ORDER : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 / 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner herein seeks to call in question legality, validity and correctness of the impugned order dated 31-1-2019 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Jabalpur in Original Application No.200/00552/2018 titled as Sri Yogendra Babu Sharma v. Union of India and others, filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, by which his original application calling in question the Review DPC proceeding dated 2-8-2016 and claiming other consequential reliefs, has been rejected by the CAT finding no merit. 2. Challenge to the above-stated impugned order has been made on the following factual backdrop: - Relevant Facts: - 3. The petitioner herein joined with the Central Ground Water Board as Assistant Executive Engineer (Group-A) on 28-7-1993 through Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). He was subsequently appointed as Assistant Executive Engineer with effect from 28-7-1995 by notification dated 12-10-1998 and he was subsequently promoted as Executive Engineer (Group-A) with effect from 17-7-2003. In the meantime, respondent No.3 published seniority list of Executive Engineers as on 1-1-2012 wherein the name of the petitioner stood at serial No.3 after the names of Mr. A.N. Gunjkar & Mr. G.L. Meena, but above Mr. J.C. Borgohain at serial No.4. 4. Respondent No.2 convened the meeting of Departmental Promotion Committee (hereinafter called as ‘DPC’) on 15-5-2014 to consider the cases of eligible candidates for the promotional post of Superintending Engineer and accordingly, in its meeting considered the cases of eligible candidates including the petitioner herein and on due consideration by the UPSC, respondent No.1, on the recommendation of respondent No.2, passed an order on 11-6-2014 promoting three Executive Engineers namely Mr. A.N. Gunjkar, Mr. G.L. Meena & Mr. J.C. Borgohain, who is junior to the petitioner, on the post of Superintending Engineer (Group-A) on regular basis and thereby the petitioner was superseded on the post of Superintending Engineer (Group-A) finding him unfit for that post. 5. A.N. Gunjkar, Mr. G.L. Meena & Mr. J.C. Borgohain, who is junior to the petitioner, on the post of Superintending Engineer (Group-A) on regular basis and thereby the petitioner was superseded on the post of Superintending Engineer (Group-A) finding him unfit for that post. 5. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the DPC proceeding dated 15-5-2014 superseding him on the post of Superintending Engineer (Group-A) and not promoting him on the post of Superintending Engineer, the petitioner herein filed O.A.No.2090/2014 before the CAT (Principal Bench), Delhi, stating inter alia that his performance was up to the mark and he had never received any adverse communication about the ACR and all his ACRs were on benchmark and there is no departmental enquiry / vigilance case either pending or contemplated against him and in that view of the matter, he was entitled to be considered and promoted on the post of Superintending Engineer (Group-A) which he has arbitrarily and illegally been deprived of and which is violative of his right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as right to be considered objectively and fairly on the promotional post is his fundamental right. The Principal Bench of CAT, Delhi by order dated 12-3-2015, disposed of the said OA filed by the petitioner herein directing the respondents (therein) to hold a Review DPC treating the ACR for the year 2007-08 as no ACR and in place thereof to consider the ACR for the year 2002-03 and further directed that the DPC should also consider the ACR for the year 2006-07 as it is there on record and give specific finding as to how it has been treated. The order dated 12-3-2015 was subjected to review and was corrected in M.A.No.935/2015 by order dated 6-4-2015. 6. Before respondent No.2 could convene the Review DPC as per the order of the CAT, the representation of the petitioner against his grading in the ACR for the year 2005-06 was considered and it was upgraded as “Very Good” by order dated 21-5-2015 passed by the Chairman of the Central Ground Water Board – respondent No.3 herein being the competent authority for that purpose. 7. 7. On receipt of proposal for Review DPC by respondent No.1 pursuant to the order of the CAT, respondent No.2 filed W.P. (C)No.1173/2016 in the High Court of Delhi challenging the order directing holding of Review DPC which was dismissed by that High Court on 12-2-2016 and thereafter, review petition was also filed before the CAT (Principal Bench), Delhi claiming review of order dated 12-3-2015 which was also dismissed by the CAT by its order dated 31-5-2016. However, despite that, respondent No.2 did not comply with the direction of the CAT and did not convene the meeting of the Review DPC even after lapse of one year leading to filing of Contempt Petition No.157/2016 by the petitioner herein which came up for hearing on 12-8-2016 before the CAT in which it was informed to the CAT by respondent No.2 that a Review DPC had already been convened on 2-8-2016 to consider the case of the petitioner and accordingly, recommendation has already been forwarded to the competent authority and in that view of the matter, the contempt case came to be closed by order dated 25-10-2016. 8. The Review DPC proceedings filed before this Court would show that the Review DPC in its meeting dated 2-8-2016 assessed the ACRs of the petitioner for the years 2003-04, 2004-05 & 2002-03 as “Very Good”, but for the years 2005-06 & 2006-07, his ACRs were assessed as “Good” by the DPC and he has been held to be unfit for the promotional post of Superintending Engineer, which the Ministry of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation – respondent No.1 herein, did not approve and expressed its disapproval to respondent No.2 by its memo dated 12-8-2016 (Annexure P-4) holding that there is no consideration of the upgraded ACR of the petitioner for the year 2005-06 and further held that non-acceptance of final grading of 2006-07 and denial of opportunity of communication of the assessed below benchmark ACRs by the Review DPC would affect the career prospects of the individual and that would be against the principles of natural justice. However, the UPSC / respondent No.2 herein did not change its stand and advised respondents No.1 & 3 herein to refer the matter to the Department of Personnel & Training (DOPT) for final decision being nodal authority and thereafter, by memo dated 7-10-2016 (Annexure R-7), ultimately, respondent No.1 did not refer the matter to the DOPT and accepted the recommendation of the Review DPC held on 2-8-2016 holding the petitioner unfit for the post of Superintending Engineer. 9. Meanwhile, the petitioner finding that respondent No.1 has accepted the recommendation of the UPSC finding him unfit for promotion on the post of Superintending Engineer, decided to question the proceeding dated 2-8-2016 for convening a fresh Review DPC and accordingly, filed O.A. No.187/2017 questioning that Review DPC proceeding before the CAT, Bench at Hyderabad, which was transferred to the Jabalpur Bench being re-registered as O.A.No.552/2018 and which has been dismissed by order dated 31-1-2019 holding as under: - (i) the issue involved in the present petition has already been determined by the CAT in contempt jurisdiction; (ii) representation for upgrading of ACR for the year 2005-06 was made on 22-12-2014, well after the original DPC dated 15-5-2014 considered the case of the petitioner, as such, the earlier ACR has attained finality; (iii) up-gradation has neither been done under any specific rule/ instructions on the subject nor as per the order of the competent court of law; (iv) ACR was upgraded by a non-speaking and un-reasoned order; (v) while upgrading ACR, previous entries have been retained in respect of certain vital aspects; and (vi) the DPC constituted by the UPSC did not accept the up-gradation of ACR for the year 2006-07 doubting that the reviewing authority has not given any reasons and justifications citing various reasons. 10. 