JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present revision has been filed against the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge (Appellate Court) vide which the appeal filed by the revisionist/appellant (accused before learned Trial Court) was partly allowed. (Parties shall hereinafter referred to in the same manner in which they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that Manju (PW2), her friends Somi Devi (Not examined), Rekha Devi, Meenu Sharma & Punita had gone to Government High School, Puruwala for appearing in Science Practical Examination on 24.02.2006. They returned to their home at about 12:00 Noon after the practical. When they reached Shaheed Smark, Surajpur, a vehicle bearing registration no. HP- 01S-0190 came from the opposite side at a high speed towards the wrong side. The vehicle hit the girls. Rekha Kumari, Meenu Sharma, Somi Devi and Punita Kumari sustained injuries. They were taken to the hospital for treatment in the same vehicle. The accident occurred due to the high speed and driving the vehicle towards the wrong side of the road. The intimation was given to the police regarding the accident and entry (Ext. PW4/A) was recorded in the daily diary. ASI-Joginder Singh (PW11) went to the spot for verification of the information. He recorded the statement of Manju (Ext. PW2/A) which was sent to the Police Station where FIR (Ext. PW11/B) was registered. He filed an application (Ext. PW11/D) for conducting the medical examination of the injured. Dr. Vijay Vohra (PW7) conducted the medical examination of Rekha and found that she had suffered a simple injury which could have been caused within 24 hours of examination. He issued MLC (Ext. PW7/A). He examined Meenu and found that she had suffered a simple injury which could have been caused within 24 hours of examination. He issued MLC (Ext. PW7/B). He also examined Somi Devi and found that she had suffered a simple injury which could have been caused within 24 hours of examination. He issued the MLC (PW7/C). HC-Jaswant Singh (PW12) was deputed to the spot to carry out the investigation as per the entry (PW11/A). ASI-Joginder Singh (PW11) handed over the case file to HC-Jaswant Singh for further investigation. HCJaswant Singh visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext. PW12/A). Gulsher Ahmed (PW9) took the spot photographs (Ext. He issued the MLC (PW7/C). HC-Jaswant Singh (PW12) was deputed to the spot to carry out the investigation as per the entry (PW11/A). ASI-Joginder Singh (PW11) handed over the case file to HC-Jaswant Singh for further investigation. HCJaswant Singh visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext. PW12/A). Gulsher Ahmed (PW9) took the spot photographs (Ext. P1 to P7) and their negatives (Ext. P8 to P14). These photographs were handed over to HC-Jaswant Singh. Punita died in the accident. HC-Jaswant Singh filed an application (Ext. PW12/B) for the post-mortem examination of Punita. He prepared the inquest report (Ext. PW12/C). Dr Kamal Pasha (PW10) conducted the postmortem examination on the dead body of Punita and found that she had died due to a head injury and rupture of the spleen. He issued the Post Mortem report (Ext. PW10/A). The injury noticed by him could have been caused by a motor vehicle accident. HCJaswant Singh seized the vehicle along with a document vide memo (Ext. PW8/A). HHC-Subhash Chand conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle and found that there was no defect in the vehicle which could have led to the accident. He noticed some damage to the vehicle. He issued the report (Ext. PW5/A). HC-Jaswant Singh recorded the statements of the witnesses as per their version. After the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, and 304(A) of IPC. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304(A) of IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses to prove its case. Rekha (PW1), Manju (PW2), and Meenu Sharma (PW3) are the eyewitnesses to the incident. HHC-Amar Singh (PW4) proved the entry in the daily diary. HHC-Subhash Chand (PW5) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. Paramjeet Singh (PW6) is the owner of the vehicle who issued the certificate regarding the employment of the accused as a driver. Dr. Vijay Vohra (PW7) conducted the medical examination of the injured. HC-Piyush Kumar (PW8) is the witness to the seizure of the vehicle and the documents. Gulsher Ahmad (PW9) took the photographs. Dr. Paramjeet Singh (PW6) is the owner of the vehicle who issued the certificate regarding the employment of the accused as a driver. Dr. Vijay Vohra (PW7) conducted the medical examination of the injured. HC-Piyush Kumar (PW8) is the witness to the seizure of the vehicle and the documents. Gulsher Ahmad (PW9) took the photographs. Dr. Kamal Pasha (PW10) conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased-Punita. ASI-Joginder Singh (PW11) visited the hospital after the receipt of the information regarding the accident. HC-Jaswant Singh (PW12) conducted the investigation on the spot. 5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. denied that the girls were walking on the road and they were hit by the vehicle bearing registration no. HP-01S-0190. He also denied that he was running the vehicle at a high speed and towards the right side of the road. He stated that he was not driving the vehicle. His vehicle did not meet with the accident. He initially stated that he wanted to lead defence evidence; however, no evidence was led by him. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the version of the prosecution that the accused was driving the vehicle was duly proved by the testimonies of the eyewitnesses, who categorically admitted that the accused present in the Court was driving the vehicle and denied that the accused was not the driver of the vehicle. It was further held that the place of the accident was a national highway. The accused was driving the vehicle towards the wrong side of the road. The vehicle hit the girls on the wrong side of the road. This was duly corroborated by the site plan and the photographs. His driving the vehicle towards the wrong side of the road led to the accident. The non-examination of the village President was not material and not sufficient to discard the testimonies of the eyewitnesses. The failure to state that the accused was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner was also not fatal to the prosecution; hence, the accused was convicted for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 279, 337, and 304A of IPC. He was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.500 and in default of payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month for the commission of offences punishable under Section 279 of IPC. He was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.500 and in default of payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month for the commission of offences punishable under Section 279 of IPC. He was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and pay a fine of Rs.500 and in case of default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month for the commission of offence punishable under Section 337 of IPC. He was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two years and pay a fine of Rs.1000 and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was dismissed by learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur. Learned Sessions Judge upheld the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. It was further held that the eye-witnesses knew each other but they could not be called to be interested. Their presence on the spot was natural and there was nothing to discard their testimonies. The prosecution case cannot be doubted due to the non-examination of the witnesses. The site plan and the photographs showed that the road was empty. The accused had driven the vehicle towards the wrong side of the road and hit the girls. This led to the accident. Hence, the conviction of the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304A of IPC was upheld. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, and 337 of the IPC was also upheld. The sentence under Section 304(A) of IPC was reduced from two years to one year. 8. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned First Appellate Court, the present petition has been filed asserting that the learned Courts below erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. There were material contradictions about the place of the accident. The witnesses-Rekha Devi, Manju Devi and Meenu Sharma were interested as they were friends. Their statements were required to be seen and appreciated carefully. There were material contradictions in their testimonies and these could not have been relied upon. There were material contradictions about the place of the accident. The witnesses-Rekha Devi, Manju Devi and Meenu Sharma were interested as they were friends. Their statements were required to be seen and appreciated carefully. There were material contradictions in their testimonies and these could not have been relied upon. No independent witness was produced. It had come in the evidence of the witnesses that one Baljeet Nagra had visited the spot and one person was sitting in the vehicle. The non-examination of these witnesses is fatal to the prosecution. Paramjeet Singh (PW6) stated that he was not present on the spot and he was told about the accident by the police; hence, his testimony was not sufficient to establish the identity of the accused. Witnesses also admitted that the name of the accused was told to them by the police which also creates doubt on the prosecution's version. