submitted that even if Ext.P1 did not indicate that the meeting to be held on 25.04.2023 would include an agenda for selecting a delegate to represent the Primary Bank in the elections to the Apex Bank, it was open to the petitioner and the other member to seek the inclusion of such an item in the agenda instead of surreptitiously holding the meeting on 25.04.2023 and selecting the writ petitioner to be the delegate of the Primary Bank in the elections to be held to the Apex Bank. It is submitted that the meeting held on 25.04.2023 is clearly illegal as the writ petitioner had taken part in the meeting in which he was clearly interested, which is contrary to the provisions of sub-clause (4) of Clause 29 of the by-laws of the society. It is submitted that the meeting held on 25.04.2023 is clearly illegal as the writ petitioner had taken part in the meeting in which he was clearly interested, which is contrary to the provisions of sub-clause (4) of Clause 29 of the by-laws of the society. Reference in this regard is made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.K.Kraipak and Others v. Union of India and Others, AIR 1970 SC 150 and to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Jose v. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 2007 (1) KLT 391 to establish that a person who is interested in the outcome of the meeting cannot be allowed to take part in the meeting. It is pointed out that if this principle is applied to the meeting held on 25.04.2023, the writ petitioner’s participation in the said meeting is illegal, and as a consequence, the entire meeting is illegal as the other member was clearly in the minority. The learned counsel also contends that even if this Court were to accept the fact that Ext.P13 order of the Joint Registrar is unsustainable on account of the fact that it was issued without notice to the petitioner or any other person, the Court must not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to set aside that order on account of the fact that the quashing of Ext.P13 will result in the resurrection of an illegal proceeding namely Ext.P10. The learned counsel refers to the judgments reported in Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt of A.P and Others, 1966 KHC 506, Abdul Hameed v. State of Kerala, 1988(1) KLT 446 , Koya v. State of Kerala, 1992(2)KLT 194 and Parents Association of Students v. M.A. Khan and another, (2009) 2 SCC 641 in support of this contention. The learned counsel also referred to specific passages from Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings to contend that unless a meeting was validly convened with notice to all members, the meeting can only be held to be illegal, and the business transacted in the meeting can have no value at all. 6. The learned counsel also referred to specific passages from Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings to contend that unless a meeting was validly convened with notice to all members, the meeting can only be held to be illegal, and the business transacted in the meeting can have no value at all. 6. Sri.M.A.Asif, the learned counsel appearing for the Apex Bank in the connected writ petition, namely W.P (C) No.15147/2023, would contend on the strength of the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Kodiyathur Panchayat v. District Panchayat Officer, Calicut, 1977 KHC 128 that where a proper notice was not given to all members, the business transacted at a meeting cannot be termed to be valid. He also placed reliance on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in N.Sudarsanan v. State of Kerala and others, 1996 KHC 429, to contend that the election of a Vice President of a Co-operative Society under Rule 43 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 was held invalid on account of the fact that no proper notice had been given to all the members entitled to vote. He also relied on the judgment of a Division Bench of this court in Manoj Kumar v. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 2018 (1) KHC 717 to substantiate the same contention. 7. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P (C) No. 15113/2023, the learned counsel who appears for the same petitioner in the connected writ petition (W.P (C) No.15147/2023), the learned Special Government Pleader, Sri. N. Reghuraj and Sri. M.A. Asif, as above, I formulate the following issues as those requiring adjudication in this case:- (i) Is the meeting of the administrative committee, which was convened on 25-04-2023, a duly constituted meeting in the eye of the law? (ii) If the meeting held on 25-04-2023 was a validly constituted meeting, did the absence of the 2nd respondent (Convener of the Administrative Committee) invalidate the meeting? (iii) If the answer to question No.