JUDGMENT : GOUTAM BHADURI, J. 1. The present appeal is against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 8-3-2021 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Kanker, District Uttar Bastar, Kanker, in ST No. 03/2020 whereby the trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘the IPC’). The trial Court also imposed default sentence in case of failure to pay the fine. 2. Filtering the unnecessary details, the prosecution case is that on 7-11-2019 the son of Fhulbasan (since deceased) namely; Heeru Ram (PW-7) lodged the merg intimation (Ex.P/7) stating, inter alia, that while he was cutting the crop in his field, which is situated behind his house, at about 2.00 pm his father Bal Singh (PW-4) came out of the house and shouted that his mother was killed by the present appellant by way of axe. When he went to house he saw that in Kothaar ¼dksBkj½ the dead body of his mother was lying in the pool of blood. Having enquired as to why such assault was made by the appellant, the father disclosed the fact that his mother has objected using the pathway towards the Kothaar of the accused and advised him to take another route. On such allegation, the appellant went to his house; came with an axe; and assaulted his mother whereby she died. The dead body of the deceased was subjected to postmortem and the statements of the witnesses were recorded including the statement of eyewitness Bal Singh (PW-4), husband of the deceased. At the instance of the appellant, bloodstained full pant, half T-shirt and axe were recovered and the same were sent to FSL. In the FSL report (Ex.P/22), human blood was found on axe and garments. 3. After due investigation, the appellant was charge sheeted before the jurisdictional criminal Court and charge sheet was filed against the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC. Thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions from where the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Kanker, District Uttar Bastar, Kanker, received the case on transfer for trial. 4. During trial the appellant/accused abjured his guilt and claimed to be tried. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited 26 documents. 4. During trial the appellant/accused abjured his guilt and claimed to be tried. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited 26 documents. Appellant in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has stated that he has been falsely implicated. 5. Upon appreciation of facts and evidence, the trial Court came to a finding that the appellant has committed the offence and convicted & sentenced him as mentioned supra. Thus, this appeal. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that there is a major contradiction prevails in the statement of PW-4 Bal Singh and disclosure of statement to PW-3 Heeru Ram and PW-5 Jaleshwari, who were son and daughter-in-law of the deceased. She would further submit that the statement of PW-4 Bal Singh would show that he was not able to see from a distance as such the very version of his statement, who was the sole inmate of house, becomes doubtful. She would also submit that at the time of incident only two persons were in the house i.e. the deceased and her husband PW-4 Bal Singh and except the husband no body has seen the incident, therefore, a doubt has been created as to who has killed the deceased. Learned counsel would submit that from the nature of evidence, it is evident that there is no motive and only on presumption the appellant has been inculpated with whom the deceased and her family members had a previous animosity. She would submit that in absence of motive the crime cannot be attributed to the appellant. According to the learned counsel, though the alleged axe and garments were recovered from the accused, but the nature and proof of human blood has not been established that it belongs to the deceased. Consequently, in absence of any evidence the entire case of the prosecution is based on presumption and the benefit of doubt should have been given in favour of the appellant. It is, therefore, submitted that the learned trial Judge has misdirected himself to evaluate the evidence and convicted the accused for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC, which is required to be set aside. 7. It is, therefore, submitted that the learned trial Judge has misdirected himself to evaluate the evidence and convicted the accused for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC, which is required to be set aside. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the State, per contra, would submit that the eyewitness has categorically deposed the happening of incident, which is further corroborated by the statements of PW-3 Heeru Ram and PW-5 Jaleshwari, who immediately reached to the spot. He would further submit that thereafter, the appellant having been apprehended on his memorandum the bloodstained garments and axe were recovered, which were having human blood and plausible explanation has not been given by the accused. Therefore, considering such circumstances along with eyewitness statement, it is manifest that the prosecution was able to prove its case beyond doubt and the impugned judgment is well merited, which do not call for any interference of this Court. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 9. According the prosecution, when the deceased objected the accused about using the Kothaar as pathway to his land he was agitated; came with an axe; and assaulted the deceased. The eyewitness PW-4 Bal Singh, who is the husband of the deceased, has deposed the same. The statement of eyewitness would reveal that on the date of incident when the accused was going to his Kothaar by using the Kothaar of the deceased as pathway, it was objected by the deceased on the ground that such use causes damage to the paddy and she suggested the accused that he should use the other way instead of using their land. On which the appellant went to his house; came with an axe; and assaulted the deceased on her face and head whereby she fell down. PW-4 Bal Singh immediately shouted and called his son and daughter-in-law, who were working in the field. Having heard so, they rushed to the spot. A suggestion though was given to PW-4 Bal Singh that he is not capable to see after certain distance, but such suggestion was denied and the witness has affirmed the fact that he has seen the incident of assault. 10. The corroboration of the statement of PW-4 Bal Singh would further is made by PW-3 Heeru Ram, who lodged the merg intimation (Ex.P/7) and FIR (Ex.P/11). 10. The corroboration of the statement of PW-4 Bal Singh would further is made by PW-3 Heeru Ram, who lodged the merg intimation (Ex.P/7) and FIR (Ex.P/11). According to him, at 12’O clock his father called and informed him that the accused has assaulted his mother and when he went to his house, he saw that his mother was lying in the pool of blood on the floor. This fact is also corroborated by PW-5 Jaleshwari, daughter-in-law of the deceased. She stated that when she was working in the field along with her husband PW-3 Heeru Ram, her father-in-law shouted that the mother-in-law has been assaulted by the accused and when she came to the house she saw that her mother-in-law was lying in the pool of blood on the floor. 11. The statements of PW-3 Heeru Ram, PW-4 Bal Singh and PW-5 Jaleshwari when are read together it shows that the statements are being bridged by each other to connect the sequence of events, which has been narrated by PW-4 Bal Singh. In the cross-examination of this witness nothing has been elicited so as to demolish their statement, therefore, the submission of the appellant that PW-4 Bal Singh has not seen the incident and tried to pass the allegation on the appellant is, prima facie, difficult to accept. 12. In order to see the different evidence we explore to other evidence, which were procured by the prosecution. In furtherance of it, we went through the postmortem report (Ex.P/20), which is proved by Dr. Omkar Singh Patel (PW-10), who conducted the postmortem on the body of the deceased. He stated that two wounds were present on the face and head of the deceased and the death was due to excessive loss of blood. It was homicidal in nature. Similar statement has been made by the eye-witness PW-4 Bal Singh to say that two assaults were made on the deceased. Postmortem report (Ex.P/20) would show that in the lower jaw one lacerated wound was present in the size of 7.5 x 2 cm and it was caused by the sharp object and the same was in regular shape and on the right ear also a lacerated wound was present in the size of 8 x 1 cm. The postmortem report, therefore, further fortifies the statement of PW-4 Bal Singh. 13. The postmortem report, therefore, further fortifies the statement of PW-4 Bal Singh. 13. Apart from this fact, when the appellant was apprehended on his memorandum the axe was recovered vide Ex.P/16. Half T-shirt and full pant were recovered vide Ex.P/17. The same has been proved by PW-6 Rajkumar Hichami and PW-7 Prabharam Kawde. The recovery has not been doubted. The axe, half T-shirt and full pant when were sent to FSL for examination, human blood was found on these articles i.e. axe (Art. ‘C’); half shirt (Art. ‘D’) and full pant (Art. ‘E’). FSL report is Ex.P/22. 14. Therefore, apart from the oral testimony of PW-4 Bal Singh this factual aspect supports the involvement of the accused to commit the crime. Consequently, we do not find any doubt which can favourably be considered in favour of the accused that he was not the author to make the assault on the deceased, who eventually succumbed to the injuries. 15. This Court cannot ignore the background of the facts and the way the incident took place. According to PW-4 Bal Singh the incident emerged on a trivial issue when the deceased stopped the appellant to use their Kothaar as pathway to reach his Kothaar and instead she suggested him to use alternate route. On such objection, the appellant became furious and went to house; came with an axe; and assaulted on the head and face of the deceased. 16. In this regard it would be relevant to quote Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC and the exception thereof: 299. Culpable homicide - Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide. 300. Culpable homicide - Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide. 300. Murder - Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or— Secondly - If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or— Thirdly - If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Fourthly - If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. Exception 1 - When culpable homicide is not murder - Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. The above exception is subject to the following provisos: First - That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person. Secondly - That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant. Thirdly - That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. Explanation - Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact. 17. Thirdly - That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. Explanation - Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact. 17. A plain reading of Section 299 of the IPC will show that it contains three clauses, in two clauses it is the intention of the offender which is relevant and is the dominant factor and in the third clause, the knowledge of the offender is relevant and is dominant factor. Analyzing Section 299 as aforesaid, it becomes clear that a person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done: (i) with the intention of causing death. (ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. (iii) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. 