ORDER : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The short question involved in the writ petition is, whether by virtue of the impugned notification dated 1-8-2013 (Annexure P-1) issued by the State Government under sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short, ‘the RTI Act’), exempting the “Anti Corruption Bureau” from the operation of the RTI Act, the said Bureau is not legally obliged to furnish information pertaining to the allegations of corruption as provided under the first proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the RTI Act? 2. The aforesaid challenge has been made on the following factual backdrop: - Relevant Facts 3. The State of Chhattisgarh exercising the power under Section 2(s) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 declared State Bureau of Investigation, Economic Offences, Raipur to be Police Station by the name of State Bureau of Investigation of Economic Offences at Raipur having the jurisdiction over the whole of the State of Chhattisgarh, by order dated 1-11-2000. Thereafter, the State Government further, in exercise of the power under Section 2(s) of the CrPC, constituted “Anti Corruption Bureau” and declared the State Bureau of Investigation, Economic Offences to be the Police Station for “Anti Corruption Bureau” as well, by order dated 27-2-2003. Thereafter, by notification dated 7-11-2006, in exercise of power under sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the RTI Act, the State Government has exempted the Chhattisgarh State Economic Offences Bureau from the operation of the RTI Act. Thereafter, by the impugned notification dated 1-8-2013, in exercise of its rule making power conferred under Section 27 read with sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the RTI Act, the State Government has exempted the Anti Corruption Bureau from the operation of the RTI Act. 4. Thereafter, by the impugned notification dated 1-8-2013, in exercise of its rule making power conferred under Section 27 read with sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the RTI Act, the State Government has exempted the Anti Corruption Bureau from the operation of the RTI Act. 4. The petitioner herein being an RTI activist, made an application under the RTI Act on 2-11-2006 (Annexure P-2) to the Public Information Officer, Anti Corruption Bureau seeking information about the number of pending cases for sanction of prosecution under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 197 of the CrPC along with name & designation of delinquent employee/officer and the provisions under which offences have been registered against those persons, which was denied by the competent authority vide Annexure P-3 holding that by virtue of notification dated 1-8-2013 (Annexure P-1), the Anti Corruption Bureau (ACB) is exempted from furnishing information under the RTI Act which is sought to be challenged by way of this writ petition. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that though by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the RTI Act, the ACB is exempted from the operation of the RTI Act, yet the ACB is obliged to furnish information, as by virtue of the first proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 24, the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption shall not be excluded and it has to be provided by the ACB and thus, by virtue of the first proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 24, the petitioner is entitled for information relating to corruption except the information which is covered by Section 10 of the RTI Act and therefore appropriate writ be issued quashing Annexure P-1 and any other appropriate writ which the petitioner is entitled may be granted to him. 6. Return has been filed by the State controverting the allegations made in the writ petition stating inter alia that Section 24 of the RTI Act clearly provides that the provisions of the RTI Act would not apply to the intelligence and security agencies being organisations established by the State Government and the ACB has already been exempted by the State Government by issuance of the impugned notification dated 1-8-2013, therefore, the ACB is exempted from sharing information and as such, the petitioner is not entitled for disclosure of information relating to ACB. It has also been pleaded that by virtue of Section 8(1)(h) of the RTI Act, there shall be no obligation to give any citizen the information which would impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders, as the main aim and object of establishment of ACB and State Economic Offences Wing in the State is to catch hold of the actual culprits by collecting cogent evidence and documents showing the offence committed by them and during investigation, an information is being sought for by any person, in that event, the culprit may try to save himself from the offence which is committed by the him. As such, sharing of information with regard to investigation carried out by the ACB as well as State Economic Offences Wing would impede the process of investigation carried out by the ACB as well as State Economic Offences Wing and therefore it cannot be disclosed and the same is covered by notification dated 1-8-2013 issued under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act, as such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. No rejoinder has been filed. Submission of the Petitioner 7. Mr. Rajkumar Mishra, the petitioner appearing in person, would submit that the first proviso to Section 24(4) of the RTI Act clearly states that the information relating to the allegations of corruption shall not be excluded, as such, the impugned notification to the extent of holding that information relating to allegations of corruption cannot be disclosed runs contrary to the object for which the RTI Act has been enacted and even by enacting the said proviso in shape of first proviso, the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and human rights violations has to be furnished, as Section 24(4) is controlled by the first proviso to Section 24(4) of the RTI Act. He would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Chief Information Commissioner and another v. State of Manipur and another, AIR 2012 SC 864 , decision of the Madras High Court in the matter of Superintendent of Police, Central Range Office of the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Chennai v. R. Karthikeyan and another, AIR 2012 Madras 84 and that of the Delhi High Court in the matter of CPIO, Intelligence Bureau