(ii) is in the negative, was it just and proper for the remaining two members of the administrative committee to have passed a resolution to nominate/select the writ petitioner as a delegate to the election to be conducted to the Apex Bank, especially in the light of the fact that no such agenda was included in Ext.P1 notice calling for the meeting? (iv) Is the decision taken by the remaining two members of the administrative committee to nominate one among them as the delegate in the elections to be held to the Apex Bank vitiated on account of any provision in the bylaws or on account of the application of the general principle contained in the maxim, Nemo judex in causa sua ? (v) Is Ext.P13 order dated 26-04-2023 of the Joint Registrar (General), Thiruvananthapuram, liable to be quashed on account of violation of principles of natural justice or on any other ground? The findings of the Court 8. Regarding issue No.1:-An administrative committee was constituted for the management of the Primary Bank in terms of the order dated 13-04-2023 in W.P (C) Nos.9342/2023, 9772/2023 and 9980/2023. There is no dispute that Ext.P1 notice was issued by the Secretary of the Primary Bank on the basis of the instructions issued by the 2nd respondent, who was appointed as the Convener of the administrative committee. Therefore the meeting of the administrative committee, which was scheduled and held on 25-04-2023, was a duly constituted meeting of the administrative committee. 9. Regarding issue No.2:-The administrative committee meeting held on 25-04-2023 cannot be termed invalid because of the absence of the 2nd respondent in the meeting. Firstly, it must be noted that there was no formal notice cancelling the meeting. The provisions of Section 28 (5) of the 1969 Act provide that the quorum for a managing committee meeting will be just above 50% of the total number of members of that committee. The provisions of Section 33 do not provide for a quorum for the meeting of an administrative committee constituted in terms of Section 33 (1) (b) of the 1969 Act, and in the absence of any statutory stipulation of any special quorum, it must be held that the quorum for a meeting of the administrative committee cannot be more than the quorum fixed in the meeting of the Managing committee. Further, the provisions of Section 33 do not place any special responsibility on the Convener of an administrative committee. The provisions do not indicate that any meeting of an administrative committee in the absence of the Convener will be invalid. In the absence of a special meaning in the statute, the Convener is a person who calls or convenes a meeting. The provisions do not indicate that any meeting of an administrative committee in the absence of the Convener will be invalid. In the absence of a special meaning in the statute, the Convener is a person who calls or convenes a meeting. The word 'convened' in its legal sense means to call together or assemble members of a body {see definitions of 'convene' and 'convener' in P Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon 4th edition page 1057 -Vol. I }. Since the provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act do not give any other statutory authority to the Convener of an administrative committee, it must be held that the absence of the Convener in the meeting held on 25-04-2023 does not invalidate the meeting in any manner. 10. Regarding issue No.3:-In order to consider this issue, it is essential for this Court to appreciate certain facts in addition to the facts already noted above. As already noticed, the 2nd respondent was appointed as the Convenor of the Administrative Committee in terms of Ext.P5 order. The pleadings in both Writ Petitions indicate that the 2nd respondent was the delegate of the Primary Bank in the elections held previously to the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the Apex Bank. He had also contested in the election and was the President of the Managing Committee of the Apex Bank. It is the case of the petitioner that the 2nd respondent had switched political allegiance for reasons best known to him, as a direct result of which the management of the Apex Bank came to be entrusted to an Administrator. It is also pleaded that the Primary Bank had thereafter withdrawn the nomination of the 2nd respondent as a delegate to the Apex Bank. The petitioner contends that the attempt of the 2nd respondent was clearly to prevent any delegate from being nominated by the Primary Bank in the elections to be held to the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the Apex Bank and that this would materially affect the result of the election as the chances of victory for the two major political fronts which were contesting the elections were very evenly placed. It must be noted that the 2nd respondent was also the 7th respondent in W.P (C) No.9980/2023 and that he was very well aware of the circumstances in which this court was called upon to issue the orders marked as Exts.P4 and P5 in W.P (C) No.15113/2023. A reading of Exts.P4 and P5 orders issued by this court in W.P (C) No.9980/2023 and connected cases would indicate that this court had also taken into account the apprehension that the elections to the managing committee of the Primary Bank would not be held within time and if an Administrator or an Administrative Committee is appointed by the competent authority that would result in a situation where elections to the Apex bank would be materially affected. Paragraph 9 of the order dated 13-04-2023 in W.P (C) Nos.9342/2023, 9772/2023 and 9980/2023 (Ext.P5) reads as under:- “9. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in these cases, the learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the official respondents, Sri.M.Sasindran appearing for the 7th respondent in W.P.