JUDGMENT : 1. Heard the parties. 2. This criminal miscellaneous petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with a prayer for quashing the order dated 16.01.2020 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur in Complaint Case No.2607 of 2019 as well as the proceeding arising therefrom pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur qua the petitioner. 3. The allegation against the petitioner is that the petitioner is the director of Rungta Mines Limited and in that capacity, he nominated, appointed and constituted Shri. Vinoy Kumar Singh for purchase of a land vide registered sale deed no.8438/7116 of the year 2008 and sale deed no. 5729/4862 dated 17.07.2008. It is the further allegation against the petitioner that though the land belongs to the complainant but Govinda Nayak and Dilip Kumar Giri by posing as owners of the said land have executed a power of attorney in favour of Ajay Kumar Singh and Ajay Kumar Singh has sold the said land to M/s. Rungta Mines limited and thereafter, the personnel of Rungta Mines came to occupy the said land sold by two sale deeds. 4. In support of the complaint, the statement on solemn affirmation of the complainant was recorded and two enquiry witnesses namely Umashankar Ghatwari and Gaurishankar Ghatwari have been examined. There is no allegation against the petitioner that he was aware that someone else then the vendor of the Rungta Mines was the real owner. By the order dated 16.01.2020 in Complaint Case No. 2607 of 2019, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur has taken cognizance inter alia against the petitioner for having committed offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of Indian Penal Code. 5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that M/s. Rungta Mines Limited is a company incorporated under the Companies Act and was granted mining leases and for carrying mining and other non-forest activities within the forest area, the Company was required to obtain permission from the Forest Department under Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 and as a condition for such permission, the Company is required to provide non-forest land as mentioned in the said order to the State Government for the purpose of compensatory afforestation. Hence, the said land was purchased by M/s. Rungta Mines Limited. It is next submitted by Mr. Hence, the said land was purchased by M/s. Rungta Mines Limited. It is next submitted by Mr. Sinha that M/s. Rungta Mines Limited engaged M/s. Mascot Real Estate Pvt. Ltd. for providing non-forest land free from all encumbrances and the said agents arranged different plots of land. It is next submitted by Mr. Sinha that the petitioner being the director of the company authorized and executed a power of attorney in favour of Shri. Vinoy Kumar Singh for purchase of the land on behalf of the company and the said Shri Vinoy Kumar Singh was assigned to the negotiate and purchase the land and accordingly, the sale deeds were executed with Vinoy Kumar Singh representing M/s. Rungta Mines Limited. It is further submitted by Mr. Sinha that there is no allegation of any of the vendors of the sale deed impersonating themselves as someone else rather they themselves are claiming to be the owners of the lands sold by them to M/s. Rungta Mines Limited. It is then submitted by Mr. Sinha that the petitioner being the director of the company cannot be fastened with any vicarious criminal liability in respect of the offences punishable under penal provisions of the Indian Penal Code in the absence of any statutory provision to the effect in the Indian Penal Code for vicarious criminal liability and in this respect, Mr. Sinha relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal vs. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2015) 4 SCC 609 , paragraph nos. 44 and 45 of which reads as under:- “44. When the company is the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect. One such example is Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In Aneeta Hada [Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 350 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 241], the Court noted that if a group of persons that guide the business of the company have the criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body corporate and it is in this backdrop, Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be understood. Such a position is, therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a deeming fiction. Such a position is, therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a deeming fiction. Here also, the principle of “alter ego”, was applied only in one direction, namely, where a group of persons that guide the business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed to the body corporate and not the vice versa. Otherwise, there has to be a specific act attributed to the Director or any other person allegedly in control and management of the company, to the effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or on behalf of the company. 45. This very principle is elaborated in various other judgments. We have already taken note of Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Datar Switchgear Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 479 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 68 and S.K. Alagh v. State of U.P., (2008) 5 SCC 662 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 686]. A few other judgments reiterating this principle are the following: 45.1. Jethsur Surangbhai v. State of Gujarat [1984 Supp SCC 207 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 474] : (SCC pp. 210-11, para 9) “9. … With due respect what the High Court seems to have missed is that in a case like this where there was serious defalcation of the properties of the Sangh, unless the prosecution proved that there was a close cohesion and collusion between all the accused which formed the subject-matter of a conspiracy, it would be difficult to prove the dual charges particularly against the appellant (A-1). The charge of conspiracy having failed, the most material and integral part of the prosecution story against the appellant disappears. The only ground on the basis of which the High Court has convicted him is that as he was the Chairman of the Managing Committee, he must be held to be vicariously liable for any order given or misappropriation committed by the other accused. The High Court, however, has not referred to the concept of vicarious liability but the findings of the High Court seem to indicate that this was the central idea in the mind of the High Court for convicting the appellant. The High Court, however, has not referred to the concept of vicarious liability but the findings of the High Court seem to indicate that this was the central idea in the mind of the High Court for convicting the appellant. In a criminal case of such a serious nature mens rea cannot