v. Sanjiv Chaturvedi, AIR 2017 Delhi 192 to bolster his submission. He would also submit that the impugned notification dated 1-8-2013 is liable to be set aside. Submission on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh 8. Mr. Amrito Das, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State/respondents, would submit that the Anti Corruption Bureau being covered by the provisions contained in Section 24(4) of the RTI Act, therefore, the said Bureau has been exempted from the operation of the RTI Act, which is strictly in accordance with law by issuing notification in the Official Gazette dated 1-8-2013. Though the first proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the RTI Act is identically worded to the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 24, but while referring to the intelligence and security organisations, particularly, investigating agency, it will have to be read in conjunction with Section 8(1)(h) of the RTI Act which clearly provides that “notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be no obligation to give any citizen, information which would impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders”. Therefore, the object of the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the RTI Act is not to frustrate any investigation or to generalize claim for any information from the notified organisation (ACB). Notified investigating agencies dealing with the offences and intelligence pertaining to corruption does not per se get covered by the first proviso automatically. Information sought for to be saved by the proviso to Section 24(4) has to be exempted individually and it cannot be generalized that any agency dealing with matters concerning corruption or human rights violation cannot be exempted under Section 24 at all. Such a preposition as has been put forth by the petitioner would frustrate the object of Section 24(4) and would give undue in row into such intelligence and security organization which at many occasions are required to act discreetly maintaining confidentiality and secrecy. Mr. Das, learned State counsel, would further submit that the notification dated 1-8-2013 has been issued in exercise of the delegated power as is contained under the RTI Act and thus have the statutory flavour and the said notification can only be challenged on the permissible grounds for assailing the subordinate legislation and not otherwise. Mr. Das, learned State counsel, would further submit that the notification dated 1-8-2013 has been issued in exercise of the delegated power as is contained under the RTI Act and thus have the statutory flavour and the said notification can only be challenged on the permissible grounds for assailing the subordinate legislation and not otherwise. He would also submit that a presumption of validity shall operate in favour of the said notification and to dispel the said presumption of validity, the petitioner was required to place on record material to show that the impugned notification is either violative of the provisions of the Constitution; or that the said notification has been issued by incompetent authority; that the impugned notification is manifestly arbitrary; or that the impugned notification is violative of the RTI Act. As such, the petitioner has utterly failed to demonstrate that the impugned notification suffers from any illegality and thus the challenge made by the petitioner is wholly without substance and liable to rejected. To bolster his submission, he would rely upon the decision of the Madras High Court in the matter of S. Vijayalakshmi v. Union of India and another, AIR 2011 Madras 275. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. Principles for adjudging legality and validity of Statutory Notification 10. The petitioner has questioned the impugned notification dated 1-8-2013 issued under sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the RTI Act. Notification containing order made or issued under statutory power given by the Act are legislative in nature and said notification has force of law. 11. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of The State of Bombay and another v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318 has pertinently held as under : - “(25) … An order made by the Provincial Govt. in exercise of the power conferred by this section owes its legal efficacy to this section & therefore in the eye of the law the notification has the force of law as if made by the legislature itself. ...” 12. in exercise of the power conferred by this section owes its legal efficacy to this section & therefore in the eye of the law the notification has the force of law as if made by the legislature itself. ...” 12. Similarly, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhdev Singh and others v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and another, (1975) 1 SCC 421 , with reference to Sections 20 & 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, held as under: - “135.… The compendious term “Subordinate Legislation” refers to notifications, orders, schemes, rules and bye-laws referred to in Sections 20 and 21 of the General Clauses Act. ...” 13. Since the impugned notification dated 1-8-2013 issued under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act has the force of law, let us consider the grounds on which the constitutional validity of subordinate legislation can be questioned. 14. In considering the vires of subordinate legislation one should start with the presumption that it is intra vires. The principle means that if subordinate legislation under consideration is open to two constructions, one of which would make it bad and the other good, the courts must adopt that construction which makes it good. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edition 2010, page 1006.) 15. A Statute is construed so as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim “ut res magis valeat quam pereat”. Therefore, a presumption that the Legislature does not exceed its jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing that the Act is not within the competence of the Legislature, or that it has transgressed other constitutional mandates, such as those relating to fundamental rights, is always on the person who challenges its vires. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edition, page 592.) 16. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others (Ministry of Women and Child Development Secretary and others), (2017) 9 SCC 1 held that legislation can be struck down if it is manifestly arbitrary and manifest arbitrariness is the ground to negate legislation as well under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It has been observed by their Lordships as under : - “101. It has been observed by their Lordships as under : - “101. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121 stated that it was settled law that subordinate legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds available for challenge against plenary legislation. This being the case, there is no rational distinction between the two types of legislation when it comes to this ground of challenge under Article 14. The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.” 17. In the matter of Dental Council of India v. Biyani Shikshan Samiti and another, (2022) 6 SCC 65 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that there is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid. B.R. Gavai, J., speaking for the Supreme Court, held in paragraphs 27 & 28 of the report as under: - “27. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In addition, it may also be questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. Though it may also be questioned on the ground of unreasonableness, such unreasonableness should not be in the sense of not being reasonable, but should be in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. 28. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. Though it may also be questioned on the ground of unreasonableness, such unreasonableness should not be in the sense of not being reasonable, but should be in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. 28. It has further been held by this Court in the said case that for challenging the subordinate legislation on the ground of arbitrariness, it can only be done when it is found that it is not in conformity with the statute or that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution. It has further been held that it cannot be done merely on the ground that it is not reasonable or that it has not taken into account relevant circumstances which the Court considers relevant.” 18. Furthermore, in the matter of State of T.N. and another v. P. Krishnamurthy and others, (2006) 4 SCC 517 , the Supreme Court has held that there is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid and laid down the grounds on which the subordinate legislation can be challenged by observing as under: - “Whether the rule is valid in its entirety? 15. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid. It is also well recognized that a subordinate legislation can be challenged under any of the following grounds :- (a) Lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation. (b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. (c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution of India. (d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act. (e) Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment. (f) Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an extent where the court might well say that legislature never intended to give authority to make such rules). 16. (d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act. (e) Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment. (f) Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an extent where the court might well say that legislature never intended to give authority to make such rules). 16. The court considering the validity of a subordinate legislation, will have to consider the nature, object and scheme of the enabling Act, and also the area over which power has been delegated under the Act and then decide whether the subordinate legislation conforms to the parent statute. Where a rule is directly inconsistent with a mandatory provision of the statute, then, of course, the task of the court is simple and easy. But where the contention is that the inconsistency or non-conformity of the rule is not with reference to any specific provision of the enabling Act, but with the object and scheme of the parent Act, the court should proceed with caution before declaring invalidity.” Nature of Right to Information under the RTI Act 19. Having noticed the principles for adjudging legality and validity of statutory notification, we would now notice the off-quoted observation qua nature of right to information made by R.V. Raveendran, J. speaking for the Supreme Court in the matter of Central Board of Secondary Education and another v. Aditya Bandopadhyay and others, (2011) 8 SCC 497 which states as under: - “66. The right to information is a cherished right. Information and right to information are intended to be formidable tools in the hands of responsible citizens to fight corruption and to bring in transparency and accountability. The provisions of RTI Act should be enforced strictly and all efforts should be made to bring to light the necessary information under clause (b) of Section 4(1) of the Act which relates to securing transparency and accountability in the working of public authorities and in discouraging corruption. But in regard to other information [that is, information other than those enumerated in Sections 4(1)(b) and (c) of the Act], equal importance and emphasis are given to other public interests (like confidentiality of sensitive information, fidelity and fiduciary relationships, efficient operation of Governments, etc.).” 20. Right to information is a basic and celebrated fundamental/ basic right but is not uncontrolled. It has its limitations. Right to information is a basic and celebrated fundamental/ basic right but is not uncontrolled. It has its limitations. The right is subject to a dual check. Firstly, this right is subject to the restrictions inbuilt within the Act, and secondly, the constitutional limitations emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution. It has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi and another, (2012) 13 SCC 61 , that wherever in response to an application for disclosure of information, the public authority takes shelter under the provisions relating to exemption, non-applicability or infringement of Article 21 of the Constitution, the State Information Commission has to apply its mind and form an opinion objectively if the exemption claimed for was sustainable on facts of the case. Legislative history leading to insertion of proviso to Section 24(4) of the RTI Act 21. The Freedom of Information Act, 2002 (for short, ‘the Act of 2002’) was enacted by the Indian Parliament with effect from 6th January, 2003. It was an Act to provide for freedom to every citizen to secure access to information under the control of public authorities, consistent with public interest, in order to promote openness, transparency and accountability in administration and in relation to matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Chapter III (Miscellaneous) of the Act of 2002 contained a provision in shape of Section 16, which states that the Act of 2002 would not apply to certain organisations. It provides as under: - “16. Act not to apply to certain organisations.