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2023 DIGILAW 566 (TS)

N. A. S. Satyavardhana Rao v. N. Sarada

2023-08-11

CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA, M.G.PRIYADARSINI

body2023
JUDGMENT: M.G. PRIYADARSINI, J. Challenging the validity and legality of the order dated 28.02.2013 in F.C.O.P. No.637 of 2001 rendered by the Judge, Family Court, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, the present appeal is preferred by the husband, petitioner therein. 2. By the impugned order, the learned Family Court dismissed the F.C.O.P. filed by the husband, appellant herein, under Section 10 of the Divorce Act seeking dissolution of marriage that took place between the parties on 15.05.1995 on the grounds of cruelty and harassment. 3. The facts that are necessary for disposal of the present appeal are that the marriage of the petitioner-husband with the respondent-wife was solemnized on 15.5.1995 as per Christian customs and rites. The petitioner is Hindu and respondent is Christian by religion. By the date of marriage, the petitioner was working as Teacher in a private School at Dilsukhnagar and was drawing very meager salary and the respondent was working as Telephone Operator in Telugu Academy and was drawing monthly salary of around Rs 8,000/-. Immediately after the marriage, the petitioner joined the respondent and started living at her parents’ house with a view to search for a new house at Dilsukhnagar at the place where the petitioner was doing his job. The parents of respondent gave one room in the first floor of the house to the respondent and petitioner for their living. For the interview attended in the year 1994 before the marriage, the petitioner has got Government Teacher job at West Godavari District immediately after ten days of the marriage. The petitioner has advised the respondent to stay with her parents and left West Godavari District to join duty in the month of July, 1995. The petitioner used to visit the respondent at Hyderabad twice or thrice in a month and also at the time of lengthy holidays. After getting Teacher job at Hyderabad, the petitioner has resigned at Chintalapudi, West Godavari and came to Hyderabad and started searching for separate house but respondent refused to live in a separate house on the pretext of her pregnancy. On 13.4.1997 the respondent begot a male child after undergoing caesarian operation. The petitioner and his parents opposed the function on 15th day since, as per customs, the ceremony has to be celebrated on 21st day. On 13.4.1997 the respondent begot a male child after undergoing caesarian operation. The petitioner and his parents opposed the function on 15th day since, as per customs, the ceremony has to be celebrated on 21st day. The parents and sisters of the respondent prevailed upon the petitioner's parents with regard to the ceremony and asked them to stay in the portion of the petitioner. Having no other alternative, they stayed in the portion of the petitioner. During their stay at Hyderabad, the mother and sister-in-law of the respondent insulted the petitioner's parents by removing articles one by one from the portion of the petitioner. On the 15th day, the mother of the respondent has locked the iron almirah in the portion of the petitioner and took away the keys. The petitioner when enquired the respondent, she told that for safety, her mother locked Almirah. The petitioner and his parents and other relatives felt insult about the incident and after function, they left Chintalapudi. The respondent's parents performed the function on 15th day, as a normal function but, without informing the petitioner, the respondent and their parents again performed cradle ceremony on 21st day in the absence of petitioner and their parents and relatives. The petitioner having felt scant regard from the respondent and her parents, has decided to live separately. Accordingly, the petitioner started living separately in a house at Chintal Basti, Hyderabad but the respondent refused to join him. While leaving the house of respondent, after due verification of all the packages and after satisfying herself, she allowed the petitioner to go out. After three months, she voluntarily came with household articles to the house of petitioner and joined him. During the stay, she picked up quarrels with the house owner and used to do things against the wishes of the house owner with a view to take the petitioner back to her parents house. Again, the respondent left the house of the petitioner in the month of October, 1997 before Deepavali on the pretext of foul smell emitting from the white wash to the house. Again, the respondent left the house of the petitioner in the month of October, 1997 before Deepavali on the pretext of foul smell emitting from the white wash to the house. Again after three days, she came back to the petitioner and picked up quarrel and half an hour after the quarrel, at the instance of the respondent, her brother, sister-in-law and sister and her husband came to the house of petitioner and started abusing him in filthy language and also made an attempt to kill him and left the house. Subsequently, upon persuasion of a Church member, the respondent