be excluded and once the charge of conspiracy failed the onus lay on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the appellant was directly and personally connected with acts or omissions pertaining to Items 2, 3 and 4. It is conceded by Mr Phadke that no such direct evidence is forthcoming and he tried to argue that as the appellant was Chairman of the Sangh and used to sign papers and approve various tenders, even as a matter of routine he should have acted with care and caution and his negligence would be a positive proof of his intention to commit the offence. We are however unable to agree with this somewhat broad statement of the law. In the absence of a charge of conspiracy the mere fact that the appellant happened to be the Chairman of the Committee would not make him criminally liable in a vicarious sense for Items 2 to 4. There is no evidence either direct or circumstantial to show that apart from approving the purchase of fertilisers he knew that the firms from which the fertilisers were purchased did not exist. Similar is the case with the other two items. Indeed, if the Chairman was to be made liable then all members of the Committee viz. Tahsildar and other nominated members, would be equally liable because all of them participated in the deliberations of the meetings of the Committee, a conclusion which has not even been suggested by the prosecution. As Chairman of the Sangh the appellant had to deal with a large variety of matters and it would not be humanly possible for him to analyse and go into the details of every small matter in order to find out whether there has been any criminal breach of trust. In fact, the hero of the entire show seems to be A-3 who had so stage-managed the drama as to shield his guilt and bring the appellant in the forefront. But that by itself would not be conclusive evidence against the appellant. In fact, the hero of the entire show seems to be A-3 who had so stage-managed the drama as to shield his guilt and bring the appellant in the forefront. But that by itself would not be conclusive evidence against the appellant. There is nothing to show that A-3 had either directly or indirectly informed the appellant regarding the illegal purchase of fertilisers or the missing of the five oil engines which came to light much later during the course of the audit. Far from proving the intention the prosecution has failed to prove that the appellant had any knowledge of defalcation of Items 2 to 4. In fact, so far as Item 3 is concerned, even Mr Phadke conceded that there is no direct evidence to connect the appellant.” 45.2. Sham Sunder v. State of Haryana [ (1989) 4 SCC 630 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 783] : (SCC p. 632, para 9) “9. But we are concerned with a criminal liability under penal provision and not a civil liability. The penal provision must be strictly construed in the first place. Secondly, there is no vicarious liability in criminal law unless the statute takes that also within its fold. Section 10 does not provide for such liability. It does not make all the partners liable for the offence whether they do business or not.” 45.3. Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI [ (2003) 5 SCC 257 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1121] : (SCC p. 277, para 30) “30. In our view, under the penal law, there is no concept of vicarious liability unless the said statute covers the same within its ambit. In the instant case, the said law which prevails in the field i.e. the Customs Act, 1962 the appellants have been therein under wholly discharged and the GCS granted immunity from prosecution.” 45.4. Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat [ (2008) 5 SCC 668 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 692] : (SCC p. 674, para 13) “13. Where a jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind. The Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the Company when the accused is the company. The Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the Company when the accused is the company. The learned Magistrate failed to pose unto himself the correct question viz. as to whether the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, would lead to the conclusion that the respondents herein were personally liable for any offence. The Bank is a body corporate. Vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain provision fixing such vicarious liabilities. Even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability.” 45.5. R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta [ (2009) 1 SCC 516 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 567] : (SCC p. 527, para 32) “32. Allegations contained in the FIR are for commission of offences under a general statute. A vicarious liability can be fastened only by reason of a provision of a statute and not otherwise. For the said purpose, a legal fiction has to be created. Even under a special statute when the vicarious criminal liability is fastened on a person on the premise that he was in charge of the affairs of the company and responsible to it, all the ingredients laid down under the statute must be fulfilled. A legal fiction must be confined to the object and purport for which it has been created.” 45.6. Sharon Michael v. State of T.N. [ (2009) 3 SCC 375 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 103] : (SCC p. 383, para 16) “16. The first information report contains details of the terms of contract entered into by and between the parties as also the mode and manner in which they were implemented. Allegations have been made against the appellants in relation to execution of the contract. No case of criminal misconduct on their part has been made out before the formation of the contract. There is nothing to show that the appellants herein who hold different positions in the appellant Company made any representation in their personal capacities and, thus, they cannot be made vicariously liable only because they are employees of the Company.” 45.7. No case of criminal misconduct on their part has been made out before the formation of the contract. There is nothing to show that the appellants herein who hold different positions in the appellant Company made any representation in their personal capacities and, thus, they cannot be made vicariously liable only because they are employees of the Company.” 