— (1) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the intelligence and security organisations, specified in the Schedule, being organisations established by the Central Government or any information furnished by such organisations to that Government. (2) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, amend the Schedule by including therein any other intelligence or security organisation established by that Government or omitting therefrom any organisation already specified therein and on the publication of such notification, such organisation shall be deemed to be included in or, as the case may be, omitted from the Schedule. (3) Every notification issued under sub-section (2) shall be laid before each House of Parliament. (3) Every notification issued under sub-section (2) shall be laid before each House of Parliament. (4) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to such intelligence and security organisations which may be specified, by a notification in the Official Gazette, by a State Government from time to time. (5) Every notification issued under sub-section (4) shall be laid before the State Legislature.” 22. As such, by virtue of notification under Section 16(4) of the Act of 2002, intelligence and security organisations specified in the Schedule being the organisations specified by the State Government were exempted from the operation of the Act of 2002. However, the Act of 2002 was not found to achieve the object of the Act for which it was enacted leading to which the Right to Information Bill, 2004 was proposed of which in clause 21(1) under Chapter IV (Miscellaneous), it was provided that the Act shall not apply to the intelligence and security organisations specified in the Schedule, being organisations established by the Central Government or any information furnished by such organisations to that Government along with the proviso appended to it. It states as under: - “21. Act not to apply to certain organisations.—(1) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the intelligence and security organisations specified in the Schedule, being organisations established by the Central Government or any information furnished by such organisations to that Government: Provided that the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption shall not be excluded under this sub-section.” 23. As such, the proviso appended to sub-clause (1) of clause 21 of the Right to Information Bill, 2004, provided that the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption shall not be excluded under the sub-section. 24. The Right to Information Bill, 2004 was referred by the Parliament to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice and that Committee submitted its Third Report on the Right to Information Bill, 2004 and presented it to the Rajya Sabha on 21st March, 2005 and laid on the table of the Lok Sabha on 21st March, 2005 itself wherein clause 21 was also discussed and the Committee opined that giving blanket exclusion to these agencies would not be justified and apart from the allegations of corruption, the allegations of violation of human rights was also recommended to be included in the proviso to the sub-clause (1) of clause 21. The Third Report on the Right to Information Bill, 2004 of the Parliamentary Standing Committee qua clause 21 states as under: - Clause – 21 32.1 The clause provides that the provisions of the Act shall not apply to the intelligence and security organizations specified in the Second Schedule. The proviso to the clause, however, casts an obligation on the authorities to provide information relating to allegations of corruption. 32.2 It was argued that keeping the intelligence and security agencies out of purview of the Act will not be in the larger public interest. Curbing disclosure or denial of any information may be justified only on the ground of principle of public interest override. In other words, information can be refused only if releasing such information may be prejudicial to the larger public interest. 32.3 The Committee appreciates the role and importance of the intelligence and security agencies. Though these agencies might have acted fairly and legitimately still they are not free from allegations of excesses. The Committee notes that keeping in view the importance of these agencies in national security and maintaining law and order, the exemption granted by the law may not be said to be totally irrational or illogical. It is, however, of the view that giving blanket exclusion to these agencies may also not be justified. Though proviso to sub-clause (1) leaves some scope for getting information pertaining to the allegations of corruption, it is also felt desirable to include allegations of violation of human rights. The Committee, therefore, recommends insertion of a suitable provision in the proviso to the sub-clause to give effect to the suggestion of the Committee. 25. The Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) was enacted on 15th June, 2005. The preamble to the RTI Act clearly indicates that the Act was enacted to promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority. The RTI Act was enacted in light of “Whereas democracy requires an informed citizenry and transparency of information which are vital to its functioning and also to contain corruption and to hold Governments are their instrumentalities accountable to the governed”. 26. The RTI Act was enacted in light of “Whereas democracy requires an informed citizenry and transparency of information which are vital to its functioning and also to contain corruption and to hold Governments are their instrumentalities accountable to the governed”. 26. The preamble to the RTI Act was noticed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Chief Information Commissioner v. High Court of Gujarat and another, (2020) 4 SCC 702 and it has been held by their Lordships that a citizen of India has every right to ask for any information subject to the limitation prescribed under the Act, and observed as under: - “25. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx The Preamble opens with a reference to the Constitution having established a democratic republic and the need, therefore, for an informed citizenry. The preamble reveals that legislature was conscious of the likely conflict with other public interest including efficient operations of the Governments and optimum use of limited fiscal resources and the preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information and the necessity to harmonise these conflicting interests. A citizen of India has every right to ask for any information subject to the limitation prescribed under the Act. The right to seek information is only to fulfill the objectives of the Act laid down in the Preamble, that is, to promote transparency of information.” 27. This would bring us to the principal contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that inclusion of even the information pertaining to corruption by proviso to Section 24(4) of the RTI Act, which the petitioner claimed and which has been denied by virtue of Section 24(4) of the RTI Act, requires consideration. 28. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice sub-sections (1) & (4) of Section 24 of the RTI Act, which state as under: - “24. 28. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice sub-sections (1) & (4) of Section 24 of the RTI Act, which state as under: - “24. Act not to apply to certain organizations.— (1) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the intelligence and security organisations specified in the Second Schedule, being organisations established by the Central Government or any information furnished by such organisations to that Government: Provided that the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and human rights violations shall not be excluded under this sub-section: Provided further that in the case of information sought for is in respect of allegations of violation of human rights, the information shall only be provided after the approval of the Central Information Commission, and notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7, such information shall be provided within forty-five days from the date of the receipt of request. (2) xxx xxx xxx (3) xxx xxx xxx (4) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to such intelligence and security organisations, being organisations established by the State Government, as that Government may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify: Provided that the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and human rights violations shall not be excluded under this sub-section: Provided further that in the case of information sought for is in respect of allegations of violation of human rights, the information shall only be provided after the approval of the State Information Commission and, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7, such information shall be provided within forty-five days from the date of receipt of request.” 29. Sub-sections (1) & (4) of Section 24 of the RTI Act, both, have been included in Chapter VI (Miscellaneous). Marginal Note of Section 24 would say that “Act not to apply to certain organizations”. Section 24(4) intends to exempt intelligence and security organisations from the applicability of the RTI Act. Section 24(1) provides that nothing contained in the RTI Act shall apply to the intelligence and security organisations specified in the Second Schedule, being organisations established by the Central Government or any information furnished by such organisations to that Government and in the Second Schedule, now, after amendments, 26 organisations have been included, which have been exempted from the operation of the RTI Act. As such, the intelligence and security organisations, which are exempted under Section 24(1) of the RTI Act have been provided in the Second Schedule by the Act itself, whereas under Section 24(4), it is left to the discretion of the State Government to notify the information and therefore except that, sub-sections (1) & (4) of Section 24 are identically worded. Similarly, sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the RTI Act exempted the intelligence and security organisations, being organisations established by the State Government, as that Government may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify. Further, first and second provisos to sub-sections (1) & (4) of Section 24 are identically worded providing that the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and human rights violations shall not be excluded under this sub-section. 30. Since the first proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the RTI Act provides that the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption, which we are concerned, and human rights violations shall not be excluded under this sub-section, refers to Section 24, it would be appropriate to notice the function of the proviso. Function of Proviso 31. The normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. 32. Justice G.P. Singh in his celebrated book “Principles of Statutory Interpretation”, 14th Edition, has laid down the function of a proviso relying upon the judgments of the Supreme Court as under: - “… In the words of LORD MACMILLAN: “The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to that case.” [Madras & Southern Maharatta Rly. Co. Ltd. v. Bezwada Municipality, AIR 1944 PC 71 , p. 73] The proviso may, as LORD MACNAGHTEN laid down, be “a qualification of the preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too general to be quite accurate”. [Local Govt. Co. Ltd. v. Bezwada Municipality, AIR 1944 PC 71 , p. 73] The proviso may, as LORD MACNAGHTEN laid down, be “a qualification of the preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too general to be quite accurate”. [Local Govt. Board v. South Stoneham Union, (1909) AC 57, p. 62 (HL)] The general rule has been stated by HIDAYATULLAH, J., in the following words: “As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment, and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule”.[ Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1596 p. 1690] And in the words of KAPUR, J.: “The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were, from the main enactment, a portion which, but for the proviso would fall within the main enactment.” 