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Varun Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr. R.P. Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Mr Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/accused submitted that the identity of the accused was not proved. The accused had categorically denied that he was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Eye-witnesses also admitted in their cross-examinations that the names of the accused were revealed to them by the police. Learned Courts below erred in holding that the accused was the driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident. He further submitted that the prosecution has not examined the Pardhan-Baljeet Nagra who had reached the spot and the person who was sitting in the vehicle at the time of the accident. They were the independent persons to depose about the accident. An adverse inference should have been drawn against the prosecution for withholding the best evidence. As per the prosecution, the accident had taken place on the National Highway and the high speed on the highway is not sufficient to constitute negligence. Learned Courts below were swayed by the fact that one life had been lost but that was not sufficient to record the conviction of the accused. As per the prosecution, the accident had taken place on the National Highway and the high speed on the highway is not sufficient to constitute negligence. Learned Courts below were swayed by the fact that one life had been lost but that was not sufficient to record the conviction of the accused. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment and orders passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr. R.P. Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State supported the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below. He submitted that the site plan clearly shows that the accident had taken place on the right side of the road, which is the wrong side for the driver of the vehicle coming from the Paonta Sahib. It was duly proved by the testimonies of the eyewitnesses that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. This was also established by the testimony of the owner and learned Courts below had rightly concluded that the accused was the driver of the vehicle. One witness was given up because he was won over and an adverse inference cannot be drawn against the prosecution in these circumstances. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present revision has been filed against the concurrent findings of the fact recorded by the learned Trial Court and the learned Appellate Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court is not appellate Court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207 10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction alike to the appellate court and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction alike to the appellate court and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 11. This Court in Manju Ram Kalita v. State of Assam, (2009) 13 SCC 330 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1015, while dealing with the scope of reappreciation of evidence by higher Court in criminal revision, observed in paras 9, 10 and 11 of the judgment as under : (SCC pp. 333- 34) “9. So far as Issue 1 is concerned i.e. as to whether the appellant got married to Smt Ranju Sarma, is a pure question of fact. All three courts below have given concurrent findings regarding the factum of marriage and its validity. It has been held to be a valid marriage. It is a settled legal proposition that if the courts below have recorded the finding of fact, the question of reappreciation of evidence by the third court does not arise unless it is found to be totally perverse. The higher court does not sit as a regular court of appeal. Its function is to ensure that law is being properly administered. Such a court cannot embark upon the fruitless task of determining the issues by reappreciating the evidence. 10. This Court would not ordinarily interfere with the concurrent findings on pure questions of fact and review the evidence again unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the departure from normal practice. ‘9. Such a court cannot embark upon the fruitless task of determining the issues by reappreciating the evidence. 10. This Court would not ordinarily interfere with the concurrent findings on pure questions of fact and review the evidence again unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the departure from normal practice. ‘9. … The position may undoubtedly be different if the inference is one of law from [the] facts admitted and proved or where the finding of fact is materially affected by a violation of any rule of law or procedure.’ (Vide Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad [Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, 1951 SCC 136], SCC p. 139, para 9) *** 11. Thus, it is evident from the above that this Court being the fourth court should not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the courts below as the said courts have exercised their discretion in good faith giving due weight to relevant material and without being swayed by any irrelevant material. Even if two views are possible on the question of fact, we, being the fourth court, should not interfere even though we may exercise discretion differently had the case come before us initially. In view of the above, we are not inclined to interfere with the finding of fact so far as the issue of bigamy is concerned nor the quantum of punishment on this count is required to be interfered with.” 14. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Rekha Devi (PW1) stated that she was returning with her friends, Manju, Meenu Sharma, Somi and Punita on 24.02.2006 at about 12:00 Noon. When they reached near Shaheed Smarak, Surajpur, a Tata Sumo came from the opposite side of Paonta Sahib at a high speed and hit the girls. She, Meenu, Somi and Punita sustained injuries. Punita succumbed to her injuries. They were walking towards their side of the road. The accused was driving the vehicle. They were taken in the same vehicle to Vohra Hospital for treatment, where they were medically examined. The accident had taken place due to the negligence of the accused. 16. She stated in her cross-examination that the place of the accident is heavily frequented by the vehicles and it is located on the national highway. No other vehicle was moving on the road at the time of the accident. The accident had taken place due to the negligence of the accused. 16. She stated in her cross-examination that the place of the accident is heavily frequented by the vehicles and it is located on the national highway. No other vehicle was moving on the road at the time of the accident. She admitted that there was a curve near the place of the accident. She did not know the name of the accused before the accident and she had not seen him driving the vehicle before that day. The name of the accused was disclosed by the Police to her. One person was sitting in the vehicle. She denied that the accused was not driving the vehicle at that time. She denied that they were walking on a single line on the road. She did not know that the driver of the vehicle had sounded the horn. She could not tell the speed of the vehicle. The vehicle was stopped by Pardhan. They were talking to each other. She denied that the vehicle was moving towards its correct side. She volunteered to say that the vehicle hit them towards their side. She denied that she was not present on the spot and the accused was not driving the vehicle. 17. Manju (PW2) also stated in her examination-in-chief that she, Rekha, Punita, Somi and Meenu were returning to their home after taking the practical. When they reached near bridge, a Tata Sumo came at a high speed and hit the girls. She sustained injuries. Punita, Somi, Meenu and Rekha also sustained injuries. The driver took them to Vohra Hospital in the same vehicle. One other person was also sitting in the vehicle, whose name was not known to her. 18. She stated in her cross-examination that Nahan- Paonta road is heavily frequented by vehicles. She admitted that there was a sharp curve at the place of the incident. She admitted that the driver was driving the vehicle towards his side. She denied that two or three persons were sitting in the vehicle. She admitted that she did not know the driver before the accident and that she had not seen the accused driving the vehicle before the accident. She could not tell the parentage of the accused. She denied that they were moving in the middle of the road by spreading out. She admitted that she did not know the driver before the accident and that she had not seen the accused driving the vehicle before the accident. She could not tell the parentage of the accused. She denied that they were moving in the middle of the road by spreading out. She admitted that they were talking to each other and they were busy in conversations. She admitted that there were houses at the place of the incident. She admitted that many people had gathered after the accident. The police revealed the name of the accused to her. She denied that the registration number was disclosed to her by the police. She volunteered to say that she had seen it herself. She admitted that the site plan was prepared at her instance. She admitted that she could not tell the speed of the vehicle. She also admitted that the other witnesses were her friends. She denied that the accident had taken place due to the negligence of the girls. 