18. If the offence is such which is covered by any one of the clauses enumerated above, but does not fall within the ambit of clauses Firstly to Fourthly of Section 300 IPC, it will not be murder and the offender would not be liable to be convicted under Section 302 of I.P.C.. In such a case if the offence is such which is covered by clause (i) or (ii) mentioned above, the offender would be liable to be convicted under Section 304 Part-I I.P.C. as it uses the expression “if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death” where intention is the dominant factor. However, if the offence is such which is covered by clause (iii) mentioned above, the offender would be liable to be convicted under Section 304 Part-II I.P.C. because of the use of expression “if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death” where knowledge is the dominant factor. 19. Now the only question arises whether his act attracts Section 302 of the IPC or any lesser offences in the proved facts and circumstances of the case. 20. 19. Now the only question arises whether his act attracts Section 302 of the IPC or any lesser offences in the proved facts and circumstances of the case. 20. In the matter of Stalin vs. State Represented by the Inspector of Police, (2020) 9 SCC 524 it was observed by the Supreme Court that when single injury was caused by the accused, offence under Section 302 IPC would be attracted or not, depends on facts and circumstances of each case and there is no principle that in all cases of a single blow Section 302 IPC is not attracted. Legal position was summarised and the relevant paras read as under: “7.1.1. In Mahesh Balmiki vs. State of M.P. (2000) 1 SCC 319 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 178, this Court while deciding the question of whether a single blow with a knife on the chest of the deceased would attract Section 302 IPC, held thus: (SCC pp. 322-323, Para 9) “9.......there is no principle that in all cases of a single blow Section 302 IPC is not attracted. A single blow may, in some cases, entail conviction under Section 302 IPC, in some cases under Section 304 IPC and in some other cases under Section 326 IPC. The question with regard to the nature of offence has to be determined on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. The nature of the injury, whether it is on the vital or non-vital part of the body, the weapon used, the circumstances in which the injury is caused and the manner in which the injury is inflicted are all relevant factors which may go to determine the required intention or knowledge of the offender and the offence committed by him. In the instant case, the deceased was disabled from saving himself because he was held by the associates of the appellant who inflicted though a single yet a fatal blow of the description noted above. These facts clearly establish that the appellant had the intention to kill the deceased. In any event, he can safely be attributed the knowledge that the knife-blow given by him was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.” 7.1.2. These facts clearly establish that the appellant had the intention to kill the deceased. In any event, he can safely be attributed the knowledge that the knife-blow given by him was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.” 7.1.2. In Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak vs. State of Gujarat, (2003) 9 SCC 322 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1809, this Court while discussing the ingredients of Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC, held thus: (SCC pp. 327-328, Para 11) “11. The fourth exception of Section 300 IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said Exception deals with a case of prosecution (sic provocation) not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The Exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self -control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1, but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact, Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon an equal footing. A “sudden fight” implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor could in such cases the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight, (c) without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provision means “unfair advantage.” 7.1.3. In Pulicherla Nagaraju vs. State of A.P. (2006) 11 SCC 444 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 500, this Court while deciding whether a case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II IPC, held thus: (SCC pp. 457-458, Para 29) “29. Therefore, the Court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. 457-458, Para 29) “29. Therefore, the Court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters — plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302, are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.” “7.1.4. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.” “7.1.4. In Singapagu Anjaiah vs. State of A.P. (2010) 9 SCC 799 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1498, this Court while deciding the question whether a blow on the skull of the deceased with a crowbar would attract Section 302 IPC, held thus: (SCC p. 803, Para 16) “16. In our opinion, as nobody can enter into the mind of the accused, his intention has to be gathered from the weapon used, the part of the body chosen for the assault and the nature of the injuries caused. Here, the appellant had chosen a crowbar as the weapon of offence. He has further chosen a vital part of the body i.e. the head for causing the injury which had caused multiple fractures of skull. This clearly shows the force with which the appellant had used the weapon. The cumulative effect of all these factors irresistibly leads to one and the only conclusion that the appellant intended to cause death of the deceased.” 