33. In the matter of Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, (1976) 1 SCC 128 , it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that a proviso must be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting clause. It is a settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It has been observed as under: - “18. We may mention in fairness to counsel that the following, among other decisions, were cited at the Bar bearing on the uses of provisos in statutes : C.I.T. v. Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd., 1959 Supp 2 SCR 256, 266 : AIR 1959 SC 713 : (1959) 36 ITR 1 ; M/s. Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Asstt. C.S.T., (1955) 2 SCR 483 , 493 : AIR 1955 SC 765 : (1955) 6 STC 627 ; Thompson v. Dibdin, 1912 AC 533, 541 : 81 LJKB 918 : 28 TLR 490; Rex v. Dibdin, 1910 Pro Div 57, 119, 125 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., 1959 Supp 2 SCR 875, 893 : AIR 1959 SC 1012 : 1959 Cri LJ 1231. The law is trite. A proviso must be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting clause. The law is trite. A proviso must be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting clause. It is a settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a separate or independent enactment. 'Words are dependent on the principal enacting words, to which they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as divorced from their context' (1912 AC 544). If the rule of construction is that prima facie a proviso should be limited in its operation to the subject-matter of the enacting clause, the stand we have taken is sound. To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction.” 34. The principle of law laid down and the function of proviso noticed by the Supreme Court in Dwarka Prasad (supra) was further followed in the matter of Union of India and others v. Dileep Kumar Singh, (2015) 4 SCC 421 and it has been held pertinently by their Lordships as under: - “20. Equally, it is settled law that a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. Therefore, the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction. ...” 35. Equally, it is settled law that a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. Therefore, the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction. ...” 35. Fazal Ali, J., speaking for the Supreme Court in the matter of S. Sundaram Pillai and others v. V.R. Pattabiraman and others, (1985) 1 SCC 591 (paras 43, 44) summed up the purposes of a proviso in the following four different purposes: - (1) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment; (2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable; (3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment, and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and (4) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision. 36. In the instant case, following the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in above-stated judgments including Sundaram Pillai (supra) defining the purposes of a proviso, it is quite vivid that the proviso to Section 24(4) of the RTI Act, which provides that the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and human rights violations shall not be excluded by virtue of notification issued under sub-section (4) of Section 24, would mean that even though the security organisation, in the instant case, the Anti Corruption Bureau, has been exempted from the operation of the RTI Act in exercise of power by the State Government, still, the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and human rights violations has to be furnished and in case of human rights violations, the information shall be provided only after the approval of the State Information Commission notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7 and such information shall be provided within forty-five days from the date of the receipt of request. Meaning of expression “pertaining to the allegations of corruption” 37. The expression “pertaining to the allegations of corruption” has not been defined in the RTI Act. Meaning of expression “pertaining to the allegations of corruption” 37. The expression “pertaining to the allegations of corruption” has not been defined in the RTI Act. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which deals with the cases relating to corruption, does not define what are the allegations of corruption. In absence of statutory definition in the RTI Act or in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the ordinary meaning to the expression used in the Act has to be looked into. There cannot be any exhaustive meaning and definition defining the allegations pertaining to corruption. It includes within its meaning many colours and shades of corruption. 38. Black’s Law Dictionary , Sixth Edition, defines “corruption” as under: - “Corruption. An act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others. The act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. See Bribe; Extortion.” 39. In the Encyclopaedia of Democracy by Seymour Martin Lipset, Vol. 1, p. 310, “Corruption” has been defined as under: - “Corruption is an abuse of public resources for private gain.” 40. The aforesaid definition of “corruption” has been noticed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain and others, (1997) 1 SCC 35 and it has been held as under: - “15. In the Encyclopaedia of Democracy by Seymour Martin Lipset, Vol. 1, p. 310, in the Chapter ‘Corruption’, it is stated that corruption is an abuse of public resources for private gain. The occasions for political corruption increase when control on the activity of public administrators are fragile and the division of power between political actors and the public bureaucrats, as well as between the Government and the middleman, is unclear. It is difficult to discover and punish cases of corruption. Research has shown that political corruption tends to be more widespread in authoritarian or totalitarian regimes and when public opinion and the press are unable to denounce corruption. Corruption develops because of confusion about the borders between State and society and between traditional and modern values. It can be expected to grow during phases of transition. Corruption should disappear in modern stable democratic societies. Instead, it is growing. Corruption develops because of confusion about the borders between State and society and between traditional and modern values. It can be expected to grow during phases of transition. Corruption should disappear in modern stable democratic societies. Instead, it is growing. Since State intervention in economic and social life has increased the occasions for political corruption, new technologies have