19. Meenu Sharma (PW3) stated that she, Rekha, Somi, Manju and Punita were walking on the road at about 12:30 noon towards their home. When they reached Shaheed Smarak, a Tata Sumo came at a high speed from Paonta side and hit the girls on the roadside. The girls fell. Punita sustained serious injuries and succumbed to those injuries. She also sustained injuries. The accused was driving the vehicle. The vehicle moved ahead but many people had gathered on the spot to stop the vehicle. The injured were taken to Vohra Hospital in the same vehicle. 20. She stated in her cross-examination that the place of the incident is located on the National Highway where the vehicles frequently move. She denied that many vehicles were moving at the time of the accident. She volunteered to say that only this vehicle was moving on the road. She did not know that there was a house towards the other side of the road where the people were residing. She admitted that there are many houses at some distance from Pulia from where the place of incident is visible. She could not say that the distance between those houses was about half furlong. She did not know that the workshop of Ashok Leyland was located at some distance from the place of the incident. Pardhan-Baljeet Singh Nagra also reached the spot after the accident. She could not say that the distance between those houses was about half furlong. She did not know that the workshop of Ashok Leyland was located at some distance from the place of the incident. Pardhan-Baljeet Singh Nagra also reached the spot after the accident. She stated that one other person was sitting in the vehicle with the accused. However, she did not know his name. She denied that the vehicle was moving towards its side. She volunteered to say that it was moving towards their side. She also denied that the vehicle was moving at a normal speed. She admitted that she did not know the accused before the accident. She volunteered to say that she had seen the accused at the time of driving the vehicle and his name was disclosed by the police. She admitted that there was a curve near the place of the accident. She denied that the girls were moving by spreading out on the road. She volunteered to say that they were only in the front and the rear. She denied that the girls were walking in the middle of the road. They had seen the vehicle at a distance of 10-15 feet. She admitted that there was a deep curve near the place of the accident. She denied that there was no negligence on the part of the accused or that he was not present on the spot. She admitted that all the witnesses were her friends. She denied that she was making a false statement. 21. These are the testimonies of the eyewitnesses. 22. It is apparent from the statements of these witnesses that they have consistently identified the accused as the driver of the vehicle. They were taken in the same vehicle to the hospital. Therefore, they had sufficient opportunity to see the accused. Therefore, there was no necessity for the test identification parade. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Daya Singh v. State of Haryana, (2001) 3 SCC 468 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 553: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 426 that where the witnesses had a lasting impression of a person, the absence of the test identification parade is not fatal. It was observed: 13. The question, therefore, is — whether the evidence of injured eyewitnesses PW 37 and PW 38 is sufficient to connect the appellant with the crime beyond reasonable doubt. It was observed: 13. The question, therefore, is — whether the evidence of injured eyewitnesses PW 37 and PW 38 is sufficient to connect the appellant with the crime beyond reasonable doubt. For this purpose, it is to be borne in mind that the purpose of test identification is to have corroboration to the evidence of the eyewitnesses in the form of earlier identification and that substantive evidence of a witness is the evidence in the court. If that evidence is found to be reliable then the absence of corroboration by test identification would not be in any way material. Further, where reasons for gaining an enduring impress of the identity on the mind and memory of the witnesses are brought on record, it is no use to magnify the theoretical possibilities and arrive at a conclusion — what in a present-day social environment infested by terrorism is really unimportant. In such cases, not holding of identification parade is not fatal to the prosecution. 23. Similarly it was held in Ramanbhai Naranbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 1 SCC 358 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 113: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 1243 that where the witnesses had a lasting impression of the assailants, their testimonies in the Court could be relied upon. It was observed: But even assuming as submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that the evidence of these two injured witnesses i.e. Bhogilal Ranchhodbhai and Karsanbhai Vallabhbhai identifying the accused in the Court may be treated to be of no assistance to the prosecution, the fact remains that these eyewitnesses were seriously injured and they could have easily seen the faces of the persons assaulting them and their appearance and identity would well remain imprinted in their minds especially when they were assaulted in broad daylight. They could not be said to be interested in roping innocent persons by shielding the real accused who had assaulted them. 24. Reliance was placed upon their statements in their cross-examinations that the name of the accused was revealed to them by the police. This statement is not sufficient to cast doubt regarding their testimonies because they never stated that they knew the name of the accused before the incident. Hence, it was quite possible for them to identify the accused on the spot and then being told about the name of the accused by the police. This statement is not sufficient to cast doubt regarding their testimonies because they never stated that they knew the name of the accused before the incident. Hence, it was quite possible for them to identify the accused on the spot and then being told about the name of the accused by the police. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly relied upon their testimonies to hold that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. 25. Paramjeet Singh (PW6) is the owner of the vehicle. He stated that he had engaged the accused as the driver of the vehicle. He stated in his cross-examination that the police had told him about the accident and he had not visited the spot. Reliance was placed upon this admission to submit that his testimony cannot be used for concluding that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. This witness has proved that he is the owner of the vehicle and he had employed the accused as the driver. This part of his testimony was not challenged in the crossexamination, which means that the same has been accepted as correct. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Nahar Singh 1998 (3) SCC 561 that where the testimony of a witness is not challenged in the crossexamination, the same cannot be challenged during the arguments. This position was reiterated in Arvind Singh Versus State of Maharashtra AIR 2020 (SC) 2451 and it was held: [57] The House of Lords in a judgment reported as Browne v. Dunn 1894 6 Reports 67 (HL) considered the principles of appreciation of evidence. Lord Chancellor Herschell, held that it is absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness if not speaking the truth on a particular point, direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged. It was held as under: "Now, my Lords, I cannot help saying that it seems to me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the circumstances which it is suggested indicate that the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intend to impeach a witness you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case but is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses. Sometimes reflections have been made upon excessive cross-examination of witnesses, and it has been complained of as undue, but it seems to me that crossexamination of a witness which errs in the direction of excess may be far more fair to him than to leave him without cross-examination, and afterwards, to suggest that he is not a witness of truth, I mean upon a point on which it is not otherwise perfectly clear that he has had full notice beforehand that there is an intention to impeach the credibility of the story which he is telling." [58] Lord Halsbury, in a separate but concurring opinion, held as under: "My Lords, with regard to the manner in which the evidence was given in this case, I cannot too heartily express my concurrence with the Lord Chancellor as to the mode in which a trial should be conducted. To my mind, nothing would be more absolutely unjust than not to cross-examine witnesses upon evidence which they have given, so as to give them notice, and to give them an opportunity of explanation, and an opportunity very often to defend their own character, and, not having given them such an opportunity, to ask the jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have said, although not one question has been directed either to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they have deposed to." [59] This Court in a judgment reported as State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, 1998 3 SCC 561 , quoted from Browne to hold that in the absence of cross-examination on the explanation of the delay, the evidence of PW-1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court. Section 146 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. This Court held as under:- "13. It may be noted here that part of the statement of PW 1 was not cross-examined by the accused. In the absence of cross-examination on the explanation of the delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court. Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. The scope of that provision is enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act by allowing a witness to be questioned: (1) to test his veracity, (2) to discover who he is and what is his position in life, or (3) to shake his credit by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions might tend directly or indirectly to incriminate him or might expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture." [60] This Court in a judgment reported as Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah (Dead) through LRs. v. Muddasani Sarojana, 2016 (12) SCC 288 laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross-examination is one of essential justice and not merely a technical one. It was held as under: "15. v. Muddasani Sarojana, 2016 (12) SCC 288 laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross-examination is one of essential justice and not merely a technical one. It was held as under: "15. Moreover, there was no effective crossexamination made on the plaintiff's witnesses with respect to the factum of execution of the sale deed, PW 1 and PW 2 have not been cross-examined as to the factum of execution of the sale deed. The crossexamination is a matter of substance not of procedure one is required to put one's version in the crossexamination of the opponent. The effect of non-crossexamination is that the statement of the witness has not been disputed. The effect of not cross-examining the witnesses has been considered by this Court in Bhoju Mandal v. Debnath Bhagat [Bhoju Mandal v. Debnath Bhagat, 1963 AIR(SC) 1906]. This Court repelled a submission on the ground that the same was not put either to the witnesses or suggested before the courts below. A party is required to put his version to the witness. If no such questions are put the Court would presume that the witness account has been accepted as held in Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. 1958 AIR(P&H) 440. 16. In Maroti Bansi Teli v. Radhabai [Maroti Bansi Teli v. Radhabai, 1945 AIR(Nag) 60, it has been laid down that the matters sworn to by one party in the pleadings not challenged either in pleadings or cross-examination by other party must be accepted as fully established. The High Court of Calcutta in A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian 1961 AIR(Cal) 359 has laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross-examination is one of essential justice and not merely a technical one. A Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Kuwarlal Amritlal v. Rekhlal Koduram 1950 AIR(Nag) 83 has laid down that when attestation is not specifically challenged and the witness is not cross-examined regarding details of attestation, it is sufficient for him to say that the document was attested. A Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Kuwarlal Amritlal v. Rekhlal Koduram 1950 AIR(Nag) 83 has laid down that when attestation is not specifically challenged and the witness is not cross-examined regarding details of attestation, it is sufficient for him to say that the document was attested. If the other side wants to challenge that statement, it is their duty, quite apart from raising it in the pleadings, to cross-examine the witness along those lines. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Karnidan Sarda v. Sailaja Kanta Mitra 1940 AIR(Pat) 683 has laid down that it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the system of administration of justice allows of cross-examination of opposite party's witnesses for the purpose of testing their evidence, and it must be assumed that when the witnesses were not tested in that way, their evidence is to be ordinarily accepted. In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court has gravely erred in law in reversing the findings of the first appellate court as to the factum of execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff." 26. There is a presumption of continuity of the things and the Court can draw a reasonable inference from his testimony that when he had employed the accused as a driver, the accused would continue to be the driver unless the contrary is shown. Since there is nothing contrary on record, therefore, his testimony would corroborate the testimonies of Rekha, Manju and Meenu that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. 27. It was suggested to the witnesses that the vehicle was being driven towards the driver’s side, the girls were moving on the road by spreading themselves, they attempted to cross the road, there was no negligence on the part of the driver and the accident occurred due to the negligence on the part of the girls. These suggestions clearly show that the presence of the accused on the spot is not disputed, otherwise, it was not possible for the accused to suggest that the girls were moving by spreading out on the road or that they had attempted to cross the road or the accident had taken place on their side. It was submitted that the suggestions are part of the defence strategy and cannot be used against the accused. However, this submission is not acceptable. It was submitted that the suggestions are part of the defence strategy and cannot be used against the accused. However, this submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355 that the suggestion put to the witness can be taken into consideration while determining the innocence or guilt of the accused. It was observed: - “34. According to the learned counsel, such suggestions could be a part of the defence strategy to impeach the credibility of the witness. The proof of guilt required of the prosecution does not depend on the suggestion made to a witness. 35. In Tarun Bora alias Alok Hazarika v. State of Assam reported in 2002 Cri. LJ 4076, a three-judge Bench of this Court was dealing with an appeal against the order passed by the Designated Court, Guwahati, in the TADA Sessions case wherein the appellant was convicted under Section 365 of the IPC read with Section 3(1) and 3(5) of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. 36. In the aforesaid case, this Court, while considering the evidence on record took note of a suggestion which was put to one of the witnesses and considering the reply given by the witness to the suggestion put by the accused, arrived at the conclusion that the presence of the accused was admitted. We quote with profit the following observations made by this Court in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 as under: “15. The witness further stated that during the assault, the assailant accused him of giving information to the army about the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). He further stated that on the third night, he was carried away blindfolded on a bicycle to a different place and when his eyes were unfolded, he could see his younger brother-Kumud Kakati (P.W.-2) and his wife Smt. Prema Kakati (P.W.-3). The place was Duliapather, which is about 6-7 km. away from his village Sakrahi. The witness identified the appellant- Tarun Bora and stated that it was he who took him in an ambassador car from the residence of Nandeswar Bora on the date of the incident. 16. In cross-examination the witness stated as under: "Accused-Tarun Bora did not blind my eyes nor he assaulted me." 17. away from his village Sakrahi. The witness identified the appellant- Tarun Bora and stated that it was he who took him in an ambassador car from the residence of Nandeswar Bora on the date of the incident. 16. In cross-examination the witness stated as under: "Accused-Tarun Bora did not blind my eyes nor he assaulted me." 17. This part of the cross-examination is suggestive of the presence of accused Tarun Bora in the whole episode. This will clearly suggest the presence of the accused-Tarun Bora as admitted. The only denial is the accused did not participate in blind-folding the eyes of the witness nor assaulted him.” 37. In Rakesh Kumar alias Babli v. State of Haryana reported in (1987) 2 SCC 34 , this Court was dealing with an appeal against the judgment of the High Court affirming the order of the Sessions Judge whereby the appellant and three other persons were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. While re-appreciating the evidence on record, this Court noticed that in the cross-examination of PW 4, Sube Singh, a suggestion was made with regard to the colour of the shirt worn by one of the accused persons at the time of the incident. This Court taking into consideration the nature of the suggestion put by the defence and the reply arrived at the conclusion that the presence of the accused namely Dharam Vir was established on the spot at the time of occurrence. We quote the following observations made by this Court in paragraphs 8 and 9 as under: “8. PW 3, Bhagat Singh, stated in his examination-in-chief that he had identified the accused at the time of occurrence. But curiously enough, he was not crossexamined as to how and in what manner he could identify the accused, as pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge. No suggestion was also given to him that the place was dark and that it was not possible to identify the assailants of the deceased. 