(C)No.9980 of 2023 and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State Election Commission and taking into consideration of the judgment of the Division Bench in W.A.No.1410 of 2017 and the judgment of the learned Single Bench of this Court in W.P. (C)No.33507 of 2022, and though the interim reliefs sought for in these Writ Petitions cannot be granted, I am of the view that the petitioners are entitled to an order for the appointment of an administrative committee from amongst the members of the present board of directors. The reasons which compel me to hold so are the following: - A. There are serious allegations that there is an attempt to delay the conduct of the election in order to ensure that the voting to the elections to be held to the Apex Society is materially affected. Though it would not be proper to reach a finding on this issue either way at this stage of the proceedings, it must be ensured that the elections to the apex society are held in compliance with all democratic principles; B. A Division Bench of this Court in The State Co-operative Election Commission v. N.P Paulose held as follows:- “6. The term of the Committee has completed. The term of the Committee has completed. The election ought to have been conducted, but because of the pendency of the amendment of the bye laws , it could not be so done. The result is that in such a situation the Registrar, in terms of Section 33(1)(b), is required to constitute an adhoc committee to manage the affairs of the Cooperative Society till proper elections are conducted and a new Managing Committee is put in place. Thus, the appointment of adhoc committee was not on account of any mal-administration or misfeasance on the part of the Committee, but only on account of the correction of the byelaws. Otherwise, there is no default on the part of the Co-operative Society. Thus even though the Registrar has a discretion to appoint an adhoc committee of maximum three persons, one among them as a convenor, who need not be member of the society to manage the affairs of the society, it does not bar the members of the Co-operative Society itself. Considering that the Cooperative Society is a democratic institution by and for the benefit of the members themselves, it would ordinarily be desirable that members of the Co-operative Society be considered, if not otherwise disqualified. Why should a foreigner to the Co-operative Society be considered, if there are competent persons in the Co-operative Society itself. Discretion conferred by Section 33(1)(b) is not an arbitrary or a fanciful discretion. It has to be exercised on some principles, one of which would be to avoid administration of a Society by nonmembers, even on an adhoc basis, unless there are good reasons to avoid the members. 7. In the present case the learned single Judge was aware of the situation under which the adhoc committee had to be formed and to safeguard the interest of the Co-operative Society ordered that the adhoc committee would be of three members who would be the President of the Co-operative Society and two other members. In other words, he would not be either a Government Officer or a non-member. 8. On the facts noted above, we do not consider it a proper case to interfere, because the State and the Election Commission is only aggrieved by the fact that their discretion has been taken away. In other words, he would not be either a Government Officer or a non-member. 8. On the facts noted above, we do not consider it a proper case to interfere, because the State and the Election Commission is only aggrieved by the fact that their discretion has been taken away. Considering the facts, consequence of events and in order to preserve the Co-operative Society, we do not think that the order of the learned single Judge needs interference.” C. A learned single judge of this Court in Anapanthy Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. State Co-operative Election Commission in almost similar circumstances came to a conclusion that since the existing managing committee is an elected body and since there are no serious allegations against them, an administrative committee from amongst them can be appointed, pending the holding of elections. Though the respondents may be right in contending that there are allegations against the present Board, I cannot ignore the fact that the Board was never superseded, though this may have been on account of orders issued by this Court in W.P (C) 24141 of 2022 and W.P (C) No. 32305 of 2022. Therefore, I direct the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies (General), Thiruvananthapuram, to issue appropriate orders constituting an Administrative Committee consisting of the President, the Vice President and one other member of the present Board of Directors of the Neyyattinkara Primary Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Limited as an Administrative Committee to carry out with the administration and management of the Society. This arrangement shall continue till 23.05.2023. Post these matters for further consideration on 23.05.2023.” In the facts and circumstances of the present case, a meeting of the administrative committee of the Primary Bank was convened to be held on 25-04-2023. It is