7.1.5. In State of Rajasthan vs. Kanhaiya Lal, (2019) 5 SCC 639 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 674 this Court in Paras 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 held as follows: (SCC pp. 643-644) “7.3. In Arun Raj vs. Union of India, (2010) 6 SCC 457 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 155 this Court observed and held that there is no fixed rule that whenever a single blow is inflicted, Section 302 would not be attracted. It is observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision that nature of weapon used and vital part of the body where blow was struck, prove beyond reasonable doubt the intention of the accused to cause death of the deceased. It is further observed and held by this Court that once these ingredients are proved, it is irrelevant whether there was a single blow struck or multiple blows. 7.4. In Ashokkumar Magabhai Vankar vs. State of Gujarat, (2011) 10 SCC 604 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 397, the death was caused by single blow on head of the deceased with a wooden pestle. It was found that the accused used pestle with such force that head of the deceased was broken into pieces. 7.4. In Ashokkumar Magabhai Vankar vs. State of Gujarat, (2011) 10 SCC 604 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 397, the death was caused by single blow on head of the deceased with a wooden pestle. It was found that the accused used pestle with such force that head of the deceased was broken into pieces. This Court considered whether the case would fall under Section 302 or Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. It is held by this Court that the injury sustained by the deceased, not only exhibits intention of the accused in causing death of victim, but also knowledge of the accused in that regard. It is further observed by this Court that such attack could be none other than for causing death of victim. It is observed that any reasonable person, with any stretch of imagination can come to conclusion that such injury on such a vital part of the body, with such a weapon, would cause death. 7.5. A similar view is taken by this Court in the recent decision in State of Rajasthan vs. Leela Ram, (2019) 13 SCC 131 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 528 and after considering a catena of decisions of this Court on the issue on hand i.e. in case of a single blow, whether a case falls under Section 302 or Section 304 Part I or Section 304 Part II, this Court reversed the judgment [Leela Ram vs. State of Rajasthan, 2008 SCC Online Raj. 945] and convicted the accused for the offence under Section 302 IPC. In the same decision, this Court also considered Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC and observed in Para 19 as under: [State of Rajasthan vs. Leela Ram, (2019) 13 SCC 131 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 528, SCC pp. 140-141] “19......Under Exception 4, culpable homicide is not murder if the stipulations contained in that provision are fulfilled. They are: (i) that the act was committed without premeditation; (ii) that there was a sudden fight; (iii) the act must be in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and (iv) the offender should not have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 7.1.6. In Bavisetti Kameswara Rao vs. State of A.P. (2008) 15 SCC 725 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 175, this Court has observed in Paras 13 and 14 as under: (SCC pp. 729-731) “13. In Bavisetti Kameswara Rao vs. State of A.P. (2008) 15 SCC 725 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 175, this Court has observed in Paras 13 and 14 as under: (SCC pp. 729-731) “13. It is seen that where in the murder case there is only a single injury, there is always a tendency to advance an argument that the offence would invariably be covered under Section 304 Part II IPC. The nature of offence where there is a single injury could not be decided merely on the basis of the single injury and thus in a mechanical fashion. The nature of the offence would certainly depend upon the other attendant circumstances which would help the court to find out definitely about the intention on the part of the accused. Such attendant circumstances could be very many, they being (i) whether the act was premeditated; (ii) the nature of weapon used; (iii) the nature of assault on the accused. This is certainly not an exhaustive list and every case has to necessarily depend upon the evidence available. As regards the user of screwdriver, the learned counsel urged that it was only an accidental use on the spur of the moment and, therefore, there could be no intention to either cause death or cause such bodily injury as would be sufficient to cause death. Merely because the screwdriver was a usual tool used by the accused in his business, it could not be as if its user would be innocuous. 