increased the cost of electoral campaigns and the professionalisation of political careers has increased the number of those who have to make a living from politics rather than living for politics. Corruption has not disappeared. Corruption has dangerous consequences for politics. Although political corruption is more widespread in non-democratic regimes, it is particularly dangerous for democracy because it undermines two of the major principles on which democracies are based: the equality of citizens' rights and the transparency of the political decision-making process. Bribes open the way for access to the State for those who are willing to pay and can afford the price. The situation may leave non-corrupt citizens with the belief that one ‘counts’ only if one has the right personal contacts with those who hold power. Because of its illegal nature, corruption increases the range of public decisions that are made in secrecy. It was suggested that internal controls on public bureaucracies through administrative controls and accounting procedures as well as ombudsman systems for public complaints, are remedies to control political corruption. The rules of code of conduct for political executives, public servants and private entrepreneurs, emphasising merit and regulated system of appointment in State bureaucracy and stimulating pride in public service, would generate remedies for political corruption.” 41. Similarly, in the matter of State of A.P. v. V. Vasudeva Rao, (2004) 9 SCC 319 as well as in the matter of N.P. Jharia v. State of M.P., (2007) 7 SCC 358 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have defined “Corruption” as under: - “3. Corruption as such has reached dangerous heights and dangerous potentialities. The word “corruption” has wide connotation and embraces almost all the spheres of our day-to-day life the world over. In a limited sense it connotes allowing decisions and actions of a person to be influenced not by rights or wrongs of a cause, but by the prospects of monetary gains or other selfish considerations. The word “corruption” has wide connotation and embraces almost all the spheres of our day-to-day life the world over. In a limited sense it connotes allowing decisions and actions of a person to be influenced not by rights or wrongs of a cause, but by the prospects of monetary gains or other selfish considerations. Avarice is a common frailty of mankind, and while Robert Walpole's observation that every man has a price, may be a little generalized, yet it cannot be gainsaid that it is not far from truth. Burke cautioned "Among a people generally corrupt, liberty cannot last long." 42. Very recently, in the matter of State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, (2020) 20 SCC 360 , in very illuminating words, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have defined “corruption” as under: - “63. There are a number of judicial precedents dealing with the definition and meaning of “corruption”. The simplest definition of “corruption” is, any act or omission by a public servant for securing pecuniary or other material advantage directly or indirectly for himself, his family or friends. ...” 43. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in the matter of First Appellate Authority-cum-Additional Director General of Police and another v. Chief Information Commissioner, Haryana and another, AIR 2011 Punjab and Haryana 168 defined “corruption” as under: - “14. Another write up is available on http://www.thegeminigeek.com. The word corruption is explained as destructive, ruining or the spoiling of the society or a nation. The corrupt society stops prevailing integrity, virtue or moral principles. It changes for the worse. Such a society begins to decay and sets itself on the road to self-destruction. Corruption is an age old phenomena. Selfishness and greed are the two main causes of corruption. Political corruption is the abuse of the powers by State officials for their unlawful private gain. A corrupt society is characterized by immorality and lack of fear and respect for the law. Corruption cannot be divorced from economics and inequality of wealth, low wages and salaries are some of the economic causes of corruption. Corruption has prevailed in all forms of Government. Various forms of corruption include extortion, graft, bribery, cronyism, nepotism, embezzlement and patronage. Corruption allows criminal activities such as money laundering, extortion and drug trafficking to thrive.” 44. Corruption cannot be divorced from economics and inequality of wealth, low wages and salaries are some of the economic causes of corruption. Corruption has prevailed in all forms of Government. Various forms of corruption include extortion, graft, bribery, cronyism, nepotism, embezzlement and patronage. Corruption allows criminal activities such as money laundering, extortion and drug trafficking to thrive.” 44. From the aforesaid analysis, it is quite vivid that the expression “pertaining to the allegations of corruption” has not been defined by the RTI Act, but “corruption” has been defined by the Supreme Court, as noticed herein-above, as act or omission of a public servant for securing pecuniary or other material advantage directly or indirectly for himself, his family or friends, therefore, even in organisations which are exempted from the operation of the RTI Act by virtue of Section 24(4) of the RTI Act, still the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption would be relevant information and cannot be denied for the reason that the organisation is exempted from the operation of the Act and it has been provided by virtue of proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the RTI Act. It is held so accordingly. View of other High Courts 45. Various High Courts have considered the issue in hand and have taken the view in this regard, which have been brought to our notice. However, we notice that the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in the matter of Subash Mohapatra v. State of Odisha and another, 2022 SCC OnLine Orissa 2014 has considered the decisions of the Delhi High Court in Sanjiv Chaturvedi’s case (supra), CPIO CBI v. C.J. Karia, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 10475 and B.S. Mathur v. Public Information Officer, (2011) 125 DRJ 508 ; the decision of the Kerala High Court in the matter of Joseph M. Puthussery v. State Information Commissioner, 2012 SCC OnLine Ker 4133; the decision of the Manipur High Court in the matter of Md. Abid Hussain v. State of Manipur, 2015 SCC