9. In his cross-examination, PW 4, Sube Singh, stated that the accused Dharam Vir was wearing a shirt of white colour. It was suggested to him on behalf of the accused that Dharam Vir was wearing a shirt of cream colour. 9. In his cross-examination, PW 4, Sube Singh, stated that the accused Dharam Vir was wearing a shirt of white colour. It was suggested to him on behalf of the accused that Dharam Vir was wearing a shirt of cream colour. In answer to that suggestion, PW 4 said: “It is not correct that Dharam Vir accused was wearing a shirt of a cream colour and not a white colour at that time.” The learned Sessions Judge has rightly observed that the above suggestion at least proves the presence of accused Dharam Vir, on the spot at the time of occurrence.” 38. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the suggestion made by the defence counsel to a witness in the crossexamination if found to be incriminating in nature in any manner would definitely bind the accused and the accused cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions against his client. 39. Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except the concession on the point of law. As a legal proposition, we cannot agree with the submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants that an answer by a witness to a suggestion made by the defence counsel in the cross-examination does not deserve any value or utility if it incriminates the accused in any manner.” 28. Hence, it was duly proved on record that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. 29. It was submitted that the girls were known to each other and they were friends, therefore, they were interested witnesses and the learned Courts below erred in relying upon their testimonies. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laltu Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2019) 15 SCC 344 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 275: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 2 that there is a distinction between an interested witness and related witness. The interested witness is the one who derives some benefits from the litigation. It was observed: 12. As regards the contention that the eyewitnesses are close relatives of the deceased, it is by now well-settled that a related witness cannot be said to be an “interested” witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim. The interested witness is the one who derives some benefits from the litigation. It was observed: 12. As regards the contention that the eyewitnesses are close relatives of the deceased, it is by now well-settled that a related witness cannot be said to be an “interested” witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim. This Court has elucidated the difference between “interested” and “related” witnesses in a plethora of cases, stating that a witness may be called interested only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of litigation, which in the context of a criminal case would mean that the witness has a direct or indirect interest in seeing the accused punished due to prior enmity or other reasons, and thus has a motive to falsely implicate the accused (for instance, see State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593]; Amit v. State of U.P. [Amit v. State of U.P., (2012) 4 SCC 107 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 590] and Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 298 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 182]). 13. Recently, this difference was reiterated in Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793, in the following terms, by referring to the three-Judge Bench decision in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593] : (Ganapathi case [Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793], SCC p. 555, para 14) “14. “Related” is not equivalent to “interested”. A witness may be called “interested” only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eyewitness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be “interested”.…” 14. In criminal cases, it is often the case that the offence is witnessed by a close relative of the victim, whose presence on the scene of the offence would be natural. The evidence of such a witness cannot automatically be discarded by labelling the witness as interested. In criminal cases, it is often the case that the offence is witnessed by a close relative of the victim, whose presence on the scene of the offence would be natural. The evidence of such a witness cannot automatically be discarded by labelling the witness as interested. Indeed, one of the earliest statements with respect to interested witnesses in criminal cases was made by this Court in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145 : AIR 1953 SC 364 : 1953 Cri LJ 1465, wherein this Court observed : (AIR p. 366, para 26) “26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person.” 15. In the case of a related witness, the Court may not treat his or her testimony as inherently tainted and needs to ensure only that the evidence is inherently reliable, probable, cogent and consistent. We may refer to the observations of this Court in Jayabalan v. State (UT of Pondicherry), (2010) 1 SCC 199 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 966 : (SCC p. 213, para 23) “23. We are of the considered view that in cases where the court is called upon to deal with the evidence of the interested witnesses, the approach of the court while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses must not be pedantic. The court must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim.” 30. In the present case, nothing was shown that the eyewitnesses would derive some benefits from the litigation. Hence, the submission that the girls were interested witnesses is not acceptable. 31. The presence of these witnesses is duly established by the injuries noticed by Dr Vijay Vohra on their person, which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. In the present case, nothing was shown that the eyewitnesses would derive some benefits from the litigation. Hence, the submission that the girls were interested witnesses is not acceptable. 31. The presence of these witnesses is duly established by the injuries noticed by Dr Vijay Vohra on their person, which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. Therefore, they are stamped witnesses and their presence on the spot cannot be doubted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1551 that the testimony of an injured witness should be relied upon. It was observed at page 726: 28. Darshan Singh (PW 4) was an injured witness. He had been examined by the doctor. His testimony could not be brushed aside lightly. He had given full details of the incident as he was present at the time when the assailants reached the tubewell. In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka [1994 Supp (3) SCC 235: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1694] this Court has held that the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies, for the reason that his presence on the scene stands established in case it is proved that he suffered the injury during the said incident. 29. In State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand [ (2004) 7 SCC 629 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2021] a similar view has been reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. In case the injured witness is subjected to lengthy crossexamination and nothing can be elicited to discard his testimony, it should be relied upon (vide Krishan v. State of Haryana [ (2006) 12 SCC 459 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 214]). Thus, we are of the considered opinion that evidence of Darshan Singh (PW 4) has rightly been relied upon by the courts below. 32. In the present case the witnesses had suffered multiple injuries and their presence on the spot cannot be undisputed. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that evidence of Darshan Singh (PW 4) has rightly been relied upon by the courts below. 32. In the present case the witnesses had suffered multiple injuries and their presence on the spot cannot be undisputed. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Singh @ Harbhajan Singh & Ors. Versus State Of Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 421 , that the evidence of the stamped witness must be given due weightage as his presence on the spot cannot be doubted. It was observed:- “36. The evidence of the stamped witness must be given due weightage as his presence at the place of occurrence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that he was present at the time of occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. Such a witness comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. "Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness". Thus, the evidence of an injured witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein. (Vide: Abdul Sayeed v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 10 SCC 259 ; Kailas & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 793 ; Durbal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 2 SCC 676 ; and State of U.P. v. Naresh & Ors., (2011) 4 SCC 324 ). 33. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P Versus Smt. Noorie Alias Noor Jahan And Others, (1996) 9 SCC 104 , that while assessing the evidence of an eye witness, the Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether in the circumstances of the case, it was possible for the eye witness to be present and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. It was observed:- “7. It was observed:- “7. The High Court having acquitted the accused persons on appreciation of the evidence, we have ourselves scrutinised the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3. The conclusion is irresistible that their evidence on material particulars has been brushed aside by the High Court by entering into the realm of conjecture and fanciful speculation without even discussing the evidence more particularly the evidence relating to the basic prosecution case. While assessing and evaluating the evidence of eyewitnesses the Court must adhere to two principles, namely whether in the circumstances of the case, it was possible for the eyewitness to be present at the scene and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. The High Court in our opinion has failed to observe the aforesaid principles and in fact, had misappreciated the evidence which has caused a gross miscarriage of justice. The credibility of a witness has to be decided by referring to his evidence and finding out how he has fared in crossexamination and what impression is created by his evidence taken insofar as the context of the case and not by entering into the realm of conjecture and speculation.” 34. There is nothing inherently improbable in their testimonies, therefore, their testimonies cannot be discarded. 35. Reliance was also placed upon the admission, in the cross-examination of Dr Vijay Vohra that injuries mentioned in the MLC can be caused by a fall on a hard surface. However, that is merely an alternative hypothesis and in the absence of any evidence regarding the fall that too, a simultaneous fall, the same is not sufficient to cast doubt on the testimonies of the eyewitnesses. 36. A heavy reliance was placed upon the fact that the prosecution had not examined the person who was sitting in the vehicle. Therefore, an adverse inference should be drawn against the prosecution. This submission cannot be accepted. Ram Kumar Sharma was cited at serial number five in the list of witnesses. He was given up as having been won over. It was held in Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 7 SCC 490 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1416: 2000 SCC OnLine SC 1311 that the Public Prosecutor is under no obligation to examine all the witnesses. If the witness has been won over, the Public Prosecutor can give him up. It was observed: 12. It was held in Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 7 SCC 490 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1416: 2000 SCC OnLine SC 1311 that the Public Prosecutor is under no obligation to examine all the witnesses. If the witness has been won over, the Public Prosecutor can give him up. It was observed: 12. In trials before a Court of Session the prosecution “shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor”. Section 226 of the Code enjoins on him to open up his case by describing the charge brought against the accused. He has to state what evidence he proposes to adduce for proving the guilt of the accused. If he knew at that stage itself that certain persons cited by the investigating agency as witnesses might not support the prosecution case he is at liberty to state before the Court that fact. Alternatively, he can wait further and obtain direct information about the version which any particular witness might speak in court. If that version is not in support of the prosecution case it would be unreasonable to insist on the Public Prosecutor to examine those persons as witnesses for prosecution. 13. When the case reaches the stage envisaged in Section 231 of the Code the Sessions Judge is obliged “to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution”. It is clear from the said section that the Public Prosecutor is expected to produce evidence “in support of the prosecution” and not in derogation of the prosecution case. At the said stage the Public Prosecutor would be in a position to take a decision as to which among the persons cited are to be examined. If there are too many witnesses on the same point the Public Prosecutor is at liberty to choose two or some among them alone so that the time of the Court can be saved from repetitious depositions on the same factual aspects. That principle applies when there are too many witnesses cited if they all had sustained injuries at the occurrence. The Public Prosecutor in such cases is not obliged to examine all the injured witnesses. If he is satisfied by examining any two or three of them, it is open to him to inform the Court that he does not propose to examine the remaining persons in that category. The Public Prosecutor in such cases is not obliged to examine all the injured witnesses. If he is satisfied by examining any two or three of them, it is open to him to inform the Court that he does not propose to examine the remaining persons in that category. This will help not only the prosecution in relieving itself of the strain of adducing repetitive evidence on the same point but also help the Court considerably in lessening the workload. The time has come to make every effort possible to lessen the workload, particularly those courts crammed with cases, but without impairing the cause of justice. 37. This position was reiterated in Banti v. State of M.P., (2004) 1 SCC 414 . Thus, no adverse inference can be drawn for giving up the occupant of the vehicle. 38. It was submitted that Pradhan Baljeet Nagar and many other persons had reached the spot, who were not examined. There were many houses in the vicinity and their residents were also not examined; hence, an adverse inference should be drawn against the prosecution. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Srichand K. Khetwani v. State of Maharashtra, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 32 : (1967) 1 SCR 595 : AIR 1967 SC 450 : 1967 Cri LJ 414 : (1967) 2 SCJ 178 that an adverse inference can only be drawn for withholding the evidence and not for failure to obtain the evidence. It was observed: 8. Further, an adverse inference against the prosecution can be drawn only if it withholds certain evidence and not merely on account of its failure to obtain certain evidence. When no such evidence has been obtained, it cannot be said what that evidence could have been and therefore no question of presuming that that evidence would have been against the prosecution, under Section 114, illustration (g) of the Evidence Act, can arise. 39. In the present case, the statements of Pradhan and the inmates were not recorded by the Investigating officer. Hence, it is a case of failure to obtain the evidence and not the withholding of the evidence and no adverse inference can be drawn. 40. 39. In the present case, the statements of Pradhan and the inmates were not recorded by the Investigating officer. Hence, it is a case of failure to obtain the evidence and not the withholding of the evidence and no adverse inference can be drawn. 40. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pohlu v. State of Haryana, (2005) 10 SCC 196 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1496: 2004 SCC OnLine SC 1393 that the intrinsic worth of the statements of witnesses examined by the prosecution is to be seen and if the testimonies of the witnesses are truthful, non-examination of some other witness will not affect the prosecution case. It was observed: 10. It was then submitted that some of the material witnesses were not examined and in this connection, it was argued that two of the eyewitnesses named in the FIR, namely, Chander and Sita Ram were not examined by the prosecution. Dharamvir, son of Sukhdei was also not examined by the prosecution though he was a material witness, being an injured eyewitness, having witnessed the assault that took place in the house of Sukhdei, PW 2. It is true that it is not necessary for the prosecution to multiply witnesses if it prefers to rely upon the evidence of the eyewitnesses examined by it, which it considers sufficient to prove the case of the prosecution. However, the intrinsic worth of the testimony of the witnesses examined by the prosecution has to be assessed by the court. If their evidence appears to be truthful, reliable and acceptable, the mere fact that some other witnesses have not been examined, will not adversely affect the case of the prosecution. We have, therefore, to examine the evidence of the two eyewitnesses, namely, PW 1 and PW 2, and to find whether their evidence is true, on the basis of which the conviction of the appellants can be sustained. 41. It was held in State of U.P. v. Ganga Ram, (2005) 13 SCC 239 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 154: 2005 SCC OnLine SC 1537 that the prosecution case cannot be doubted just because some other pedestrian or the resident present on the spot was not examined when the evidence of the examined witnesses is found satisfactory. It was observed: 9. It was observed: 9. One of the grounds on which the High Court recorded the acquittal of the accused was that the occurrence is stated to have taken place on a pucca road on which bullock-carts, buses and other vehicles also go. The time is also 5.15 p.m. but no outsider or pedestrian or resident of the vicinity has been named in the FIR or the statement of the witnesses but only PW 2 Hemraj has been examined as an independent witness. This ground, taken by the High Court, is farfetched and contrary to the testimony of eyewitnesses. This can be hardly a ground to disbelieve the otherwise creditworthy testimony, which inspired confidence. It is now a well-settled principle of law that whom to cite as a witness and whom not is within the domain of the prosecution. It is also a well-settled principle that the prosecution evidence has to be weighed and not to be counted. Just because any other pedestrian or resident of the vicinity has not been cited as a witness will be no grounds to throw away the otherwise reliable testimony of the eyewitnesses which is natural and inspires confidence. There is no evidence on record to show that there were other pedestrians or residents of the vicinity present at the relevant time, besides the prosecution witnesses. In our view, the aforesaid reason by the High Court is based on conjectures and surmises and is perverse. 