clear from the facts of these cases that apart from exercising his franchise as a delegate of the Primary Bank, the petitioner also wished to contest the election to the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the Apex Bank, which he could do only if he were a delegate of the Primary Bank. The last date for filing nominations regarding the elections to the Apex Bank was on 27-04-2023, and it was, therefore, absolutely essential that a decision is taken in the meeting held on 25-04-2023 regarding the delegate to represent the Primary Bank. The last date for filing nominations regarding the elections to the Apex Bank was on 27-04-2023, and it was, therefore, absolutely essential that a decision is taken in the meeting held on 25-04-2023 regarding the delegate to represent the Primary Bank. The pleadings in these writ petitions suggest that Ext.P9 resolution through which the writ petitioner was selected to be a delegate of the Primary Bank was passed after the elder among the members of the Administrative Committee other than the Convener was elected to chair the meeting. The sequence of events also clearly indicates that there was an apparent attempt on the part of the Convener (2nd respondent) to ensure that the meeting on 25-04-2023 did not choose any person as the delegate of the Primary Bank as there was no agenda for selecting the delegate (to represent the Primary Bank) in the meeting of the administrative committee of the Primary Bank to be held on 25-04-2023. This was, to say the least, surprising as it was common knowledge that the last date for filing nominations to contest in the election to the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the Apex Bank was 27-04-2023. Though the Convener states in the affidavit filed in this court that he could not attend the meeting because of his ill health, it appears that immediately after coming to know about the resolutions taken at the meeting held on 25-04-2023, the 2 nd respondent filed a complaint (Ext.R2(a) filed along with the Counter Affidavit of the 2nd respondent) before the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Thiruvananthapuram on the very same day. This complaint of the 2nd respondent was forwarded to the Joint Registrar of C0-operative Societies (presumably along with a report), and the Joint Registrar of C0-operative Societies acted immediately, leading to the issuance of Ext.P13 order on the very next day i.e., on 26-04-2023 rescinding all the resolutions taken in the meeting of the administrative committee held on 25-04-2023, in the exercise of jurisdiction under Rule 176 of the 1969 Rules. The totality of the facts and circumstances, including the reasons which compelled this court to pass an order for the appointment of an administrative committee, compels me to hold that the apprehension of the petitioners in W.P (C) Nos.9342/2023, 9772/2023 and 9980/2023 that the delay in holding elections to the Managing Committee of the Primary Bank and the failure to include an agenda in the meeting of the administrative committee to be held on 25-04-2023 for selection of a delegate was clearly to ensure that the election to the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the Apex Bank was materially affected and a delegate from the Primary Bank is not able to file his nomination or exercise franchise in the elections that were to be held to the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the Apex society on 15-05-2023. In such circumstances, It must be held that owing to an emergency situation (the last date for filing nominations to contest in the election to the Board of Directors of the Apex Bank was 27-04-2023), it was necessary for the administrative committee, which met on 25-04-2023, to discuss an item which was not on the agenda. 11. The general rule and practice of meetings is that only matters for which a meeting has been called with notice to all concerned can be discussed in such meetings. The judgments of this court in Kodiyathur Panchayat (supra), N.Sudarsanan (supra) and Manoj Kumar (supra) indicate that the business to be transacted in a meeting must be specified in the notice convening the meeting . However, is this an inflexible rule of universal application? I should think not. In Kodiyathur Panchayat (supra), this court referred to and followed the law laid down in Vice Chancellor, Utkal University and others v. S.K. Ghosh and others; AIR 1954 SC 217 . A reading of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in S.K. Ghosh (supra) clearly indicates that the general rule referred to above is not a rule of universal application. In Kodiyathur Panchayat (supra), this court referred to and followed the law laid down in Vice Chancellor, Utkal University and others v. S.K. Ghosh and others; AIR 1954 SC 217 . A reading of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in S.K. Ghosh (supra) clearly indicates that the general rule referred to above is not a rule of universal application. S.K. Ghosh (supra) is a case where the Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether decisions taken at meetings of the Syndicate of the Utkal University of Orissa regarding the cancellation of results of an examination were bad on account of the fact the notice calling for the meetings and the agenda