10. Finally, questioning and challenging the order passed by the CAT, the petitioner has filed this writ petition before this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India calling in question the DPC proceeding dated 2-8-2016 as well as the order of the CAT dated 31-1-2019 by which his original application has been dismissed holding inter alia that the Review DPC did not consider the ACR for the years 2005-06 & 2006-07 in accordance with law and the manner of upgrading and the manner of awarding “Very Good” has been questioned by the DPC constituted by the UPSC which is neither the province nor the authority of the UPSC to downgrade in the manner not contemplated by law and therefore it is arbitrary and liable to be set aside and the petitioner was entitled to be considered objectively and fairly by the Review DPC for the promotional post of Superintending Engineer, which is his fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. 11. Respondents No.1 & 3 have filed their return stating inter alia that the Review DPC proceeding dated 2-8-2016 is valid and legal as per law and there is no violation of the principles of natural justice. Affidavit in support of the return supporting the averments in the return, has been filed. 12. Similarly, respondent No.2 has filed its separate return supporting its stand taken before the CAT stating inter alia that a Court / Tribunal should not ordinarily interfere with the findings of the DPC / Selection Committee, unless, of course, if the same are violative of the statutory provisions of the Recruitment Rules or are actuated by mala fides and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of UPSC v. Hiranyalal Dev, (1988) 2 SCC 242 to submit, how to categorize in the light of the relevant records and what norms to apply in making the assessments are exclusively the function of the Selection Committee and the jurisdiction to make selection is vested in the Selection Committee. As such, the Review DPC has rightly graded the petitioner for two years as “good” and rightly found him unfit for the promotional post of Superintending Engineer. 13. Rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner opposing the averments made in the returns and reiterating the stand taken in the writ petition. Submissions: - 14. Mr. As such, the Review DPC has rightly graded the petitioner for two years as “good” and rightly found him unfit for the promotional post of Superintending Engineer. 13. Rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner opposing the averments made in the returns and reiterating the stand taken in the writ petition. Submissions: - 14. Mr. Yogendra Babu Sharma – petitioner in person, would vehemently submit that the manner in which the Review DPC has proceeded and considered his case leading to his non-promotion on the post of Superintending Engineer is absolutely arbitrary and contrary to the well settled principles of law, though he has been upgraded for the year 2005-06 by the competent authority i.e. respondent No.3 herein, yet his up-gradation has been doubted by the DPC, which is not the province and jurisdiction of the DPC constituted by the UPSC and furthermore, for the year 2006-07, his remark of “Very Good” has also been doubted on the basis of irrelevant and nonexistent ground which is absolutely arbitrary. He would further submit that the learned CAT also did not look into the assessment made by the Review DPC and rejected the original application applying the principle of constructive res judicata on the basis of the order of the CAT passed in the contempt proceeding, which is per se illegal and the principle of constructive res judicata would not be applicable in the facts of the present case and totally on irrelevant grounds, the Review DPC has found him unfit for the post of Superintending Engineer, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. He would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Dev Dutt v. Union of India and others, (2008) 8 SCC 725 to bolster his submission. 15. Mr. Ramakant Mishra, learned Deputy Solicitor General of India, appearing on behalf of the Union of India / respondents No.1 & 3, would submit that recommendation of the Review DPC has been accepted by the competent authority finding it in accordance with law by its memo dated 7-10-2016, which is in accordance with law and as such, the CAT has rightly dismissed the original application filed by the petitioner. 16. Mr. 16. Mr. B.D. Guru, learned counsel appearing for the UPSC / respondent No.2, would support the DPC proceeding dated 2-8-2016 stating that the DPC constituted by respondent No.2 has considered the respective merit of the candidates and assessed the merit of promotion and procedurally, this Court would not like to sit in appellate jurisdiction as appellate authority, as it has been done fairly. He would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Union Public Service Commission v. Arun Kumar Sharma and others, (2015) 12 SCC 600 to buttress his submission. 17. Mr. Amrito Das, learned amicus curiae, would submit that the Review DPC though considered the case of the petitioner for the promotional post of Superintending Engineer, but the manner in which the Review DPC considered the ACR of the petitioner for two years – particularly 2005-06 & 2006-07, is not in accordance with the well settled law in this regard. He further submits as under: - 1. That, for the year 2005-06, the petitioner's ACR was upgraded by respondent No.3 by order dated 21-5-2015, yet the Review DPC declined to accept the upgraded ACR of the petitioner as “Very Good” by questioning the time of upgrading and by applying the principle of constructive res judicata, etc., which is not the province and jurisdiction of the Review DPC. The Review DPC has power and jurisdiction to grade the candidate appropriately, upon assessing the overall performance of a candidate, but not in a manner by disputing the up-gradation done by the competent authority, which is per se arbitrary and illegal. 2. That, for the year 2006-07, the petitioner's grading in the ACR – “Very Good” has also been questioned and he has been graded “Good” on totally irrelevant grounds, which is again not the province and jurisdiction of the Review DPC and it is well settled by the Supreme Court in this regard, as the Review DPC cannot question the very ACR awarded by the competent authority except to make its own assessment on the basis of entries made in the ACRs. 18. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and the amicus curiae as well and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. Question involved: - 19. 18. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and the amicus curiae as well and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. Question involved: - 19. The short question that is involved in the instant writ petition is, whether the Review DPC constituted by respondent No.2 is justified in holding that the petitioner is unfit for the post of Superintending Engineer (Group-A) and further, whether the CAT is justified in affirming the Review DPC proceedings dated 2-8-2016 by the impugned order dated 31-1-2019? 20. Admittedly and undisputedly, the petitioner’s case for the promotional post of Superintending Engineer (Group-A) was considered by the DPC constituted by the UPSC on 15-5-2014, however, the petitioner was found unfit on the said post and his junior Mr. J.C. Borgohain was promoted which the petitioner questioned by filing substantive original application before the CAT, Delhi and the CAT, Delhi by its order dated 12-3-2015 allowed the original application and directed that the ACR for the year 2007-08 may be taken as no ACR and the same may be treated as ACR for the year 2002-03 by modifying / reviewing it. In the meanwhile, during the pendency of consideration of the Review DPC, the petitioner’s ACR for the year 2005-06 was upgraded by the competent authority as “Very Good” by order dated 21-5-2015 and during the pendency of contempt proceeding, Review DPC came to be held on 2-8-2016 in which the petitioner's grading for the years 2003-04, 2004-05 & 2002-03 was assessed and accepted as “Very Good” by the Review DPC, as earlier it was, however, for the years 2005-06 & 2006-07, his ACR was graded “Good” by the DPC and on that count, he was found unfit for the said post, thereby the Review DPC minutes dated 2-8-2016 was called in question in the original application filed before the CAT which has been rejected by the CAT by the impugned order, which is sought to be challenged in this writ petition. 21. Before we could proceed further to decide the correctness of the Review DPC proceeding, at this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the relevant judgments rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court delineating the scope of interference in the DPC proceeding and the grading awarded by the DPC or the Selection Committee. 