42. Further, the witnesses stated that Pradhan and other persons had reached the spot after the accident and they could not have deposed about the actual accident. Hence, their nonexamination will not affect the prosecution case in any manner. 43. The witnesses consistently stated that the accident had taken place towards the right side of the road and the accused had brought the vehicle towards the right side of the road. The site plan (Ex. PW12/A) shows that the width of the road was 30 feet out of which 23 feet was mettled. The vehicle had left its side and it was driven towards the other side. The site plan corroborates the testimonies of the witnesses. 44. Reliance was placed on the cross-examination of Manju (PW2) wherein she stated that the vehicle was going towards its side. It was submitted that this admission is sufficient to cast doubt regarding the prosecution case. This submission is not acceptable. The site plan corroborates the testimonies of the witnesses. 44. Reliance was placed on the cross-examination of Manju (PW2) wherein she stated that the vehicle was going towards its side. It was submitted that this admission is sufficient to cast doubt regarding the prosecution case. This submission is not acceptable. The witness had only stated that the vehicle was towards its side without clarifying whether it was towards the left side of the road or the right side. When the site plan shows the vehicle towards the right side, her testimony is not sufficient to infer that the vehicle was being driven towards the left side. It is trite to say that the man may lie but the circumstances do not. Hence, her testimony cannot be used to discard the prosecution case. 45. Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the vehicle was being driven towards the right side and this caused the accident. 46. Rule 2 of the Rules of Road Regulations 1989 provides that the driver of a motor vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right-hand side. Therefore, the driver is under obligation to drive the vehicle towards the left side or as close to the left as possible. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State AIR 1961 Orissa 71 that driving the vehicle on the wrong side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 47. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 47. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399 that where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was clearly negligent. It was observed: “It has been proved from the spot map and other evidence that respondent rashly or negligently took the vehicle from almost left side of the road to the right side of the road which was wrong side for him and struck against the girl as a result of which she died. In Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 208 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering a case under Section 304-A, IPC and in para 4 has held as follows:— "It is admitted that the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. It is also admitted that the bus was driven over a bridge and then it fell into the canal. In such a situation the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and the burden shifts on to the man who was in control of the automobile to establish that the accident did not happen on account of any negligence on his part. He did not succeed in showing that the accident happened due to causes other than negligence on his part." In the present case, the respondent has not at all explained under what circumstances he struck the deceased girl almost on the edge of the wrong side of the road after leaving skid marks of 74 feet in length on the road. The explanation of the respondent that the deceased all of a sudden tried to cross the road and in that process she struck with the mudguard of the jeep does not emerge from the evidence, rather it is false. The prosecution has proved rash or negligent driving on the part of the respondent which caused the death of Anu. Thus, an offence under Sections 279, 304-A, IPC is proved.” 48. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 and it was held: “16. The prosecution has proved rash or negligent driving on the part of the respondent which caused the death of Anu. Thus, an offence under Sections 279, 304-A, IPC is proved.” 48. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side while going from Dangri to Kangoo there was a 7 ft. kacha portion and on the other side, there is an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-6. This fact is apparent also from the fact that after he was hit the injured fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on its wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses who state that they were on the extreme left side and the motorcycle which was coming from the opposite side hit them. It does not need the genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 49. Therefore, the accused was clearly negligent in driving the Tata Sumo towards the right side of the road and his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. 50. It was submitted that there are contradictions in the testimonies of the witnesses. The incident had taken place on 24.02.2006. The witnesses deposed after the lapse of one and a half years and two years. Human memories fail with time and do not behave like a video recorder. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde and another Versus State of Maharashtra AIR 2023 SC 1736 , that witnesses do not have photographic memory and the contradictions are bound to come with time. It was observed as under:- “25. Human memories fail with time and do not behave like a video recorder. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde and another Versus State of Maharashtra AIR 2023 SC 1736 , that witnesses do not have photographic memory and the contradictions are bound to come with time. It was observed as under:- “25. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straightjacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which did not have this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events, which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events, which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat 1983 Cri LJ 1096 : ( AIR 1983 SC 753 ) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana AIR 1995 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP ( AIR 1959 SC 1012 )] 51. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 253, that the Court has to examine the evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to omission, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed:- 38.... This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238 held : (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. It was observed:- 38.... This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238 held : (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter, and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546, Mr Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. In this case, there was no contradiction, only minor discrepancies. 40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202, this Court held : (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32) “30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even in law render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Such discrepancies may even in law render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740, Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546, Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 323 and Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 961. 31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case, that the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055]. 32. These are variations which would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 persons can hardly be expected to state a minuteby- minute description of the event. Everybody, and more particularly a person who is known to or is related to the deceased, would give all his attention to taking steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to make every effort to provide him with medical aid and inform the police. The statements which are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements being made and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 777] .” 41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685, this Court held : (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49) “46. Then, it was argued that there are certain discrepancies and contradictions in the statement of the prosecution witnesses in as much as these witnesses have given different timing as to when they had seen the scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in the statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. *** 49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statement of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any material or serious contradiction in the statement of these witnesses which may give any advantage to the accused.” 