had joined the petitioner in the month of December and stayed with the petitioner only for a period of one month 20 days and finally she left the house having quarreled with the petitioner. On the next day in the morning, the respondent came with Police and took the petitioner to the Police Station, wherein also, she demanded the petitioner to reside with her at her parents’ house as a pre-condition to drop the criminal case. The petitioner has refused for the proposal. After due enquiry, the Police have sent back the petitioner. The petitioner made a complaint to the concerned Police in view of the threats made by the respondent and her family members. On 29.1.1998, the respondent took away all her household articles from the petitioner's house. Then the petitioner filed O.P. No.124 of 1998 against the respondent for divorce but it was finally dismissed for default. After receiving the notice in the above OP, as a counter blast, the respondent filed a criminal case against the petitioner before the Mahila Court under Section 498-A of the IPC and also under the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act. During the pendency of the divorce OP, on the advice of the Court, the respondent again joined with the petitioner in the month of March/April, 2000. As usual, the respondent picked up quarrels with the petitioner and left his company. The behaviour and conduct of the respondent has caused lot of mental agony and as a consequence the respondent was subjected to cruelty to such an extent, where he was afraid about even imagining the company of the respondent itself. Hence, the petition. 4. Contesting the O.P., the respondent filed counter admitting the relationship. The behaviour and conduct of the respondent has caused lot of mental agony and as a consequence the respondent was subjected to cruelty to such an extent, where he was afraid about even imagining the company of the respondent itself. Hence, the petition. 4. Contesting the O.P., the respondent filed counter admitting the relationship. The respondent never neglected the petitioner and that she never refused to go to the house of the petitioner. In fact, during the relevant time the respondent was suffering from Typhoid and taking rest without leaving Hyderabad. The respondent parents never abused the petitioner. As a matter of fact, wife and husband residing at Ramnagar i.e., upper portion of father-in-law. Due to separation of the parents house, the respondent advised to take house outside of any place, as such the petitioner has taken house at Chintal Basthi after getting job in Hyderabad. The brothers and sisters of both sides attended celebration on 15th day. The respondent's parents, brothers and sisters never insulted the parents, brothers and sisters of the petitioner and no function celebrated on 21st day. The function was celebrated according to customs of Christianity. The petitioner demanded to give the up-stair portion in his name and as the same was refused by the respondent, he left the house. After taking bed rest, she joined the matrimonial life. The petitioner made a report at Police Station, Saifabad and after intervention of the elders of both sides, the petitioner withdrew the complaint and thereafter petitioner and respondent lived happily at Chinthal Basti, Hyderabad. The respondent stayed upto 20.01.1998 with the petitioner and one day prior to that there was a quarrel between them and called the parents of the respondent due to harassment of dowry and scooter etc., and unable to bear the harassment of the petitioner, the respondent made a report to Mahila Police Station. The petitioner earlier filed OP No.124/1998, which was dismissed for default. Finally on 20.04.2000 the petitioner without informing to her left the house. 5. On behalf of petitioner, PWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exs.Pl to P14 were marked. Exs.Pl to P3 are the letters, dt. 13.02.1997, 15.05.1996 and 04.07.1996 respectively, addressed by the respondent to her in-laws, Ex.P4 is the letter, dt.22.04.1997, Ex.P5 is the letter, dt. 07.04.1997, Ex.P6 is the receipt, Ex.P7 is the copy of promotion orders, dt. 5. On behalf of petitioner, PWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exs.Pl to P14 were marked. Exs.Pl to P3 are the letters, dt. 13.02.1997, 15.05.1996 and 04.07.1996 respectively, addressed by the respondent to her in-laws, Ex.P4 is the letter, dt.22.04.1997, Ex.P5 is the letter, dt. 07.04.1997, Ex.P6 is the receipt, Ex.P7 is the copy of promotion orders, dt. 08.05.2000 of the petitioner to the post of School Assistant. Ex.P8 is the proceedings issued by the District Educational Officer, Hyderabad District appointing the petitioner as Teacher, Ex.P9 is the proceedings of the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, R.R. District, dt.06.01.1997, Ex.P10 is the certified copy of orders in O.P. No.124 of 1998 filed by the petitioner against the respondent under Section 10 of Indian Divorce Act seeking dissolution of marriage between the petitioner and respondent, Ex.P11 is the certified copy of decree in O.P. No.124 of 1998, Ex.P12 is the C.C. of Judgment in C.C. No.23 of 1999 on the file of learned XXII Metropolitan Magistrate-cum-Mahila Court at Hyderabad under which the petitioner, who is an accused in the said case was found not guilty and he was acquitted for the offence under Section 498-A, Ss.3, 4 and 6 of Dowry Prohibition Act. Ex.P13 is the list of marriage articles, Ex.P14 is the photostat copy of complaint filed before the learned XXII M.M.