21. Before we could proceed further to decide the correctness of the Review DPC proceeding, at this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the relevant judgments rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court delineating the scope of interference in the DPC proceeding and the grading awarded by the DPC or the Selection Committee. Right to be considered for promotion is Fundamental Right: - 22. It is appropriate to notice here that promotion is not a fundamental right of Government servant, but right to be considered for promotion is a fundamental right, such a right brings within its purview an effective, purposeful and meaningful consideration. Suitability or otherwise of the candidate concerned, must be left at the hands of the DPC, but the same has to be determined in terms of the rules applicable therefor. (See Union of India and others v. Sangram Keshari Nayak, (2007) 6 SCC 704 .) In other words, right to be considered objectively and fairly on the promotional post is guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution of India. Under Article 16 of the Constitution, right to be “considered” for promotion is a fundamental right. It is not mere “consideration” for promotion, that is important, but the “consideration” must be “fair” according to the established principles governing service jurisprudence. (See Badrinath v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others, (2000) 8 SCC 395 .) Scope of interference in DPC proceeding: - 23. In Hiranyalal Dev’s case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held as under: - “How to categorize in the light of the relevant records and what norms to apply in making the assessments are exclusively the function of the Selection Committee. The jurisdiction to make selection is vested in the Selection Committee.” 24. Likewise, in the matter of Union of India and others v. Lt. Gen. Rajendra Singh Kadyan and another, (2000) 6 SCC 698 , the Supreme Court has held that where the entire service profile was considered by the authorities concerned or by the DPC, court cannot substitute its own view to that of the authorities /DPC sitting under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution of India, and observed as under in paragraph 29: - “29. ... ... It is a well-known principle of administrative law that when relevant considerations have been taken note of and irrelevant aspects have been eschewed from consideration and that no relevant aspect has been ignored and the administrative decisions have nexus with the facts on record, the same cannot be attacked on merits. Judicial review is permissible only to the extent of finding whether the process in reaching decision has been observed correctly and not the decision as such. In that view of the matter, we think there is no justification for the High Court to have interfered with the order made by the Government.” 25. In the matter of Union of India and another v. A.K. Narula, (2007) 11 SCC 10 , the Supreme Court has pertinently held that the DPC is required to make an overall assessment of the performance of each candidate separately, and it can only be questioned either on the ground of its mala fides or arbitrariness, and observed as under: - “15. The guidelines give a certain amount of play in the joints to DPC by providing that it need not be guided by the overall grading recorded in CRs, but may make its own assessment on the basis of the entries in the CRs. DPC is required to make an overall assessment of the performance of each candidate separately, but by adopting the same standards, yardsticks and norms. It is only when the process of assessment is vitiated either on the ground of bias, mala fides or arbitrariness, that the selection calls for interference. Where DPC has proceeded in a fair, impartial and reasonable manner, by applying the same yardstick and norms to all candidates and there is no arbitrariness in the process of assessment by DPC, the court will not interfere (vide SBI v. Mohd. Mynuddin, (1987) 4 SCC 486 , UPSC v. Hiranyalal Dev (Supra) and Badrinath v. Govt. of T.N. (Supra)). ...” 26. Similarly, in the matter of Union of India and others v. S.P. Nayyar, (2014) 14 SCC 370 , the Supreme Court again while delineating the scope and grounds for judicial review in a consideration made by the DPC has held that High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in appeal over the assessment made by the DPC, and their Lordships pertinently observed in its report as under: - “11. It is settled that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in appeal over the assessment made by the DPC. If the assessment made by the DPC is perverse or is not based on record or proper record has not been considered by the DPC, it is always open to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to remit the matter back to the DPC for recommendation, but the High Court cannot assess the merit on its own on perusal of the service record of one or the other employee. 15. It is also settled that the High Court under Article 226 can remit the matter for reconsideration if a person was not properly considered for a promotion for which he was eligible. But it cannot direct to promote a person to the higher post, without giving a plausible ground.” 27. The principle of law laid down in S.P. Nayyar’s case (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of H.S. Sidhu v. Devendra Bapna and others, (2016) 1 SCC 495 . 28. Thereafter, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Union Public Service Commission v. M. Sathiya Priya and others, (2018) 15 SCC 796 held that since the jurisdiction to make selection as per law is vested in the Selection Committee and as the Selection Committee members have got expertise in the matter, it is not open for the courts generally to interfere in such matters except in cases where the process of assessment is vitiated either on the ground of bias, mala fides or arbitrariness. It was further held by their Lordships that it is not the function of the court to hear the matters before it treating them as appeals over the decision of the Selection Committee and to scrutinize the relative merit of the candidates. The question as to whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted expert body i.e. the Selection Committee. The question as to whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted expert body i.e. the Selection Committee. However, carving out exception to the limited scope of judicial review, their Lordships have appropriately held that it is not the case that the expert body’s opinion is not subject to judicial review in all circumstances and can be interfered with if it suffers from mala fides or arbitrariness, and pertinently observed as under: - “18. We are conscious of the fact that the expert body’s opinion may not deserve acceptance in all circumstances and hence it may not be proper to say that the expert body’s opinion is not subject to judicial review in all circumstances. In our constitutional scheme, the decision of the Selection Committee/Board of Appointment cannot be said to be final and absolute. Any other view will have a very dangerous consequence and one must remind oneself of the famous words of Lord Acton “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. The aforementioned principle has to be kept in mind while deciding such cases. However, in the matter on hand, it is abundantly clear from the affidavit filed by UPSC that the Selection Committee which is nothing but an expert body had carefully examined and scrutinised the experience, Annual Confidential Reports and other relevant factors which were required to be considered before selecting the eligible candidates for IPS. The Selection Committee had in fact scrutinised the merits and demerits of each candidate taking into consideration the various factors as required, and its recommendations were sent to UPSC. It is the settled legal position that the courts have to show deference and consideration to the recommendations of an Expert Committee consisting of members with expertise in the field, if malice or arbitrariness in the Committee’s decision is not forthcoming. The doctrine of fairness, evolved in administrative law, was not supposed to convert tribunals and courts into appellate authorities over the decision of experts. The constraints—self-imposed, undoubtedly—of writ jurisdiction still remain. Ignoring them would lead to confusion and uncertainty. The jurisdiction may become rudderless. 