did not contain any reference to the topic of cancellation of results of the examination in question. The first meeting had taken a decision to cancel the results of an examination, and the second meeting took up a request for reconsideration of the decision taken in the first meeting. One member of the Syndicate of the University was not present in the first meeting, and another member was not present in the second meeting. The High Court of Orissa invalidated the decision to cancel the examination results, against which the Vice Chancellor and others appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Orissa High Court. In Paragraph 16 of its judgment in S.K. Ghosh (supra) it was held:- “16. The reason for the stricter rule laid down in the cases cited before us is that though an incorporated body like an University is a legal entity it has neither a living mind nor voice. It can only express its will in a formal way by a formal resolution and so can only act in its corporate capacity by resolutions properly considered, carried and duly recorded in the manner laid down by its constitution. If its rules require such resolutions to be moved and passed in a meeting called for the purpose, then every member of the body entitled to take part in the meeting must be given notice so that he can attend and express his views Individual assents given separately cannot be regarded as equivalent to the assent of a meeting because the incorporated body is different from the persons of which it is composed. Hence, an omission to give proper notice even to a single member in these circumstances would invalidate the meeting and that in turn would invalidate resolutions which purport to have been passed at it. But this is only when such inflexible rigidity is imposed by the incorporating constitution. The position is different when, either by custom or by the nature of the body or by its constitution and rules, greater latitude and flexibility are permissible. Each case must be governed by its own facts and no universal rule can be laid down; also it may well be that in the same body certain things, such as routine matters, can be disposed of more easily and with less formality than others. It all depends on the nature of the body and its rules. (Emphasis is supplied) In Kodiyathur Panchayat (supra), the Division Bench referred to the above paragraph and also took note of the fact that there are specific rules under the erstwhile Panchayats Act for convening a meeting of the panchayat committee and also in the matter of moving resolutions in the meeting of the committee. Paragraph 4 of the judgment in Kodiyathur Panchayat (supra), refers to Rule 5 of the Kerala Panchayats (Proceedings of Panchayat Meeting of Committees) Rules which specifically provided that the agenda for the meeting shall be prepared and this court with reference to the aforesaid Rule held as follows:- “It is clear from the rules that before any matter is taken up for discussion in a meeting of the panchayat committee, the members are entitled to notice. In other words, no business is to be transacted in a meeting unless notice thereof is given in advance to the members. There is no case for the petitioner that the subject relating to the bifurcation of the panchayat was included in the agenda in the meeting held on 6-11-1975 or that all the members were informed in advance that the said subject would be taken up.” Thus Kodiyathur Panchayat (supra) was a case where there were specific rules governing the manner in which the meeting of the panchayat committee had to be held and is therefore not ratio for the proposition that any meeting that discusses an item which was not on the agenda is illegal. In fact, a close reading of paragraphs 16 (quoted above) and 17 of the judgment in S.K. Ghosh (supra) establishes beyond doubt that the position is quite the contrary. In paragraph 17 of the judgment in S.K. Ghosh (supra) it was held:- 17. In the present case, there were not one but two meetings. Proper notices of both meetings were issued to all the members including the two absentees. The only defect is that the matter we are concerned with was not included in the agenda of either meeting. We need not decide here whether this must always be done -there are English cases which indicate that that is not always necessary, see for example -The King v. Pulsford [108 ER 1073], La Compagnie De Mayville v. Whitley [(1896) 1 Ch 788] and Parker and Cooper Ltd. v. Reading [(1926) 1 Ch 975]; also, in the present case one of the items in the agenda of both notices was “other matters, if any”. But it is not necessary to go into that because in this case these members did in fact attend one or other of the meetings and expressed their views, not individually, but as members of a meeting which was considering the matter; and there was unanimity on both occasions. Even on the stricter view taken in the cases relied on by counsel it is pointed out that want of due notice can be waived in given circumstances. Thus, if a person who was not noticed appears at the meeting and waives the irregularity, the defect is cured; so also when a person is too far away to be reached in time to enable him to communicate with the Committee before the meeting : the sending of a notice is then excused. See