OnLine Mani 129; the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the matter of Saleem Baig v. State of U.P., PIL No.63607 of 2010, decided on 25-10-2010; and that of the Madras High Court in the matters of Superintendent of Police v. M. Kannappan, (2013) 1 MLJ 348 & S. Vijayalakshmi (supra), threadbare and it has been held by the Orissa High Court as under: - “34. Indeed, information pertaining to allegations of corruption and human rights violations has been legislatively identified by the RTI Act as a species as deserving of a different treatment in terms of disclosure, which is what is highlighted by the first proviso to both Section 24(1) as well as Section 24(4) of the RTI Act. If Section 8 is read with Section 24 of the RTI Act, as it has to since no provision can be viewed as otiose, then it becomes apparent that even while dealing with requests for information falling in the domain of Section 8 of the RTI Act, if such information pertains to allegations of human rights violations or corruption, regard will have to be had to the first provisos to Section 24(1) Section 24 (4) of the RTI Act. 35. The upshot of the above discussion is that this Court finds that the impugned notification in so far as it seeks to exempt the entire Vigilance Department of the Government from the view of the RTI Act would run counter to the 1st proviso to Section 24(4) of the RTI Act. In other words, the notification insofar as it prevents disclosure of information concerning the General Administration (Vigilance) Department even when it pertains to allegations of corruption and human rights violations would be contrary to the first proviso to Section 24(4) of the RTI Act and, by that yardstick, would be unsustainable in law. If under the RTI Act disclosure is the norm, and non-disclosure the exception, then the impugned notification seeks to take away what is provided by the RTI Act and is therefore ultra vires the RTI Act.” 46. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the Orissa High Court in Subash Mohapatra (supra) in this regard. 47. If under the RTI Act disclosure is the norm, and non-disclosure the exception, then the impugned notification seeks to take away what is provided by the RTI Act and is therefore ultra vires the RTI Act.” 46. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the Orissa High Court in Subash Mohapatra (supra) in this regard. 47. At this stage, the argument of the learned Additional Advocate General that if the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and human rights violations are provided to the information seeker, it will be violative of Section 8(1)(h) of the RTI Act, as there is no obligation to give any citizen, information which would impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders and Section 8 gives overriding effect to the other provisions of the Act, has to be noted for rejection. This argument deserves to be rejected for two reasons. Firstly, the petitioner’s application for grant of information has not been rejected vide order dated 24-11-2016 (Annexure P-3) relying upon Section 8(1)(h) of the RTI Act, but it has been rejected solely on the ground that the ACB is exempted from the operation of the RTI Act under Section 24(4), however, for the sake of convenience, the reason assigned in the order Annexure P-3 is reproduced herein-below for ready reference: - mDr ds lanHkZ esa lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd] jkT; 'kklu }kjk ,UVh djI'ku C;wjks dks lwpuk vf/kdkj vf/kfu;e 2005 ds izko/kku ls NwV iznku fd;k x;k gSA tks jkT; 'kklu dk vkns'k&ÞN-x- 'kklu] lkekU; iz'kklu foHkkx] ¼lwpuk dk vf/kdkj izdks"B½ ea=ky;] egkunh Hkou] u;k jk;iqj }kjk tkjh vf/klwpuk dzekad ,Q 7&16@2005@1&lwviz jk;iqj fnukad 01-08-2023 gSAÞ mDr vkns'k ds izdk'k esa lwpuk dk vf/kdkj vf/kfu;e 2005 vUrxZr fdlh Hkh izdkj dh tkudkjh ugha nh tk jgh gSA vkns'k dh Nk;kizfr bl i= ds lkFk layXu gSA lknj lwpukFkZA 48. Secondly, the petitioner has sought information vide Annexure P-2 seeking information from the Public Information Officer, ACB about number of pending cases for sanction of prosecution under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 197 of the CrPC along with name & designation of delinquent employee/officer, etc.. It is not the case of the respondents / State either in return or before the Court that the information sought by the petitioner would impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders. It is not the case of the respondents / State either in return or before the Court that the information sought by the petitioner would impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders. Even as reproduced herein-above, the order Annexure P-3 by which the petitioner’s application has been rejected nowhere provides that the information sought by the petitioner cannot be accorded on account of Section 8(1)(h) of the RTI Act and the State is exempted from disclosure of information under Section 8(1)(h). As such, this submission made on behalf of the State deserves to be and is hereby rejected. Conclusion 49. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that the impugned notification dated 1-8-2013 (Annexure P-1) exempting the whole Anti Corruption Bureau from the operation of the RTI Act is in teeth of the first proviso to Section 24(4) of the said Act and to the extent the notification prevents disclosure of information concerning the ACB even when it pertains to the allegations of corruption and human rights violations would be contrary to the first proviso to Section 24(4) of the RTI Act. Accordingly, the impugned notification dated 1-8-2013 (Annexure P-1) issued by the General Administration Department, Government of Chhattisgarh (Right to Information Cell) exempting the ACB from the operation of the RTI Act would not permit the Government to deny information pertaining to the ACB involving the allegations of corruption and human rights violations, except the information which relates to sensitive and confidential activities undertaken by the ACB. It is declared accordingly. Respondent No.1 is directed to issue clarificatory notification to the aforesaid effect within three weeks from today. Consequently, the impugned order Annexure P-3 rejecting the application of the petitioner is hereby quashed and the competent authority is directed to consider afresh the case of the petitioner for grant of information within four weeks from today in accordance with law. 50. The writ petition is allowed to the extent sketched herein-above leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s).