20. This Court has repeatedly observed and concluded that the recommendations of the Selection Committee cannot be challenged except on the ground of mala fides or serious violation of the statutory rules. The constraints—self-imposed, undoubtedly—of writ jurisdiction still remain. Ignoring them would lead to confusion and uncertainty. The jurisdiction may become rudderless. 20. This Court has repeatedly observed and concluded that the recommendations of the Selection Committee cannot be challenged except on the ground of mala fides or serious violation of the statutory rules. The courts cannot sit as an appellate authority or an umpire to examine the recommendations of the Selection Committee like a court of appeal. This discretion has been given to the Selection Committee only, and the courts rarely sit as a court of appeal to examine the selection of a candidate; nor is it the business of the court to examine each candidate and record its opinion. Since the Selection Committee constituted by the UPSC is manned by experts in the field, we have to trust their assessment unless it is actuated with malice or bristles with mala fides or arbitrariness.” 29. In Badrinath (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down the principles of law qua scope of judicial review in assessment made by DPC, by courts/tribunals and held as under: - “40. Unless there is a strong case for applying the Wednesbury doctrine or there are mala fides, courts and Tribunals cannot interfere with assessments made by Departmental Promotion Committees in regard to merit or fitness for promotion. But in rare cases, if the assessment is either proved to be mala fide or is found based on inadmissible or irrelevant or insignificant and trivial material and if an attitude of ignoring or not giving weight to the positive aspects of one's career is strongly displayed, or if the inferences drawn are such that no reasonable person can reach such conclusions, or if there is illegality attached to the decision, then the powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution are not foreclosed. 41. While the courts are to be extremely careful in exercising the power of judicial review in dealing with assessment made by Departmental Promotion Committees, the executive is also to bear in mind that, in exceptional cases, the assessment of merit made by them is liable to be scrutinised by courts, within the narrow Wednesbury principles or on the ground of male fides. The judicial power remains but its use is restricted to rare and exceptional situations. The judicial power remains but its use is restricted to rare and exceptional situations. We are making these remarks so that courts or Tribunals may not – by quoting this case as an easy precedent – interfere with assessment of merit in every case. Courts and Tribunals can neither sit as appellate authorities nor substitute their own views to the views of Departmental Promotion Committees. Undue interference by the courts or Tribunals will result in paralysing recommendations of Departmental Committees and promotions. The case on hand can be a precedent only in rare cases.” 30. Similarly, in the matter of Baidyanath Yadav v. Aditya Narayan Roy and others, (2020) 16 SCC 799 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down the scope of review to be limited and court cannot reassess the matter. It has been held by their Lordships that it was not for the High Court to address questions of comparative merit of the candidates, and neither is it appropriate for us to do the same and the Court has to look into whether there was any serious violation of statutory rules, or any bias, mala fides or arbitrariness in the entire selection process, and observed as under: - “4.3. It can be concluded from the above that it was not for the High Court to address questions of comparative merit of the candidates, and neither is it appropriate for us to do the same. All we may look into is whether there was any serious violation of statutory rules, or any bias, mala fides or arbitrariness in the entire selection process. To address this question, it is essential to revisit the process prescribed for the selection of non-SCS officers to the IAS.” 31. Recently, in the matter of Mohd. Mustafa v. Union of India and others, (2022) 1 SCC 294 , it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that Courts in exercise of power under judicial review do not interfere with selections made by expert bodies by reassessing comparative merits of the candidates. It was further held that interference with selections is restricted to decisions vitiated by bias, mala fides and contrary to statutory provisions. It has been observed by their Lordships in its report as under: - “18. It was further held that interference with selections is restricted to decisions vitiated by bias, mala fides and contrary to statutory provisions. It has been observed by their Lordships in its report as under: - “18. Conditions prompted by extraneous or irrelevant considerations are unreasonable and liable to be set aside by Courts in exercise of its power under judicial review, [Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Harayana, (1985) 3 SCC 189 ]. (See State of U.P. v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, (1985) 3 SCC 131 , Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, (1983) 1 SCC 438 , Sant Raj v. O.P. Singla, (1985) 2 SCC 349 , Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, 1968 AC 997 : (1968) 2 WLR 924 : (1986) 1 All ER 694 (HL).) A decision can be arrived at by an authority after considering all relevant factors, [Sachidanand Pandey v. State of W.B., (1987) 2 SCC 295 ]. If the discretionary power has been exercised in disregard of relevant consideration, the Court will normally hold the action bad in law, [H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 10th Edn. (Oxford University Press, 2009)]. Relevant, germane and valid considerations cannot be ignored or overlooked by an executive authority while taking a decision, [C.K. Thakker, Administrative Law, Second Edn. (Eastern Book Company, 2012) p. 801]. It is trite law that Courts in exercise of power under judicial review do not interfere with selections made by expert bodies by reassessing comparative merits of the candidates. Interference with selections is restricted to decisions vitiated by bias, mala fides and contrary to statutory provisions. (See Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. B.S. Mahajan, (1990) 1 SCC 305 , Badrinath v. State of T.N. (Supra), National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences v. K. Kalyana Raman, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 481, I.P.S. Dewan v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 383 , UPSC v. Hiranyalal Dev (Supra), M.V. Thimmaiah v. UPSC, (2008) 2 SCC 119 and UPSC v. M. Sathiya Priya (Supra).)” 32. As such, from the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments, it is vividly clear that recommendation of the Selection Committee can be questioned only on the ground of “mala fides” or “serious violation of statutory rules” or “arbitrariness” and Courts cannot sit as an appellate authority or as a court of appeal over the recommendation of the DPC / Selection Committee. Having noticed the scope of interference in the recommendations of the DPC being an expert body, it would bring us to the facts of the case, more particularly, to the minutes of the DPC meeting dated 2-8-2016 by which the petitioner has been held to be unfit for the post of Superintending Engineer (Group-A). Proceedings of the Review Departmental Promotion Committee: - 33. As already noticed herein, the petitioner has been graded “Very Good” in the ACRs for the years 2003-04, 2004-05 & 2002-03 and he has been graded “Good” for the years 2005-06 & 2006-07. The following extract from the minutes of the DPC meeting dated 2-8-2016 would be relevant to consider the challenge made by the petitioner in this writ petition for the year 2005-06: - “4. The Review Departmental Promotion Committee accordingly examined the Character Rolls/APARs for the years 2002-03 (in lieu of 2007-08) and decided to adopt the assessment of the original DPC in respect of the ACRs for the years 2003-04 and 2004-05 of the officer and to re-examine the ACRs for the years 2005-06 and 2006-07. 