14. In State of Karnataka vs. Vedanayagam, (1995) 1 SCC 326 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 231 this Court considered the usual argument of a single injury not being sufficient to invite a conviction under Section 302 IPC. In that case the injury was caused by a knife. The medical evidence supported the version of the prosecution that the injury was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The High Court had convicted the accused for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC relying on the fact that there is only a single injury. In that case the injury was caused by a knife. The medical evidence supported the version of the prosecution that the injury was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The High Court had convicted the accused for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC relying on the fact that there is only a single injury. However, after a detailed discussion regarding the nature of injury, the part of the body chosen by the accused to inflict the same and other attendant circumstances and after discussing clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC and further relying on the decision in Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri. L.J. 818, the Court set aside the acquittal under Section 302 IPC and convicted the accused for that offence. The Court State of Karnataka vs. Vedanayagam, (1995) 1 SCC 326 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 231, relied on the observation by Bose, J. in Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri. L.J. 818 to suggest that: “16.......With due respect to the learned Judge he has linked up the intent required with the seriousness of the injury, and that, as we have shown, is not what the section requires. The two matters are quite separate and distinct, though the evidence about them may sometimes overlap.” The further observations in the above case were: [Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri. L.J. 818, AIR p. 468, Paras 16-17] “16........The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. But whether the intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of law. Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a totally separate and distinct question and has nothing to do with the question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in question. 17. It is true that in a given case the enquiry may be linked up with the seriousness of the injury. For example, if it can be proved, or if the totality of the circumstances justify an inference, that the prisoner only intended a superficial scratch and that by accident his victim stumbled and fell on the sword or spear that was used, then of course the offence is not murder. But that is not because the prisoner did not intend the injury that he intended to inflict to be as serious as it turned out to be but because he did not intend to inflict the injury in question at all. His intention in such a case would be to inflict a totally different injury. The difference is not one of law but one of fact......” (Emphasis in original) 7.2. From the above stated decisions, it emerges that there is no hard-and-fast rule that in a case of single injury Section 302 IPC would not be attracted. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The nature of injury, the part of the body where it is caused, the weapon used in causing such injury are the indicators of the fact whether the accused caused the death of the deceased with an intention of causing death or not. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The nature of injury, the part of the body where it is caused, the weapon used in causing such injury are the indicators of the fact whether the accused caused the death of the deceased with an intention of causing death or not. It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever the death occurs on account of a single blow, Section 302 IPC is ruled out. The fact situation has to be considered in each case, more particularly, under the circumstances narrated herein above, the events which precede will also have a bearing on the issue whether the act by which the death was caused was done with an intention of causing death or knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without intention to cause death. It is the totality of the circumstances which will decide the nature of offence.” 21. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, when it is the primary duty of the Court to examine the intention which is a dominant factor. The platform of the offence is a village and the dispute arose on a trivial issue of using the Kothaar of the deceased as a pathway to reach own Kothaar of the appellant. Had there been no objection, the incident would have not taken place, which reluctantly goes to show that there was no pre-meditation to cause the offence and the objection to use the way inflated which provoked the appellant and in a heat of passion, he assaulted the deceased. The nature of injury also would show that practically it was a single blow on vital part by which two severe injuries were caused. 22. In our opinion though we cannot enter into mind of the accused but the intention has to be gathered from the surrounding circumstances and the reason for such agitated inflated behaviour. In a normal household in the village the axe is available, therefore, though the evidence available would show the way and the offence was committed. The appellant done the act with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but there was no intention on the part of the accused either to cause death or bodily injury as is likely to cause death. The appellant done the act with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but there was no intention on the part of the accused either to cause death or bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Therefore, in our considered view, we hold that the offence committed by the appellant would amount to culpable homicidal not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. 23. Accordingly, we allow the appeal in part. Conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC are hereby set aside and instead he is convicted under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for ten (10) years. The fine amount and the default sentence imposed by the trial Court shall remain unaltered.