Radha Kishan Jaikishan v. Municipal Committee, Khandwa [61 IA 125] and Young v. Ladies Imperial Club, Lim. [89 LJKB 563] The substance is more important than the form and if there is substantial compliance with the spirit and substance of the law, we are not prepared to let an unessential defect in form defeat what is otherwise a proper and valid resolution. We, however, confine our remarks to the facts of this case where there was actual appearance without objection at meetings properly convened and where there was complete unanimity on both occasions. We, however, confine our remarks to the facts of this case where there was actual appearance without objection at meetings properly convened and where there was complete unanimity on both occasions. Whether it would be proper to reach the same conclusion when there is a dissentient voice we are not prepared to say. In our opinion, the High Court was wrong in holding that the two resolutions were invalid. Whatever may be thought about each taken separately, the defects, if any, are, in our judgment, cured when the two are read together and regarded as a whole. (Emphasis is supplied) While noting the observation in paragraph 17 of S.K. Ghosh (supra) that the remarks are confined to the facts of that case, on a conjoint reading of the same with the observations in paragraph 16 of that judgment it is clear that it is only when there are rigid rules governing the manner and method of holding the meeting that the Court is called upon to hold that a meeting held in violation of such rules would be invalid. In N.Sudarsanan (supra), this court followed Kodiyathur Panchayat (supra) and referred to 'Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings' to hold as follows:- “12……………………..In the absence of a specific notice to all the members, the meeting convened for some other purpose cannot be permitted to take up the item of election abruptly without notice to the members and proceed with the election. Apart from the fact that an adjourned item cannot be automatically be taken up in the next meeting in so far as the election of the Vice President is concerned, it cannot be done simply for the reason that the procedure has been laid down under R.43 and that opportunity should be given to all the members in reference to the election. ……………………I am of the view that the said resolution to hold the election is patently illegal and clearly violative of R.43 and the general rules of meetings and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court and Supreme Court in reference to the meetings. ……………………I am of the view that the said resolution to hold the election is patently illegal and clearly violative of R.43 and the general rules of meetings and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court and Supreme Court in reference to the meetings. Therefore, if there was no meeting in the eye of law, the decision taken to elect the petitioner as unopposed to the post of Vice President is void ab initio.” Paragraph 11 of the judgment of this court in N.Sudarsanan (supra) also clearly indicates that this court was concerned with the validity of a meeting which had to be held under specific rules governing the conduct of the meeting. In Manoj Kumar (supra), this court specifically found that notice of the meeting in question had not been given to all the members and that in a given case where the entirety of the general body is present even without notice in that regard, a motion of no confidence against office bearers of any organisation can be validly moved and passed. A Division Bench of this court in T.M. Paul v. City Hospital (Pvt) Ltd and others, (1999) 97 Comp Cas 216 also considered the question as to whether the failure to include an item in the agenda for a meeting of the Board of Directors of a Company would invalidate that decision. The attention of the Court was clearly drawn to Kodiyathur Panchayat (supra). However, It was held:- “As noticed earlier, the notice contained an agenda for the meeting. But the vital resolutions passed on that day were not in the agenda. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents points out the general principle stated in Kodiyathur Panchayat v. Dt. Panchayat Officer [1977] KLT 80 that notice of business must be specified and no other matter should be considered unless the whole body corporate is present and consents. But the provisions in the Companies Act do not require that there must be an agenda for a meeting of the board of directors. Panchayat Officer [1977] KLT 80 that notice of business must be specified and no other matter should be considered unless the whole body corporate is present and consents. But the provisions in the Companies Act do not require that there must be an agenda for a meeting of the board of directors. Learned counsel for the appellants have brought to our notice the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Suresh Chandra Marwaha v. Laula Private Ltd., [1978] 48 Comp Cas 110 (Punj) and also the decision of the Delhi High Court in Abnash Kaur (Smt) v. Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd., [1974] 44 Comp Cas 390 (Delhi) and submitted that there is no necessity for an agenda for the meeting of the board of directors. In Needle Industries (India) Ltd. v, Needle Industries Newey (India) Holding Ltd., [1981] 51 Comp Cas 743 (SC) also co-option of a director not in the agenda has been upheld. As noticed in these decisions there is a specification in Section 172 for issuance of an agenda for general meetings. But there is no such provision for meeting of the board of directors.” Thus on the authority of the decision of the Constitution Bench in S.K. Ghosh (supra), the decisions of this Court in Kodiyathur Panchayat (supra), N.Sudarsanan (supra), T.M. Paul (supra) and Manoj Kumar (supra), the following propositions emerge:- (i) That there is inflexible rule of universal application that absence of notice regarding a particular point/issue of discussion in a meeting or the absence of agenda regarding a particular point/issue of discussion in a meeting will always invalidate the meeting. -See paragraphs 16 and 17 of the judgment in S.K. Ghosh (supra); (ii) Where the conduct of a meeting is governed by statutory rules, then as in Kodiyathur Panchayat (supra) and N.Sudarsanan (supra), the failure to comply with the mandate of the specific rules may invalidate the meeting. (as already noticed, there is no statutory provision governing the conduct of meetings by an administrative committee). (iii) Manoj Kumar (supra) was decided upon facts distinctly different from the facts of these cases. The striking difference is that in Manoj Kumar, giving notice to all the members might have resulted in a distinct result emerging from the General Body. This is not the case here. Two out of the three members of the administrative committee were present in the meeting held on 25-04-2023. The striking difference is that in Manoj Kumar, giving notice to all the members might have resulted in a distinct result emerging from the General Body. This is not the case here. Two out of the three members of the administrative committee were present in the meeting held on 25-04-2023. They are clearly in the majority. The outcome would have been no different if the item had been actually included in the agenda and discussions were held in that regard. I, therefore, hold that the decision taken on an emergent matter, not on the agenda, in the meeting of the Administrative Committee (constituted in terms of Ext.P.6 order) -namely, the selection of a delegate to represent the Primary Bank is not illegal in any manner as there are no statutory rules governing the conduct of the meetings of an Administrative Committee constituted under Section 33 of the 1969 Act. To borrow the words of Vivian Bose J. in S.K. Ghosh (supra) it is only when there are rules of ‘inflexible rigidity’ governing the holding of meetings by an administrative committee constituted under Section 33 of the 1969 Act that this court must hold that a meeting held in violation of such rules is illegal. 12. Regarding issue No. IV:- The provisions of the by-laws of the Primary Bank and, in particular, clause 29 (4) of the by-laws have been pressed into service to contend that the decision taken in the meeting of the administrative committee held on 25-04-2023 is bad for the reason that one among the members constituting the committee was selected to be the delegate of the Primary Bank in the elections to the Apex Bank. It was submitted that the provisions of the by-laws were equally applicable and bind the Administrative Committee in the same manner as it binds the Managing Committee. According to the respondents, clause 29 (4) of the bylaws seeks to prevent any person from taking part in a meeting which decides upon a matter in which he is personally interested. In other words, it is contended that the selection of the petitioner as a delegate would be wrong for the reason that the petitioner himself had taken part in the meeting which selected him as the delegate. In other words, it is contended that the selection of the petitioner as a delegate would be wrong for the reason that the petitioner himself had taken part in the meeting which selected him as the delegate. The decisions of the Supreme Court in A.K.Kraipak (supra), Delhi Financial Corporation (supra) and a Division Bench of this Court in Jose (supra) are clearly authority for the proposition that no man can be a Judge in his own cause. However, that principle which is also expressed in the maxim, Nemo judex in causa sua cannot have any application in the facts of this case. The decision taken in the meeting held on 25-04-2023 to select the writ petitioner as the delegate to exercise franchise in the election to be held to the managing committee of the Apex Bank cannot be taken as a decision for the benefit of the writ petitioner. The right to exercise franchise in the elections to be held to the Apex Bank is a right flowing to the Primary Bank as a member of the Apex Bank and in terms of the by-laws of the Apex Bank. The nomination of the writ petitioner to exercise franchise in the name of the Primary Bank and as a delegate of the Primary Bank cannot, by any stretch of imagination, confer any benefit on the writ petitioner. Therefore the principles laid down in the decisions referred to above cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. I, therefore, hold that the provisions of Clause 29 (4) of the by-laws of the Primary Bank and the general principle expressed in the maxim, Nemo judex in causa sua does not invalidate the decision to nominate the writ petitioner as a delegate in any manner. 