4.1 The Committee noted the following discrepancies in the ACR for the year 2005-06 now furnished with the proposal for Review DPC:- (i) At the time of submission of the proposal for original DPC held in the Commission on 15.5.2014 for promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer, the Ministry along with other documents for consideration of DPC, furnished the certificate regarding compliance of DoP&T OM No.21011/1/2010-Estt.A dated 13.4.2010 which stated as follows:- “… It is also certified that there is no Below Bench Mark Grading in the ACRs/APARs of the Officers who are under consideration for promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer, except Shri Y.B. Sharma, Executive Engineer whose ACR for the year 2005-06 and 2007-08 are below Bench Mark which have been communicated to him but no representation has been received from him. Therefore, the ACRs/ APARs of the officers for the relevant period, are treated as final.” (ii) In the ACR for the year 2005-06, several new pages have now been found interspersed with the original ACR and the pages in the said and subsequent ACRs have been renumbered. (iii) It has been observed that the Reporting Officer assessed the ACR as ‘Good’ on 21.11.2008 and ‘No Reviewing Certificate’ has been attached to the effect that the Reviewing Officer has retired. Further while as per the certificate in compliance of DoP&T OM dated 13.04.2010 from the Ministry, the ACR for the year 2005-06 had attained the finality at the time of the Regular DPC held on 15.05.2014, a fresh entry dated 19.05.2015 has now been found made by the Chairman, CGWB to the effect that “Considering the achievement against the target of the division his grading is upgraded as ‘Very Good’. It has been noted from the papers now attached with the ACR, that Shri Y.B. Sharma had made a representation for upgradation of his ACR (for the year 2005-06), on 22.12.2014 i.e. well after the original DPC (which was held on 15.05.2014) and after it had attained finality. 4.2 The Committee was informed that when the issue of the above upgradation was raised with the Ministry before convening the Review DPC, the Ministry furnished the following clarification:- “… that clarifications in the matter were called for from the Central Ground Water Board. The CGWB have clarified that the Hon’ble CAT Principal Bench, New Delhi in its judgment dated 12.03.2015 had not specifically ordered to receive and consider any representation from Shri Yogendra Babu Sharma for upgradation of his ACR for the year 2005-06. However, since the Hon’ble Tribunal had ordered to convene Review DPC, the Board felt that representation from Shri Yogendra Babu Sharma regarding below bench mark ACR for the year 2005-06 could be entertained in terms of DoP&T’s OM No.21011/1/2010-Estt.(A) dated 13.4.2010. Accordingly, representation dated 22.11.2014 of Shri Yogendra Babu Sharma was considered and his ACR for the year 2005-06 was upgraded from ‘Good’ to ‘Very Good’ by Chairman, CGWB being the competent Authority. Accordingly, representation dated 22.11.2014 of Shri Yogendra Babu Sharma was considered and his ACR for the year 2005-06 was upgraded from ‘Good’ to ‘Very Good’ by Chairman, CGWB being the competent Authority. The CGWB have also stated that, if deemed fit, earlier ACR of Shri Yogendra Babu Sharma for the year 2005-06, with grading “Good”, which was considered during regular DPC held on 15.05.2014 may please again be considered for the Review DPC to be held.” From the above clarification it has transpired that the upgradation of ACR for the year 2005-06, after it had already attained finality prior to convening of the Regular DPC on 15.05.2014 has neither been done under any specific rule/ instructions on the subject nor as per any court/CAT order. 4.3 The Committee noted that as certified by the Ministry at the time of Regular DPC held on 15.05.2014, Shri Y.B. Sharma was given the opportunity to represent against the below benchmark ACRs but he did not make any representation at that time. The extant instructions clearly provide that the representation can be given by the concerned officer within 15 days of receipt of the ACR. Shri Sharma, however, did not represent within the time limit prescribed in this case Shri Sharma represented much later that too after (i) the ACR had attained finality and (ii) the Regular DPC had already been held on 15.05.2014. 4.4 The DPC further noted that the ACR was upgraded without any Speaking Order and that the following entries in respect of certain vital parameters have been retained:- PART-III (NATURE AND QUALITY OF WORK) S.No.2 Quality of output: The quality of performance was satisfactory PART-III (ATTRIBUTES) S.No.10 Supervisory Ability 10(4) Review of Performance: Satisfactory PART-IV-GENERAL S.No.3 General Assessment: He is having strong liking and disliking and able to manage the office work. S.No.4 Grading : Good The Committee found that apart from the specific entries mentioned above, entries that have been retained in other relevant columns also mostly did not reflect performance/ability that could be treated as more than ‘Good’. 4.5 In view of the above, the Review DPC decided to retain the grading for the year 2005-06 as ‘Good’.” 34. S.No.4 Grading : Good The Committee found that apart from the specific entries mentioned above, entries that have been retained in other relevant columns also mostly did not reflect performance/ability that could be treated as more than ‘Good’. 4.5 In view of the above, the Review DPC decided to retain the grading for the year 2005-06 as ‘Good’.” 34. A careful perusal of the aforesaid finding recorded and grading awarded by the Review DPC for the year 2005-06 grading the petitioner as “Good” would show that the DPC constituted by the UPSC has not accepted the up-gradation of ACR by the competent authority for the year 2005-06 for the following reasons: - 1. That, the representation for up-gradation was made on 22-12-2014 i.e. after the original DPC was held on 15-5-2014 for considering the case of the petitioner for the promotional post of Superintending Engineer and the ACR was upgraded as “Very Good” on 21-5-2015 and as such, the original ACR of the petitioner for the year 2005-06 before up-gradation, has to be treated as final. 2. That, the petitioner’s ACR for the year 2005-06 was upgraded without any speaking and reasoned order. 3. That, the ACR has not been upgraded under any specific rule or instructions. 4. That, while upgrading the ACR, previous entries in the ACR have been retained in respect of certain vital aspects. Legal Analysis and Discussion: - 35. We will consider the correctness of the above-stated four reasons one by one, as they have been seriously questioned on behalf of the petitioner. Firstly, the DPC has recorded that the ACR of the petitioner for the year 2005-06 graded as “Good” prior to its up-gradation on 21-5-2015 has to be treated as final, as the original DPC was convened on 15-5-2014, thereafter, representation was made on 22-12-2014 and up-gradation was made on 21-5-2015. It is well settled law that once the adverse entry is communicated to any Government servant, he has a right to make a representation against the entry to the authority concerned, and the authority concerned must decide the representation in a fair manner and within a reasonable period. As such, adverse remark given to the public servant in the ACR is always subject to representation which the concerned public servant has right to make against the adverse entry in the ACR. As such, adverse remark given to the public servant in the ACR is always subject to representation which the concerned public servant has right to make against the adverse entry in the ACR. The Supreme Court in the matter of Brij Mohan Singh Chopra v. State of Punjab, (1987) 2 SCC 188 has clearly held that making of a representation is a valuable right to a government employee and if the representation is not considered, it is bound to affect him in his service career, as in government service grant of increment, promotion and ultimately premature retirement all depend on the scrutiny of the service records. The Supreme Court further in the matter of Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab and others, (1979) 2 SCC 368 wherein the appellant therein was denied promotion on account of certain adverse entries against which he had made representation to the Government but for some reason or the other, those representations could not be considered or disposed of and in view of those adverse entries, he was not selected for promotion. Their Lordships while considering the effect of non-consideration of the representation, observed as under:- “17. The principle is well-settled that in accordance with the rules of natural justice, an adverse report in a confidential roll cannot be acted upon to deny promotional opportunities unless it is communicated to the person concerned so that he has an opportunity to improve his work and conduct or to explain the circumstances leading to the report. Such an opportunity is not an empty formality, its object, partially, being to enable the superior authorities to decide on a consideration of the explanation offered by the person concerned, whether the adverse report is justified. ...” 