-cum-Mahila Court at Hyderabad by the respondent against the petitioner and others in C.C. No.23/99. On behalf of respondent, RWI was examined and Exs.B1 to B13 were marked. Exs.B1 to B4 are the Photostat copies of petition, counter, affidavit and order in O.P.No.124 of 1998, Ex.B5 is the certified copy of order in I.A.No.1239 of 2000 in O.P.No.124 of 1998, Ex.B6 is the certificate issued by Baptist Church, Hyderabad, Ex.B7 is the Photostat copy of Baptismal register, Exs.B8 and B9 are the Photostat copies of sick/fitness certificates issued to the respondent, Ex.B10 is the photo, Ex.B11 is the Photostat copy of birth certificate, Ex.B12 is the photographs of the petitioner along with Keziamani and Ex.B13 is the copy of letter addressed by the respondent to the District Educational Officer against the petitioner. 6. 6. The learned Judge after considering the oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both the sides, was pleased to dismiss the F.C.O.P. Aggrieved by the same, the husband has preferred the present appeal with the following grounds: i) The learned Family Court committed a grave error in dismissing the OP without even framing an issue and without even arriving at any definite conclusion whether or not the dual grounds of cruelty and desertion on the part of the wife are proved; especially when the same have been established beyond reasonable doubt by the husband with cogent and convincing evidence. ii) Without concluding the issues involved in the OP, the trial Court straightaway, decided that the husband is not entitled to decree of divorce under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act simply following the decisions of the Kerala High Court cited on behalf of the wife, in K.A.Philip Appellant v. Susan Jacob and others, AIR 2001 Kerala at page 195. iii) The trial Court failed to realize that the aforesaid decision was rendered particularly with reference to provisions of Section 10 of the (unamended) Indian Divorce Act, 1869, which stood amended by Act 51 of 2001 with effect from 03.10.2001, including ‘cruelty’ and ‘desertion’ as grounds for dissolution of marriage i.e., in Section 10 (1)(x) and Section 10 (1)(x) respectively. iv) While dismissing the OP by following the aforesaid decision, the trial Court committed a grave illegality/irregularity in completely brushing aside and ignoring the two decisions cited on behalf of the husband; one rendred by Kerala High Court and the other by the Madhya Pradesh High Court following Act 51 of 2021 and delivered subsequent to the above referred decision i.e., suo motu reference in Matter of Divorce Act v. State, 2002 – KERLJ-2, page 432 = 2002 ILR (KER)-3 Page 486. Thus, the failure on the part of the trial Court in not following the above two decisions cited on behalf of the husband has resulted into miscarriage of justice. v) The trial court did not appreciate the fact that the evidence on record proves beyond doubt that the wife treated the husband with cruelty, and had deserted him for more than (2) two years prior to the filing of the OP. v) The trial court did not appreciate the fact that the evidence on record proves beyond doubt that the wife treated the husband with cruelty, and had deserted him for more than (2) two years prior to the filing of the OP. vi) The trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the husband was subjected to mental cruelty by the wife and that the conduct of the wife was such that it had become intolerable for the husband to suffer any longer, and living together with her has become impossible. vii) The trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the wife made a false complaint against the husband and his parents for which they were prosecuted under Section 498 A of IPC and ultimately he was acquitted by the Mahila Court, Hyderabad holding that there are no circumstances to assume that the accused has harassed PW1 for additional dowry and subjected her to harassment. viii) The trail Court did not appreciate the fact that husband cannot be expected to live with the wife, who got a false report made against him and got him arrested by the Police; humiliation and agony suffered by the husband were too much; he was required to undergo the traumatic experience of the arrest by the police at the instance of the wife. ix) The trial Court did not appreciate the fact that parties are living apart ever since 19.01.1998. The factum of separation is not disputed. The wife did not live with the husband when attempts were made to bring reconciliation. Her simple assertion in her evidence that she is still willing to live with the husband is nothing but hollow expression bereft of any sanctity. Thus, the ground of desertion too is established on behalf of the husband. x) The trail Court failed to appreciate that once it is established beyond doubt that the marriage has been irretrievably broken down, and has