45.7. Keki Hormusji Gharda v. Mehervan Rustom Irani [ (2009) 6 SCC 475 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1113] : (SCC pp. 480-81, paras 16-19) “16. We have noticed hereinbefore that despite of the said road being under construction, the first respondent went to the police station thrice. He, therefore, was not obstructed from going to the police station. In fact, a firm action had been taken by the authorities. The workers were asked not to do any work on the road. We, therefore, fail to appreciate that how, in a situation of this nature, the Managing Director and the Directors of the Company as also the Architect can be said to have committed an offence under Section 341 IPC. 17. The Penal Code, 1860 save and except in some matters does not contemplate any vicarious liability on the part of a person. Commission of an offence by raising a legal fiction or by creating a vicarious liability in terms of the provisions of a statute must be expressly stated. The Managing Director or the Directors of the Company, thus, cannot be said to have committed an offence only because they are holders of offices. The learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, therefore, in our opinion, was not correct in issuing summons without taking into consideration this aspect of the matter. The Managing Director and the Directors of the Company should not have been summoned only because some allegations were made against the Company. 18. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate [ (1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400] this Court held as under: (SCC p. 760, para 28) ‘28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.’ 19. Even as regards the availability of the remedy of filing an application for discharge, the same would not mean that although the allegations made in the complaint petition even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, do not disclose an offence or it is found to be otherwise an abuse of the process of the court, still the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” (Emphasis supplied) 6. It is then submitted by Mr. Sinha that there is absolutely no allegation anywhere in the complaint or the statement on solemn affirmation of the complainant or the statement of the inquiry witnesses to the effect that the petitioner at any point of time made any false promise or inducement and by doing so has caused any person to deliver any valuable property to the petitioner or has caused anyone to suffer from wrongful loss and in absence of such allegation, no offence under Section 420 of Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioner. It is next submitted by Mr. It is next submitted by Mr. Sinha that there is no allegation against the petitioner of forging any document or creating any false document hence, the offence punishable under Section 468 of Indian Penal Code is also not made out against the petitioner. It is further submitted by Mr. Sinha that there is no allegation against the petitioner of using any forged document for cheating any person hence, the offence punishable under Section 471 of Indian Penal Code is also not made out against the petitioner either. It is next submitted by Mr. Sinha that if the vendor of M/s. Rungta Mines Limited has no title over the land, sold by them then at best the Rungta Mines Limited has been cheated and no one else and in this respect M/s. Rungta Mines Limited could have instituted the case of cheating and for the said purpose, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Mohammed Ibrahim & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Anr. reported in (2009) 8 SCC 751 , paragraph no. 23 of which reads as under:- “23. When we say that execution of a sale deed by a person, purporting to convey a property which is not his, as his property, is not making a false document and therefore not forgery, we should not be understood as holding that such an act can never be a criminal offence. If a person sells a property knowing that it does not belong to him, and thereby defrauds the person who purchased the property, the person defrauded, that is, the purchaser, may complain that the vendor committed the fraudulent act of cheating. But a third party who is not the purchaser under the deed may not be able to make such complaint.” (Emphasis supplied) Hence, it is submitted that the order taking cognizance dated 16.01.2020 be quashed qua the petitioner. 7. Learned Addl. P.P. and the learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 on the other hand vehemently opposes the prayer for quashing the order dated 16.01.2020. It is then submitted by Mr. J.N. Upadhyay the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 that there is allegation that all the accused persons named in the complaint have together forged the document and has sold the lands. It is then submitted by Mr. J.N. Upadhyay the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 that there is allegation that all the accused persons named in the complaint have together forged the document and has sold the lands. Hence, it is submitted that the order taking cognizance be not interfered with and the criminal miscellaneous petition being without any merit be dismissed. 8. Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after going through the materials in the record, this Court finds that there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioner of creating the forged document. The fact remains undisputed that the petitioner himself was not the signatory to the sale deed rather one Vinoy Kumar Singh who was the constituted attorney was signatory to the sale deed on behalf of M/s. Rungta Mines Limited. M/s. Rungta Mines Limited has not been impleaded as an accused in the complaint though the sale deed has said to have been executed in favour of M/s. Rungta Mines Limited and the petitioner has been implicated as he is the director of said Rungta Mines Limited. There is no allegation against the petitioner that he was aware that the vendor of M/s. Rungta Mines Limited was not the real owner of the property sold by them to M/s. Rungta Mines Limited. 9. It is a settled principle of law that there is no provision of vicarious liability in the Indian Penal Code as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (supra). 10. Under such circumstances, in the absence of any specific allegation against the petitioner that he has any knowledge that his vendor of the sale deed was not having any title in respect of the sale deed executed by them in favour of M/s. Rungta Mines Limited and as already mentioned above in this judgment M/s. Rungta Mines Limited has not been arrayed as an accused, this Court is of the considered view that cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of Indian Penal Code qua the petitioner is not sustainable in law and continuation of the same will amount to abuse of process of court. Thus, this is a fit case where such cognizance qua the petitioner be quashed and set aside in the interest of justice. Thus, this is a fit case where such cognizance qua the petitioner be quashed and set aside in the interest of justice. Accordingly, the order dated 16.01.2020 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur in Complaint Case No.2607 of 2019 as well as the proceeding arising therefrom pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate; Jamshedpur is quashed and set aside qua the petitioner only. 11. In the result, this criminal miscellaneous petition is allowed.