36. Furthermore, in Dev Dutt (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have recognised the right of representation of the Government servant against the entry which is adverse to him as that entitles the concerned public servant to make representation for up-gradation and observed as under: - “17. In our opinion, every entry in the ACR of a public servant must be communicated to him within a reasonable period, whether it is a poor, fair, average, good or very good entry. In our opinion, every entry in the ACR of a public servant must be communicated to him within a reasonable period, whether it is a poor, fair, average, good or very good entry. This is because non-communication of such an entry may adversely affect the employee in two ways: (1) had the entry been communicated to him he would know about the assessment of his work and conduct by his superiors, which would enable him to improve his work in future; (2) he would have an opportunity of making a representation against the entry if he feels it is unjustified, and pray for its upgradation. Hence, non-communication of an entry is arbitrary, and it has been held by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597 that arbitrariness violates Article 14 of the Constitution. 37. We further hold that when the entry is communicated to him the public servant should have a right to make a representation against the entry to the authority concerned, and the authority concerned must decide the representation in a fair manner and within a reasonable period. We also hold that the representation must be decided by an authority higher than the one who gave the entry, otherwise the likelihood is that the representation will be summarily rejected without adequate consideration as it would be an appeal from Caesar to Caesar. All this would be conducive to fairness and transparency in public administration, and would result in fairness to public servants. The State must be a model employer, and must act fairly towards its employees. Only then would good governance be possible.” 37. The correctness of the principle of law laid down in Dev Dutt (supra) was doubted and led to referring the matter to a larger Bench in which in the matter of Sukhdev Singh v. Union of India and others, (2013) 9 SCC 566 (Three Judges Bench), the principle of law laid down in Dev Dutt (supra) was reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court holding that communication of the entry enables him/her to make representation for up-gradation of the remarks entered in the ACR, and it was pertinently observed as under: - “8. In our opinion, the view taken in Dev Dutt that every entry in ACR of a public servant must be communicated to him/her within a reasonable period is legally sound and helps in achieving threefold objectives. First, the communication of every entry in the ACR to a public servant helps him/her to work harder and achieve more that helps him in improving his work and give better results. Second and equally important, on being made aware of the entry in the ACR, the public servant may feel dissatisfied with the same. Communication of the entry enables him/her to make representation for upgradation of the remarks entered in the ACR. Third, communication of every entry in the ACR brings transparency in recording the remarks relating to a public servant and the system becomes more conforming to the principles of natural justice. We, accordingly, hold that every entry in ACR—poor, fair, average, good or very good—must be communicated to him/her within a reasonable period.” 38. As such, the finding recorded by the Review DPC holding that ACR of the petitioner for the year 2005-06 prior to up-gradation has to be treated as final, is in teeth of the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in Gurdial Singh Fijji (supra), Brij Mohan Singh Chopra (supra), Dev Dutt (supra) and Sukhdev Singh (supra), as the right to make representation against adverse entry in the ACR is a valuable right of the public servant and once it (representation) is considered by the competent authority that too favourably and ACR is upgraded by the competent authority as “Very Good”, the Review DPC or the Selection Committee cannot refuse to consider it on the ground that the earlier ACR prior to up-gradation has become final, as it is in teeth of the well settled law in this regard and it would be arbitrary and contrary to the well settled law in this regard. Accordingly, it is held so. 39. Secondly, the Review DPC has held that ACR of the petitioner was upgraded without any speaking and reasoned order. However, perusal of the record speaks otherwise. Accordingly, it is held so. 39. Secondly, the Review DPC has held that ACR of the petitioner was upgraded without any speaking and reasoned order. However, perusal of the record speaks otherwise. Copy of letter dated 21-5-2015 (Annexure RJ-7), which has been authored by the Administrative Officer, Central Ground Water Board, Faridabad to the Under Secretary (Central Ground Water Board), Ministry of Water Resources, RD & GR, New Delhi, would show that the petitioner's ACR for the year 2005-06 has been upgraded from “Good” to “Very Good”. Though the ACR was said to be enclosed along with the said letter, but it has not been filed along with the letter dated 21-5-2015 (Annexure RJ-7, page 68 of the paper book). Respondent No.3 Central Ground Water Board has sent proposal to the Ministry of Water Resources, RD & GR, New Delhi, filed as Annexure RJ-8, dated 22-7-2016 (page 69 of the paper book) in which it has been stated that the Chairman, CGWB has assigned following reasons for upgrading the petitioner’s grading: - “Based on the Progress report of Div.IV, Chennai for the period 2005-06 received today (19.05.2015) sent by Shri L. Ramakrishna vide (letter No.Div.IV/OP-1B/15-16-977 dated 19.05.2015), it has been concluded that resume and claim on target and assignment of Sl.No.2 of Part 2 of ACR of Shri Y.B. Sharma (as per Y.B. Sharma’s statement/document) submitted by Shri Y.B. Sharma, EE is correct. Based on assessment, it is felt that grading of APAR should be upgraded. Accordingly, his grading is upgraded to Very Good”. 40. As noticed herein, the competent authority while upgrading the ACR has recorded its reason duly reflected in the memo dated 21-5-2015. However, the question whether in considering the representation against adverse report, the authorities are duty bound to record reasons, or to communicate the same to the person concerned came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and others v. E.G. Nambudiri, (1991) 3 SCC 38 in which their Lordships clearly held that every administrative authority is not under obligation to record reasons for its decision and courts and tribunals, adjudicating rights of parties, are required to act judicially and to record reasons, and observed as under: - “6. … Ordinarily, courts and tribunals, adjudicating rights of parties, are required to act judicially and to record reasons. … Ordinarily, courts and tribunals, adjudicating rights of parties, are required to act judicially and to record reasons. Where an administrative authority is required to act judicially it is also under an obligation to record reasons. But every administrative authority is not under any legal obligation to record reasons for its decision, although, it is always desirable to record reasons to avoid any suspicion. Where a statute requires an authority though acting administratively to record reasons, it is mandatory for the authority to pass speaking orders and in the absence of reasons the order would be rendered illegal. But in the absence of any statutory or administrative requirement to record reasons, the order of the administrative authority is not rendered illegal for absence of reasons. ...” 