become dead, on account of the conduct of the parties, no useful purpose would be served by keeping such marriage alive; though this aspect of the matter was brought to the notice of the trial Court time and again during the Court proceedings. xi) While dismissing the OP trial Court ignored the well settled legal position brought to its notice viz., as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, following the 71st Report of Law Commission of India, on "Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage” that in a situation, where parties separated and separation continued for sufficient length of time, and one of them presented petition for divorce, a presumption can be drawn that the marriage has broken down. Even after serious endeavour by Court to reconcile parties, if it is found that breakdown is irreparable, divorce should not be withheld. Consequences of preservation in law of unworkable marriage which has long ceased to be effective are bound to be a source of great misery for parties. xii) The trial Court committed a grave error/irregularity in permitting the cress examination of the husband in as much as, the matter was remanded by order of the Hon'ble Court in C.M.A. No. 2189 of 2004 dated 23.01.2012 for the purpose of cross examination of the wife alone by the husband. In fact, the cross -examination of the husband was over during the trial and before the OP was dismissed for the first time in the year 2003 itself. xiii) In fact, taking advantage of the error so committed by the trial Court in, once again, permitting the unwarranted cross-examination of the husband, the wife came up with a baseless allegation, bereft of any proof, that the husband had contracted second mamage. In support of such an allegation only a few photographs (Ex. B12) were produced and the husband was examined vis-a-vis those photographs xiv) The trial Court further failed to notice the contradictions in the statements of the wife viz., while alleging before the Court that the husband had contracted a second marriage; she addresses a letter (Ex.B-13) on 18.07.2012 i.e., during the course of the cross-examination itself, to the effect that she recently came to be informed that her husband is trying to contract second marriage clandestinely, without her knowledge and without obtaining divorce. In the said letter, she requested the department to incorporate her name as wife and names of her children as legal heirs and nominees of Mr. NAS Sathyavardhan Rao in the service records for entitlement of service and death benefits of her husband being his legally wedded wife and children. 7. In the said letter, she requested the department to incorporate her name as wife and names of her children as legal heirs and nominees of Mr. NAS Sathyavardhan Rao in the service records for entitlement of service and death benefits of her husband being his legally wedded wife and children. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-husband and the learned counsel for the respondent-wife. Perused the material available on record. 8. The impugned order discloses that the Court below dismissed the O.P. mainly on the ground that the appellant being a Christian by religion, cannot seek divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion since the said grounds are not available to Christian husband under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act relying on the decision of the Kerala High Court reported in K.A. Philip v. Susan Jacob and Ors, AIR 2001 Kerala 195. The relevant portion of the said decision reads thus:- “Another ground alleged in the petition is cruelty and desertion. As stated above, a divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion is not available to the husband-petitioner under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act. So far as Christian husband is concerned, it is impermissible to dissolve the marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion”. However, the Court below lost sight of the fact that by way of Act No. 51 of 2001 (which came into force with effect from 03.10.2001), Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act got amended, by incorporationg ‘desertion’ and ‘cruelty’ in Section 10(1)(ix) and (x) as grounds for dissolution of marriage to a Christian spouse. Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, as amended by Act 51 of 2001 reads thus:- “10. Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, as amended by Act 51 of 2001 reads thus:- “10. Grounds for dissolution of marriage.