42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238, this Court held : (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter, and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 52. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh Vs State of Bihar, AIR 2022 SC 2817 , wherein it was observed:- “[17] It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries attributed on hand or foot but the constant narrative of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the place of occurrence armed with guns and they caused the injury on informant PW-6. However, the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omissions as observed by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457 . This Court while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony, while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be ground to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as under: "42. Only such omissions which amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness." 53. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court the statements of the witnesses cannot be discarded due to omissions, contradictions or discrepancies. Even if there is a contradiction of statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness." 53. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court the statements of the witnesses cannot be discarded due to omissions, contradictions or discrepancies. The Court has to see whether the discrepancies affect the prosecution case adversely or not and whether they are related to the core of the prosecution case or the details. The contradictions were bound to come in such circumstances and minor contradictions are insufficient to discard the prosecution case. 54. In the present case, no significant contradiction was pointed out. Hence, the prosecution case cannot be doubted due to minor contradictions alone. 55. It was submitted that the witnesses had not stated that the accident had taken place due to the negligence of the accused and the learned Courts below erred in convicting the accused. This submission is not acceptable. Rekha Devi (PW1) had categorically stated that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. In any case, it is not permissible for a witness to depose about rashness or negligence. A witness has to depose the facts and inference is to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without the Jury. A witness is not permitted to derive any inference but he is supposed to place the facts before the court, leaving the Jury or the Judge, when he is sitting without the Jury, to draw the inferences. The statement of a witness that the driver of the vehicle was negligent is an inference, which cannot be drawn by the witness. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington vs. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 at 595 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant but his opinion is not.” 56. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant but his opinion is not.” 56. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP) wherein it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court.” 57. Therefore, it was duly proved by the prosecution evidence that the accused was the driver of the vehicle. He had driven the vehicle towards the right side of the road, which led to the accident. In the accident, Rekha, Meenu and Somi Devi had sustained simple injuries and Punita had succumbed to her injuries. Therefore, the prosecution case for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304(A) of the IPC was duly established. 58. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for six months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279, six months and a fine for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 337. The learned Trial Court had also sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two years and a fine for the commission of offence punishable under Section 304A of IPC which was reduced to one year by the learned First Appellate Court. 59. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court should have granted the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act and the learned Courts below erred in denying this benefit to the accused. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-A of IPC. It was observed: “11. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-A of IPC. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highway are among the top killers of the country" the saturation of accidents toll was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision thus : "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence, to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. While considering the quantum of sentence, to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 60. A similar view was taken in Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 208 , wherein it was observed:- 6. Learned counsel lastly made an alternative plea that the Probation of Offenders Act may be applied to secure his job. This Court has held in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 ] that the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be invoked in cases involving rash or negligent driving of the bus resulting in death of human beings.” 61. In State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182 , it was held:- 13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. In State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182 , it was held:- 13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 62. Therefore, in view of these binding precedents, it is not permissible to grant the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act in an offence involving rash and negligent driving. 63. This Court held in State of H.P. Versus Sushil Kumar 2010(1) HLJ 298 that no leniency should be shown to a person convicting or for driving a vehicle in a rash or negligent manner. It was observed: “21. In so far as the sentence part is concerned, in my considered opinion, the learned trial Court has lost sight of the fact that there is a spiralling increase in motor vehicular accidents in recent years. Thousands of valuable lives are being lost by a sheer act of rash and negligent driving, which is more than the loss of lives in any war between countries. 22. The Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 on the question of sentence in a case of an identical nature stated:- "13. While considering the question of a sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of an automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of an automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident; or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if is convicted of the offence for causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of the vehicle he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents, due to callous driving of automobiles." 23. Hon'ble Shri Justice K.G. Balakrishnan, as he then was, while speaking for the Court, in State of Karnataka v. Sharanappa Basnagouda Aregoudar AIR 2002 Supreme Court 1529, where the accused was held guilty for causing the death of four persons and the High Court took a lenient view in sentencing the accused, observed:- "We are of the view that having regard to the serious nature of the accident, which resulted in the death of four persons, the learned Single Judge should not have interfered with the sentence imposed by the Court, below. It may create and set an unhealthy precedent and send wrong signals to the subordinate Courts which have to deal with several such accident cases. If the accused are found guilty of rash and negligent driving, Courts have to be on guard to ensure that they do not escape the clutches of law very lightly. The sentence imposed by the Courts should have a deterrent effect on potential wrongdoers and it should be commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. If the accused are found guilty of rash and negligent driving, Courts have to be on guard to ensure that they do not escape the clutches of law very lightly. The sentence imposed by the Courts should have a deterrent effect on potential wrongdoers and it should be commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. Of course, the Courts are given discretion in the matter of sentence to take stock of the wide and varying range of facts that might be relevant for fixing the quantum of sentence, but the discretion shall be exercised with due regard to the larger interest of the society and it is needless to add that passing of sentence on the offender is probably the most public face of the criminal justice system." 24. Therefore, on the examination of the matter in the above circumstances and on facts, I think no word is sufficient to criticize the conduct and prudence of the learned trial Magistrate dealing on the point of sentence in a shockingly reckless manner. Looking at the gravity of the offence, the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court is wholly inadequate. The learned trial court has inflicted a fleabite sentence on the respondent who has not atoned adequately for his misadventure.” 64. In the present case, a precious life was lost and the sentence of one year cannot be said to be excessive and no interference is required with the same. 65. No other point was urged. 66. In view of the above, the present revision fails and the same is dismissed.