41. In light of authoritative pronouncements by their Lordships, the finding of the Review DPC while downgrading the petitioner that ACR of the petitioner was upgraded without any reason, is factually and legally, on both counts, incorrect on the face of record, as every administrative authority is not under legal obligation to record reasons for its decisions as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in E.G. Nambudiri’s case (supra). However, in the instant case, reasons were recorded by the competent authority while upgrading the petitioner for a particular year, as such, finding by the Review DPC in this regard is per se illegal on the face of record. 42. Further, it has been held by the Review DPC that up-gradation has not been made under any specific rule or instructions by the competent authority. As already pointed out in Brij Mohan Singh Chopra (supra), making of a representation is a valuable right to a government employee and once the representation is made, the competent authority has to decide the same in a fair manner and within a reasonable time. This principle has also been reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dev Dutt (supra) and Sukhdev Singh (supra). This principle has also been reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dev Dutt (supra) and Sukhdev Singh (supra). As such, the law declared by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurdial Singh Fijji (supra), Brij Mohan Singh Chopra (supra), Dev Dutt (supra) and Sukhdev Singh (supra) is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution of India on the UPSC and the UPSC cannot say that up-gradation of ACR of a Government servant cannot be made in absence of any rule or instructions and any up-gradation so made is without rule or instructions. 43. Article 141 of the Constitution of India mandates that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. As such, the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts and tribunals. However, the general principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court stands applicable to every person including those who were not parties to that order (see MSL Patil, Assistant Conservator of Forests, Solapur v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 11 SCC 361 ). Judicial discipline to abide by declaration of law by the Supreme Court, cannot be forsaken, under any pretext by any authority or court, be it even the highest court in a State, oblivious to Article 141 of the Constitution (see State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar, (2004) 5 SCC 568 , 571-72 (para 6)). 44. As such, in absence of rules & regulations governing the field, the declaration of law made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dev Dutt (supra), Sukhdev Singh (supra), Gurdial Singh Fijji (supra), Brij Mohan Singh Chopra (supra) and E.G. Nambudiri’s case (supra), would be binding on the UPSC or on the Review DPC constituted by the UPSC by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and the UPSC cannot say that in absence of rules & regulations, up-gradation, which has been made under the law declared by the court, can be ignored. 45. The left out entries of previous ACR of the petitioner after his up-gradation would have no relevance and shall become inconsequential. Once the ACR of a concerned Government servant is upgraded, the adverse narration / comments cannot be relied upon else the up-gradation itself would be nullified. 45. The left out entries of previous ACR of the petitioner after his up-gradation would have no relevance and shall become inconsequential. Once the ACR of a concerned Government servant is upgraded, the adverse narration / comments cannot be relied upon else the up-gradation itself would be nullified. Adverse entries cannot be referred to for any purpose and same is denuded of its content for all practical purposes. 46. It is true that the DPC is not required to be guided by the overall grading graded by the competent authority recorded in the ACR, but to make its own assessment on the basis of the entries in CRs and the DPC has full discretion to devise its method and procedure for objective assessment of suitability and merit of the candidate being considered by it. However, the discretion vested in the DPC / Review DPC has to be exercised strictly in accordance with the applicable rules & regulations and the law declared in this regard. As such, the findings / reasons recorded by the Review DPC downgrading the petitioner for the year 2005-06 is per se illegal and contrary to the well settled law in this regard for the reasons noticed herein-above. It is held accordingly. 47. Similarly, the following extract from the minutes of the DPC meeting dated 2-8-2016 would be relevant to consider the challenge made by the petitioner for the year 2006-07: - “5.1 The Reporting Officer has given detailed remarks in respect of the above essential attributes which would justify the Final Grading of ‘Average’ given by him. The Reviewing Officer has, in Column 3, recorded that he agrees with the assessment of the Officer (reported upon) given by the Reporting Officer. 5.2 Again in Column 4, which relates to general remarks given by the Reporting Authority and meritorious work of the Officer and the Grading, the Reviewing Officer has noted “I agree with the Comments” implying that he agrees with the general remarks as well as ‘Average’ grading recorded by the Reporting Officer. Thereafter, what appears to be interpolation and overwriting, it has been written “He cannot be graded below V. good and is graded V. Good”. Apart from the last word “Good”, the rest of this sentence appears to be subsequent additions and, therefore, suspicious. Thereafter, what appears to be interpolation and overwriting, it has been written “He cannot be graded below V. good and is graded V. Good”. Apart from the last word “Good”, the rest of this sentence appears to be subsequent additions and, therefore, suspicious. In any case, while the Reporting Officer has given detailed remarks on each attribute/parameter, the Reviewing Officer has not given any reasons/justifications to contradict. The ACR does not bear any remarks of an Accepting Authority.” 48. A careful perusal of the aforesaid reasons recorded by the Review DPC qua ACR of the petitioner for the year 2006-07 would show that the petitioner has been downgraded by the Review DPC holding that the said remark by the reviewing authority appears to be suspicious because of certain overwriting in the said remark, as detailed remarks on each attribute given by the reporting authority, the reviewing authority has not given reasons to contradict for awarding “Very Good”. ACR for the year 2006-07 has been finalised by the reviewing authority grading the petitioner as “Very Good”. The act of grading the petitioner as “Very Good” for a particular year is an official act and by virtue of Illustration (e) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, all the official acts are presumed to have been done rightly and regularly. Illustration (e) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act gives rise to the presumption that every official act has been regularly performed and such presumption requires rebuttal. The legal maxim omnia praesumuntur rite it dowee probetur in contrarium solemniter esse acta i.e. all the things are presumed to have been done regularly and rightly, applies. When acts are of official nature and went through the process of scrutiny by official persons, a presumption arises that the said acts have regularly been performed. (See Gian Chand and others v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 420 .) The said maxim is a well established principle as regards official acts. Courts repose great confidence on the fidelity and accuracy of official documents kept in due course of business and properly and regularly kept. 49. (See Gian Chand and others v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 420 .) The said maxim is a well established principle as regards official acts. Courts repose great confidence on the fidelity and accuracy of official documents kept in due course of business and properly and regularly kept. 49. As such, though the Review DPC is competent to devise its mechanism to evaluate the ACR grading of the concerned Government servant, but once the Review DPC was provided with the ACRs of the candidates by the competent authority, the Review DPC cannot raise doubt to the genuineness and validity of the said ACRs and the ACRs have to be examined on the face of record and the DPC cannot go behind the recording of the said ACR remarks raising doubt regarding the genuineness of the said ACR holding it to be suspicious. Raising doubt regarding genuineness of the ACR introduces trust deficit into the correctness of the official record itself which has the rebuttable presumption under Illustration (e) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act and if any doubt is crept in the mind of the Review DPC, the Review DPC can seek clarification of the same from the competent authority, but it cannot question the genuineness of the ACR holding it to be suspicious document. Questioning the validity and genuineness of ACR is beyond the competency and jurisdiction of the DPC. It is for those who want to show that official record was incorrect, to bring the relevant material before the competent authority to show the incorrectness in the ACR. More particularly, in the instant case, the reviewing authority, who has graded the petitioner as “Very Good”, is the Chairman of Central Ground Water Board – respondent No.3 and the said remarks holding it to be genuine, have been supported by respondent No.1. 