— (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement* of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, may, on a petition presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife, be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization of the marriage, the respondent— (i) has committed adultery; or (ii) has ceased to be Christian by conversion to another religion; or (iii) has been incurably of unsound mind for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or (iv) has, for a period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition, been suffering from a virulent and incurable form of leprosy; or (v) has, for a period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition, been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form; or (vi) has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of the respondent if the respondent had been alive; or (vii) has wilfully refused to consummate the marriage and the marriage has not therefore been consummated; or (viii) has failed to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights for a period of two years or upwards after the passing of the decree against the respondent; or (ix) has deserted the petitioner for at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or (x) has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent. (2) xxx” (emphasis added) 9. Admittedly, the O.P. was instituted in the year 2001. Even if we assume that the above amendment was post-institution of the O.P., still the pragmatic view is to hold the proceedings initiated under the provisions of the unamended Act, which had not resulted into a decree, in accordance with the amendments made by Act 51 of 2001. Admittedly, the O.P. was instituted in the year 2001. Even if we assume that the above amendment was post-institution of the O.P., still the pragmatic view is to hold the proceedings initiated under the provisions of the unamended Act, which had not resulted into a decree, in accordance with the amendments made by Act 51 of 2001. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to the decision of a Division Bench of Kerala High Court reported in Suo Motu Reference in the Matter of Divorce Act v. State, 2002-KERLJ-2, 432. It is observed at para Nos. 8 to 11 as under:- “8. The next question for consideration is whether Act 51 of 2001 has retrospective effect. There appears to be serious disagreement amongst counsel on this issue. While some of the counsel have urged that the Act should not be made applicable to the proceedings which were pending in the High Court prior to 3rd October, 2001, some urge that there is no reason why it should not be made applicable retrospectively. Mr. Tony George Kannanthanam strongly contended that the procedure with regard to confirmation of decrees, where a decree was passed by a District Court or the procedure of confirmation by a special ,Bench where the decree nisi was passed by the High Court contemplated under Ss. 16, 17 and 20, are discriminatory as against Christians and result in imposition of cumbersome procedure, which achieve no useful purpose. He contended that, it is precisely the reason why the amendment was brought into effect. He strongly urged that this Court should hold that the procedure for confirmation of decrees prescribed in Ss. 16, 17 and 20 of the unamended Act should be declared as violative of Article 14 and ultra vires of the Constitution, That is not an issue which we propose to consider in the present reference. In the present reference, we have confined our attention only to the position of law emerging as a result of the coming into force of the Act 51 of 2001. 9. It is a basic canon of construction of statutes that no statute shall be construed to have retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the term of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. 9. It is a basic canon of construction of statutes that no statute shall be construed to have retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the term of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. It is also an accepted principle that presumption against retrospectively does not apply in the case of a statute affecting the procedure in courts. 10. Act 51 of 2001 contains no express provision suggesting that it was intended to operate retrospectively, nor do we see any other compelling reason to take the view that it was intended to operate retrospectively. In our view, the provisions of Act 51 of 2001 operate prospectively, from the date when the Act was brought into force, ie., from 3.10.2001. The immediate question that arises is how are the proceedings, which were pending at different stages, be disposed of. The proceedings might have been pending before the District Court or High Court at various stages. We can envisage the following contingencies:- (a) Proceedings pending before the District Court, which had not culminated in a decree; (b) Proceedings which had culminated in a decree of the District Court and are pending confirmation before a High Court; (c) Proceedings which are pending before the High Court in which a decree nisi has not been made; (d) Proceedings in the High Court in which decree nisi has been made and are pending confirmation. 11. The most practical and pragmatic view which would save considerable inconvenience, expenditure and hardship to the litigants is to hold that all proceedings, whether pending in the District Court or the High Court, initiated under the provisions of the unamended Act, which had not resulted into a decree shall be governed and disposed of in accordance with the amendments made by the Act No. 51 of 2001. ….” Hence, the findings of the Court below in this regard are unsustainable under law. 10. Now, it is to be seen whether the appellant-husband has established the grounds of cruelty and desertion by the respondent-wife as pleaded by cogent and convincing evidence. 