13. Regarding issue No.V:-Exhibit P13 order is liable to be quashed on the short ground that it is issued in violation of principles of natural justice. Moreover, the findings rendered on issues (i) to (iv) indicate beyond doubt that Exhibit P13 is not sustainable in law. The availability of an alternate remedy and an objection raised to the maintainability of these Writ petitions, on that ground, need not detain this Court as it is well settled that the rule of alternate remedy is a rule that does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. There is a clear distinction between ‘entertainability’ and ‘maintainability’. The availability of an alternate remedy and an objection raised to the maintainability of these Writ petitions, on that ground, need not detain this Court as it is well settled that the rule of alternate remedy is a rule that does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. There is a clear distinction between ‘entertainability’ and ‘maintainability’. In its recent judgment in Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority and Others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95, the Supreme Court held:- “4……..At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition “not maintainable”. In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the “maintainability” of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that “entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to “maintainability” goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of “entertainability” is entirely within the realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary……..” Further, the contention that Ext.P13 need not be quashed as it would revive an illegal proceeding on the strength of the principles in the decisions of the Supreme Court in Parents Association of Students (supra), and by this court in Koya (supra) & Abdul Hameed (supra) cannot be accepted as I have already held that the decision taken to select the writ petitioner as the delegate of the Primary Bank in the elections held to the Apex Bank in the meeting of the administrative committee which took place on 25-04-2023 is not illegal in any manner. The principle is unexceptionable, however, it has no application to the facts of this case. The principle is unexceptionable, however, it has no application to the facts of this case. Therefore, Ext.P13 in W.P (C) 15113/2023 is quashed. 14. The prayers in W.P (C) No.15147/2023 relate to the rejection of the nomination filed by the petitioner to contest the elections to the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the Apex Bank. This Writ petition can only be dismissed. Though I have held that the selection of the petitioner as the delegate of the Primary Bank is valid and proper, it is not disputed that the Primary Bank is in default to the Apex Bank, and the petitioner has therefore attracted a disqualification in terms of Rule 46 of the 1969 Rules. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P (C) No.15147/2023 states that the relief sought regarding the rejection of the nomination of the writ petitioner to contest the elections to the managing committee of the Apex Bank is not being pressed. The disqualification will not affect the vote exercised by the writ petitioner as a delegate of the Primary Bank. I have considered this issue in W.P (C) No.14523/2023. It was held that the disqualification under Rule 46 is only to be a member of the managing committee of the Apex Bank/Society, and such disqualification does not affect the exercise of the franchise as a delegate of the Primary Bank. Resultantly, W.P (C) No.15147/2023 is dismissed, subject to the above clarification. 15. W.P(C) 15113/2023 will stand allowed in the following manner:- (i) Exhibit P13 order dated 26-04-2023 of the Joint Registrar (General), Thiruvananthapuram, is quashed. It is declared that the selection of the writ petitioner as a delegate of the Primary Bank in the elections to be held to the Managing Committee/Board of Directors of the Apex Bank in the meeting of the administrative committee of the Primary Bank held on 25-04-2023 is valid and legal; (ii) Since the writ petitioner was permitted to cast his vote in the elections held to the Apex Bank on 15-05-2023, by virtue of the interim order dated 05-05-2023 in W.P(C) 15113/2023, and since the vote cast by the petitioner is kept in a separate ballot box, (pending consideration of the present writ petition in terms of the aforesaid interim order) it is directed that the vote cast by the petitioner which is now kept in a separate ballot box shall be counted. The results of the election shall be declared without treating the vote cast by the petitioner as invalid on account of the fact that the selection of the petitioner as a delegate was on the basis of a decision taken by the Administrative Committee of the Primary Bank on 25-04-2023 and in the manner discussed above. It is clarified that the vote cast by the petitioner is valid and the fact that the Primary Bank is in default only affects the nomination filed by the petitioner for contesting the election to the Managing Committee / Board of Directors of the Apex Bank.