50. More particularly, in the instant case, the reviewing authority, who has graded the petitioner as “Very Good”, is the Chairman of Central Ground Water Board – respondent No.3 and the said remarks holding it to be genuine, have been supported by respondent No.1. 50. As such, in our considered opinion, for the year 2006-07, the petitioner could not have been downgraded by the Review DPC by questioning his ACR holding the same to be suspicious document, as the DPC went into a rowing enquiry as to whether the ACR as a document itself inspires confidence or not, as the Review DPC was not supposed to determine the authenticity / genuineness of the document, more particularly, it is not the case of respondents No.1 & 3 that the document sent i.e. ACR for the year 2006-07, is not the genuine document. The Review DPC was obliged to assess the overall performance of the candidates including the petitioner strictly in accordance with law. 51. In our considered opinion, the Review DPC did not have any authority to sit as an appellate authority examining the legality, genuineness, authenticity and trustworthiness of the ACR once it is established that the said ACR has been recorded by the competent authority. In case the DPC has any doubt with regard to the authenticity of the document / ACR, it can, at best, sought for a clarification from respondents No.1 & 3 with regard to the same, but cannot disregard and downgrade the ACR of a candidate for the reason that it doubts the authenticity of the said document, as it would amount to acting arbitrarily and unfairly by which it can be held that the petitioner was not considered fairly and objectively on the post of Superintending Engineer (Group-A). 52. The petitioner challenged the finding of the Review DPC before the CAT, but remained unsuccessful. The CAT held that the finding recorded by the Delhi Bench of the CAT in the contempt proceeding would operate as constructive res judicata. 52. The petitioner challenged the finding of the Review DPC before the CAT, but remained unsuccessful. The CAT held that the finding recorded by the Delhi Bench of the CAT in the contempt proceeding would operate as constructive res judicata. It is appropriate to notice here that in the contempt proceeding, the Delhi Bench of the CAT only confined to the question as to whether its earlier order dated 12-3-2015 as modified by review order dated 6-4-2015 was substantially complied with by the UPSC or not in convening the Review DPC for considering the case of the petitioner and it did not have opportunity to examine the legality, validity and correctness of the finding recorded by the Review DPC which has been held on 2-8-2016 during the pendency of the contempt proceeding. In any case, the principle of constructive res judicata was not at all attracted. The learned CAT has applied the principle of constructive res judicata in rejecting the original application filed by the petitioner holding that the petitioner has challenged the recommendation of the DPC held on 15-5-2014 in O.A. No.2090/2014 by way of original application and that original application has already been considered and disposed of on 12-3-2015 and directed for holding of Review DPC and therefore, the same is hit by the principle of constructive res judicata. 53. The issue of constructive res judicata was recently considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Samir Kumar Majumder v. Union of India and others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1182 in which it has been observed by their Lordships as under: - “34. This principle popularly known as the doctrine of constructive res judicata, based on the might and ought theory, has been recognized by this Court in several judgments. In Maharashtra Vikrikar Karamchari Sangathan v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 2 SCC 552 , this Court held as under:- "22. It was then contended on behalf of the appellants that neither the Recruitment Rules of 1971 nor the Seniority Rules of 1982 provided for carrying forward the vacancies falling in either category. In the absence of such rules which specifically provide for carrying forward the vacancies falling in either category, no such carry-forward rule could be implied either in the Recruitment Rules or in the Seniority Rules. In the absence of such rules which specifically provide for carrying forward the vacancies falling in either category, no such carry-forward rule could be implied either in the Recruitment Rules or in the Seniority Rules. This contention need not detain us any longer because such a contention was available to the appellants in the earlier proceedings, namely, Transfer Application No. 822 of 1991 and the same was not put in issue. That not having been done, it must follow that such a contention is barred by the principles of constructive res judicata. Neither the contesting respondents nor the appellants ever raised this contention at any stage of the proceedings in Transfer Petition No. 822 of 1991. It would, therefore, be too late to raise such a contention when the seniority list has been finalized pursuant to the judgment of MAT, Bombay Bench in Transfer Petition No. 822 of 1991." 54. As such, in light of the principles of law laid down in Samir Kumar Majumder (supra) following the decision in Maharashtra Vikrikar Karamchari Sangathan, (2000) 2 SCC 552 (supra), it is evidently clear that the petitioner did not question the finding & order dated 12-3-2015 passed by the CAT in the earlier proceeding before the CAT, what he had challenged before the CAT was, the Review DPC proceeding which considered him and found him unfit for the post of Superintending Engineer on untenable grounds, as such, the principle of constructive res judicata would have no application in the instant case and the finding of the CAT in this regard is also contrary to law. 55. Similarly, though the CAT has rightly referred to the ambit, scope, power and duty of the DPC as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court while examining the ACRs by relying upon its earlier decisions, but has utterly failed to apply, consider and examine the reasons given by the Review DPC while downgrading the ACR of the petitioner for the years 2005-06 and 2006-07. Such finding of the CAT in this regard is clearly perverse and contrary to the well settled law in this regard. Conclusion: - 56. Such finding of the CAT in this regard is clearly perverse and contrary to the well settled law in this regard. Conclusion: - 56. As a fallout and consequence of the aforesaid discussion, the DPC proceeding dated 2-8-2016 holding the petitioner unfit for the post of Superintending Engineer (Group-A) and further, the impugned order dated 31-1-2019 passed by the CAT, Jabalpur in O.A.No.200/00552/2018, affirming the DPC proceeding dated 2-8-2016, are hereby set aside. Respondent No.2 is directed to convene the Review DPC afresh to consider the case of the petitioner as on 15-5-2014 i.e. the date when his junior Mr. J.C. Borgohain was considered. Such Review DPC shall be convened within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter and case of the petitioner shall be considered on its own merits strictly in accordance with law. 57. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. No order as to cost(s). 58. While parting with record, we appreciate the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Amrito Das, Advocate, who not only appeared as amicus curiae and has submitted the written note, but also argued on the issue involved herein on short notice.