11. The marriage between the parties took place on 15.05.1995 as per Christian customs and rites. They were blessed with two sons on 13.04.1997 & 24.08.1998. They became majors long back. 10. Now, it is to be seen whether the appellant-husband has established the grounds of cruelty and desertion by the respondent-wife as pleaded by cogent and convincing evidence. 11. The marriage between the parties took place on 15.05.1995 as per Christian customs and rites. They were blessed with two sons on 13.04.1997 & 24.08.1998. They became majors long back. The present position as reported by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the first son got married and serving abroad while the second son is making attempts to go abroad. The respondent is also a Government employee having posted as Telephone Operator (presently, Manager at the State Telugu Academy). Serious differences took place between the parties in relation to the celebration of 21st day celebration of firsts son in 1997 and the said differences got aggreviated which led to filing of O.P. No. 124 of 1998 by the husband seeking divorce, which was finally dismissed for default. During the pendency of the divorce OP, on the advice of the Court, the respondent again joined the company of the husband in the month of March/April, 2000. As usual, the respondent picked up quarrels with the husband and left his company. The wife also filed a criminal case against the husband and his parents before the Mahila Court for the offence under Section 498-A IPC, which ultimately ended in acquittal as seen from Ex.P.12. In support of his claim, the husband got examined one Uma Rao, as P.W.2, at whose house, the husband stayed as a tenant. P.W.2 deposed that in the month of May, 1997, the husband stayed as a tenant in the first floor of the house and three or four months later, the wife also joined the company of the husband. According to him, the behaviour of wife was abnormal and adamant in nature and used to quarrel with the husband and his family members on petty issues. On one day after Deepawali festival, the wife came from her parents house, quarreled with the husband, again she brought her brother and other relatives and all of them demanded his to shift his family to the wife’s house, for which he refused. All of them abused him in filthy language and when attempted to beat him, he was harboured by him (P.W.2). Even the brother of the wife attempted to kill the husband by holding a stone. All of them abused him in filthy language and when attempted to beat him, he was harboured by him (P.W.2). Even the brother of the wife attempted to kill the husband by holding a stone. P.W.2 and his family members intervened and pacified the matter and in the process, the wife and her brother abused them in filthy language. In this regard, the husband approached the police of Saifabad, that the police called the wife and her brother and warned them not to repeat the same in future. He denied the suggestion that there was no dispute between the husband and wife while they were residing at his house. 12. The pleadings and the evidence of R.W.1 is to the effect that even though she joined the company of the husband as per the orders in O.P. No. 124 of 1998, but the husband did not cooperate and left the house without informing anything. As he did not pursue the O.P., it came to be dismissed for default. According to her, during the pendency of the present O.P., the husband married another woman, namely Yalla Kezia Mani on 19.07.2002 and a reception was held on 23.07.2002 at Nimra Function Hall, Hyderabad. It is to be seen that the husband has denied the suggestion contracting of second marriage on 19.07.2002, but however, admitted that he was in live-in relationship with Yalla Kezia Mani. However, he has stated that he got separated from Yalla Kezia Mani through a settlement deed dated 31.08.2009. Further, a copy of the letter, dated 18.07.2012 addressed to the District Educational Officer, Gunfoundry, Hyderabad, by the wife is filed along with the written statement. It shows that the wife requested the employer of the husband for incorporation of her name and the children as the nominees and legal heirs of husband in the service record stating that her husband is trying to contract second marriage clandestinely, without her knowledge and without obtaining divorce of the marriage with her. Thus, the said letter belies the very claim made by the wife to the effect that the husband had contracted second marriage with Yalla Kezia Mani on 19.07.2002. 13. Mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling with one of the spouses due to the behavioural pattern by the other and it is difficult to establish by direct evidence. Thus, the said letter belies the very claim made by the wife to the effect that the husband had contracted second marriage with Yalla Kezia Mani on 19.07.2002. 13. Mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling with one of the spouses due to the behavioural pattern by the other and it is difficult to establish by direct evidence. It is necessarily a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case. As observed above, through the evidence of P.W.2, an independent witness, the husband was able to establish cruely meted out to the husband. Furthermore, as seen from Ex.P.14, the wife filed a complaint under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act with Women Police Station, CCS, DD, Hyderabad which was numbered as C.C. No. 23 of 1999. On trial, by judgment dated 04.04.2003 the husband was found not guilty of the offences with which he was charged and was acquitted of the charges. It is no-doubt true that mere preferring of complaint alone cannot be construed to be an act of cruelty. However, if the complaint is found to be false, then it would cause mental cruelty to the sufferer. That apart, it is brought to the notice of this Court that another complaint came to be registered against the husband at the instance of the wife on 07.02.2018 which is numbered as C.C. No. 73 of 2018 for the offence under Section 494 IPC and the said C.C. is stated to be pending before the XIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, City Criminal Court Complex, Hyderabad. 14. As regards the desertion, the record discloses that the parties have parted their ways from 19.01.1998 i.e., two and half decades. Even the efforts made by this Court, during the pendency of the appeal, to save the matrimonial life of the parties has yielded no result. It reflects that the marriage between the parties has irretrievably broken down beyond repaid. 15. The Apex Court in Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, (2006) 4 SCC 558 , at para Nos. 72 to 76, observed as under:- “72. Once the parties have separated and the separation has continued for a sufficient length of time and one of them has presented the petition for divorce, it can well be presumed that the marriage has broken down. 72 to 76, observed as under:- “72. Once the parties have separated and the separation has continued for a sufficient length of time and one of them has presented the petition for divorce, it can well be presumed that the marriage has broken down. The Court, no doubt, should seriously make an endeavour to reconcile the parties. Yet, if it is found that the break down is irreparable, then divorce should not be withheld. The consequence of preservation in law of the unworkable marriage which has long ceased to be effective or bound to be a source of greater misery for the parties. 73. A law of divorce based mainly on fault is inadequate to deal with a broken marriage. under the fault theory, guilt has to be proved; divorce courts are presented with concrete instances of human behaviour as they bring the institution of marriage into disrepute. 74. We have been principally impressed by the consideration that once the marriage has broken down beyond repair, it would be unrealistic for the law not to take notice of that fact, and it would be harmful to society and injurious to the interests of the parties. Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be surmised that matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction, though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever the tie the law in such cases does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. 75. Public interest demands not only that the married status should, as far as possible, as long as possible, and whenever possible, be maintained, but where a marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of solvage, public interest lies in the recognition of that fact. 76. Since there is no acceptable way in which a spouse can be compelled to resume life with the consort, nothing is gained by trying to keep the parties tied forever to a marriage that in fact has ceased to exist.” 16. Considering the fact that the husband and wife parted their ways and are living separately for a considerable period, it is a fit case to grant divorce by dissolving the marriage between the parties on the sole reason that there is no possibility for reunion of the parties in order to live together. Considering the fact that the husband and wife parted their ways and are living separately for a considerable period, it is a fit case to grant divorce by dissolving the marriage between the parties on the sole reason that there is no possibility for reunion of the parties in order to live together. Even during the pendency of the appeal, though several measures are taken by this Court for conciliation, the parties did not come forward for reunion, which shows that the marriage between the parties has irretrievably broken down. As held by the Apex Court, when the marriage between the parties has irretrievable broken down, any attempt to force the parties to live together would tantamount to causing mental cruelty and would only prolong the mental agony of the parties for the rest of their lives. Therefore, this Court is inclined to grant decree of divorce by dissolving the marriage between the parties. 17. In the result, the appeal stands allowed setting aside the judgment of the Judge, Family Court at Hyderabad dated 28.02.2013. Consequently, FCOP No. 637 of 2001 is allowed granting decree of divorce by dissolving the marriage between the appellant and the respondent dated 15.05.1995. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.